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Abstract		The	purpose	of	this	research	is	to	determine	the	importance	of	using	the	cultural	landscape	 in	evaluating	the	resilience	of	an	urban	community	after	the	occurrence	of	a	natural	 disaster.	 The	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 neighborhood	 of	 the	 Lower	 Ninth	 Ward	 after	Hurricane	 Katrina	 in	 2005	 in	 the	 city	 of	 New	 Orleans.	 Natural	 disasters	 are	 gaining	significance	 and	magnitude	when	 they	 hit	 cities,	 which	 are	 becoming	more	 and	more	populated	over	the	years.		The	damage	these	disasters	cause	is	colossal.	It	is	very	costly	for	cities	 to	undergo	major	disasters	and	sometimes,	 large	sections	of	cities	need	to	be	entirely	rebuilt.	The	costliest	price	 is	 the	human	life,	and	as	history	marks	 it,	 too	many	lives	have	perished	due	to	disasters.	While	rebuilding	is	a	challenging	task,	yet	feasible,	rebuilding	a	community	is	not	as	tangible	as	rebuilding	the	infrastructure.	This	research	focuses	 on	 the	 many	 intangible	 aspects,	 like	 place	 attachment	 and	 social	 networks,	 a	community	needs	to	rebuild	itself	in	a	sound	and	resilient	way.		The	 concept	 of	 resilience	 is	 very	 contested	 in	 the	 literature	 and	 many	 have	attempted	to	measure	it.	This	research	takes	a	step	back	and	scrutinizes	the	concept	of	resilience	 from	 a	 holistic	 perspective,	 which	 highlights	 its	 complexity.	 This	 leads	 to	questioning	 the	 importance	 of	 measuring	 the	 concept,	 especially	 that	 it	 changes	 with	time	and	with	the	different	scales	of	geography.	In	addition,	a	relationship	between	the	cultural	landscape	and	resilience	is	established,	which	allows	for	a	better	understanding	of	this	complexity.		Taking	a	little	from	multiple	disciplines	(Landscape	Architecture,	Urban	Planning,	and	Sociology),	this	research	resorts	to	a	methodology	that	reflects	its	multidisciplinary	aspect.	 The	 methodology	 is	 the	 mixed	 methods	 research	 design,	 which	 allows	 the	collection	 of	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 data.	 The	 focus	 is	 to	 gather	 census	 data,	newspaper	articles,	and	observations	 to	give	a	general	perspective	on	 the	post-Katrina	situation.	Interviews	are	collected	from	residents	and	from	professionals	so	as	to	tackle	the	research	from	different	angles.	This	allows	reaching	results	at	the	case	study	level	as	well	as	the	theoretical	level.		
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This	 research	 validates	 the	 importance	 of	 using	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 in	 post-disaster	 situations	 as	 planners	 and	 government	 officials	 overlook	 it.	 Some	 of	 the	elements	 that	 constitute	 it	 like	 place	 attachment	 and	 social	 networks	 motivate	people	 to	 return	 to	 their	 original	 neighbourhoods	 and	 rebuild	 their	 homes	 and	community.	These	elements,	however,	cannot	by	themselves	give	people	back	what	they	lost	 in	 the	 disaster.	 By	 relating	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience,	 it	implies	that	resilience	is	a	social	construction.			
Keywords:	 Resilience,	 cultural	 landscape,	 ‘home’,	 social	 construction,	 natural	disasters,	urban	communities,	mixed-methods	research	design,	Lower	Ninth	Ward,	New	Orleans.			 	
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Résumé	Le	 but	 de	 cette	 recherche	 est	 d’évaluer	 l’importance	 du	 paysage	 culturel	dans	 la	 résilience	 des	 communautés	 urbaines	 post-catastrophes.	 Ce	 travail	 se	concentre	 sur	 le	 quartier	 du	 Lower	 Ninth	 Ward	 dans	 la	 ville	 de	 La	 Nouvelle-Orléans	 (États-Unis)	 après	 le	 passage	 de	 l’ouragan	 Katrina	 en	 2005.	 Les	catastrophes	 naturelles	 prennent	 une	 envergure	 et	 causent	 des	 dommages	considérables	lorsqu’elles	touchent	des	villes.	La	reconstruction	post	-désastre	est	donc	 très	 dispendieuse	 pour	 les	 villes	 et	 les	 gouvernements,	 d’autant	 que	certaines	 régions	 sont	 dévastées	 au	point	 qu’elles	 doivent	 être	 reconstruites	 au	complet.	Cependant,	le	coût	le	plus	lourd	à	assumer	reste	celui	en	vies	humaines	et	 si	 rebâtir	 les	 éléments	 concrets	 d’une	 ville	 est	 une	 tâche	 difficile	 à	entreprendre,	 reconstruire	 une	 communauté	 est	 considérablement	 plus	complexe.	 Dans	 le	 but	 de	 comprendre	 une	 telle	 démarche,	 cette	 recherche	 se	concentre	 sur	 les	 éléments	 intangibles,	 comme	 l’attachement	 au	 lieu	 et	 les	réseaux	 sociaux,	 dont	 une	 communauté	 a	 besoin	 pour	 se	 reconstituer	 de	 façon	durable	et	résiliente.	Le	 concept	 de	 résilience	 est	 très	 contesté	 dans	 la	 littérature	 et	 plusieurs	chercheurs	se	sont	essayés	à	le	mesurer.	Cette	recherche	adopte	une	perspective	critique	sur	 le	concept	et	 le	revisite	d’un	point	de	vue	holistique	pour	mettre	en	lumière	 sa	 complexité.	 Cette	 démarche	 permet	 de	 remettre	 en	 question	l’importance	de	mesurer	un	concept	finalement	en	perpétuelle	redéfinition	dans	le	temps	et	selon	les	échelles	géographiques.	De	plus,	en	établissant	une	relation	entre	 résilience	 et	 paysage	 culturel,	 il	 a	 été	 possible	 de	 mieux	 comprendre	 la	complexité	de	la	résilience.		Touchant	 à	 plusieurs	 disciplines	 (architecture	 de	 paysage,	 urbanisme	 et	sociologie),	 cette	 recherche	 utilise	 une	 méthodologie	 qui	 reflète	 son	 aspect	multidisciplinaire	:	 les	méthodes	mixtes.	Ces	dernières	permettent	 la	collecte	de	données	 quantitatives	 et	 qualitatives	 qui	 produisent	 une	 vue	 globale	 de	 la	situation	 post-Katrina	 à	 travers	 le	 regroupement	 de	 recensions	 statistiques,	
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d’observations	de	terrain	et	d’articles	de	 journaux.	Parallèlement,	des	entretiens	ont	 été	 réalisés	 avec	 des	 résidents	 du	 quartier	 ainsi	 qu’avec	 des	 professionnels	pour	 mieux	 comprendre	 les	 différents	 points	 de	 vue.	 Cette	 méthodologie	 a	permis	de	 produire	 des	 résultats	 au	 niveau	 du	 cas	 d’étude	 autant	 qu’au	 niveau	théorique.		La	recherche	valide	l’importance	de	prendre	en	compte	le	paysage	culturel	dans	 les	 situations	 post-catastrophes,	 en	 particulier	 dans	 la	mesure	 où	 il	 s’agit	d’un	élément	souvent	négligé	par	les	urbanistes	et	les	acteurs	locaux.	En	effet,	les	éléments	 constitutifs	 du	 paysage	 culturel	 tels	 que	 l’attachement	 au	 lieu	 et	 les	réseaux	 sociaux,	 participent	 d’un	 sentiment	 d'appartenance	 «	home	»	 et	 d’une	volonté,	 pour	 les	 résidents,	 de	 reconstruire	 leurs	 habitations,	 leur	 communauté	ainsi	que	leur	quartier.	Toutefois,	il	faut	reconnaître	que	ces	éléments	ne	suffisent	pas	à	retrouver	ce	qu’ils	ont	perdu.	Ainsi,	l’étude	du	paysage	culturel	permet	non	seulement	 de	mieux	 comprendre	 la	 complexité	 de	 la	 résilience,	mais	 démontre	également	que	cette	dernière	est	une	construction	sociale.	 
Mots-clés:	 résilience,	 paysage	 culturel,	 catastrophes	 naturelles,	construction	 sociale,	 communautés	 urbaines,	 méthodes	 mixtes,	 Lower	 Ninth	Ward,	la	Nouvelle-Orléans.	 		
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Chapter	1:	Introduction			In	 the	 twenty-first	 century,	 disasters	 have	 drawn	 a	 substantial	 amount	 of	attention	 from	 the	 media,	 governmental	 agencies,	 and	 researchers.	 With	 the	 growing	number	of	people	in	urban	areas,	these	unidirectional	migrations	will	only	keep	growing	with	a	total	of	54%	of	the	world’s	population	living	in	cities	in	2014.	The	drastic	increase	of	inhabitants	is	not	coming	to	a	halt	because	the	projections	indicate	that,	“in	1950,	30	per	cent	of	 the	world’s	population	was	urban,	and	by	2050,	66	per	cent	of	 the	world’s	population	 is	 projected	 to	 be	 urban.”	 (United	 Nations,	 2014)	 The	 most	 important	distinctive	feature	of	this	project	is	its	multi-disciplinary	aspect.	The	main	phenomenon	of	 interest	 is	natural	disasters,	with	 a	 special	 attention	 to	urban	 communities,	 and	 the	manner	 in	which	place	attachment	and	 social	networks	 interact	with	 the	post-disaster	return	and	rebuilding	process	of	the	affected	residents.	While	focusing	on	the	inhabitants	after	 a	 calamity,	 the	 following	 elements	 and	 concepts	 have	 surfaced:	 resilience,	vulnerability,	and	the	cultural	landscape.	The	present	work	touches	multiple	disciplines	such	as	Urban	Planning,	Landscape	Architecture,	and	Sociology,	as	it	appears	that	urban	environments	 are	 very	 complex	 entities	 that	 require	 several	 lenses	 to	 start	understanding	 them.	Moreover,	 this	 research	 seeks	 a	 relatively	 new	methodology	 that	emphasizes	 the	 collection	 of	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 data,	 i.e.	 mixed	 methods	research	design.	This	study	aims	at	a	better	comprehension	of	how	urban	communities	react	in	a	post-disaster	situation	and	the	reasons	why	they	choose	to	return	and	rebuild	their	devastated	neighborhood	while	acknowledging	their	vulnerabilities,	as	well	as	the	difficulties	that	could	result	from	the	process.	This	dissertation	focuses	on	Hurricane	Katrina,	which	hit	the	city	of	New	Orleans	on	August	29th	2005.	More	specifically,	the	attention	is	geared	to	the	Lower	Ninth	Ward	(LNW),	one	of	 the	most	devastated	neighborhoods	 in	 the	city.	The	LNW	was	chosen	as	the	case	study	for	this	research	for	many	reasons:	it	suffered	from	unimaginable	damage	because	of	the	massive	water	surge	resulting	from	the	levees	breach;	it	has	largely	been	unaddressed	 by	 the	 current	 academic	 research	 that	 it	 was	 poor	 and	majority	 African	
	 2	
American;	most	importantly,	it	has	a	unique	cultural	identity	that	led	people	to	overcome	the	 obstacles	 preventing	 them	 from	 returning	 home.	 	 A	 year	 after	 the	Hurricane,	 very	few	 people	 have	 returned	 and	 those	who	 have	 not	 were	 doing	 tremendous	 efforts	 to	come	back.	Hence,	one	year	after	the	storm,	the	majority	of	the	residents	were	not	able	to	return	and	they	were	still	scattered	in	and	out	of	the	city.	When	asked	about	their	needs	and	aspirations,	 the	main	 thing	 that	people	wanted	 to	do	was	 to	go	back	“home”.	Also,	the	LNW	has	a	unique	history	and	culture	and	that	makes	it	a	unique	place	to	study,	and	the	fact	that	people	have	resided	in	this	area	for	generations	makes	 it	a	very	culturally	rich	neighborhood.		Being	excluded	from	the	rest	of	the	city,	especially	with	the	Industrial	Canal,	the	LNW	turned	inward,	which	only	reinforced	and	maintained	a	strong	identity	and	values	that	 were	 only	 recognized	 by	 the	 residents.	 Examining	 the	 LNW	 closely	 revealed	 a	fascinating	story	about	the	neighborhood,	the	residents,	and	the	local	culture.	It	became	clear	 to	 the	author	 that	 in	order	 to	understand	 the	 intricacies	and	complexities	of	 this	specific	 community,	 a	 historical	 look	 is	 required	 so	 as	 to	 build	 a	 mature	 and	comprehensive	 perspective	 about	 the	 reality	 and	 the	 state	 of	 the	 neighborhood.	Therefore,	 to	 evaluate	 a	 community’s	 resilience,	 it	 is	 imperative	 to	 study	 its	 cultural	landscape	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 reasons	 behind	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 attachment	people	have	to	their	home	and	to	their	social	networks.	
1.1.	Background	and	Statement	of	the	Problem		After	a	calamity	takes	place,	people	struggle	greatly	to	put	back	the	pieces	of	their	lives	 together.	 The	 residents	 of	 the	 LNW	 faced	 a	 particularly	 bleak	 situation,	 if	 only	because	seven	years	after	Hurricane	Katrina,	the	area	had	not	yet	been	rebuilt.	After	all	the	loss	they	have	endured	and	the	years	of	struggle,	some	of	the	residents	gave	up,	but	others	 were	 relentless	 and	 kept	 on	 fighting.	 They	 were	 fighting	 for	 their	 home,	 their	family,	and	their	neighborhood,	one	which	had	flooded	more	than	once	over	the	course	of	history.	This	is	where	it	becomes	pertinent	to	talk	about	the	resilience	of	the	LNW;	but	in	 order	 to	 do	 so,	 it	 is	 fundamental	 to	 have	 a	 good	 understanding	 of	 the	 concept	 of	resilience	before	determining	whether	or	not	it	applies	to	this	area	and	its	community.		
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In	disaster	research,	the	concepts	of	resilience	and	vulnerability	have	come	hand-in-hand.	Scholars	use	 them	 in	various	 fashions.	Having	been	used	 for	quite	 some	 time,	the	concept	of	vulnerability	has	been	scrutinized	a	 lot	by	 the	 literature	and	has	been	a	central	 component	 in	 disaster	 risk	management	 since	 the	 1980s	 (Timmerman,	 1981).	Vulnerability	contributed	greatly	to	the	disaster	literature	as	researchers	used	it	as	a	tool	to	better	assess,	measure,	and	map	the	elements	rendering	cities	fragile	in	the	face	of	a	calamity	(Bankoff	et	al.,	2004;	Berkes,	2007;	Birkmann,	2006;	Cutter	et	al.,	2003;	Pigeon,	2002;	Thomas	et	al.,	2012).	When	disasters	are	at	stake,	it	is	not	only	important	to	look	at	the	existing	weaknesses,	but	also	at	the	elements	characterizing	a	city	and	community	to	withstand,	 rebuild,	 and	 return	 to	 a	 functioning	 state.	 This	 is	 where	 evaluating	 the	resilience	of	a	city	or	community	becomes	a	relevant	element	to	look	into.		Nowadays,	resilience	has	been	turned	into	a	buzzword	that	goes	beyond	disaster	related	 topics.	 The	 concept	 is	 currently	 used	 in	 any	 context	 that	 involves	 change,	 and,	more	 specifically,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 climate	 change	 and	 adaptation	 (Blanco	 et	 al.,	 2009;	Moser,	2008;	Muller,	2007;	Prasad,	2008;	Vogel	et	al.,	2007).	 In	their	book,	Lewis	et	al.	(2012)	argue	 that	people	must	 strengthen	 their	 resilience	 in	order	 to	adapt	 to	change.	Resilience	is	a	highly	contested	concept	in	disaster	literature,	and	this	does	not	support	its	 purpose.	 The	 literature	 looks	 at	 resilience	 as	 either	 being	 a	 continuously	 changing	concept,	i.e.	a	‘process’;	or	as	a	constant	and	measurable	concept,	i.e.	an	‘outcome’	(Cutter	et	 al.,	 2008).	 Many	 researchers	 have	 tried	 to	 look	 at	 resilience	 from	 a	 quantitative	perspective	by	developing	a	set	of	indicators	in	order	to	measure	it	(Cutter	et	al.,	2010;	Liu,	2008;	Liu	et	al.,	2007;	Pelling,	2003;	Plyer	et	al.,	2013).	Therefore,	it	is	important	to	understand	resilience	in	order	to	comprehend	its	place	and	role	in	any	post-catastrophe	situation.	When	 it	 comes	 to	 urban	 communities,	 the	 literature	 does	 not	 focus	 on	 such	issues	 or	 on	 a	 qualitative	 way	 of	 looking	 and	 evaluating	 resilience.	 In	 this	 research,	community	resilience	is	an	important	aspect	as	it	focuses	on	the	community	at	stake	and	at	the	intangible	elements	that	are	part	of	it:	cultural	values,	place	attachment,	and	social	networks.	 In	 addition,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 calamity,	 the	 various	 scales	 of	 geography	 are	affected	 by	 the	 destructive	 phenomenon,	 and	 resilience	 should	 be	 scrutinized	 at	 each	different	level:	the	individual,	the	household,	the	neighborhood,	the	city,	and	the	country.		
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As	 it	 turns	 out,	 the	 intangible	 elements	 affecting	 resilience	 are	 also	 part	 of	 the	cultural	landscape.	With	the	coexistence	of	many	points	of	view	in	the	literature,	there	is	a	 general	 consensus	 about	 how	 this	 landscape	 is	 defined	 (Forman	 et	 al.,	 1986;	Naveh,	1995,	 1998;	 Poullaouec-Gonidec	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 Being	 the	 result	 of	 a	 continuous	transformation	 of	 the	 environment,	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 plays	 a	 major	 role	 in	determining	 the	 elements	 rendering	 a	 community	 unique	 and	 having	 a	 direct	relationship	 with	 its	 living	 entourage.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 disaster	 literature	 does	 not	bridge	between	the	elements	of	the	cultural	landscape	and	resilience,	which	is	one	of	the	attempts	this	research	is	making.	The	cultural	 landscape	takes	a	secondary	place	when	disasters	 strike,	 and	 the	 focus	 is	 mainly	 geared	 toward	 risk	 management	 and	 the	rebuilding	 of	 the	 economy	 as	 well	 as	 the	 infrastructure	 and	 the	 promotion	 of	 urban	development	 through	 land-use	planning	 (Berke	 et	 al.,	 1993;	Burby	 et	 al.,	 2000;	Chang,	2010;	Chernick	et	al.,	2005;	Davidson	et	al.,	2007;	Keller	et	al.,	1989).	It	has	been	witnessed	that	urban	communities	lose	a	lot	and	suffer	tremendously	after	the	occurrence	of	a	disaster.	The	loss	is	not	only	at	the	physical	level,	but	also	at	the	community	 level.	 People	 lose	 their	 homes,	 their	 identity,	 their	 belongings,	 and	 most	importantly	their	 lives.	The	problem	presents	 itself	as	such:	governments	and	planners	focus	on	the	physical	aspect	of	rebuilding	while	they	disregard	the	elements	that	brought	and	 built	 the	 community	 together	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 The	 gap	 in	 the	 knowledge	 when	studying	community	resilience	is	the	lack	of	research	and	literature	about	the	impact	of	place	 attachment	 and	 social	 networks	 on	 the	 resilience	 of	 a	 devastated	 community.	 In	addition,	the	cultural	elements	belonging	to	a	certain	group	of	individuals	contribute	to	shaping	 their	 cultural	 landscape	 and	 render	 them	 unique.	 As	 a	 result,	 there	 are	 no	linkages	 between	 resilience	 and	 these	 cultural	 elements	 in	 disaster	 literature.	 The	relationship	between	the	cultural	 landscape	and	resilience	is	taken	for	granted	and	left	largely	unexplored.	This	dissertation	aims	at	putting	 the	concept	of	resilience	at	a	new	level,	one	 larger	 than	 the	current	 literature	presented	earlier,	 and	resilience	should	be	looked	at	in	a	holistic	way,	an	all-encompassing	way.		
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1.2.	Purpose	and	Significance	of	the	Study		The	 purpose	 of	 the	 study	 is	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 community	 of	 the	 LNW	 in	 a	 post-Katrina	environment	and	on	 the	elements	 that	contributed	(or	not)	 to	 the	returning	of	the	 residents	 and	 the	 rebuilding	 of	 the	 neighbourhood.	 Therefore,	 the	 focus	 is	 on	evaluating	 ‘how’	 and	 ‘why’	 place	 attachment	 and	 social	 networks	 render	 a	 community	more	or	 less	 resilient	after	 the	occurrence	of	a	catastrophe.	This	evaluation	 is	done	by	setting	up	an	in-depth	portrait	of	the	concept	of	resilience,	which	means	analyzing	what	the	 literature	 provides	 in	 terms	 of	 measuring	 it.	 By	 understanding	 resilience	 and	 by	identifying	the	indicators	used	to	measuring	it,	it	becomes	clear	that	cultural	elements—place	 attachment,	 identity,	 cultural	 traditions,	 and	 social	 networks—have	 not	 been	sufficiently	taken	into	account	by	the	existing	research.		This	study	relies	on	a	mixed	methods	research	design	that	identifies	the	tangible	and	intangible	indicators	affecting	the	resilience	of	an	urban	community	as	devastated	as	the	LNW.	The	aim	in	using	such	a	methodology	is	to	use	primary	and	secondary	data	as	well	as	qualitative	and	quantitative	data	to	provide	answers.	Since	the	literature	focuses	mainly	on	tangible	indicators	to	measure	resilience,	this	research	cannot	disregard	this	aspect	of	 the	 concept.	Therefore,	by	adding	 the	qualitative	 side	 to	 the	data,	 the	 results	will	be	more	cumulative	 than	 if	 each	 type	of	data	were	 taken	separately.	The	 research	focuses	 on	 collecting	 data	 on	 the	 multiple	 levels	 of	 geography:	 at	 the	 individual,	 the	household,	and	the	neighbourhood	levels,	as	well	as	to	present	a	general	overlook	of	the	city.	 Also,	 it	 aims	 at	 interviewing	 multiple	 stakeholders	 that	 are	 related	 directly	 or	indirectly	 to	 the	 LNW:	 residents,	 religious	 figures,	 non-profit	 organization	representatives,	planners,	philanthropists,	and	city	officials.		The	reason	why	this	research	is	important	is	because	it	pays	a	lot	of	attention	to	the	 cultural	 elements	 that	 form	 the	 cultural	 landscape.	 These	 elements	 are	 taken	 for	granted	 in	 post-disaster	 situations;	 yet	 they	 contribute	 to	 the	 rebuilding	 process	 and	they	 help	 communities	 gain	 their	 strength	 after	 losing	 everything.	 These	 intangible	elements	were	built	over	many	decades	and	centuries,	and	they	took	the	form	and	shape	of	the	community	at	stake.	When	a	disaster	strikes,	it	causes	major	disruption,	it	destroys	
	 6	
the	 physical	 environment,	 and	 it	 takes	 lives	 away;	 but	 the	 only	 thing	 that	 remains	untouched	 is	 the	cultural	 identity	and	 the	attachment	people	have	 to	 their	homes.	The	intention	here	 is	 to	 shed	 light	on	 these	elements	and	 their	 importance	 so	 they	are	not	taken	 for	 granted	 by	 planners,	 city	 officials,	 and	 governments.	 By	 doing	 so,	 this	 study	contributes	to	the	literature	on	resilience	by	taking	into	account	intangible	indicators	in	the	rebuilding	process	and	in	bringing	back	communities	together.	By	sticking	together,	communities	 with	 strong	 bonds	 and	 social	 networks	 are	 stronger	 if	 circumstances	compel	them	to	live	apart.	This	aspect	is	neglected	in	disaster	management	and	is	always	left	to	be	sorted	on	its	own.	Thus,	governments	and	disaster	risk	managers	should	take	into	account	 the	cultural	 landscape	and	 its	value.	They	should	 incorporate	 it	 into	 their	rebuilding	plans.		In	consequence,	this	dissertation	is	unique	in	three	ways:	it	tackles	the	concept	of	resilience	 from	 different	 angles,	 it	 determines	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 relationship	 between	resilience	and	the	cultural	landscape,	and	it	proposes	a	mixed	methods	research	design	to	conduct	the	study.		
Primary	Research	Questions	In	order	to	determine	the	problem	raised	earlier	and	the	approach	to	tackle	it,	it	took	a	series	 of	 questions	 that	 finally	 led	 to	 the	 main	 research	 question.	 The	 questions	 are:	What	 is	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 resilience	 of	 a	 community	 and	 its	 cultural	landscape?	 Why	 are	 people	 incited	 to	 returning	 to	 their	 neighborhood	 after	 a	 major	devastation	while	knowing	its	existing	vulnerabilities?	Why	are	they	attached	to	such	a	place?	 How	 can	 researchers	 contribute	 to	 a	 more	 coherent	 rebuilding	 process	 while	maintaining	the	local	identity	and	cultural	values?	How	does	the	historical	evolution	of	a	geographic	 area	affect	 its	 vulnerability?	How	 important	 is	 it	 to	measure	 resilience	and	should	disaster	researchers	re-evaluate	the	concept?		Main	Research	Question:		
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If	a	relationship	is	established	between	the	cultural	landscape	and	the	concept	of	resilience,	then	what	is	the	role	of	place	attachment	and	social	networks	in	the	creation	of	resilient	urban	communities	in	the	Lower	Ninth	Ward	after	Hurricane	Katrina?	
1.3.	Research	Design	Since	 the	 literature	 proposes	 quantifiable	 indicators	 to	 measure	 resilience	 and	this	 research	 looks	at	 it	 from	a	qualitative	perspective,	with	 intangible	 indicators,	 then	the	 logical	 choice	of	methodology	 is	 to	 combine	 the	 two.	The	 intention	behind	using	 a	mixed	 methods	 research	 design	 is	 to	 help	 answer	 the	 main	 research	 question,	 as	 it	involves	 looking	at	multiple	 types	of	data	 to	 reach	 coherent	 results.	On	one	hand,	 it	 is	imperative	 to	 collect	numbers	 reflecting	on	 the	 evolution	of	 the	LNW	before	 and	after	Hurricane	Katrina	in	order	to	compare	the	contrast	between	the	two	periods.	Also,	maps	need	 to	 be	 collected	 to	 show	 the	 status	 of	 the	 area	 with	 regards	 to	 flood	 levels	 and	rebuilding	progress.	On	the	other	hand,	interviews	have	to	be	conducted	in	order	to	have	the	perspectives	of	the	different	stakeholders	involved	in	the	LNW.	The	questions	were	designed	to	answer	to	the	following:	
• Identify	the	cultural	landscape,	
• Compare	what	the	residents	have	now	and	what	they	had	before	the	storm,	
• Identify	their	social	networks	and	find	out	if	they	have	changed	after	the	storm,	
• How	they	perceive	themselves	and	how	they	are	perceived	from	others,	
• And	how	they	look	at	the	future.	All	interviews	lasted	an	hour	or	more	on	occasions,	and	the	researcher	explained	the	 research	 intentions	 as	 well	 as	 the	 scope	 so	 as	 the	 interviewees	 know	 how	 they	contribute	 to	 the	 research.	 Each	 participant	 was	 asked	 to	 sign	 a	 consent	 form	 that	explained	 to	 them	 the	 research	 and	 if	 they	 felt	 like	withdrawing	 from	 the	 study,	 then	they	 were	 free	 to	 do	 so.	 The	 questions	 were	 pre-determined	 and	 validated	 by	 the	research	 committee	 and	 the	 ethical	 board	 of	 the	 Université	 de	 Montréal	 and	 the	University	 of	 New	 Orleans.	 Finally,	 a	 total	 of	 28	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 over	 the	period	of	three	months.		
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Assumptions	and	Limitations	As	a	starter,	the	main	element	this	research	is	based	on	is	the	idea	of	‘topophilia’.	It	is	a	fact	that	people	are	attached	to	their	home,	and	that	it	is	the	first	thing	they	want	to	return	to	after	the	occurrence	of	a	disaster.	This	love	of	place	is	called	‘topophilia’	(Tuan,	1990),	 and	 each	 community	 defines	 its	 topophilia	 differently	 because	 of	 cultural	differences.		In	order	to	understand	this	topophilia,	it	is	of	great	pertinence	to	study	and	question	 the	 community	 at	 hand.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 LNW,	 the	 assumption	 was	 to	interview	the	residents	and	understand,	through	their	experiences	and	perspectives,	the	reasons	 of	 this	 strong	 attachment	 to	 their	 home	 and	 neighborhood,	 even	with	 all	 the	vulnerabilities	and	obstacles	they	face.		It	seemed	obvious	that	the	residents’	strong	will	to	return	and	rebuild	their	neighborhood,	in	addition	to	their	topophilia	and	intertwined	social	networks,	would	make	them	more	resilient.	But	soon	enough,	the	research	started	revealing	 a	 more	 complicated	 reality,	 especially	 when	 resilience	 is	 a	 much-contested	concept	in	the	literature.		The	 limitations	 of	 this	 research	 were	 mainly	 at	 the	 case	 study	 level.	 After	scrutinizing	 the	 literature	 and	 determining	 the	 research	 problem,	 the	 data	 collection	exposed	a	much	more	disturbing	reality.	Due	to	much	media	attention,	the	LNW	proved	to	be	a	fertile	ground	for	new	and	upcoming	research	projects,	and	many	took	the	chance	to	interview	residents	and	ask	for	their	time	to	participate	in	their	research	while	giving	nothing	 in	 return,	 except	 fake	 promises	 to	 improve	 their	 living	 conditions.	 Their	struggles	 remained	 the	 same	 and	 they	were	 not	 being	 helped	 to	 rebuild	 their	 homes.	Therefore,	 seven	 years	 after	 the	 catastrophe,	 people	 were	 suffering	 from	 ‘interview	fatigue’	and	they	were	not	interested	in	being	taken	advantage	of	by	another	researcher.	Getting	 interviews	 from	 residents	 took	 some	 time	 and	 became	 possible	 insofar	 as	 the	researcher	was	able	to	establish	a	strong	and	trusting	relationship	with	the	residents.	In	addition,	 it	was	deemed	very	pertinent	 to	 look	outside	 the	neighborhood	and	question	the	 different	 stakeholders	 involved	 in	 the	 LNW.	 This	 change	 in	 perspective	 led	 to	 a	change	in	strategy	and	the	questionnaires	were	modified	to	fit	with	all	the	participants.	Also,	 another	 limitation	was	 the	 lack	 of	 resources	 to	 find	 and	 interview	 the	 residents	
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who	did	not	return	in	order	to	evaluate	their	 level	of	attachment,	how	did	they	rebuild	their	social	networks,	and	how	does	that	impact	their	level	of	resilience.		As	this	dissertation	is	being	finished,	the	tenth	anniversary	of	Hurricane	Katrina	took	place.	The	city	of	New	Orleans	looked	at	all	the	accomplishments	that	took	place	in	the	 city	 and	 its	 neighborhoods.	 And	 as	 for	 the	 LNW,	 some	 improvements	 have	 been	made,	though	the	neighborhood	has	not	yet	returned	to	its	pre-storm	state.	This	research	does	not	criticize	that	fact,	but	it	just	underlines	that	ten	years	can	be	a	marking	point	for	some,	but	not	necessarily	for	others.	And	as	it	will	be	presented	in	Chapter	6,	the	LNW	has	 made	 many	 improvements	 and	 the	 residents	 are	 very	 hopeful,	 but	 does	 this	hopefulness	is	enough	to	determine	its	resilience?		
1.4.	Dissertation	Overview	Aside	 from	the	 introduction	and	 the	conclusion,	 this	dissertation	 is	divided	 into	six	 main	 chapters	 (chapter	 2	 to	 7).	 Chapter	 2	 is	 a	 review	 of	 the	 literature	 with	 an	overview	 of	 the	 different	 definitions	 of	 disasters,	 vulnerability,	 resilience,	 and	 the	cultural	landscape.	The	first	three	are	of	great	importance	to	this	research	because	they	have	taken	a	lot	of	attention	in	disaster	research,	and	they	are	shaping	the	future	of	how	disaster	management	and	prevention	are	perceived.	As	 for	 the	 cultural	 landscape,	 it	 is	primordial	to	this	research	because	it	focuses	mainly	on	the	impact	a	community	has	on	its	environment.	The	aim	 is	 to	understand	how	people	change	 their	environment	 to	 fit	their	 needs	 and	 how—in	 return—the	 modified	 landscape	 acquires	 its	 own	 cultural	identity.	In	the	case	of	disasters,	when	everything	is	shattered,	it	is	the	cultural	identity	that	 remains	 intact	 even	 if	 the	physical	 environment	 is	 gravely	destroyed.	 If	 resilience	implies	 the	 return	 or	 the	 bouncing	 forward,	 then	 disaster	 specialists	 should	 take	 into	account	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 place	 attachment	 and	 social	networks	in	the	rebuilding	process.			Chapter	 3	 presents	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 of	 the	 research.	 It	 is	 the	 most	important	 part	 of	 this	 work	 as	 it	 emphasizes	 on	 the	 relationship	 of	 resilience	 with	vulnerability,	as	well	as	 the	relationship	between	resilience	and	the	cultural	 landscape.	Many	 authors	 see	 a	 strong	 relationship	 between	 vulnerability	 and	 resilience,	 and	 this	
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research	 reinforces	 this	 view:	 where	 vulnerability	 is	 part	 of	 the	 resilience	 process.		However,	it	also	claims	that	while	vulnerability	is	a	state	that	can	be	measured,	resilience	is	 constantly	 changing	 and	 evolving	 over	 time.	 In	 order	 to	 better	 understand	 both	concepts,	 the	 literature	proposes	ways	 to	measure	 them.	What	 seems	 to	be	a	 common	shortcoming	 is	 that	 the	 literature	 has	 a	 more	 quantitative	 perspective	 on	 measuring	them,	 and	 this	 research	 proposes	 to	 look	 at	 both	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	perspectives.	 Since	 the	 literature	 focuses	 mainly	 on	 tangible	 indicators	 to	 measure	resilience,	 this	 research	 criticizes	 the	 different	methods	 of	measuring	 the	 concept	 and	proposes	 intangible	 indicators	 that	 eventually	 are	 part	 of	 the	 cultural	 landscape.	 By	establishing	this	connection,	resilience	and	the	cultural	landscape	are	related	and	affect	one	another.	Beyond	these	connections,	the	chapter	finally	ascertains	that	resilience	is	a	complex	concept	and	should	be	looked	at	beyond	the	set	of	indicators	affecting	it.		Chapter	 4	 explains	 the	 choice	 of	 the	methodological	 approach—mixed	methods	research	design—and	 its	 theoretical	groundings.	As	explained	earlier,	 the	use	of	mixed	methods	 is	 critical	 to	 this	 research	 project	 as	 it	 helps	 in	 looking	 at	 the	 situation	 from	different	 angles,	 and	 the	 different	 collected	 data	 permitted	 a	 validation	 through	 the	triangulation	of	the	different	sources.	This	research	methodology	allowed	the	researcher	to	 not	 only	 answer	 the	 research	 question,	 but	 also	 to	 provide	 a	 new	perspective	 on	 a	highly	studied	case	study:	the	LNW	after	Hurricane	Katrina.	The	combination	of	the	case	study	with	the	methodology	took	the	concept	of	resilience	to	a	new	theoretical	level.		Chapter	5	gives	an	overview	of	the	historical	evolution	of	the	LNW	as	well	as	the	city	of	New	Orleans.	It	is	very	relevant	to	this	research	to	look	back	at	the	evolution	and	the	transformation	of	the	neighborhood	because	they	led	to	determine	the	uniqueness	of	the	area,	its	cultural	values	and	identity,	and	the	different	decisions	that	led	to	its	current	state.	Looking	at	the	decisions	that	were	made	in	the	past	and	the	physical	evolution	of	the	 area	 can	 explain	much	 of	 the	 devastation	 that	 occurred	 during	Hurricane	 Katrina.	Also,	this	chapter	focuses	on	the	evolution	of	the	social	networks	that	took	form	over	the	years	 and	 it	 highlights	 the	 cultural	 elements	 that	 made	 people	 attached	 to	 their	neighborhood.		
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Chapter	6	presents	four	sets	of	results	of	the	data	collected,	as	well	as	the	analysis.	First,	 the	 data	 permitted	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 reasons	 behind	 the	 late	 rebuilding	process	 from	 the	perspective	of	 the	 residents	 as	well	 as	 the	professionals.	 Second,	 the	data	revealed	two	distinct	and	non-matching	perceptions	of	the	LNW,	one	belonging	to	the	 residents	 and	 the	 other	 belonging	 to	 the	 professionals.	 Third,	 comparing	 the	indicators,	 tangible	and	 intangible,	 lead	 to	different	 conclusions	about	 the	 resilience	of	the	 neighborhood	 and	 the	 community,	 which	 leads	 to	 examining	 the	 importance	 of	measuring	 resilience.	 	 And	 fourth,	 a	 new	 element	 surfaced	 from	 the	 interviews.	 The	stakeholders	expressed	hope	and	a	positive	outlook	at	the	future	of	the	LNW	and	the	city	of	New	Orleans.	Last	 but	 not	 least,	 Chapter	 7	 is	 an	 interpretation	 of	 the	 data,	 as	 well	 as	 the	research.	 It	shows	how	the	research	problem	and	question	are	addressed	and	 it	opens	towards	looking	at	the	concept	of	resilience	at	the	theoretical	level.	The	case	study	of	the	LNW	played	the	dual	role	of	a	research	study,	as	well	as	a	filter	through	which	resilience	was	scrutinized.	The	new	proposed	resilience	model	suggests	 that	 in	order	 to	evaluate	resilience,	researchers	must	take	into	account	tangible	and	intangible	elements	when	it	comes	to	urban	communities.	Furthermore,	when	the	model	was	applied	to	a	case	study	as	complex	as	the	LNW,	it	led	to	determine	that	when	the	cultural	landscape	is	used	as	a	tool	 to	 evaluate	 community	 resilience,	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience	 becomes	 a	 social	construction.		
Summary	The	intent	of	this	introduction	is	to	present	the	main	highlights	of	the	dissertation	by	exposing	the	research	problem,	question,	and	research	statement.	In	the	process,	an	overview	of	the	work	is	presented	to	give	a	cumulative	perspective	on	the	direction	the	research	 has	 taken.	Disaster	 research	 is	 still	 in	 its	 infancy,	with	 researchers,	 planners,	and	governments	having	a	lot	to	learn	in	order	to	better	mitigate,	prevent,	and	manage	devastating	 situations.	 Most	 importantly,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 better	 plan	 the	 rebuilding	process	in	order	to	be	efficient	and	sustainable	for	future	generations.	This	research	aims	at	 portraying	 an	 element	 that	 is	 taken	 for	 granted:	 the	 cultural	 landscape.	 The	 key	
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concepts	 tackled	 in	 this	 dissertation	 are	 vulnerability,	 resilience,	 and	 the	 cultural	landscape	and	they	will	be	presented	in	the	following	section,	Chapter	2,	where	the	link	between	them	will	be	explained	further.				 	
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Chapter	2: :	Literature	Review	
2.1.	Overview	A	 resilient	 community	 rebuilding	 is	 very	 important	 after	 the	 occurrence	 of	 a	disaster.	 This	 being	 said,	 a	 resilient	 rebuilding	 stands	 for:	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	calamity’s	 consequences	 on	 a	 community	 as	 well	 as	 its	 vulnerabilities	 in	 order	 to	improve	its	adaptability	when	facing	a	life-altering	event.	When	disasters	are	the	subject	of	a	study,	two	main	concepts	appear	to	the	surface:	vulnerability	and	resilience.	These	concepts	 are	 relatively	 recent	 in	 the	 field	 of	 urban	 studies	 and	 are	 highly	 contested,	especially	‘resilience’	(which	will	be	explained	further).	Over	the	last	few	decades,	these	terms	 took	 a	 lot	 of	 attention	 from	 researchers	 studying	 the	 different	 fields	 related	 to	disaster	management,	risk	prevention	and	mitigation,	and	various	others.	Nowadays,	the	concept	of	resilience	is	being	used	in	reference	to	any	context	that	is	undergoing	change,	whether	slow	or	abrupt.	This	is	especially	applicable	to	the	climate	change	and	its	impact	on	 the	 living	environment,	and	more	specifically	at	 the	community	 level.	This	research	focuses	mainly	on	the	changes	caused	by	disasters,	though	the	triggering	reasons	of	the	disasters	 are	 not	 relevant	 to	 this	 research.	 The	 focus	 is	 on	 what	 happens	 after	 the	disaster	has	passed	and	when	people	return	and	rebuild.	 	 In	 this	chapter,	 the	aim	is	 to	present	 the	 relevant	 conceptual	 elements	 this	 research	 is	 built	 upon:	 the	 concept	 of	resilience	and	how	it	affects	the	cultural	 landscape.	Although	these	two	concepts	are	of	importance,	yet	it	is	very	necessary	to	talk	about	the	elements	that	affect	both	concepts.	When	discussing	resilience,	elements	like	natural	disasters,	vulnerability,	and	risk	come	to	 the	 surface.	 And	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 cultural	 landscape,	 elements	 like	 place	attachment,	 memory,	 and	 social	 networks	 are	 important	 to	 highlight.	 At	 first,	 these	components	seem	unrelated	and	distinct,	but	when	it	comes	to	urban	communities	and	their	resilience,	 this	research	unveils	a	close	relationship.	This	new	finding	 is	meant	 to	help	 future	 planners,	 disaster	 managers,	 and	 governments	 in	 proposing	 better,	 more	efficient,	and	sustainable	rebuilding	solutions.		
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2.2.	The	Concept	of	Resilience	and	its	Constituting	Elements	
2.2.1.	Natural	Disasters	and	Disaster	Discourse		The	 disaster	 discourse	 changed	 over	 the	 last	 few	 decades;	 more	 specifically	natural	disasters.	What	is	misleading	in	natural	disasters	is	the	word	‘natural’.	While	the	sources	of	the	calamity	may	originate	from	natural	causes,	the	consequences	tend	to	be	aggravated	by	 the	 increased	and	 concentrated	presence	of	human	beings	 in	urbanized	areas.	According	to	the	World	Urbanization	Prospects,	50%	of	the	earth	population	was	located	in	cities	in	2014,	and	the	predictions	indicate	to	higher	concentrations	by	2025	(United	Nations,	 2014).	Many	 reasons	 lead	 to	 this	 aggravated	 situation:	 1)	 cities	 have	and	 continue	 to	 attract	 more	 and	 more	 people,	 2)	 changing	 and	 modifying	 the	environment	 to	 expand	 and	 grow	 cities,	 3)	 climate	 change,	 4)	 social	 and	 economic	inequalities,	 and	 many	 more.	 	 This	 research	 focuses	 mainly	 on	 natural	 disasters	 or	hybrid	 disasters,	 i.e.	 those	 that	 can	 percolate	 from	 natural	 causes,	 but	 whose	consequences	are	the	result	of	human	error1.			Dauphiné	et	 al.	 (2013)	argue	 that	 risks	and	catastrophes	are	notions	 that	 cover	diverse	realities.	They	can	refer	to	the	possibility,	as	well	as	the	effectiveness,	of	an	event,	but	 they	 can	 also	 refer	 to	 the	 damage	 caused.	 In	 this	 case,	 they	 either	 point	 at	 ‘risk-damage’	or	‘catastrophe-damage’.	These	terms	are	usually	used	at	the	human	or	material	levels,	but	they	can	also	be	used	at	the	economic,	financial,	natural,	cultural	heritage,	or	ecosystem	levels.	Depending	on	the	event	itself,	if	it	is	probable	or	a	potential,	then	it	is	considered	a	risk;	and	if	it	is	actual	and	effective,	then	it	is	considered	a	perturbation,	an	accident,	a	crisis,	a	disaster,	or	a	catastrophe.	The	latter	can	then	be	given	a	name,	a	date,	duration,	 and	 it	 is	 to	 be	 found	 in	 a	 specific	 geographic	 space	with	 a	 distinct	 intensity.																																																									
1	There	 are	 three	 classes	when	disasters	 are	 at	 stake	 (Orleans,	 2013):	 ‘natural	 disasters’,	 ‘man-made	disasters’,	 and	‘hybrid	disasters’	as	follows,	“Natural	disasters	generally	are	beyond	the	ability	of	man	to	produce,	influence	or	prevent	[…].	The	scale	of	loss	of	life	from	natural	disasters	can	range	from	a	few	individuals	to	several	million.		Man-made	disasters	are	the	disasters	that	are	of	anthropogenic	origin.	[…]	The	associated	loss	of	life	due	to	this	type	of	disaster	seldom	exceeds	several	hundred.		Hybrid	disasters	arise	from	a	concatenation	of	anthropogenic	(man-made	and	natural	events.	Man	and	his	associated	activities	 can	 produce	 natural	 disasters	 that	 would	 not	 otherwise	 occur,	 or	 significantly	 aggravate	 the	 effects	 of	 a	natural	disaster.	[…]	The	loss	of	life	due	to	this	type	of	disaster	can	be,	and	usually	is,	extremely	large.”	
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Therefore,	 time	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 to	 differentiate	 the	 risk	 from	 the	 catastrophe.	Risk	 starts	well	 before	 the	 catastrophe	 and	 can	outlast	 it;	 the	 catastrophe	 is	 a	 specific	event	 that	 starts	 and	 finishes	 at	 a	 distinct	 time.	Also,	 both	 act	 on	 the	 physical	 space	differently.	Whereas	the	space	affected	by	a	risk	is	more	areolar,	the	space	affected	by	a	catastrophe	 is	more	 factual.	 This	 leads	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 risks	 are	 probable	 phenomena,	whereas	catastrophes	or	disasters	are	real	events	(Dauphiné	et	al.,	2013).		In	his	book	Risk	Society,	Beck	(2013	[1992])	puts	wealth	in	direct	relation	to	risks	and	 they	 are	 both	 social	 productions.	 He	 states	 that	 historically,	 “the	 concepts	 of	‘industrial’	 or	 ‘class	 society’,	 in	 the	broadest	 sense	of	Marx	or	Weber,	 revolved	around	the	issue	of	how	socially	produced	wealth	could	be	distributed	in	a	socially	unequal	and	
also	 ‘legitimate’	 way.”	 (Beck,	 2013	 [1992],	 p.	 19)	 This	 unequal	 distribution	 leads	 to	having	socially	unjust	societies,	especially	when	facing	risks	and	hazards.	This	is	the	case	in	 the	LNW	before	Hurricane	Katrina,	where	people	have	had	 less	resources	to	rebuild	their	 torn	 neighborhood	when	 compared	 to	 other	 neighborhoods.	 Toueir	 (2015)	 talks	about	 the	 historical	 facts	 that	 lead	 to	 the	 social	 inequalities	 that	 currently	 exist	 in	 the	LNW:	these	were	socially	and	historically	produced	over	time,	and	were	the	result	of	the	decisions	taken	over	the	centuries.		Defining	disasters	is	necessary	because	they	are	more	than	simple	events	that	just	take	place	at	a	specific	time	and	place.	They	affect	urban	communities	and	they	expose	the	weaknesses	or	the	urban	fabric	as	well	as	the	community.	 	According	to	the	Hyogo	Framework,	 “Disaster	risk	arises	when	hazards	 interact	with	physical,	social,	economic	and	environmental	vulnerabilities.”	(UNISDR,	2005)	Along	 these	 lines,	Keller	 et	 al.	 (1989,	 p.	 3)	 define	 a	disaster	 as	 “an	 event	which	afflicts	 a	 community	 the	 consequences	 of	 which	 are	 beyond	 the	 immediate	 financial,	material	 or	 emotional	 resources	of	 the	 community.”	Disasters	 are	not	only	 events	 that	are	triggered	by	the	natural	environment,	but	also	by	the	social,	political,	and	economic	environments.	 It	 is	 therefore	 important	 to	 avoid	 separating	 the	 ‘natural’	 and	 ‘human’	dimensions	 of	 any	 studied	 disaster	 (Wisner	 et	 al.,	 2004	 [1994]).	 Because	 if	 these	 two	aspects	are	separated	from	each	other,	 it	“invites	a	failure	to	understand	the	additional	
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burden	of	natural	hazards,	and	it	is	unhelpful	in	both	understanding	disasters	and	doing	something	to	prevent	or	mitigate	them.”	(Wisner	et	al.,	2004	[1994],	p.	5)	In	his	book	What	is	a	Disaster?	Quarantelli	(1998)	asks	multiple	social	scientists	to	define	what	 a	 disaster	 is.	 Although	 they	 look	 at	 the	 term	 in	 its	 broadest	meaning,	 the	general	 consensus	 is	 that	 the	 consequences	 of	 disasters	 are	 of	 socio-economic	 nature.	One	of	the	authors	states,		disaster	 is	 no	 longer	 experienced	 as	 a	 reaction;	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 action,	 a	result,	and,	more	precisely,	as	a	social	consequence.	The	new	approach	provides	the	 basis	 for	 moving	 from	 disaster	 as	 an	 effect	 to	 disaster	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	underlying	 logic	 of	 the	 community.	 […]Therefore,	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 of	disaster	 is	neither	one	of	 conflict,	nor	of	defense	against	external	attacks,	but	 is	the	result	of	the	upsetting	of	human	relations.	(Gilbert,	1998,	p.	6)		This	 is	also	valid	 in	 the	French	 literature.	Pigeon	(2005)	states	 that	hazards	are	not	 only	 natural,	 since	 they	 have	 become	 a	 hybrid	 of	 natural	 and	 anthropogenic	components.	Dauphiné	et	al.	 (2013,	p.	25)	propose	the	hazard	“anthropisé”2,	which	 is	a	phenomenon	 that	 is	 triggered	 by	 natural	 causes	 but	 its	 evolution	 is	 directly	 linked	 to	human	actions.			With	these	definitions	of	disasters,	the	phenomenon	takes	on	a	social	qualification	that	directly	makes	it	responsible	for	affecting	human	lives	in	a	disruptive	and	negative	way.	 The	 natural	 disasters	 of	 interest	 to	 this	 research	 are	 those	 that	 are	 triggered	 by	natural	events.	Yet,	when	they	hit	problematic	areas	inhabited	by	humans,	they	become	a	complex	combination	of	natural	hazards	and	human	action.	Therefore,	to	open	up	to	the	next	section,	the	following	must	be	taken	into	account,		to	understand	disasters	we	must	not	only	know	about	 the	types	of	hazards	that	might	 affect	 people,	 but	 also	 the	 different	 levels	 of	 vulnerability	 of	 different																																																									
2	The	word	“anthropisé”	is	a	French	word	and	since	a	translation	of	this	term	in	English	does	not	exist,	the	author	chose	to	maintain	 the	 original	word	 so	 as	 to	 preserve	 its	meaning.	 The	 original	 quote	 in	 French	 is	 “On	 parle	 alors	 d’aléa	anthropisé.	Cet	aléa	anthropisé	est	un	phénomène	dont	 le	déclenchement	est	naturel	mais	dont	 l’évolution	est	 liée	à	l’action	humaine,	notamment	aux	modalités	d’occupation	du	sol.”		
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groups	of	people.	This	vulnerability	 is	determined	by	social	systems	and	power,	not	by	natural	forces.	(Wisner	et	al.,	2004	[1994],	p.	7)		Thus,	 it	 is	of	great	 importance	to	portray	the	concept	of	vulnerability	as	 it	helps	understand	the	weaknesses	faced	by	a	community,	especially	when	they	are	the	result	of	the	human	impact	on	the	physical,	social,	economic,	cultural,	and	political	environments.		
2.2.2.	Vulnerability	in	the	Literature	Vulnerability	 has	 been	 of	 interest	 in	 disaster	 research	 for	 some	 time	 and	many	authors	have	 tried	 to	define	 it	and	 to	measure	 it.	Dauphiné	et	al.	 (2013)	 identify	 three	approaches	to	vulnerability:	the	first	analyzes	vulnerability	from	the	level	of	potential	or	real	damage	caused	by	the	disaster;	the	second	looks	at	vulnerability	as	the	capacity	of	a	society	 to	 respond	 when	 facing	 a	 perturbation;	 the	 third	 puts	 more	 emphasis	 on	 the	territorial	 issues.	 The	 first	 approach	 falls	 under	 biophysical	 vulnerability	 and	 results	from	the	impact	of	the	hazard	on	the	system,	while	the	second	and	third	fall	under	social	and	territorial	vulnerability	and	can	be	evaluated	independently	from	the	hazard.		Toueir	 (2015)	 presents	 the	 concept	 of	 vulnerability	 and	 how	 it	 leads	 to	 social	vulnerability.	 The	 concept	 of	 vulnerability	 has	 been	 defined	 in	 different	 ways	 and	researchers	have	tried	to	measure	it,	but	what	is	lacking	is	a	more	historical	perspective.	In	this	regard,	the	importance	of	tracking	down	the	decision	making	process	that	lead	to	the	current	state	cannot	be	underestimated.	The	author	states,	 “a	historical	 look	at	 the	evolution	 of	 a	 city	 and	 the	 community	 and	 the	 reasons	 for	 their	 particular	 evolution	before	 a	 calamity	 is	 crucial	 to	 understanding	 their	 combined	 vulnerabilities.”	 (Toueir,	2015,	 p.	 222)	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 LNW,	 it	 is	 very	 important	 to	 look	 at	 the	 historical	evolution	of	the	city	as	well	as	the	series	of	decisions	that	were	made	over	the	course	of	time.	 Chapter	 5	 of	 this	 dissertation	 portrays	 in	 detail	 the	 events	 that	 formed	 the	neighborhood	and	 contributed	 to	 its	 transformation.	Also,	 the	 evolution	of	 the	LNW	 is	put	 in	context	with	 the	evolution	of	 the	city	of	New	Orleans	as	 it	 reflects	how	the	area	was	negatively	perceived	by	the	city.	In	the	LNW,	it	was	particularly	relevant	to	look	at	the	events	that	 took	place	before	Hurricane	Katrina,	since	 it	sheds	 light	on	the	reasons	
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rendering	 the	 neighborhood	 vulnerable	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 storm	 as	 devastating	 as	Hurricane	Katrina.	In	 their	book	 ‘Natural	Disasters:	Protecting	Vulnerable	Communities’,	Merriman	et	al.	(1993)	acknowledge	the	importance	of	assessing	the	vulnerability	of	a	community	in	the	case	of	a	disaster,	and	the	authors	point	out	that	most	of	the	literature	is	geared	toward	a	quantitative	assessment.	They	also	highlight	the	lack	in	the	literature	in	terms	of	qualitatively	measuring	vulnerability.	The	reasons	this	is	happening	is	“due	to	the	fact	that	physical	damage	such	as	buildings,	infrastructure,	land,	agriculture	etc.	are	relatively	easier	to	quantify	than	developing	indicators	for	social,	political	or	household	economic	vulnerabilities.”	 (Merriman	 et	 al.,	 1993,	 p.	 1)	 In	 addition,	 in	 their	 article	 Cutter	 et	 al.	(2003)	acknowledge	the	 fact	 that	measuring	social	vulnerability	 is	done	quantitatively:	“socially	 created	 vulnerabilities	 are	 largely	 ignored,	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 difficulty	 in	quantifying	 them,	 which	 also	 explains	 why	 social	 losses	 are	 normally	 absent	 in	 after-disaster	cost/loss	estimation	reports.”	(Cutter	et	al.,	2003,	p.	243)	This	will	be	elaborated	later	 in	Chapter	3,	where	 the	different	ways	of	measuring	both	concepts,	vulnerability,	and	 resilience	 will	 be	 discussed.	 In	 the	 meantime,	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 expose	 how	 the	literature	 perceives	 this	 concept,	 as	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 aspects	 seem	 to	 always	 be	absent	in	evaluating	vulnerability.	 According	to	Wisner	et	al.	(2004	[1994]),	“the	social	production	of	vulnerability”	should	be	as	equally	 important	as	 the	natural	hazard	when	it	comes	to	evaluating	risk.	They	argue	that	the	risk	percolating	from	a	disaster	is	a	result	of	the	natural	hazard	and	the	degrees	of	vulnerability	relative	to	the	hazard.	They	argue	that	“disasters	are	a	result	of	the	interaction	of	both;	there	cannot	be	a	disaster	there	are	hazards	but	vulnerability	is	(theoretically)	nil,	or	if	there	is	a	vulnerable	population	but	no	hazard	event.”(Wisner	et	al.,	2004	[1994],	p.	49)	And	they	propose	the	following	equation:		“Risk	=	Hazard	x	Vulnerability”	There	are	many	ways	to	look	at	the	term	‘vulnerability’.	Manyena	(2006)	presents	a	table	with	many	definitions	of	the	concept.	In	this	chapter,	these	definitions	are	laid	out	in	table	2.1,	and	some	new	ones	have	been	added	so	as	to	show	the	growing	number	of	
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definitions.	Vulnerability	 is	even	used	 in	 the	context	of	 climate	change	and	adaptation;	where	climate	change	has	a	direct	impact	on	the	criteria	used	in	evaluating	vulnerability	and	 it	 is	 used	 to	 identify	 the	weakness	 or	 fragility	 of	 any	 system	 (Adger	 et	 al.,	 2007;	Adger	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Brooks,	 2003;	 Dessai	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Some	 researchers	 conducted	studies	on	the	influence	of	climate	change	on	social	and	territorial	vulnerability	(Thomas	et	al.,	2012).		In	 the	 literature,	 vulnerability	 is	 looked	at	with	multiple	 lenses	where:	1)	 some	define	it	as	the	capacity	of	a	‘system’	to	absorb	and	cope	with	the	event	of	a	disaster,	thus	the	ability	of	people	to	protect	themselves,	2)	some	try	to	quantify	vulnerability	in	order	to	use	it	as	a	planning	tool	and	this	will	be	presented	in	more	details	in	the	next	chapter,	3)	some	who	are	more	 interested	 in	objectifying	vulnerability	with	the	use	of	statistics	and	probability,	 and	4)	 some	who	 focus	on	a	more	cultural	 and	psychosocial	 aspect	of	vulnerability	where	the	attention	is	geared	toward	the	individual,	the	household,	and	the	community	 (Bankoff	 et	 al.,	 2004;	 Barroca	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Beck,	 2006;	 Berkes,	 2007;	Birkmann,	2006;	Brooks,	2003;	Cannon,	1994;	Chardon	et	al.,	1994;	Cutter	et	al.,	2003;	D’Ercole	et	al.,	2009;	Gallopin,	2006;	Gotham	et	al.,	2011;	Laska	et	al.,	2006;	Merriman	et	al.,	 1993;	Morrow,	 1999;	 Oliver-Smith,	 1996;	 Paton	 et	 al.,	 2001;	 Pelling,	 2003;	 Pigeon,	2002).	In	disaster	research,	the	most	cited	definition	of	vulnerability	is	the	following:		By	 ‘vulnerability’	we	mean	 the	 characteristics	 of	 a	 person	 or	 group	 in	 terms	 of	their	 capacity	 to	 anticipate,	 cope	with,	 resist,	 and	 recover	 from	 the	 impact	 of	 a	natural	hazard.	It	involves	a	combination	of	factors	that	determine	the	degree	to	which	someone’s	life	and	livelihoods	are	put	at	risk	by	a	discrete	and	identifiable	event	in	nature	or	in	society.	(Wisner	et	al.,	2004	[1994],	p.	11)	The	 same	 authors	 argue	 that	 disasters	 take	 place	 when	 a	 large	 number	 of	vulnerable	people	are	exposed	to	a	hazard	that	causes	a	major	damage	and	disruption	to	their	lives	(Wisner	et	al.,	2004	[1994]).		Table	2.1:	A	portray	of	the	many	definitions	of	vulnerability	(inspired	by	Manyena	(2006)	and	compiled	by	the	author)		Author	 Definitions	
Timmerman	
(1981)	 Vulnerability	 is	 the	degree	 to	which	a	system	acts	adversely	 to	 the	occurrence	of	a	hazardous	event.	The	degree	and	quality	of	the	adverse	reaction	are	conditioned	by	a	system’s	resilience	(a	
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measure	of	the	system’s	capacity	to	absorb	and	recover	from	the	event).	
Pijawaka	et	al.	
(1985)	
Vulnerability	 is	 the	 threat	 or	 interaction	 between	 risk	 and	 preparedness.	 It	 is	 the	 degree	 to	which	 hazardous	 materials	 threaten	 a	 particular	 population	 (risk)	 and	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	community	to	reduce	the	risk	or	adverse	consequences	of	hazardous	material	releases.	
Dow	(1992)	 Vulnerability	is	the	differential	capacity	of	groups	and	individuals	to	deal	with	hazards,	based	on	their	positions	within	physical	and	social	worlds.	
Watts	 et	 al.	
(1993)	 Vulnerability	 is	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 exposure,	 capacity	 and	 potentiality.	 Accordingly,	 the	perspective	 and	 normative	 response	 to	 vulnerability	 is	 to	 reduce	 exposure,	 enhance	 coping	capacity,	 strengthen	 recovery	potential	 and	bolster	damage	 control	 (i.e.,	minimize	destructive	consequences)	via	private	and	public	means.	
Wisner	 et	 al.	
(2004	[1994])	 By	vulnerability	we	mean	the	characteristics	of	a	person	or	a	group	in	terms	of	their	capacity	to	anticipate,	 cope	 with,	 resist	 and	 recover	 from	 the	 impact	 of	 a	 natural	 hazard.	 It	 involves	 a	combination	of	factors	that	determine	the	degree	to	which	someone’s	life	and	livelihood	are	put	at	risk	by	a	discrete	and	identifiable	event	in	nature	or	in	society.	
Green	 et	 al.	
(1994)	
Vulnerability	 to	 flood	 disruption	 is	 a	 product	 of	 dependence	 (the	 degree	 to	which	 an	 activity	requires	 a	 particular	 good	 as	 an	 input	 to	 function	 normally),	 transferability	 (the	 ability	 of	 an	activity	 to	 respond	 to	 a	 disruptive	 threat	 by	 overcoming	 dependence	 either	 by	 deferring	 the	activity	in	time,	or	by	relocation,	or	by	using	substitutes),	and	susceptibility	(the	probability	and	extend	to	which	the	physical	presence	of	flood	water	will	affect	inputs	or	outputs	of	an	activity).	
Watts	 et	 al.	
(1993)	
Vulnerability	 is	 best	 defined	 as	 an	 aggregate	 measure	 of	 human	 welfare	 that	 integrates	environmental,	 social,	 economic	 and	 political	 exposure	 to	 a	 range	 of	 potential	 harmful	perturbations.	Vulnerability	is	a	multilayered	and	multidimensional	social	space	defined	by	the	determinate,	 political,	 economic	 and	 institutional	 capabilities	 or	 people	 in	 specific	 places	 at	specific	times.	
Weichselgartner	
(2001)	 By	 vulnerability,	 we	 mean	 the	 condition	 of	 a	 given	 area	 with	 respect	 to	 hazard,	 exposure,	preparedness,	prevention,	and	response	characteristics	to	cope	with	specific	natural	hazards.	It	is	a	measure	of	 the	capability	of	 this	 set	of	elements	 to	withstand	events	of	a	certain	physical	character.	
Pelling	(2003)	 Vulnerability:	Denotes	exposure	to	risk	and	an	inability	to	avoid	or	absorb	potential	harm.	
Cutter	 et	 al.	
(2003)	
Social	 vulnerability	 is	 partially	 the	 product	 of	 social	 inequalities—those	 social	 factors	 that	influence	or	shape	the	susceptibility	of	various	groups	to	harm	and	that	also	govern	their	ability	to	respond.	However,	 it	also	 includes	place	 inequalities—those	characteristics	of	communities	and	the	built	environment,	such	as	the	level	of	urbanization,	growth	rates,	and	economic	vitality,	that	contribute	to	the	social	vulnerability	of	places.	
Maret	 and	 Cadoul	
(2008)	 To	 be	 vulnerable	 is	 to	 be	 physically	 exposed	 to	 a	 hazard,	 to	 display	 certain	 fragility	 in	 the	occurrence	of	a	calamity.	It	is	also	the	ability	to	foresee	and	consider,	or	not,	the	available	means	to	face	the	crisis3	
Gotham	 et	 al.	
(2011)	 We	view	vulnerability	as	a	condition	that	encompasses	the	features	of	exposure,	susceptibility,	and	coping	capacity.	Power	relations,	socio-cultural	processes,	and	political	economy	shape	and	influence	the	variability	of	these	features,	making	some	groups	more	susceptible	to	stress	and	trauma	than	others.		The	reasons	for	outlining	the	different	definitions	of	the	concept	of	vulnerability	are	 to	 show	 the	 array	 of	 points	 of	 view	 that	 date	 from	 the	 1980s,	 and	 to	 establish	 a	connection	between	the	concept	of	resilience	and	the	way	it	is	defined.	In	this	research,																																																									
3	Être	vulnérable,	c’est	être	physiquement		exposé	à	un	aléa,	c’est	présenter	une	certaine	fragilité	face	au	sinistre	qui	pourrait	survenir	et	c’est	aussi	ne	pas	envisager,	ou	mal	envisager,	les	moyens	disponibles	pour	faire	face	à	la	crise.	
	 21	
the	 concept	 of	 vulnerability	 is	 not	 evaluated,	 but	 it	 is	 pertinent	 to	 understand	 its	evolution	in	the	literature	in	order	to	comprehend	how	it	relates	to	resilience.	Disaster	researchers	 started	with	vulnerability	and	only	 later	did	 they	bridge	 it	with	 resilience.	Wisner	et	al.	(2004	[1994])	were	among	the	first	to	establish	a	relation	between	social	vulnerability	and	resilience.	And	since	this	work	focuses	mainly	on	resilience,	and	more	specifically	on	understanding	the	concept,	it	was	deemed	logical	to	start	the	study	with	vulnerability	 so	 as	 to	 recognize	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 two.	 In	 this	 research,	 the	attention	 is	 geared	 strictly	 towards	 the	 residents	 of	 the	 LNW	 after	 Hurricane	 Katrina,	and	in	order	to	evaluate	the	resilience	of	its	community,	it	was	imperative	to	present	its	vulnerabilities.		
2.2.3.	How	are	Disasters	and	Vulnerability	Social	Constructions?	What	 is	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 ‘social	 construction’?	 According	 to	The	Dictionary	of	
Human	Geography,	it	is:		The	 idea	 that	 the	 social	 context	of	 individuals	and	groups	 constructs	 the	 reality	that	they	know,	rather	than	an	independent	material	world.	Knowledge	is	always	relative	to	the	social	setting	of	the	inquirers,	the	outcome	of	an	ongoing,	dynamic	process	 of	 fabrication.	 Further,	 social	 construction	 applies	 as	much	 to	 forms	 of	specialized	understanding	(e.g.	high-energy	physics)	as	it	does	to	everyday,	taken-for-granted	knowledge.	(Gregory	et	al.,	2009,	p.	690)	As	previously	discussed,	disaster	 research	has	evolved	remarkably	over	 the	 last	three	decades.	This	is	due	mainly	to	the	incessant	migration	of	people	to	urbanized	areas,	which	are	becoming	more	and	more	concentrated	in	dense	centers.	In	the	present	work,	natural	disasters	refer	to	“anthropisés”	as	they	stand	for	disasters	that	are	triggered	by	natural	 causes,	 followed	 by	 human-made	 consequences.	 This	 research	 adheres	 to	 the	following	statement,	“if	workers	in	the	area	do	not	even	agree	on	whether	a	“disaster”	is	fundamentally	 a	 social	 construction	 or	 a	 physical	 happening,	 clearly	 the	 field	 has	intellectual	 problems.”	 (Quarantelli,	 1998,	 p.	 xiv)	 Disaster	 scholars	 should	 come	 to	 a	consensus	that	when	disasters	become	“anthropisés”,	 they	become	social	constructions.	By	acknowledging	that	fact,	disasters	can	be	looked	at	from	the	same	angle	and	research	
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can	 contribute	 to	 improving	 the	quality	of	 lives	of	 the	 growing	number	of	people	who	are,	 and	 continue	 to	be,	 exposed	 to	 risks.	Natural	hazards	have	become	a	 result	of	 the	intricate	 interaction	 between	 humans	 and	 their	 environment.	 Thus,	 the	 modified	environment	is	considered	a	social	construction	as	well.	Also,	Hoffman	et	al.	(2002)	state	in	 their	 book	 Catastrophe	 and	 Culture,	 “Eminently	 social,	 disasters	 are	 worked	 out	 in	complex	 interactions	and	discourses	 in	which	 the	needs	and	 interest	of	many	 involved	individuals,	 groups,	 and	 organizations	 are	 articulated	 and	 negotiated	 over	 the	 often	extended	duration	of	the	entire	phenomenon.”	(p.	12)	In	addition,	Toueir	(2015,	p.	231)	states,		Since	 disasters	 have	 consequences	 that	 are	 socially	 constructed,	 and	 cities	 are	complex	social,	economic,	political,	and	physical	constructions,	disasters	become	very	 complex	 events.	 These	 calamities	 cause	 the	 destruction/disruption	 of	 a	complex	system,	the	urban	fabric,	making	disasters	complex	events	with	socially	constructed	consequences.	In	their	book	The	Social	Construction	of	Reality,	Berger	et	al.	(1991)	highlight	the	terms	 reality	 and	 knowledge.	 	 Whereas	 the	 first	 stands	 for	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 is	recognized	as	being	 independent	 and	not	 controlled	by	humans,	 the	 second	ascertains	the	reality	of	the	phenomenon	with	the	specific	characteristics	it	has.	This	can	easily	be	applied	 to	disasters,	which	are	realities,	and	 thus	phenomena	on	which	 the	knowledge	has	 often	 been	 taken	 for	 granted.	 Toueir	 (2015)	 makes	 the	 connection	 between	‘sociology	of	knowledge’	and	disasters,	“knowledge	should	be	built	on	an	understanding	of	 the	 different	 processes	 that	 make	 reality	 a	 complex	 process	 because	 it	 is	 a	 social	construction.”	(Toueir,	2015,	p.	226)	As	 for	 vulnerability,	 the	 focus	 in	 this	 research	 is	 on	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 the	residents	 of	 the	 LNW,	 and	 as	 it	 is	 discussed	 in	 Toueir	 (2015)	 and	 in	 Chapter	 4,	vulnerability	 has	 been	 constructed	 historically	 and	 socially.	Morrow	 (1999,	 p.	 1)	 says	that	 “disaster	 vulnerability	 is	 socially	 constructed,	 i.e.,	 it	 arises	 out	 of	 the	 social	 and	economic	 circumstances	 of	 everyday	 living.”	 As	 stated	 by	 Beck	 (2013	 [1992])	 and	 by	
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Hoffman	et	al.	 (2002),	 it	 is	 the	uneven	distribution	of	wealth	and	power	that	renders	a	society	vulnerable.		Inequalities	 in	 class	 and	 risk	 society	 can	 therefore	 overlap	 and	 condition	 one	another;	 the	 latter	 can	 produce	 the	 former.	 The	 unequal	 distribution	 of	 social	wealth	 offers	 almost	 impregnable	 defensive	 walls	 and	 justifications	 for	 the	production	of	risks.	(Beck,	2013	[1992],	p.	44)		Additionally,	 the	 author	 argues	 that	 low-income	 groups	 located	 in	 cheaper	residential	areas	that	are	exposed	to	risks,	and	unlike	the	wealthy,	they	do	not	have	the	financial	means	 to	purchase	 their	 safety.	That	was	especially	 true	 in	post-Katrina	New	Orleans	and	the	LNW.		Vulnerability	 is	 also	 a	 political	 construction,	 as	 it	 can	 result	 from	 the	 series	 of	decisions	 that	were	made	over	 the	 course	of	history.	Toueir	 (2015,	p.	 238)	 states	 that	researchers	should	“understand	the	vulnerabilities	and	how	they	were	constructed	over	the	course	of	history”	so	as	to	increase	knowledge	and	learn	from	old	experiences.	Also,	the	acquired	knowledge	should	be	spread,	“knowledge	gains	a	new	political	significance.	Accordingly	the	political	potential	of	the	risk	society	must	be	elaborated	and	analyzed	in	a	sociological	theory	of	the	origin	and	diffusion	of	knowledge	about	risks.”	 (Beck,	2013	[1992],	 pp.	 23-24).	 Also	 Gotham	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 view	 vulnerability	 “as	 an	 a	 priori	 social	condition	 and	 examines	 the	 social	 and	 political	 construction	 of	 vulnerability	assessments,	interpretations,	and	perceptions.”		Therefore,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 understanding	 the	 vulnerabilities	 of	 an	 urban	community,	it	is	important	to	grasp	the	extent	to	which	natural	disasters	and	the	concept	of	 vulnerability	 are	 socially	 constructed.	 This	 is	 how	 studying	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 a	community,	a	neighborhood,	or	a	city	can	lead	to	sustainable	solutions.	By	determining	that	 vulnerability	 is	 a	 social	 construction,	 then	 researchers	 can	 track	 down,	 through	 a	historical	 study,	 the	 elements	 and	 the	 decisions	 that	 led	 to	 a	 fragile	 state	 that	 cannot	withstand	a	certain	disaster.	And	by	doing	so,	planners	and	governments	can	learn	from	previous	 mistakes	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 better	 and	 more	 sustainable	 future.	 By	ascertaining	 that	 vulnerability	 is	 a	 social	 construction,	 the	 responsibility	 is	 turned	
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toward	decision-makers.	And	then,	maybe,	 the	way	cities	are	planned	can	be	 looked	at	from	a	different	perspective.		
2.2.4.	Resilience	in	the	Literature	Just	 as	 vulnerability	 illustrates	 how	 a	 city	 and	 its	 people	 are	 at	 risk,	 resilience	shows	how	a	city	and	its	people	can	overcome	the	disaster	and	its	impacts.	As	mentioned	earlier,	 it	was	the	concept	of	vulnerability	that	was	first	scrutinized	and	researched	on.	Vulnerability	is	an	a	priori	concept	that	helped	understand	the	weaknesses	of	a	system	before	the	occurrence	of	a	calamity.	But	while	most	vulnerability	studies	were	done	after	the	 occurrence	 of	 a	 disaster	 for	 long,	 recent	 studies	 started	 aiming	 at	 evaluating	 the	vulnerability	 of	 a	 geographic	 area	 or	 of	 a	 community	 before	 the	 disaster	 takes	 place.	Therefore,	 it	was	not	until	recently	that	studying	the	vulnerability	of	a	system	could	be	part	of	disaster	prevention.	This	can	be	shown	in	the	work	of	many	scholars	(Bankoff	et	al.,	 2004;	 Birkmann,	 2006;	 Chardon	 et	 al.,	 1994;	 D'Ercole	 et	 al.,	 1994;	Morrow,	 1999;	Pigeon,	 2002;	 Thomas	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 This	 scholarship	 demonstrated	 that	 vulnerability	must	 be	 looked	 at	 with	 a	 special	 attention	 to	 the	 physical/infrastructure,	 economic,	political,	social,	cultural,	and	historical	levels.		Evaluating	 resilience	 can	 only	 take	 place	 once	 the	 disaster	 happens;	 thus	 it	 is	done	a	posteriori.	This	does	not	mean	that	researchers	and	planners	must	wait	 for	 the	occurrence	of	the	event	in	order	to	react.	On	the	contrary,	this	is	where	both	concepts—vulnerability	 and	 resilience—contribute	 to	 disaster	 research.	 Here	 is	 a	 suggestion	 on	how	to	best	utilize	both	concepts	in	regards	to	the	different	possible	scenarios:	
• Pre-disaster	 scenario:	 evaluate	 the	 possible	 vulnerabilities	 of	 a	 geographic	 area	while	 taking	 into	 account	 physical/infrastructure,	 economic,	 political,	 social,	cultural,	 and	 historical	 factors.	 Pinpoint	 the	 potential	 threats	 or	 hazards	 that	could	 cause	 a	 crisis	 in	 order	 to	 be	 prepared,	 and	 if	 possible,	 list	 the	 hazards	according	 to	 frequency	 and	 priority.	 Enumerate	 the	 available	 resources	 for	disaster	 mitigation	 and	 management.	 Set	 a	 plan	 of	 action	 for	 immediate	intervention,	and	a	recovery	plan	with	the	different	phases	that	could	take	place	while	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 population’s	 needs	 and	 access	 to	 resources.	
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Depending	on	 the	 vulnerabilities,	 prioritize	 the	most	 important	 ones	 and	 tackle	them	 before	 the	 occurrence	 of	 a	 disaster	 in	 order	 to	 minimize	 the	 potential	damage.		
• Post-disaster	scenario:	evaluate	the	vulnerabilities	of	the	affected	geographic	area	in	 order	 to	 track	 down	 the	 source	 of	 the	weaknesses	 and	 the	 reasons	why	 the	system	 did	 not	 withstand	 the	 calamity.	 The	 evaluation	 must	 take	 into	 account	physical/infrastructure,	economic,	political,	social,	cultural,	and	historical	factors.	Depending	 on	 the	 date	 the	 disaster	 occurred,	 the	 system’s	 resilience	 should	 be	examined	 carefully.	 The	 resilience	 of	 a	 city	 or	 community	 changes	 from	 the	occurrence	of	the	disaster	to	the	moment	when	the	dust	settles,	and	then	from	the	cleaning	 and	 recovery	 parts	 to	 when	 the	 systems	 reaches	 a	 functional	 status.	Therefore,	 there	 are	 multiple	 states	 of	 resilience	 and	 this	 will	 be	 explained	further.		Resilience	 has	 been	 taking	 a	 lot	 of	 attention	 in	 disaster	 research,	 although	 it	originated	in	physics,	psychology,	and	ecology.	Resilience	started	as	an	evaluation	of	the	level	of	shock	absorption	in	physics	and	psychology,	and	then	it	found	its	way	into	social	sciences	by	making	a	detour	in	ecology	(Dauphiné	et	al.,	2013;	Klein	et	al.,	2003;	Maret	&	Cadoul,	2008).	A	preliminary	and	simplistic	way	of	presenting	resilience	is	talking	about	the	 three	 states	 at	 which	 this	 concept	 can	 be	 found.	 In	 a	 post-disaster	 situation,	 if	resilience	 is	 considered	 the	 return	 to	 normalcy	 or	 to	 a	 previous	 state,	 then	 three	scenarios	are	present:	1)	 the	 return	 to	a	 situation	worse	 than	 the	previous	one,	2)	 the	return	 to	 a	 situation	 similar	 to	 the	 previous	 one,	 and	 3)	 the	 return	 to	 an	 improved	situation,	better	and	more	sustainable	 than	the	previous.	 It	 is	 important	 to	have	a	pre-determined	opinion	on	how	resilience	is	perceived	in	disaster	research,	because	it	leads	the	 way	 to	 framing	 the	 concept.	 Therefore,	 in	 post-disaster	 situations,	 there	 should	ideally	 be	 a	 consensus	 between	 researchers,	 planners,	 and	 decision-makers	 about	 the	level	 of	 resilience	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 achieved.	 The	 first	 and	 second	 propositions	mentioned	do	not	 reflect	 the	 resilience	of	 a	 city	or	 community,	but	 the	 third	does:	 the	return	to	an	improved	situation.	Yet,	this	statement	is	very	broad	and	can	lead	in	many	directions.	This	is	the	reason	why	scrutinizing	the	concept	of	resilience	is	the	main	focus	
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of	this	research.	The	aim	is	to	look	at	the	concept	from	different	perspectives	and	try,	as	much	as	possible,	to	present	resilience	as	holistically	as	possible.	The	different	levels	of	resilience	and	how	it	is	influenced	by	time	and	space	is	discussed	further	in	Chapter	3.	In	 disaster	 research,	many	 authors	 define	 resilience	 (refer	 to	 table	 2.2)	 and	 all	these	definitions	seem	to	have	a	common	denominator:	‘Resilience’	is	the	‘ability’	or	the	‘capacity’	 to	 ‘cope’	 and	 ‘absorb’	 the	 impacts	 of	 disasters	 (Berke	 et	 al.,	 2006;	 Cardona,	2003;	 Comfort,	 1999;	 Holling,	 1973;	 Holling	 et	 al.,	 1995;	 Horne,	 1998;	 Kendra	 et	 al.,	2003;	Mallak,	1998;	Maret	&	Cadoul,	2008;	Mileti,	1999;	Paton	et	al.,	2000;	Pelling,	2003;	UNISDR,	2005;	Wildavsky,	1991).	Manyena	(2006)	presents	a	very	cumulative	list	of	the	different	 definitions	 of	 resilience	 in	 his	 article,	 and	 he	 points	 out	 that	 it	 is	 a	 highly	contested	 concept	 in	 the	 literature.	 In	 this	 research,	 it	 was	 imperative	 to	 look	 at	 the	different	definitions	to	better	understand	how	the	literature	is	positioned	in	terms	of	all	the	different	perspectives.		Table	2.2:	A	portray	of	the	many	definitions	of	resilience	(inspired	by	Manyena	(2006)	and	compiled	by	the	author)	
Author	 Definition	
Holling	(1973)	
Resilience	determines	the	persistence	of	relationships	within	a	system	and	is	a	measure	of	the	ability	of	these	systems	to	absorb	changes	of	state	variables,	driving	variables,	and	parameters,	and	 still	persist.	 In	 this	definition	 resilience	 is	 the	property	of	 the	 system	and	persistence	or	probability	of	extinction	is	the	result.	
Wildavsky	
(1991)	 Resilience	is	the	capacity	to	cope	with	unanticipated	dangers	after	they	have	become	manifest,	learning	to	bounce	back.	
Holling	et	al.	
(1995)	
It	 is	the	buffer	capacity	or	the	ability	of	a	system	to	absorb	perturbation,	or	the	magnitude	of	disturbance	 that	 can	 be	 absorbed	 before	 a	 system	 changes	 its	 structure	 by	 changing	 the	variables.	
Horne	(1998)	 Resilience	is	a	fundamental	quality	of	individuals,	groups	and	organizations,	and	systems	as	a	whole	 to	 respond	 productively	 to	 significant	 change	 that	 disrupts	 the	 expected	 pattern	 of	events	without	engaging	in	an	extended	period	of	regressive	behavior.		
Mallak	(1998)	 Resilience	is	the	ability	of	an	individual	or	organization	to	expeditiously	design	and	implement	positive	 adaptive	 behaviors	 matched	 to	 the	 immediate	 situation,	 while	 enduring	 minimal	stress.	
Mileti	(1999)	 Local	 resilience	with	 regard	 to	disasters	means	 that	 a	 locale	 is	 able	 to	withstand	an	extreme	natural	event	without	suffering	devastating	losses,	damage,	diminished	productivity,	or	quality	of	life	without	a	large	amount	of	assistance	from	outside	the	community.	
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Paton	et	al.	
(2000)	
Resilience	describes	 an	active	process	of	 self-righting,	 learned	 resourcefulness	 and	growth—the	ability	to	function	psychologically	at	a	level	far	greater	than	expected	given	the	individual’s	capabilities	and	previous	experiences.	
Kendra	et	al.	
(2003)	 The	ability	to	respond	to	singular	or	unique	events.	
Cardona	(2003)	 The	capacity	of	the	damaged	ecosystem	or	community	to	absorb	negative	impacts	and	recover	from	these.	
Pelling	(2003)	
The	ability	of	an	actor	to	cope	with	or	adapt	to	hazard	stress.	The	capacity	to	adjust	to	threats	and	mitigate	or	avoid	harm.	Resilience	can	be	found	in	hazard-resistant	buildings	or	adaptive	social	systems.	
Resilience	
Alliance	(2005)	
Ecosystem	resilience	is	the	capacity	of	an	ecosystem	to	tolerate	disturbance	without	collapsing	into	a	qualitatively	different	state	that	 is	controlled	by	a	different	set	of	processes.	A	resilient	ecosystem	can	withstand	shocks	and	rebuild	itself	when	necessary.	Resilience	in	social	systems	has	the	added	capacity	of	humans	to	anticipate	and	plan	for	the	future.	
UNISDR	(2005)	
The	 capacity	 of	 a	 system,	 community	 or	 society	 potentially	 exposed	 to	 hazards	 to	 adapt,	 by	resisting	 or	 changing	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 and	maintain	 an	 acceptable	 level	 of	 functioning	 and	structure.	This	determined	by	 the	degree	 to	which	 the	 social	 system	 is	 capable	of	organizing	itself	to	increase	this	capacity	for	learning	from	past	disasters	for	better	future	protection	and	to	improve	risk	reduction	measures.	
Vale	et	al.	(2005)	
The	 term	 resilient	 city	 implies	 finality,	 but	 it	 is	 always	 coupled	 with	 an	 ongoing	 recovery	process	 that,	 for	 many	 people,	 will	 never	 quite	 end.	 […]	 the	 goal	 should	 be	 productive	openness,	 ability	 to	 structure	 and	 confront	 the	 contradictory	 impulses	 inherent	 in	 the	contested	 processes	 of	 recovery	 and	 remembrance.	 […]	We	 don’t	 always	 get	 over	 traumatic	events,	but	we	do	get	through	them.	
Maret	and	
Cadoul	(2008)	
Resilience,	 an	 after	 crisis	 phenomenon,	 only	 takes	 place	 if	 the	 community	 is	 prepared	 to	undergo	 the	 catastrophe:	 by	 doing	 that,	 the	 community	 positions	 itself	 ahead	 of	 crisis	management.		Resilience	 is	 the	 capacity	 to	 overcome	 a	 catastrophe,	 while	 adopting	 a	 sustainable	configuration.4	
Ungar	et	al.	
(2008)	
Resilience	 is	 the	 capacity	 of	 individuals	 to	navigate	 their	way	 to	 resources	 that	 sustain	well-being;	second,	resilience	is	the	capacity	of	individuals’	physical	and	social	ecologies	to	provide	these	 resources;	 and	 third,	 resilience	 is	 the	 capacity	 of	 individuals	 and	 their	 families	 and	communities	to	negotiate	culturally	meaningful	ways	for	resources	to	be	shared.		
Cutter	et	al.	
(2008)	
A	system’s	capacity	to	absorb	disturbance	and	re-organize	into	a	fully	functioning	system.	It	includes	not	only	a	system’s	capacity	to	return	to	the	state	(or	multiple	states)	that	existed	before	the	disturbance,	but	also	to	advance	the	state	through	learning	and	adaptation.	
Gotham	et	al.	
(2011)	 We	view	resilience	as	incorporating	three	factors:	the	ability	to	absorb	shocks	and	trauma,	the	ability	to	bounce	back	and	recover,	and	the	ability	to	learn,	adapt,	and	innovate.																																																									
4		Free	translation	by	the	author,	the	original	statement	is	:	“la	résilience	est	alors	la	capacité	ou	l’acte	de	retrouver	un	fonctionnement	 normal	 après	 le	 désastre.	 […]	 la	 résilience	 prend	 aussi	 le	 sens	 de	 capacité	 à	 se	 remettre	 d’une	catastrophe,	mais	en	adoptant	une	configuration	plus	durable.”	The	translated	version	is	:	«	Resilience	is	the	capacity	to	overcome	a	catastrophe,	while	adopting	a	sustainable	configuration.”	
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Manyena	(2011)	 Disaster	resilience	could	be	viewed	as	the	intrinsic	capacity	of	a	system,	community	or	society	predisposed	to	a	shock	or	stress	to	“bounce	forward”	and	adapt	in	order	to	survive	by	changing	its	non-essential	attributes	and	rebuilding	itself.	
Oliver	et	al.	
(2014)	 We	argue	 that	 resilience	does	not	necessarily	mean	returning	 to	an	original	 state	but	may	 in	fact	mean	moving	towards	a	more	viable	state.			The	selection	of	 the	definitions	 that	are	presented	 in	 this	section	 is	pertinent	 to	this	research	as	they	allow	a	more	holistic	view	on	the	concept.	This	permits	for	a	wide-eyed	 perspective,	 which	 matter	 insofar	 as	 the	 aim	 is	 to	 scrutinize	 the	 concept.	 The	definition	presented	by	Holling	 (1973)	 is	 the	most	 cited	 in	disaster	 research.	Although	the	 author	 refers	 to	 ecosystems,	 it	 was	 nonetheless	 the	 pioneering	 definition	when	 it	comes	 to	 post-disaster	 resilience.	 Over	 the	 following	 few	 decades,	 more	 definitions	appeared,	 as	 researchers	 paid	 more	 and	 more	 attention	 to	 disaster	 prevention,	mitigation,	and	management.	Maret	and	Cadoul	(2008,	p.	114)	define	it	as	the:	‘capacity	or	ability	to	return	to	a	normal	functioning,	but	with	a	more	sustainable	configuration’.	The	 authors	 base	 their	 definition	 on	 Pelling	 (2003),	 and	 this	 only	 shows	 how	 the	definitions	are	all	related	somehow.		In	his	dissertation	and	in	a	more	recent	editorial,	Manyena	(2009,	2011)		presents	resilience	with	 a	 new	 perspective.	 He	 states	 that	 “Like	most	 social	 science	 constructs,	there	 is	 some	 confusion	 over	 the	 definition	 of	 resilience.”	 (Manyena,	 2011,	 p.	 418)	He	argues	that	disasters	lead	to	change	and	the	notion	of	bouncing	back	leads	to	the	return	to	 a	 previous	 state;	 therefore,	 that	 notion	 lacks	 in	 precision	 because	 returning	 to	 the	original	state	does	not	mean	change.	The	author	states	that	this	could	mean	“a	return	to	vulnerability	 and	 bouncing	 back	 to	 the	 conditions	 that	 caused	 the	 disaster	 in	 the	 first	place;	 they	may	 re-create	 and	 strengthen	 the	 pre-disaster	 structures	 and	 institutions.”	(Manyena,	2011,	p.	419)	In	this	case,	resilience	does	not	contribute	to	improving	the	pre-existing	 conditions	 but	 it	 helps	 re-instate	 a	 vulnerable	 state.	 Thus,	 he	 proposes	 that	resilience	should	be	 looked	at	as	a	“bouncing	 forward”	concept	 in	order	to	surpass	the	disaster.	This	is	relevant	to	this	research	project	because	it	proposes	to	look	at	resilience	
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through	 time	 and	 at	 the	 different	 geographic	 scales,	 which	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 more	details	in	Chapter	3.		The	definitions	that	are	pertinent	to	this	research	are	the	ones	that	highlight	the	element	 of	 time,	 and	 more	 specifically	 Cutter	 et	 al.	 (2008);	 Gotham	 et	 al.	 (2011);	Manyena	(2011);	Maret	and	Cadoul	(2008);	Oliver	et	al.	(2014);	Ungar	et	al.	(2008).	All	look	at	resilience	not	only	as	a	return	to	a	normal	equilibrium	and	the	ability	of	people	to	adjust	to	the	harshness	of	the	event,	but	also	as	means	to	create	more	sustainable	urban	fabrics	with	communities	that	can	withstand	and	overcome	future	disasters.	Therefore,	the	aim	of	this	study	is	not	to	define	the	concepts	of	‘vulnerability’	and	‘resilience’,	but	to	adopt	the	definitions	stated	in	the	already	existing	literature.	The	chosen	definitions	are	the	ones	that	 look	at	these	concepts	from	a	social	perspective,	but	also	those	that	view	resilience	as	a	return	to	a	more	sustainable,	improved,	and	durable	state	which	will	lead	to	better	planning	strategies	in	the	future.	However,	in	all	the	definitions	stated	above,	the	role	of	culture	on	the	resilience	of	a	community	is	nowhere	to	be	found,	even	though	each	community	in	every	city	in	the	world	has	 its	own	cultural	 identity	and	social	 structures.	Therefore,	why	 is	culture	not	present	in	any	resilience-related	research?	This	research	relies	primarily	on	the	impact	cultural	identity	and	values	have	on	a	community.	With	respect	to	disasters,	the	focus	is	to	 look	 at	 these	 elements	 and	 how	 they	 contribute,	 or	 not,	 to	 the	 resilience	 of	 a	devastated	 community.	 The	 focus	 has	 always	 been	 and	 still	 is	 on	 rebuilding	 the	infrastructure	 and	 physical	 environment,	 which	 is	 crucial	 in	 post-disaster	reconstruction,	 but	 the	 cultural	 element	 seems	 to	 always	 linger	 in	 the	 background	instead	of	 being	 as	 important	 as	 restoring	 the	 infrastructure	 and	 the	 economy.	A	 vital	part	of	rebuilding	a	community	is	the	residents’	need	to	return	home	and	build	back	their	houses	and	their	networks,	but	it	seems	to	fall	behind	on	the	priority	list	when	it	comes	to	 reality.	 This	 research	 assumes	 that	 place	 attachment	 and	 social	 networks	 play	 an	important	 role	when	 it	 comes	 to	 community	 resilience.	 Hence,	 it	 uses	 the	 case	 of	 the	LNW	after	Hurricane	Katrina	to	evaluate	whether	or	not	these	elements	contribute	to	the	resilience	of	the	neighborhood.		
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In	 order	 to	 conduct	 such	 as	 study,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 find	 the	 source	 of	 place	attachment,	cultural	identity,	and	social	networks	when	addressing	an	urban	community.	All	these	highlighted	elements	fall	under	the	definition	of	the	‘cultural	landscape’,	which	is	detailed	in	the	following	section.	It	is	vital	to	define	the	relationship	between	resilience	and	 the	 cultural	 landscape,	 as	 it	 is	 the	 key	 to	 looking	 and	 evaluating	 the	 concept	 of	resilience	 from	a	new	perspective.	The	 contribution	 to	 the	 literature	on	 resilience	 and	disasters	is	at	the	cultural	landscape	level.		
2.3.	The	Cultural	Landscape	
2.3.1.	Definition	of	the	Cultural	Landscape	As	mentioned	earlier,	 the	 focus	of	 this	work	 is	 on	how	 to	 foster	 resilient	urban	communities.	 These	 communities	 exist	 in	 a	 very	 specific	 context	 and	 thrive	 on	 very	complex	social	structures	that	give	them	their	own	identity.	This	identity	is	engraved	in	people’s	 memory	 and	 is	 reflected	 in	 their	 cultural	 values	 and	 traditions.	 Over	 time,	people	have	deeper	and	deeper	 roots	with	 the	 surrounding	environment,	 along	with	a	strong	 attachment	 to	 their	 home,	 their	 neighborhood,	 and	 their	 community.	 The	combination	of	place	attachment,	identity,	cultural	values,	social	networks,	and	memory	forms	 the	 ‘cultural	 landscape’,	 which	 is	 unique	 to	 each	 city,	 and	 sometimes	 to	 every	neighborhood.	In	this	section,	the	cultural	landscape	will	be	explored	and	defined	to	have	a	 better	 understanding	 of	 how	 and	 why	 this	 landscape	 is	 important	 in	 post-disaster	situations,	and	how	understanding	it	can	affect	community	resilience.	Being	the	essence	of	the	inception	of	the	cultural	landscape,	‘Cultural	Geography’	is	a	sub-field	of	‘Human	Geography’,	with	the	American	geographer	Carl	O.	Sauer	as	the	initiator.	In	his	article,	The	Morphology	of	Landscape,	he	defines	it	as	follows,		The	cultural	landscape	is	fashioned	out	of	a	natural	landscape	by	a	culture	group.	Culture	 is	 the	agent,	 the	natural	areas	 is	 the	medium,	 the	cultural	 landscape	the	result.	Under	the	influence	of	a	given	culture,	itself	changing	through	phases,	and	probably	 reaching	 ultimately	 the	 end	 of	 its	 cycle	 of	 development.	 With	 the	introduction	 if	 a	 different,	 that	 is,	 alien	 culture,	 a	 rejuvenation	 of	 the	 cultural	
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landscape	sets	in,	or	a	new	landscape	is	superimposed	on	remnants	of	a	an	older	one.	The	natural	landscape	is	of	course	of	fundamental	importance,	for	it	supplies	the	materials	 out	 of	which	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 is	 formed.	 The	 shaping	 force,	however,	lies	in	the	culture	itself.	(Sauer,	2007	[1925],	p.	46)	In	the	quote	above,	the	author	puts	the	main	emphasis	on	culture	as	the	shaping	force	and	the	agent	responsible	 for	 transforming	a	 landscape	 into	a	cultural	 landscape.	Another	 author	 who	 marked	 the	 field	 greatly,	 is	 the	 Chinese	 geographer	 Yi-Fu	 Tuan.	According	to	him,	he	looks	at	the	landscape	from	a	sensorial	perspective	where,		Landscape,	 like	 culture,	 is	 elusive	 and	 difficult	 to	 describe	 in	 a	 phrase.	What	 is	culture	 how	 does	 one	 delimit	 a	 culture	 area?	 The	 contents	 of	 culture	 can	 be	itemized,	although	if	one	is	meticulous	the	list	threatens	to	grow	to	interminable	length.	 Culture	 is	 not	 such	 a	 list.	 Landscape,	 likewise,	 is	 not	 to	 be	 defined	 by	itemizing	 its	 parts.	 The	 parts	 are	 subsidiary	 clues	 to	 an	 integrated	 image.	Landscape	is	such	an	image,	a	construct	of	the	mind	and	of	feeling.	(Tuan,	1979,	p.	89)	While	 cultural	 geography	 gave	 a	 unique	 perspective	 on	 defining	 the	 cultural	landscape,	other	disciplines	 started	showing	 interest.	 For	 the	purpose	of	 this	 research,	the	 definition	 of	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 combines	 all	 three	 fields:	 ‘Cultural	 Geography’,	‘Landscape	Ecology’,	and	‘Historical	Ecology’.		At	first,	Landscape	Ecology	was	first	initiated	by	Carl	Troll	in	1971	(Forman	et	al.,	1986;	Naveh	et	al.,	1984).	Then,	in	the	1980s,	it	diverged	in	two	directions:	the	European	and	the	North	American.	The	European	was	led	by	Naveh	and	Lieberman,	and	the	North	American	was	 led	 by	 Forman	 and	 Godron.	 Naveh	 et	 al.	 (1984,	 p.	 3)	 define	 Landscape	Ecology	as,		a	young	branch	of	modern	ecology	that	deals	with	the	interrelationship	between	man	 and	 his	 open	 and	 built-up	 landscapes.	 […]	 landscape	 ecology	 evolved	 in	central	 Europe	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 holistic	 approach	 adopted	 by	 geographers,	ecologists,	landscape	planners,	designers,	and	managers	in	their	attempt	to	bridge	the	gap	between	natural,	agricultural,	human,	and	urban	systems.		
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For	these	two	authors,	landscape	is	a	‘Gestalt’	system	where	the	sum	of	its	parts	is	more	 than	 the	whole.	 According	 to	 this	 approach,	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 is	 defined	 as	follows:	“We	can	consider	all	human	inhabited,	influenced	or	modified	landscapes	as	the	tangible	product	of	interactions	between	nature	and	culture.”	(Naveh,	1995,	p.	46)		The	 North	 American	 approach	 presented	 by	 Forman	 and	 Godron	 (1986)	 is	slightly	different.	The	first	looks	at	the	landscape	from	a	more	objective	look,	they	define	the	 ‘landscape’	 and	 ‘landscape	 ecology’	 as	 follows:	 “We	 now	 see	 the	 landscape	 as	 a	distinct,	measurable	unite	defined	by	its	recognizable	and	spatially	repetitive	cluster	of	interacting	ecosystems,	geomorphology,	and	disturbance	regimes.”	(Forman	et	al.,	1986,	p.	11)	They	geared	 their	attention	on	 the	relationships	between	 the	different	elements	constituting	 the	 landscape,	 and	 they	 do	 not	 put	 a	 lot	 of	 emphasis	 on	 the	 human	contribution	to	the	landscape.		Following	the	European	approach	in	landscape	ecology,	Tress	et	al.	(2001,	p.	151)	believe	 that	 “people	play	a	dual	role	 in	 the	people-landscape	 interaction”.	According	to	them,	humans	influence	the	landscape,	and,	in	turn,	the	landscape	influences	them,	be	it	at	 the	 visual,	 but	 also	 at	 the	 mental	 and	 physical	 levels.	 The	 diagram	 in	 Figure	 2.1	illustrates	this	interaction.		
	Figure	2.1:	The	people-landscape	interaction	model.	(source:	Tress	and	Tress,	2001)			Adding	to	the	definition	proposed	by	Tress	and	Tress	(2001),	Ruiz	et	al.	(2005,	p.	69)	put	forth	that	“all	landscape	dimensions	are	relevant	and	need	to	be	treated	with	the	same	consideration,	as	are	the	interactions	between	them”.	They	put	an	emphasis	on	the	
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impact	 humans	 have	 on	 landscapes,	 and	 how	 they	 play	 a	 major	 role	 in	 their	transformation.	They	portray	their	landscape	model	in	Figure	2.2,	where	they	show	that	the	 landscape	 is	made	 of	 the	 land,	 the	 individual,	 and	 the	 interactions	 between	 them.	Also,	they	say	that	the	landscape	is	the	result	of	the	interactions	of	humans	with	the	land,	and	the	land	is	affected	by	how	people	perceive	it.		
	Figure	2.2:	Generic	landscape	model	(adapted	and	modified	from	Tress	and	Tress	2001),	(source:	Ruiz	and	Domon,	2005)	
2.3.2.	Landscape	Ecology	versus	Historical	Ecology	Since	 these	 two	 fields	are	more	 recent,	 this	dissertation	will	 focus	on	 them	and	not	 on	 Cultural	 Geography.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 latter	 took	 a	 turn	 toward	focusing	 on	 culture	 alone,	 and	 this	 research	 looks	 at	 elements	 beyond	 culture	 alone.	Historical	ecology	started	in	the	late	1990s	and	has	been	explored	primarily	by	William	Balée	(2002,	2006).	Although	historical	ecology	is	much	younger	than	landscape	ecology,	it	 too	 focuses	on	 the	 important	relationship	between	nature	and	culture,	 thus	between	humans	and	the	biosphere.	Moreover,	it	puts	the	emphasis	on	the	historical	aspect	that	humans	 play	 on	 transforming	 the	 landscape.	 Balée	 (2006,	 p.	 76)	 defines	 historical	ecology	 as	 a	 program	 that	 focuses	 on	 the	 relationships	 formed	 over	 time	 “between	societies	 and	 environments	 and	 the	 consequences	 of	 these	 interactions	 for	understanding	 the	 formation	 of	 contemporary	 and	 past	 cultures	 and	 landscapes”,	because	defining	these	‘interactions’	helps	in	the	understanding	of	the	local	culture	and	traditions.	In	a	later	text,	Balée	et	al.	(2006,	p.	1)	use	the	following	definition:		
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Historical	 ecology	 is	 an	 interdisciplinary	 approach.	 It	 focuses	 on	 the	 historical	landscape,	a	multidimensional	physical	entity	that	has	both	spatial	and	temporal	characteristics	 and	 has	 been	 modified	 by	 human	 activity	 such	 that	 human	intentions	and	actions	can	be	inferred,	if	not	read	as	material	culture,	from	it.	For	Balée	et	al.	(2006),	landscape	is	an	inaccessible	text.	It	is	written	in	a	manner	which	 is	 not	 readable,	 but	 consists	 nonetheless	 in	 acquired	 human	 actions	 and	behaviors—‘culture’.	 For	 them	 “[c]ulture	 is	 physically	 embedded	 and	 inscribed	 in	 the	landscape	as	nonrandom	patterning,	often	a	palimpsest	of	continuous	and	discontinuous	inhabitation	by	past	and	present	people”	(Balée	et	al.,	2006,	p.	2).	Therefore,	in	historical	ecology,	the	focal	element	of	interest	is	the	‘landscape’,	and	the	landscape	is	the	“product	of	the	collision	between	nature	and	culture”	(Balée	et	al.,	2006,	p.	2)	regardless	of	where	this	‘collision’	takes	place.	The	figure	below	(Figure	2.3)	proposes	the	following	diagram	as	the	definition	of	the	‘landscape’.				 			
			 Figure	2.3:	The	'landscape'	viewed	as	a	'collision'	in	historical	ecology.	(source:	author)		In	 conclusion,	 the	 two	 approaches	 are	 relevant	 to	 this	 research,	 and	 their	definitions	of	the	‘landscape’	or	the	‘cultural	landscape’	are	very	similar.	But,	the	fields	of	landscape	ecology	focuses	more	on	ecosystems	and	the	impact	humans	have	on	the	state.	It	 also	 emphasizes	 the	 richness	 of	 the	 ecological	 biodiversity	 in	 natural	 ecosystems.	
Culture	Nature Landscape	
Time	
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Historical	 ecology	 puts	 more	 emphasis	 on	 the	 role	 humans	 have	 in	 transforming	 the	landscape	over	time.	Such	a	role	is	not	necessarily	perceived	as	a	nuisance	like	it	is	seen	in	 landscape	ecology.	Figure	2.4,	a	comparison	of	both	 fields	 is	put	 forth	to	explain	the	choice	 made	 in	 this	 research,	 which	 clarifies	 and	 summarizes	 the	 views	 proposed	 by	both	 fields.	 Therefore,	 the	 definition	 adopted	 in	 this	 research	 is	 the	 historical	 ecology	one.		 						 Figure	2.4:	Comparison	of	landscape's	definitions	in	'Landscape	Ecology'	and	'Historical	Ecology'.	(source:	author)	Now	 that	 a	 definition	 of	 the	 landscape	 has	 been	 drawn,	mostly	 from	 historical	ecology,	the	concept	of	‘cultural	landscape’	used	in	this	research	can	be	detailed	further.	Over	time,	people	change	the	landscape	to	fit	their	needs;	in	return,	the	landscape	affects	the	people	that	inhabit	it.	It	is	an	interactive	relationship	that	evolves	and	changes	over	time.	 The	 very	 result	 of	 this	 relationship	 is	 the	 ‘cultural	 landscape’.	 In	 Figure	 2.5,	 the	diagram	 shows	 that	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 is	 the	 result	 of	 an	 interactive	 relationship	between	people	and	the	 landscape;	when	people	 inhabit	a	 landscape,	 they	cause	direct	changes	to	make	it	fit	their	needs,	and	the	modified	landscape	indirectly	causes	changes	to	the	generations	of	people	living	in	it	over	time.	Culture	and	traditions	give	a	place	its	identity,	and	without	an	identity	there	is	no	past	or	future.	But	the	cultural	landscape	is	always	changing	and	evolving	over	time.	Also,	looking	at	the	landscape	as	the	interaction	between	people	 and	nature	 is	 very	 broad,	 this	 research	will	 thus	 look	 at	 it	with	more	depth.		
Landscape	Ecology	 Historical	Ecology	Both	define	landscape	as	the	interaction	between	nature	and	culture		Focus	on	natural	ecosystems,	and	biodiversity	 Focus	on	people,	time,	and	history	
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	 						 Figure	2.5:	The	interactive	relationship	between	people	and	nature.	People	directly	change	nature	to	fit	their	needs,	and	the	cultural	landscape	indirectly	changes	people	to	adate	to	its	configuration.	(source:	author)		As	 mentioned	 previously,	 cultural	 landscapes	 are	 the	 result	 of	 an	 interactive	relationship	between	people	and	their	surrounding	landscape,	and	this	relationship	is	at	risk	 when	 a	 disaster	 takes	 place.	 But	 what	 happens	 to	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 after	 a	disaster?	How	does	the	cultural	 landscape	affect	community	resilience?	Do	the	cultural	elements	help,	or	not,	 in	rebuilding	a	community	devastated	by	a	disaster?	What	about	the	case	of	the	LNW	after	Hurricane	Katrina?			
2.3.3.	Elements	of	the	Cultural	Landscape	
Place	Attachment	and	Social	Networks	When	talking	about	the	attachment	people	have	to	their	environment,	one	should	keep	in	mind	the	community	at	hand,	the	identity	of	the	place	in	question,	and	the	social	networks	present	in	that	specific	place	as	they	contribute	directly	to	the	‘sense	of	place’.		Human	 relations	 vary	 and	 they	 follow	 two	 major	 trends,	 one	 defined	 as	community	and	the	other	as	society.	Tonnies	(1957)	puts	forth	a	differentiation	whence	community	 (Gemeinschaft)	 is	 the	 result	 of	 “real	 and	 organic	 life”,	 and	 society	(Gesellschaft)	is	the	result	of	“imaginary	and	mechanical	structure”.	The	author	states,		
People	 Nature	
Cultural	Landscape	
direct	changes	
indirect	changes	
	 37	
All	intimate,	private,	and	exclusive	living	together,	so	we	discover,	is	understood	as	life	in	Gemeinschaft	(community).	Gesellschaft	(society)	is	public	life—it	is	the	world	itself.	In	Gemeinschaft	with	one’s	family,	one	lives	from	birth	on,	bound	to	it	in	weal	 and	woe.	One	 goes	 into	Gesellschaft	 as	 one	 goes	 into	 a	 strange	 society.	(Tonnies,	1957,	pp.	33-34)		According	 to	 Gans	 (1962,	 p.	 105),	 “the	 specific	 institutions	 that	 constitute	 the	community	 are	 the	 church;	 the	 parochial	 school;	 formal	 social,	 civic,	 and	 political	organizations,	 some	of	 them	 church-related;	 and	 some	 commercial	 establishments.”	 In	the	context	of	this	research,	this	last	statement	is	particularly	pertinent	where	the	focus	is	on	the	community	of	the	LNW,	which	is	very	attached	to	its	churches,	schools,	and	local	businesses.		Home	and	place	attachment	become	crucial	when	a	region	is	hit	by	a	disaster.	A	home	reflects	upon	the	identity	of	the	people	inhabiting	it,	thus	whom	they	are	and	what	their	 traditions	 are.	 Falk	 et	 al.	 (2006,	 p.	 116)	 define	 ‘place’	 as	 “a	 geographical	 unit	 in	which	identity	is	grounded	[…]	place	is	viewed	as	an	important	aspect	of	the	self	that	is	simultaneously	a	physical	setting	outside	of	the	person	and	a	symbolic	presence	within	the	person”,	and	for	them	‘home’	is	not	where	people	have	lived	for	a	certain	number	of	years,	 but	 rather	where	 they	 came	 from.	When	a	home	 is	 destroyed	by	 a	disaster,	 the	identity	of	 the	home	 is	 compromised;	all	 the	memories	 that	 took	place	under	 this	 roof	are	erased;	sometimes	lives	are	lost	“if	you	have	organized	your	lives	around	the	shape	of	 that	 house.	 To	 lose	 it	 is	 to	 lose	 a	 part	 of	 you”(Convery	 et	 al.,	 2008,	 p.	 101).	 This	 is	applicable	at	the	level	of	a	home,	a	neighborhood,	or	a	city,	all	things	to	which	people	can	develop	an	attachment	to.	This	attachment	is	a	reflection	of	the	identity	of	the	people	and	their	environment.	Tuan	(1990)	refers	to	this	attachment	as	Topophilia	and	he	defines	it	as	 “the	 affective	 bond	 between	 people	 and	 place	 or	 setting”	 (p.	 4).	 For	 the	 author,	topophilia	is	the	result	of	humans’	perception	of	their	environment	and	that	two	people	or	 two	 social	 groups	 will	 not	 look	 at	 the	 environment	 in	 the	 same	way,	 it	 is	 culture-bound.	In	his	opinion,		
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the	word	 “topophilia”	 is	 a	neologism,	useful	 in	 that	 it	 can	be	defined	broadly	 to	include	 all	 of	 the	 human	 being’s	 affective	 ties	 with	 the	 material	 environment.	These	 differ	 greatly	 in	 intensity,	 subtlety,	 and	 mode	 of	 expression.	 […]	 More	permanent	 and	 less	 easy	 to	 express	 are	 feelings	 that	 one	 had	 toward	 a	 place	because	it	is	home,	the	locus	of	memories,	and	the	means	of	gaining	a	livelihood.	(Tuan,	1990,	p.	93)	After	 a	 disaster	 takes	 place,	 the	 people	 who	 decide	 to	 stay	 and	 rebuild	 their	homes	 find	 themselves	 facing	 two	 major	 obstacles:	 the	 first	 is	 to	 overcome	psychologically	the	experience	they	have	endured,	and	the	second	is	to	live	with	all	the	complications	of	 rebuilding	 (Colten	et	al.,	2009;	Convery	et	al.,	2008).	Therefore,	 these	people	 need	 ‘strong	 ties’	 which	 will	 “enhance	 collective	 capacities	 endeavors.	 The	absence	of	strong	ties	increases	uncertainty	between	networked	actors”(Nicholls,	2008,	p.	 4).	 Furthermore,	 government	 support	 and	 aid	 in	 pre	 and	 post-disaster	 situations	 is	very	important,	for	without	it,	people	would	not	return	to	their	homes,	and	bonds	with	their	environments	would	be	broken,	if	only	because	the	city	or	homes	they	once	lived	in	are	 not	 just	 a	 set	 of	 buildings	 or	 simple	 structures,	 but	 rather	 are	 series	 of	 complex	relationships	between	 ‘human	 lives’	 and	 ‘social	 networks’	 that	 give	 a	place	 its	 identity	and	bring	it	to	life	(Berke	et	al.,	2006;	Vale	et	al.,	2005).		An	 important	 element	 to	 be	 considered	when	 talking	 about	 disasters	 and	 post-disaster	 situations	 is	 the	 presence	 of	 social	 networks	 as	 they	 help	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 a	stronger	 attachment	 to	 place.	 Topophilia	 and	 social	 networks—whether	 formal	 or	informal—go	hand	in	hand	when	defining	the	identity	of	a	place.	The	presence	of	strong	social	networks	generates	an	attachment	to	a	home,	a	community,	and	a	neighborhood.	According	to	Falk	et	al.	(2006,	pp.	116-117),		one’s	 sense	 of	 place	 is	 grounded	 heavily	 in	 interpersonal	 social	 relations,	especially	 those	 involving	 family	 and	 community.	 […]	 a	 person’s	 social	 and	existential	identity	is,	to	some	degree,	a	by-product	of	where	they	live.	They	are	in	part	who	 they	 are	 because	 of	 where	 they	 are.	When	 families	 and	 communities	exist	 in	 one	 area	 for	 generations,	 their	 sense	 of	 place	 may	 be	 very	 strong—
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keeping	them	there	in	good	times	and	bad,	and	drawing	them	back	after	they	have	moved	away.	This	is	a	crucial	point	after	the	occurrence	of	a	disaster.	Paton	et	al.	(2001)	state	that	 ‘sense	 of	 community’	 helps	 people	 get	 more	 involved	 in	 the	 rebuilding	 of	 their	homes	and	 their	community,	and	 this	 is	more	challenging	 if	 there	were	not	any	strong	social	 networks.	 Also,	 they	 believe	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 such	 networks	 will	 render	 a	community	 more	 vulnerable	 after	 a	 disaster	 and	 will	 encourage	 the	 feeling	 of	helplessness	and	isolation.	Furthermore,	coping	is	an	important	element	to	foster	after	a	life-altering	event.	Therefore,	“the	more	people	who	are	involved	in	community	activities	that	 engender	 a	 sense	 of	 community,	 efficacy	 and	problem	 solving,	 the	 greater	will	 be	their	resilience	to	adversity”	(Paton	et	al.,	2001,	p.	274).	One	more	element	to	look	for	is	‘community	empowerment’;	it	becomes	fundamental	in	the	decision-making	process	and	“the	key	elements	in	this	community	empowerment	model	can	be	summarized	in	terms	of	the	efficacy,	coping,	sense	of	community	and	support	constructs”	(Paton	et	al.,	2001,	p.	274).	 Another	form	of	social	networks	that	is	not	often	discussed	is	the	‘informal	social	network’.	Informal	social	networks	are	important	in	any	urban	community.	They	consist	in	 the	 things	 taking	 place	 regardless	 of	 the	 formal	 social	 networks	 and	 organizations.	They	are	the	relationships	between	neighbors,	the	gatherings	in	religious	events,	and	any	sorts	of	informal	gatherings	that	are	specific	to	urban	communities	belonging	to	certain	cultures.	Sopher	(1979,	p.	137)	states,		The	primary	content	of	home,	from	what	people	say,	is	not	material	landscape	but	people.	When	one	is	absent,	recollection	of	home	is	primarily	of	the	human	beings	there.	Without	the	continuing	presence	of	 the	sustaining	group,	 the	place	would	no	longer	be	home.	It	 is	one’s	relations	with	this	nurturing	and	sheltering	group	as	they	are	associated	with	the	landscape	that	give	it	meaning	as	the	landscape	of	home.		These	 informal	 social	 networks	 go	 unnoticed	 in	 post-disaster	 situations,	 since	they	 only	 exist	 in	 action	 and	 are	 passed	 on	 from	 generation	 to	 generation	 due	 to	
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traditions,	 forming	 the	 cultural	 identity	 of	 a	 community.	When	 a	 disaster	 takes	 place,	these	 informal	networks	are	 the	ones	 that	help	people	heal	and	come	back	together	 to	form	 the	 ‘formal	 social	 networks’.	 Only	 they	 create	 local	 organizations	 and	 grassroots	movements	in	order	to	promote	the	emotional	and	physical	rebuilding	of	a	community.	In	the	course	of	this	research,	these	informal	social	networks	will	be	a	key	source,	as	they	will	help	understand	the	attachment	people	have	with	their	neighborhood	regardless	of	its	 vulnerabilities.	 And	 they	 will	 show	 how	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 is	 formed	 (pre-disaster)	and	continues	to	evolve	(post-disaster).		In	 his	 dissertation,	 Haynes	 (2013,	 p.	 xv)	 “explores	 sports	 form	 a	 cultural	perspective	to	understand	the	perceived	social	values	provided	to	the	host	community.”	His	research	shows	how	Hurricane	Katrina	changed	the	collective	identity	of	the	city	of	New	Orleans,	and	how	sports,	 identity,	and	ritual	 contributed	 to	 the	creation	of	a	civic	religion	 (Haynes,	 2013).	 The	 New	 Orleans’	 football	 team,	 the	 Saints,	 as	 well	 as	 the	Superdome	are	part	of	 the	cultural	 identity	of	 the	city.	When	the	Saints	won	the	Super	Bowl,	 they	 restored	 a	 lost	 identity	 that	 was	 washed	 away	 by	 the	 storm;	 winning	 the	championship	 gave	 people	 their	 city	 back	 as	 well	 as	 their	 cultural	 identity	 (Haynes,	2013).	 Therefore,	 when	 talking	 about	 culture	 in	 New	 Orleans	 and	 in	 its	 entire	neighborhoods,	 more	 specifically	 the	 LNW,	 it	 becomes	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 people’s	identity	and	it	explains	why	the	residents	are	attached	to	their	city.		When	 a	 disaster	 occurs,	 cultural	 identity	 is	 not	 an	 element	 that	 is	 taken	 into	account;	 the	main	 priority	 goes	 to	 rebuilding	 infrastrure.	 Managing	 the	 crisis	 at	 hand	preoccupies	 planners	 and	 decision	makers,	 who	 are	 caught	 up	 in	 restoring	 the	 order.	This	 state	 of	 emergency	 often	 makes	 many	 things	 slip	 away	 from	 their	 attention,	especially	 culture.	 This	 is	 unfortunate,	 since	 the	 residents’	 primary	 incentives	 for	returning	 are	 the	 attachment	 they	 have	 formed	 with	 their	 environment,	 and	 the	networks	 they	 are	 a	 part	 of.	 If	 decision	 makers	 do	 not	 prioritize	 these	 aspects	 of	rebuilding,	 then	 how	 can	 people	 restore	 their	 lives	 and	 move	 on?	 Seven	 years	 after	Hurricane	 Katrina,	 the	 LNW	 is	 not	 yet	 rebuilt,	 while	 residents	 are	 still	 struggling	 to	
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return.	What	are	the	reasons	behind	this	late	rebuilding	process?	And	why	are	residents	attached	to	such	a	vulnerable	neighborhood?		
Memory	In	 the	 case	 of	 recurrent	 disasters,	 memory	 is	 noteworthy,	 as	 it	 becomes	 what	people	 use	 to	 fall	 back	 on	 when	 experience	 and	 lessons	 learned	 are	 at	 stake.	 People	reminisce	 to	 what	 they	 had	 before,	 and	 they	 use	 those	 memories	 as	 the	 grounds	 to	rebuild	what	existed	before.	Individuals	use	their	memory	to	remember	loved	ones	they	lost	during	the	calamity,	as	well	as	to	help	them	heal	and	move	forward.		There	 are	 different	 kinds	 of	 memory,	 and	 Halbwachs	 (1992)	 states	 them	 as	follows:	‘collective	memory’,	‘individual	memory’,	and	‘historical	memory’.	He	focuses	on	‘collective	memory’	and	the	important	role	that	time	and	place	play	in	the	shaping	of	this	memory.	 According	 to	 the	 same	 author,	 all	 memories	 are	 the	 result	 of	 people’s	interactions	 with	 each	 other,	 for	 “it	 is	 in	 society	 that	 people	 normally	 acquire	 their	memories.	 It	 is	 also	 in	 society	 that	 they	 recall,	 recognize,	 and	 localize	 their	memories”	(Halbwachs,	1992,	p.	38).	He	gives	a	specific	example	of	the	memory	of	a	trip	he	took	to	London,	 from	which	his	 recollections	of	 the	city	are	demarcated	by	 the	people	he	met,	whether	it	was	an	architect,	a	historian,	or	an	artist.	His	memories	of	the	city	of	London	are	 in	 direct	 relation	with	 the	 expertise	 of	 the	 people	 he	 interacted	with,	 and	without	their	comments	and	remarks	he	would	not	have	had	this	specific	memory,		There	is	thus	no	point	in	seeking	where	…	[memories]	are	preserved	in	my	brain	or	in	some	nook	of	my	mind	to	which	I	alone	have	access:	for	they	are	recalled	by	me	externally,	and	the	groups	of	which	I	am	a	part	at	any	given	time	give	me	the	means	to	reconstruct	them	(Halbwachs,	1992,	p.	38).		Following	into	Halbwachs	footsteps,	Olick	(1999,	p.	335)	states	“[m]emories	[…]	are	as	much	 the	products	of	 the	symbols	and	narratives	available	publicly—and	of	 the	social	 means	 for	 storing	 and	 transmitting	 them—as	 they	 are	 the	 possessions	 of	individuals.”	
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Another	perspective	on	the	relation	between	memory	and	history	is	given	by	the	French	historian	Pierre	Nora.	According	to	him,	“we	speak	so	much	of	memory	because	there	 is	 so	 little	 of	 it	 left”	 (Nora,	 1989,	 p.	 7).	His	 focus	 is	 primarily	 on	 French	 history,	memory,	and	identity;	yet	his	writings	are	applicable	at	the	international	level.	When	he	refers	to	memory	and	history,	he	mentions	 ‘sites	of	memory’	(lieux	de	mémoire)	and	he	states:	Lieux	de	mémoire	where	memory	crystallized	and	secretes	itself	has	occurred	at	a	particular	historical	moment,	a	turning	point	where	consciousness	of	a	break	with	the	 past	 is	 bound	 up	with	 the	 sense	 that	memory	 has	 been	 torn	 […]	 There	 are	lieux	 de	 mémoire,	 sites	 of	 memory,	 because	 there	 are	 no	 longer	 milieux	 de	memoire,	real	environments	of	memory.	(Nora,	1989,	p.	7)		For	the	author,	if	people	can	relive	a	memory,	then	they	wouldn’t	have	dedicated	the	 lieux	 de	memoire	 to	 perpetuate	 the	 memories;	 whether	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 statue,	 a	memorial,	or	any	other	form	of	remembrance.	Yet	when	it	comes	to	memory	and	history,	Nora	believes	that	they	are	opposite	terms	and	according	to	him,	memory	is	‘life’.	It	is	in	continuous	evolution	where	it	is	“open	to	the	dialectic	of	remembering	and	forgetting”;	it	is	vulnerable	as	it	can	be	manipulated,	and	it	can	go	from	the	state	of	being	dormant	to	revived,	 depending	 on	 the	 circumstances.	 Memory	 is	 “a	 bond	 tying	 us	 to	 the	 eternal	present	[…],	 is	blind	to	all	but	the	group	it	blinds”	and	finally	he	ends	with	“memory	is	absolute”	 (Nora,	 1989,	 pp.	 8-9).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 history	 is	 a	 problematic	reconstruction	 and	 representation	 of	 the	 past,	 it	 is	 open	 to	 criticism,	 and	 it	 can	 “only	conceive	 the	 relative”.	 He	 believes	 that	 history	 “belongs	 to	 everyone	 and	 to	 no	 one,	whence	its	claim	to	universal	authority”	(Nora,	1989,	p.	7).		When	it	comes	to	resilience,	memory	or	 ‘social	memory’	becomes	a	key	 issue	to	help	people	recover	after	a	disaster.	Resilience	“resides,	in	part,	in	the	ability	to	draw	on	past	 experiences	 and	 is	 inherently	 historical—both	 in	 formal	 and	 informal	 terms”	(Colten	et	al.,	2009,	p.	357).	The	authors	recommend	that	specialists	should	take	people’s	memory	of	past	events	very	seriously	and	include	it	 in	proper	pre-disaster	preparation	and	 post-disaster	mitigation	 to	 create	more	 resilient	 cities	 in	 the	 future	 (Colten	 et	 al.,	
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2009).	 Relying	 on	 people’s	 memory	 of	 old	 or	 current	 disasters	 can	 help	 increase	resilience	 when	 facing	 disasters	 in	 the	 future,	 and	 if	 this	 memory	 is	 not	 taken	 into	consideration,	 the	 population	 becomes	 more	 vulnerable.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 New	 Orleans,	since	 many	 people	 left	 between	 hurricanes	 Betsy	 and	 Katrina	 “with	 decreased	participation,	 social	 memory	 diminishes	 and	 it	 becomes	 impossible	 to	 draw	 on	 past	knowledge	in	the	face	of	a	calamity”	(Colten	et	al.,	2009,	p.	356).		Also,	 Dauphiné	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 predict	 people’s	 reactions	when	a	disaster	strikes,	hence	the	great	value	of	some	preventive	measures	to	reinforce	social	 resilience,	 and	 to	 avoid	 raising	 a	 panic	 that	 might	 cause	 more	 casualties.	 They	propose	that	these	preventive	measures	should	be	based	on	people’s	recollection	of	past	events	 to	 draw	 useful	 lessons	 from	 recurring	 events	 aiming	 at	 educating	 the	 local	community	in	order	to	increase	social	resilience.		
2.3.4.	The	Cultural	Landscape	a	Social	Construction		As	 already	 seen,	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 consists	 of	 elements	 that	 are	 originally	socially	 constructed.	 Humans	 have	 constructed	 the	 idea	 of	 home,	 community,	 place	attachment	or	topophilia,	and	social	networks.	Cosgrove	(1998)	says	that	the	landscape	is	a	cultural	concept	and	he	states,	“in	seeking	the	material	foundations	for	the	landscape	idea	 the	 obvious	 point	 of	 departure	 is	 the	 human	 use	 of	 the	 earth,	 the	 relationships	between	society	and	the	land.”	(Cosgrove,	1998,	p.	2)	Also	Cannon	(1994)	states,		Conventional	 analysis	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 humankind	 and	 the	environment	 has	 tended	 to	 emphasize	 nature	 as	 a	 set	 of	 determinants,	without	adequately	 integrating	nature	with	social	and	economic	systems.	 I	 argue	 that	 in	effect	the	environment	is	itself	a	social	construction.	(Cannon,	1994,	p.	14).		In	 addition,	 Greider	 et	 al.	 (1994,	 p.	 2)	 state,	 “through	 sociocultural	 phenomena,	the	physical	environment	is	transformed	into	landscapes	that	are	the	reflections	of	how	we	define	ourselves.”	Landscape	or	 the	cultural	 landscape	—	as	 it	 is	referred	to	 in	 this	research	—	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	 interaction	 between	 people	 and	 nature.	 It	 is	 a	 social	
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construction.	 Figure	 2.6	 illustrates	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 as	well	 as	 the	 elements	 that	constitute	it.	
	Figure	2.6:	The	continuously	evolving	cultural	landscape	in	time.	(source:	author)	This	phenomenon	is	continuously	evolving	as	culture	constantly	changes	with	the	people	inhabiting	the	space.	The	cultural	landscape	is	not	static.	It	can	be	looked	at,	at	a	specific	point	in	time	and	space,	but	it	is	constantly	changing.	As	time	goes	by,	the	people	forging	the	landscape	change	constantly	with	the	different	generations	inhabiting	it.	And	with	the	multiple	technological	advances	that	humans	have	witnessed	and	will	continue	to	witness	in	the	future,	this	evolution	is	inevitable.			When	 a	 disaster	 strikes,	 it	 interrupts	 the	 course	 of	 life	 and	 everything	 that	 it	touches,	particularly	the	cultural	landscape.	It	certainly	affects	the	physical	environment	as	well,	but	it	essentially	changes	the	relationship	people	have	with	their	environment—especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 LNW	 post	 Hurricane	 Katrina—from	 a	 social	 and	 cultural	perspectives.	Thus,	the	question	remains:	what	happens	to	this	cultural	landscape?	How	is	 it	 transformed?	Figure	2.7	shows	this	disruption	to	the	 landscape.	This	 is	where	this	research	 intervenes;	where	 it	 explores	 how	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 is	 transformed	 and	what	it	becomes	in	the	aftermath	of	a	calamity.		This	 is	 pertinent	 to	 this	 research,	 as	 it	 will	 be	 portrayed	 in	 Chapter	 3	 that	resilience	 too,	 is	 a	 continuously	evolving	 concept	and	 its	 relationship	with	 the	 cultural	
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landscape	 is	 an	 important	 one.	 The	 elements	 constituting	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 are	shown	 to	have	 an	 impact	 on	 resilience	of	 the	 community	of	 the	LNW	(refer	 to	 section	3.1.3).		
	Figure	2.7:	What	happens	to	cultural	landscape	after	a	disaster	hits?	(source:	author)	
2.4.	Elements	to	Retain			This	 chapter’s	 intention	 is	 to	 give	 an	 overview	 on	 the	 literature	 on	 disasters,	vulnerability,	 resilience,	 and	 cultural	 landscape.	 It	 is	 opportune	 to	 explain	 the	 key	components	 of	 resilience.	 It	 involves	 disasters	 and	 vulnerability,	 which	 is	 particularly	important	in	disaster	research	since	resilience	would	be	irrelevant	if	it	were	not	for	these	life-altering	 and	 disrupting	 phenomena.	 Since	 urban	 areas	 are	 the	 targeted	 areas,	 we	should	 look	 at	 disasters	 and	 how	 they	 affect	 these	 human-clustered	 spaces.	 Also,	 the	built	environment	is	composed	of	vulnerable	human-built	structures,	which	are	shaped	by	 decisions	 that	 were	 made	 over	 the	 course	 of	 history,	 often	 with	 a	 clear	 lack	 of	knowledge	and	expertise.	Disasters	striking	in	areas	weakened	by	vulnerabilities	due	to	human	intervention	and	decision-making	are	social	constructions.	Similarly	constructed	is	 the	 cultural	 landscape,	 which	 is	 strictly	 the	 result	 of	 human	 intervention	 on	 the	environment.	 Humans	 have	 always	 modified	 their	 surroundings	 to	 fit	 and	 to	accommodate	their	needs,	and	each	community	and	society	has	done	it	differently.	The	resulting	cultural	landscape	contributes	to	creating	attachment	and	topophilia,	as	well	as	unique	 cultural	 values	 that	 stand	 out	 when	 a	 community	 is	 being	 studied.	 All	 these	contribute	to	making	this	unique	landscape	a	social	construction.		
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Disasters	are	becoming	more	and	more	costly	for	governments;	they	do	the	most	damage	 when	 they	 hit	 human-inhabited	 areas,	 especially	 since	 more	 than	 half	 of	 the	earth’s	 population	 is	 congregated	 in	 these	 complex	 webs	 called	 cities.	 If	 researchers	spend	more	time	understanding	the	elements	constituting	these	webs	and	how	they	are	formed,	then	lessons	can	be	learned	and	repeating	the	same	mistakes	can	be	prevented.		
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Chapter	3: Theoretical	Framework	
3.1.	Overview		In	chapter	2,	the	focus	was	on	presenting	the	concept	of	resilience,	how	it	relates	to	 natural	 disasters	 and	 vulnerability,	 and	 its	 many	 definitions.	 Also,	 the	 cultural	landscape	was	presented,	for	it	plays	an	important	role	in	contributing	to	the	resilience	of	a	community.	The	problem	is	that	the	literature	does	not	link	post-disaster	resilience	to	the	cultural	landscape,	as	well	as	its	constituting	elements,	notably	place	attachment,	social	networks,	memory,	and	cultural	identity.		In	 this	chapter,	 the	 intention	 is	 to	scrutinize	 the	concept	of	 resilience	by	 talking	about:	 1)	 the	 methods	 proposed	 in	 the	 literature	 of	 measuring	 resilience	 and	vulnerability,	 2)	 the	 indicators	 that	 affect	 them	 (tangible	 and	 intangible),	 and	 3)	 the	existing	 relationship	 between	 resilience	 and	 vulnerability,	 and	 between	 resilience	 and	cultural	landscape.	The	aim	of	this	section	is	to	present	the	various	existing	methods	and	show	that	 they	are	not	all-encompassing.	The	 intention	of	 this	 research	 is	 to	present	a	new	perspective	 on	how	 to	 perceive	 and	measure	 resilience,	 along	with	 a	 new	model.	This	 dissertation	 also	 compiles	 the	 existing	 indicators	 (tangible)	 used	 to	 measure	resilience	and	shows	that	they	do	not	suffice,	and	therefore	new	intangible	indicators	are	presented.	 These	 intangible	 indicators	 reflect	 the	 cultural	 landscape.	 It	 is	 by	understanding	how	resilience	 is	perceived	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 it	becomes	possible	 to	look	at	it	in	a	non-quantitative	fashion.	It	is	important	to	explore	the	ways	of	measuring	the	concept	in	order	to	locate	the	lacking	elements	and	question	how	the	literature	looks	at	it.	And	by	adding	the	cultural	aspect	to	evaluating	community	resilience,	this	research	aims	at	showing	that	by	ignoring	culture,	post-disaster	rebuilding	lacks	in	substance.		While	exploring	 the	different	aspects	of	 resilience,	elements	 like	 time	and	space	appear.	Both	play	a	major	role	in	determining	the	resilience	of	a	community.	This	leads	to	questioning	whether	it	 is	relevant	to	only	rely	on	measuring	the	concept.	 In	general,	this	 line	of	 thinking	points	 out	 to	 one	direction:	 resilience	 is	more	 than	 the	 sum	of	 its	indicators	and,	therefore,	is	a	complex	concept.		
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3.2.	The	Relationship	between	Resilience	and	Vulnerability	
3.2.1.	Measuring	Resilience	and	Vulnerability	in	the	Literature	This	 section	 will	 shed	 the	 light	 on	 the	 different	 vulnerability	 and	 resilience	models.	 It	 will	 put	 forth	 a	 new	 resilience	 model	 that	 compliments	 the	 others	 while	adding	 to	 them.	The	models	presented	below	present	 a	 cumulative	 look	on	measuring	resilience	and	vulnerability	but	none	of	them	takes	culture	into	account.		
Measuring	Vulnerability	Aside	from	their	definition	of	vulnerability	from	a	social	perspective,	Wisner	et	al.	(2004	[1994])	propose	two	disaster	models	that	help	in	better	understanding	risk	when	it	 comes	 to	 vulnerability	 analysis.	 The	 first	 model	 is	 the	 Pressure	 and	 Release	 model	(PAR	model),	 it	 is	 a	 tool	 that	 shows	 “how	disasters	 occur	when	natural	 hazards	 affect	vulnerable	people.”	(Wisner	et	al.,	2004	[1994],	p.	50)	They	characterize	vulnerability	as	deeply	 anchored	 in	 social	 processes	 with	 sources	 unrelated	 to	 the	 disaster	 itself.	 The	PAR	model	is	shown	below	in	Figure	3.1.	According	to	the	authors,		The	basis	 for	 the	PAR	 idea	 is	 that	a	disaster	 is	 the	 intersection	of	 two	opposing	forces:	 those	 processes	 generating	 vulnerability	 on	 one	 side,	 and	 the	 natural	hazard	 event	 (or	 sometimes	 a	 slowly	 unfolding	 natural	 process)	 on	 the	 other.	(Wisner	et	al.,	2004	[1994],	p.	50)	
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	Figure	3.1:	Pressure	and	Release	(PAR)	model:	the	progression	of	vulnerability.	(source:	Wisner	et	al.,	2004	[1994])	The	second	model	proposed	by	Wisner	et	al.	 (2004	 [1994])—that	complements	the	PAR	model—is	called	the	Access	model.	According	to	the	authors,	this	second	model	“is	an	expanded	analysis	of	the	principal	factors	in	the	PAR	model	that	relate	to	human	vulnerability	and	exposure	to	physical	hazard,	and	focuses	on	the	process	by	which	the	
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natural	event	impacts	upon	people	and	their	responses.”	(Wisner	et	al.,	2004	[1994],	p.	50)	Figure	3.2	is	an	outline	of	the	Access	model	with	eight	boxed	that	represent	“a	set	of	closely	related	ideas,	an	event	or	distinct	process.”	(Wisner	et	al.,	2004	[1994],	p.	89)	The	purpose	 of	 the	model	 is	 to	 help	 understand	 a	wide	 range	 of	 social	 and	 environmental	events,	as	well	as	long-term	processes	that	could	be	associated	with	a	disaster.		
	Figure	3.2:	The	Access	model	in	outline.	(source:	Wisner	et	al.,	2004[1994])	From	another	perspective,	the	model	presented	by	Cutter	et	al.	(2003)	is		a	model	that	aims	at	measuring	vulnerability	with	the	use	of	tangible	indicators.	They	present	a	set	of	‘concepts	and	metrics’	to	define	social	vulnerability	wherein	each	of	these	concepts	either	 increases	 or	 decreases	 social	 vulnerability.	 They	 call	 it	 the	 “Social	 Vulnerability	Index”	(SoVI).	They	state	that	“socially	created	vulnerabilities	are	largely	ignored,	mainly	due	 to	 the	 difficulty	 in	 quantifying	 them,	 which	 also	 explains	 why	 social	 losses	 are	normally	 absent	 in	 after-disaster	 cost-loss	 estimation	 reports”	 (Cutter	 et	 al.,	 2003,	 p.	243).	 This	 method	 was	 used	 on	 a	 specific	 geographic	 location,	 targeting	 mainly	 the	
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southeast	 coast	 of	 the	United	 States.	 The	 authors	 compiled	 indicators	 and	 indices	 that	contribute	 to	 either	 increasing	 or	 decreasing	 vulnerability.	 Although	 the	 SOVI	method	may	be	a	very	useful	tool,	it	lacks	in	data	on	previous	disasters.	The	authors	acknowledge	that	 their	 model	 is	 far	 from	 perfect	 (Cutter	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 Also,	 this	 method	 is	 a	quantitative	one	and	does	not	consider	intangible	elements	like	place	attachment,	social	networks,	 cultural	 identity,	 and	 knowledge	 of	 previous	 disasters	 in	 their	 study,	 even	though	these	elements	can	contribute	to	a	better	understanding	of	the	vulnerability	of	a	community.		Thomas	et	al.	(2012)	developed	another	method	to	map	vulnerability	through	the	use	 of	 indicators	 and	 indices	 as	 well.	 While	 the	 authors	 based	 their	 research	 on	 the	Cutter	et	al.	(2003)	model,	their	objective	is	to	understand	the	total	vulnerability	of	the	study	 area.	 This	 involved	 evaluating	 the	 risk	 of	 flooding	 due	 to	 climate	 change	 on	 the	northern	shore	of	the	Island	of	Montreal,	the	Rivière	des	Prairies,	in	Canada.	The	authors	present	an	approach	that	 focuses	on	prevention,	adaptation,	and	reinforcing	resilience.	The	process	was	divided	into	four	steps:	1)	provide	a	historical	assessment	of	previous	inundations	on	the	Island	of	Montreal,	2)	develop	a	model	of	the	level	of	water	reached	while	the	river	 flooded,	3)	analyze	the	maximum	vulnerability	of	 the	flooded	area	with	the	use	of	 indices,	and	4)	map	the	different	typologies	of	vulnerability	according	to	the	different	 flood	 levels.	 By	 using	 the	 Cutter	 et	 al.	 (2003)	method,	 a	 set	 of	 initial	 results	stemmed,	 which	 led	 to	 setting	 up	 workshops	 with	 the	 different	 stakeholders	 (risk	emergency	 representatives,	urban	planners,	 and	other	people	 involved	 in	 the	planning	process).	A	set	of	indicators	were	compiled	and	weighted	according	to	relevance,	and	to	the	stakeholders	who	are	familiar	with	the	area	and	its	problems.	Relying	on	an	iterative	design,	the	task	was	to	validate	the	set	of	indicators	put	forth	by	the	Cutter	et	al.	(2003)	analysis.	The	results	concluded	that	the	iterative	method	was	very	similar	to	the	Cutter	et	 al.	 (2003)	 method,	 and	 it	 validated	 the	 indicators	 chosen	 for	 the	 study.	 The	 most	important	 difference	 is	 the	 implication	 of	 the	 stakeholders;	 this	 process	 made	 them	directly	 involved,	 and	 the	maps	 are	 used	 as	 a	 reference	 by	 the	 city	 of	 Montreal.	 This	iterative	planning	process	and	method	is	helpful	to	understand	the	vulnerability	and	the	adaptive	 capacity	 of	 the	 area	 to	 present	 long-term	 and	 efficient	 solutions.	 It	 is	 also	
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relevant	 in	 terms	 of	 mapping	 vulnerability,	 and	 can	 be	 a	 very	 constructive	 tool	 for	decision-makers.	Although	the	authors	showed	 initiative	 in	conducting	 interviews	with	the	 stakeholders,	 they	 did	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	 intangible	 elements	 mentioned	earlier	 (place	 attachment,	 social	 networks,	 cultural	 identity,	 and	 knowledge),	 nor	 did	they	conduct	interviews	with	residents	in	order	to	assess	the	vulnerability	of	the	studied	community.	 Also,	 the	 methods	 presented	 thus	 far	 did	 not	 consider	 the	 historical	evolution	 of	 social	 vulnerability	 and	 the	 different	 decisions	 that	 were	 taken	 over	 the	course	of	time;	the	decisions	that	shaped	the	city	and	are	believed	to	either	contribute	to	the	vulnerability	of	a	geographic	area	or	not.		
Measuring	Resilience	This	approach,	the	first	to	measure	resilience,	is	presented	by	Cutter	et	al.	(2010).	Their	work	has	been	cited	314	times	in	the	literature5.	They	propose	a	set	of	‘indicators’	to	measure	 resilience,	 and	 they	 adopt	 the	Disaster	Resilience	 of	 Place	method	 (DROP)	from	 Cutter	 et	 al.	 (2008)	 for	 their	 conceptual	 framework.	 The	 DROP	 model	 presents	resilience,		As	a	dynamic	process	dependent	on	antecedent	conditions,	the	disaster’s	severity,	time	 between	 hazard	 events,	 and	 influences	 from	 exogenous	 factors.	 Although	conceptually	dynamic,	immediately	preceding	the	disaster,	the	degree	of	recovery	leads	 to	 the	static	depiction	of	 the	antecedent	conditions.	 (Cutter	et	al.,	2008,	p.	604)	The	model	has	multiple	advantages	as	it	focuses	on	the	resilience	of	communities	and	takes	into	account	scale	and	temporality;	and	it	aims	at	natural	hazards,	resilience	at	the	community	 level,	and	the	social	resilience	of	place	(Cutter	et	al.,	2008).	The	chosen	indicators	 are	 divided	 into	 subcomponents:	 social	 resilience,	 economic	 resilience,	institutional	 resilience,	 infrastructural	 resilience,	 and	 community	 capital.	 Each	 of	 the	subcomponents	has	variables	as	to	how	they	affect	resilience	(positively	or	negatively).																																																									
5		This	information	is	taken	from	a	search	on	Google	Scholar	on	April	18th,	2016.	According	to	this	search	engine,	this	article	has	been	cited	greatly	by	scholars,	thus	adding	to	its	relevance.		
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The	 authors	 did	 not	 include	 ecological	 resilience,	 as	 it	 caused	 the	 results	 to	 be	inconsistent	due	to	the	large	area	of	study	(Cutter	et	al.,	2010).	This	method	is	valuable	as	one	can	look	at	the	subcomponents	individually	or	all	together,	and	determine	if	the	study	area	is	resilient,	be	it	only	at	the	level	of	each	subcomponent,	or	overall.	By	looking	at	resilience	through	the	subcomponents,	it	will	be	easier	for	decision-makers	to	propose	the	 right	plan	 for	 the	affected	area	and	 involve	 the	 community	 in	 increasing	 resilience	where	 needed.	 Some	 subcomponents	 might	 show	 a	 higher	 resilience	 than	 others,	decision-makers	can	then	target	these	individually	and	propose	a	plan	to	increase	their	resilience,	which	 saves	money	 and	 time.	 Also,	 the	DROP	model	 proved	 four	 points:	 1)	getting	all	the	relevant	data	can	be	a	challenge	and	applying	the	model	to	all	levels	of	the	geography	 is	 questionable;	 2)	 the	 authors	 mention	 elements	 like	 ‘place	 attachment’,	‘empowerment’,	 and	 ‘social	 learning’,	 but	 yet	did	not	measure	 them	or	 they	propose	 a	superficial	way	 of	 doing	 so;	 3)	 they	 do	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	 qualitative	 aspect	 of	measuring	 resilience	 by	 conducting	 interviews	 with	 residents,	 stakeholders,	 and	 local	officials;	 and	 4)	 Cutter	 et	 al.	 (2008,	 p.	 2)	 argue	 that	 “vulnerability	 and	 resilience	 are	dynamic	 processes,	 but	 for	 measurement	 purposes	 are	 often	 viewed	 as	 static	phenomena”.	 This	 leads	 to	 a	 conflicting	 perspective:	 if	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience	 is	perceived	as	a	process,	then	how	can	it	be	static?			
A	New	Resilience	Model		Table	3.1	summarizes	the	approaches	presented	in	this	section	with	the	different	elements	and	methods	used.	All	the	models	presented	above	have	one	thing	in	common:	they	 rely	 on	 measurable	 indicators,	 along	 with	 a	 quantitative	 method,	 to	 assess	 the	vulnerability	or	the	resilience	of	a	geographic	area.	The	indicators	hint	towards	the	state	of	 the	 community	 or	 city	 at	 a	 specific	 point	 in	 time.	 Hence,	 they	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	preliminary	tool	to	assess	the	resilience	of	a	community,	though	they	are	not	sufficient	to	draw	 firm	 conclusions.	 Another	 task	 is	 to	 look	 at	 how	 vulnerability	 and	 resilience	 are	measured,	as	both	have	overlapping	indicators.	In	New	Orleans,	and	more	specifically	in	the	LNW,	people	suffered	from	“survivor	fatigue”	and	people	were	no	longer	interested	in	sitting-in	for	an	interview.	As	a	result,	the	attention	changed	from	the	residents	to	the	
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various	 stakeholders	 involved	 in	 the	 neighborhood:	 planners,	 city	 official,	 NPO	representatives,	and	the	residents.	This	change	in	perspective	helped	get	a	larger	look	at	the	 reality	of	 the	 situation.	The	proposed	model	 (Table	3.1)	will	 rely	on	 the	 indicators	mentioned	in	the	following	two	sections	and	by	comparing	numbers	between	the	years	2000	and	2010,	and	then	propose	 indicators	 that	are	non-measurable,	and	 from	which	questionnaires	will	be	designed	to	interview	different	actors.			Table	3.1:	Summary	of	the	different	models	measuring	vulnerability	and	resilience	with	the	type	of	indicators	and	methods.	(source:	author)			 	 Models	measuring	vulnerability	or	resilience	 Proposed	model	Toueir	(2015)	Wisner	et	al.	(2004)	[1994]	 Cutter	et	al.	(2003)	 Thomas	et	al.	(2012)	 Cutter	et	al.	(2010)	Vulnerability	 ✓ ✓	 ✓	 ✗	 ✗	Resilience	 ✗ ✗	 ✗	 ✓	 ✓	Tangible	indicators	 ✓ ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	Intangible	indicators	 ✓ ✗	 ✗	 ✗	 ✓	Quantitative	method	 ✓ ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	Qualitative	method	 ✓ ✗	 ✗	 ✗	 ✓	Maps	 ✗ ✗	 ✓	 ✗	 ✓	The	work	conducted	 in	 the	course	of	 this	research	aims	at	contributing	 to	post-disaster	 research	 as	 well	 as	 being	 replicable	 and	 applicable	 to	 other	 case	 studies.	 By	replicating	 the	 results	 onto	 other	 communities,	 this	 research	will	 help	 people	 recover	faster,	better,	 and	with	a	more	 sustainable	 configuration.	The	objective	 is	 to	prove	 the	importance	of	using	cultural	elements	to	the	whole	process	of	rebuilding,	using	tangible	and	 intangible	 indicators,	and	 involving	the	community	 in	 the	decision-making	process	after	a	disaster.		
3.2.2.	A	Preliminary	Assessment	of	Resilience	with	Tangible	Indicators		When	 looking	 over	 the	 different	 methods	 of	 measuring	 resilience	 and	vulnerability,	all	 the	authors	mentioned	 in	section	3.2.1	used	a	series	of	 indicators	and	indices	 to	 break	 down	 the	 different	 elements	 they	 needed	 to	 measure.	 This	 section	focuses	on	compiling	all	 the	 indicators	 that	 influence	resilience	 (whether	negatively	or	
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positively).	 However,	 there	 are	 different	 indicators	 that	 influence	 the	 resilience	 of	 a	community	at	a	more	intangible	level	which	are	more	difficult	to	measure	quantitatively,	and	they	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section.		Table	3.2	is	the	result	of	the	extensive	literature	review,	undertaken	in	the	course	of	this	study,	of	the	indicators	affecting	resilience.	It	sums	up	the	indicators	proposed	by	multiple	 authors,	 and	 then	 categorizes	 them	 into	 four	 sections:	 the	 governance/	institutional	 level,	 the	 social	 level,	 the	 economic	 level,	 and	 the	 physical	 level.	 Many	authors	 scrutinize	 the	 indicators	 that	 can	 affect	 resilience:	 Pelling	 (2003),	 Manyena	(2006),	Cutter	et	al.	(2003),	Wisner	et	al.	(2004	[1994]),	Birkmann	(2006),	Gotham	et	al.	(2011),	Gotham	(2007b),	Gotham	(2007a),	Dauphiné	et	al.	(2007),	Chamlee-Wright	et	al.	(2009).	These	indicators	are	of	interest	for	this	research.	Not	only	do	they	contribute	to	better	understanding	a	city’s	capacity	to	withstand	and	overcome	disasters,	but	they	also	provide	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 different	 elements	 that	 are	 part	 of	 a	 resilient	 urban	community.	These	indicators	are	important	at	all	the	aforementioned	levels;	for	instance,	according	to	Pelling	(2003)	and	Cutter	et	al.	(2003);	Cutter	et	al.	(2010),	the	presence	of	a	strong	political	power	 increases	the	resilience	of	a	community	because	 it	proves	that	the	government	officials	are	supportive	and	ready	to	take	charge	of	the	situation.	A	quick	recovery	 permits	 for	 a	 return	 to	 a	 functional	 life	 faster	 than	 a	 slow	 recovery.	 Having	educated	people	with	higher	income	and	living	in	structures	that	are	built	to	withstand	certain	natural	disasters	can	 increase	people’s	 resilience,	and	so	on.	However,	 the	way	these	 indicators	 impact	 recovery	 may	 vary,	 and	 things	 can	 get	 more	 complicated	depending	 on	 the	 disaster	 and	 the	 context.	 Therefore,	 each	 of	 these	 indicators	 affects	resilience	differently,	some	increase	(+)	it	and	others	decrease	(-)	it.	Table	3.2:	Compilation	of	tangible	indicators	that	help	in	an	initial	evaluation	of	resilience	(source:	author)	
Indicator	 Source	
Increases	(+)	or	
Decreases	(-)	
Resilience	
Governance/Institutional	Political	Power	 Pelling	(2003)	Cutter	et	al.	(2003)	(2010)	 (+)	Recovery	 Pelling	(2003)	Cutter	et	al.	(2010)	Manyena	(2006)	 (+)	Coping	 Blaikie	et	al.	(1994)	 (+)	
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Indicator	 Source	
Increases	(+)	or	
Decreases	(-)	
Resilience	Preparedness	 Pelling	(2003)	 (+)	Adaptive	Potential	 Pelling	(2003)	 (+)	Uncertainty	 Pelling	(2003)	 (-)	Cooperation	 Pelling	(2003)	 (+)	Trust	 Pelling	(2003)	 (+)	Medical	Capacity	 Cutter	et	al.	(2003)	Cutter	et	al.	(2010)	 (+)	Participatory	Development	 Pelling	(2003)	 (+)	Local	Organization	 Pelling	(2003)	 (+)	Prevention	 Blaikie	et	al.	(1994)	Pelling	(2003)	 (+)	Auto-organization	 Dauphiné	and	Provitolo	(2007)	 (+)	
Social	Diversity	 Blaikie	et	al.	(1994)	Dauphiné	and	Provitolo	(2007)		Reghezza-Zitt	et	al.	(2012)	 (+)	Coping	 Blaikie	et	al.	(1994)	 (+)	
Social	Structures	 Pelling	(2003)	Cutter	et	al.	(2003)	Gotham	and	Campanella	(2011)	Manyena	(2006)	 (+)	Livelihood	 Pelling	(2003)	Manyena	(2006)	 (+)	Gender	 Pelling	(2003)	Cutter	et	al.	(2003)	(2010)	 Men	(+)	Age	 Pelling	(2003)	Cutter	et	al.	(2003)	(2010)	 Non-elderly	(+)	Physical	and	Psychological	health	 Pelling	(2003)	Cutter	et	al.	(2010)	 (+)	
Place	Attachment	 Cutter	et	al.	(2010)	(Gotham,	2007a,	2007b)	Chamlee-Wright	and	Storr	(2009)	Vale	and	Campanella	(2005)	Falk	et	al.	(2006)	 (+)	Cultural	Values/	Traditions	 Cutter	et	al.	(2003)	Manyena	(2006)	 (+)	
Adaptation/	Adaptability	 Pelling	(2003)	Manyena	(2006)	Gotham	et	al.	(2011)	Cutter	et	al.	(2008)	Reghezza-Zitt	et	al.	(2012)	 (+)	
Education/	Knowledge	
Dauphiné	and	Provitolo	(2007)	Pelling	(2003)	Blaikie	et	al.	(1994)	Cutter	et	al.	(2003)	(2010)	Manyena	(2006)	Reghezza-Zitt	et	al.	(2012)	
(+)	
Social	Networks	 Blaikie	et	al.	(1994)	Berke	et	al.	(1993)	Pelling	(2003)	Cutter	et	al.	(2010)	Paton	and	Johnston	(2001)	 (+)	
Economic	Income	 Cutter	et	al.	(2003)	 High	income	(+)	Low	income	(-)	
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Indicator	 Source	
Increases	(+)	or	
Decreases	(-)	
Resilience	Wealth	 Cutter	et	al.	(2008)	Beck	(2013	[1992])	 (+)	Technology/	Innovation	 Cutter	et	al.	(2010)	 (+)	Insurance	 Pelling	(2003)	Cutter	et	al.	(2003)	(2010)	 (+)	Economic	Stability	 Pelling	(2003)	 (+)	Household	Asset	 Pelling	(2003)	Cutter	el	al.	(2010)	 (+)	Employment	 Pelling	(2003)	Cutter	et	al	(2003)	(2010)	 (+)	Land	Tenure	 Pelling	(2003)	 (+)	Susceptibility	 Birkmann	(2006)	 (-)	Poverty	 Pelling	(2003)	 (-)	
Physical	Exposure	 Pelling	(2003)	 (-)	Recurrence	 Pelling	(2003)	 (-)	Resistance	 Pelling	(2003)	 (+)	Security	 Pelling	(2003)	 (+)		 Compiling	 these	 indicators	will	 eventually	 allow,	 through	 the	method	 proposed	later	in	Chapter	4,	an	initial	analysis	of	the	resilience	of	the	neighborhood	of	interest—the	 LNW	 in	 New	 Orleans.	 Comparing	 quantitatively	 (between	 2000	 and	 2010),	 the	gathered	indicators	with	those	of	the	Data	Center6,	and	more	specifically	those	pertinent	to	the	LNW,	will	allow	for	the	verification	and	the	confirmation	of	the	applicability	of	the	indicators,	while	providing	a	first	assessment	of	the	resilience	of	the	neighborhood.	This	last	point	will	be	evaluated	again	when	analyzing	the	qualitative	data.		
3.2.3.	A	Deeper	Assessment	of	Resilience	with	Intangible	Indicators	There	are	pertinent	indicators	to	resilience	that	are	difficult	to	quantify,	and	they	can	make	a	community	more	resilient	after	a	disaster	according	to	some	authors	(Pelling,	2003;	Cutter	et	al.,	2010;	Gotham	and	Campanella,	2011;	Gotham,	2007a,	Gotham,	2007b,	Dauphiné	and	Provitolo,	2007,	Chamlee-Wright	and	Storr,	2009,	Falk	et	al.,	2006,	Paton	and	 Johnston,	 2001).	 These	 indicators	 are	 listed	 in	 the	 table	 below	 (Table	 3.3).	 These	elements	 are	not	only	part	 of	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 (place	 attachment,	 roots,	 identity,	social	 networks,	 memory),	 but	 also	 they	 constitute	 the	 elements	 behind	 an	 urban																																																									
6	The	Data	Center:	http://www.datacenterresearch.org/		
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community	 (auto-organization,	 social	 learning/knowledge,	 empowerment,	 and	diversity).	After	Hurricane	Katrina,	people	expressed	a	great	need	to	return	and	rebuild	their	homes	instead	of	moving	elsewhere,	and	this	took	place	in	the	Ninth	Ward	in	New	Orleans:		Sense	 of	 place	 was	 an	 important	 motivator	 for	 early	 returnees.	 The	 data	 also	suggests	that	after	suffering	an	abrupt	and	often	prolonged	evacuation	experience	following	 Hurricane	 Katrina,	 this	 sense	 of	 place	 was	 transformed	 from	background	context	 into	an	 important	cultural	 resource.	 (Chamlee-Wright	et	al.,	2009,	p.	615)		From	most	 of	 the	 published	work	 on	 the	 LNW,	 only	 Chamlee-Wright	 and	 Storr	(2009)	 use	 place	 attachment	 and	 identity	 in	 a	 qualitative	 study	 to	 understand	 the	reasons	for	people	coming	back	to	New	Orleans	after	Katrina.	Consequently,	this	is	why	this	research	focuses	on	place	attachment,	as	it	plays	a	primordial	role	in	people’s	return.	In	what	way,	or	ways,	and	what	effect	does	place	attachment	have	on	the	resilience	of	a	community?		Cutter	et	al.	(2010)	quantify	the	indicators	they	used	to	measure	resilience.	One	of	these	 is	 ‘place	 attachment’,	 and	 it	 stands	 for	 the	 “net	 international	migration”	 and	 the	“percentage	population	born	in	a	state	that	still	resides	in	that	state”.	Yet,	there	is	more	to	 place	 attachment	 than	 people	migrating	 from	place	 to	 place	 or	 those	 born	 and	 still	residing	 in	 the	same	city.	These	can	give	an	 indicative	perspective	of	 the	state	of	place	attachment,	but	they	cannot	give	a	comprehensive	view.	Place	attachment	is	something	that	 is	 constructed	over	 time	 and	 accompanied	by	 social	 networks,	whether	 formal	 or	informal.	The	 latter	plays	an	 important	 role	 in	 reinforcing	 the	attachment	people	have	with	their	home,	community,	and	environment.	Place	attachment	is	very	closely	knit	to	social	networks,	to	cultural	 identity,	and	to	memory,	and	these	are	difficult	concepts	to	assess	quantitatively.		As	for	the	other	authors	mentioned	in	Table	3.3,	they	mention	these	indicators	to	reinforce	 their	 arguments,	 but	 they	 do	 not	 go	 in	 depth	 on	 how	 or	 why	 they	 impact	
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community	resilience.	Thus,	the	objective	here	is	to	understand	the	role	these	indicators	play,	and	whether	they	increase,	or	decrease	the	resilience	of	a	community.	It	will	also	be	verified	 if	 social	 networks	 (formal	 or	 informal)	 allow	 for	 a	 faster	 adaptation	 and	 re-bouncing	after	a	disaster	disrupts	the	course	of	people’s	lives.		
Table	3.3:	Intangible	indicators	that	play	a	role	in	a	better	evaluation	of	the	concept	of	resilience	(source:	author)	
Indicator	that	affect	resilience	 Source	
Place	Attachment	
Cutter	et	al.	(2010)	Gotham	(2007a)	Gotham	(2007b)	Chamlee-Wright	and	Storr	(2009)	Vale	and	Campanella	(2005)	Falk	et	al.	(2006)	Roots	 Chamlee-Wright	and	Storr	(2009)	Identity	 Chamlee-Wright	and	Storr	(2009)	
Social	Networks	 Blaikie	et	al.	(1994)	Berke	et	al.	(1993)	Pelling	(2003)	Cutter	et	al.	(2010)	Paton	and	Johnston	(2001)	Memory	 Dauphiné	and	Provitolo	(2007)	Colten	and	Sumpter	(2009)	Ripley	(2008)	Auto-organization	 Dauphiné	and	Provitolo	(2007)	Dauphiné	et	al.	(2013)	Klein	et	al.	(2003)	
Social	Learning/Knowledge	
Cutter	et	al.	(2008)	(2003)	(2010)	Dauphiné	and	Provitolo	(2007)	(2013)	Gotham	et	al.	(2011)	Dauphiné	and	Provitolo	(2007)	Pelling	(2003)	Blaikie	et	al.	(1994)	Manyena	(2006)	Reghezza-Zitt	et	al.	(2012)	Empowerment	 Cutter	et	al.	(2010)	Diversity		 Blaikie	et	al.	(1994)	Dauphiné	and	Provitolo	(2007)	(2013)	Reghezza-Zitt	et	al.	(2012)			 In	this	research,	the	combined	indicators	(tangible	and	intangible)	will	be	looked	at	 in	 two	 different	 ways:	 first,	 by	 using	 the	 indicators	 proposed	 by	 the	 authors	mentioned	 above	 and	 by	 the	 Data	 Center,	 numbers	 will	 be	 compiled	 and	 compared	between	 2000	 and	 2010	 to	 give	 a	 preliminary	 assessment	 of	 the	 state	 of	 the	neighborhood	 (before	 and	 after	 the	devastation).	 Second,	 use	 the	 intangible	 indicators	mentioned	in	Table	3.3	to	formulate	questionnaire	 interviews	with	the	residents	of	the	LNW,	stakeholders,	and	local	officials.	This	will	allow	for	an	evaluation	of	the	resilience	
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of	the	neighborhood	via	 intangible	 indicators	 in	order	to	compare	the	two	and	provide	an	answer	to	the	research	question	proposed	in	this	dissertation.		
3.2.4.	The	Relationship	between	Resilience	and	Vulnerability		Why	is	 it	 important	to	talk	about	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	resilience	and	vulnerability?	This	relationship	 is	a	complex	one	and	has	been	debated	by	many.	Some	argue	 that	 they	 are	 opposite	 concepts;	 others	 state	 that	 they	 complement	 each	 other	(Cutter	et	al.,	2008).	In	this	research,	the	main	reason	for	understanding	this	relation	is	related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	before	using	 the	 term	resilience,	 the	 term	vulnerability	was	 the	one	that	took	all	the	attention.	Only	in	recent	studies	did	resilience	take	over	and	became	a	 common	buzzword	 in	 disaster	 research.	 Some	 researchers	 have	 open	 debates	 about	how	the	relevancy	of	the	concept.	A	research	group	at	the	Université	de	Montréal	(The	Disaster	Resilience	and	Sustainable	Reconstruction	Research	Alliance	–	Oeuvre	Durable;	and	Information	and	Research	for	Reconstruction	–	I-Rec)	posted	an	online	debate	with	the	 following	question:	 “Is	 the	 concept	of	 resilience	useful	 in	 the	 fields	of	disaster	 risk	reduction	 and	 the	 build	 environment	 or	 is	 it	 just	 another	 abused	 and	 malleable	buzzword?”	 The	 outcome	 of	 the	 debate	 can	 be	 found	 on	 the	 following	 link	(https://oddebates.wordpress.com/second-debate/).	 In	the	debate,	people	voted	either	‘yes’	or	‘no’	before	and	after	the	debate	on	whether	the	concept	is	useful	or	not.	Initially,	the	majority	 of	 the	 votes	 were	 ‘yes’,	 and	 when	 the	 debate	 was	 over	 the	 results	 were	switched	and	the	majority	voted	‘no’.	With	such	changing	results,	most	of	the	comments	underline	 the	usefulness	of	 the	 concept.	 In	 conclusion,	 the	moderator,	Prof.	 Lizarralde,	closes	 the	debate	 the	 following	 statement,	which	only	 shows	 that	 the	 concept	 is	 still	 a	topic	of	interest	and	that	it	is	still	relevant.				The	concept’s	deeper	value	seems	not	to	be	intrinsic,	but	the	result	of	contextual,	dynamic	 conditions	 in	 the	 implementation	 and	 interpretation	 of	 it.	 Even	 its	originality	and	metaphorical	significance	seem	to	be	questioned.	Contrary	to	the	
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original	question	proposed	in	the	debate,	the	results	reveal	that	the	concept	can	be	useful	even	if	it	has	been	abused,	and	even	if	it	is	malleable,	and	slippery.7		Also,	both	concepts—vulnerability	and	resilience—share	common	indicators	that	affect	them	 differently.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 their	 similarities	 and	differences.	The	 intent	here	 is	 to	grasp	the	relationship	between	these	two	concepts	 in	order	to	come	closer	to	a	better	comprehension	of	the	concept	of	resilience.		Barroca	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 acknowledge	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 relationship	 between	vulnerability	 and	 resilience,	 thus	 they	 compile	 quantitative	 data	with	 two	 of	 the	most	reputable	 search	 engines:	 Web	 of	 Science	 and	 Factivia.	 Web	 of	 Science	 is	 a	 research	platform	 that	 gives	 access	 to	 published	 articles	 and	 usually	 aims	 at	 an	 academic	audience.	 Factivia	 is	 a	 research	 tool	 that	 gathers	 data	 and	 information	 from	multiples	sources	 (private	 and	 public	 companies)	 and	 it	 targets	 a	 wider	 audience.	 The	 data	collected	focused	on	figuring	out	the	number	of	times	the	concepts	of	vulnerability	and	resilience	are	used	in	each	of	these	search	engines.	In	addition,	the	search	was	narrowed	down	to	the	use	of	these	concepts	in	the	specific	disciplines	of	geography	and	planning.	The	timeline	of	the	search	was	from	the	early	1990s	until	2013.	The	authors	show	that—in	the	case	of	Web	of	Science—the	concept	of	vulnerability	(over	300	times)	is	used	more	than	 resilience	 (over	 50	 times)	 in	 the	 literature.	 But	what	was	 noticeable	 is	 that	 both	concepts	 were	 drastically	 more	 used	 after	 2005.	 This	 is	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	disaster	research	started	focusing	more	on	these	concepts,	therefore	publishing	more	on	the	 topic.	 As	 for	 the	 other	 search	 engine—Factivia—it	 showed	 that	 both	 concepts	 are	exponentially	 used	more,	 and	 vulnerability	 is	 used	more	 than	 resilience	up	until	 2010	(where	 both	 concepts	 were	 used	 between	 8,000	 and	 11,000	 times),	 but	 then	 it	 got	reversed	and	resilience	is	used	more.	This	is	explained	by	the	fact	that	both	concepts	are	of	interest	to	researchers	as	well	as	to	people	outside	of	the	research	world.	One	of	the	hypothesis	that	Barroca	et	al.	(2013)	raise	is:	“in	order	to	exist,	the	concept	of	resilience	
																																																								
7 	Refer	 to	 the	 following	 website	 for	 the	 whole	 debate,	 votes,	 and	 arguments:	https://oddebates.wordpress.com/second-debate/	
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is	 transformed	 to	 be	 closer	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 vulnerability.”8	(p.	 5)	 According	 to	 the	authors,	the	concept	of	resilience	takes	the	place	of	what	vulnerability	was	a	few	years	ago.	Yet	 they	acknowledge	the	 fact	 that	since	 their	respective	origins,	 there	has	been	a	noticeable	difference	between	 the	 two.	 In	 their	opinion,	 resilience	 is	a	quality	whereas	vulnerability	 is	 a	 state.	 And	 the	 common	 element	 between	 the	 two	 definitions	 is	 the	‘capacity	to	cope’.	In	addition,	the	authors	argue	that	what	differentiates	resilience	from	vulnerability	 are	 the	 synonyms	 of	 each.	 Resilience	 is	 linked	 to	 persistence,	 resistance,	adaptation,	 flexibility,	 elasticity,	 etc.;	whereas	 vulnerability	 is	 associated	with	 fragility,	sensibility,	 weakness,	 deficiency,	 traumatism,	 etc.	 According	 to	 the	 authors,	 resilience	and	vulnerability	cannot	be	substituted,	as	 they	presume	neither	 the	same	 factors,	nor	the	same	etymologic	and	semantic	dimensions	(Barroca	et	al.,	2013). Manyena	 (2006)	 presents	 in	 his	 article	 many	 authors’	 perspectives	 (refer	 to	Tables	 2.1	 and	 2.2	 in	 Chapter	 2),	 and	 he	 focuses	 on	 defining	 the	 term	 resilience	 and	whether	or	not	it	is	the	opposite	of	vulnerability.	In	order	to	do	that,	he	presents	tables	summarizing	the	different	definitions	of	resilience,	and	he	presents	vulnerability	under	two	categories:	one	in	relation	to	disaster	resilience,	and	one	that	looks	at	vulnerability	from	a	different	perspective,	one	which	is	not	necessarily	in	relation	with	resilience.	Also,	the	 author	 concludes	 in	 his	 article	 that	 “two	 views	 have	 emerged:	 one	 sees	 disaster	resilience	and	vulnerability	as	factors	of	each	other,	while	the	other	sees	them	more	as	separate	entities.”	(Manyena,	2006,	p.	443)	Cutter	 et	 al.	 (2003)	 talk	 about	 social	 vulnerability	 and	 present	 the	 different	‘factors’	 that	 influence	 this	 concept.	 These	 factors	 either	 increase	 or	 decrease	 ‘social	vulnerability’.	 Also,	 Cutter	 et	 al.	 (2008)	 argue	 that	 “resilience	 and	 vulnerability	 as	separate	 but	 often	 linked	 concepts”,	 and	 they	 explain	 in	 multiple	 diagrams	 how	 the	literature	looks	at	the	relation	between	‘vulnerability’,	‘resilience’,	and	‘adaptive	capacity’	(Cutter	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 In	 a	 later	 article,	 Cutter	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 present	 ‘indicators’	 that	influence	 resilience,	 and	 some	of	 these	 indicators	 are	 the	 same.	Therefore,	 if	 the	 same																																																									
8	Free	 translation	by	 the	author.	Original	quote	 “Pour	exister,	 le	concept	de	résilience	s’est	 transformé	pour	devenir	très	proche	de	la	notion	de	vulnérabilité”	
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elements	that	increase	resilience	also	decrease	vulnerability,	there	clearly	is	an	existing	relation	between	the	two	concepts.	But	what	is	the	nature	of	this	relation?		Gotham	 and	 Campanella	 (2011)	 acknowledge	 the	 fact	 that	 resilience	 and	vulnerability	are	related	concepts	and	coupled	with	adaptation	and	transformation,	they	all	 presented	 opportunities	 and	 challenges	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 aftermath	 of	 Hurricane	Katrina.	 This	 was	 especially	 true	 when	 the	 recession	 started	 in	 2008,	 and	 the	 British	Petroleum	 (BP)	 oil	 spill	 of	 2010	 took	 place.	 The	 authors	 argue,	 “resilience	 and	vulnerability	 are	 not	 antonyms.	 Rather	 urban	 ecosystems	 exhibit	 both	 vulnerable	 and	resilient	 qualities	 that	 are	 oftentimes	 products	 of	 past	 and	 present	 cross-scale	interactions”	(Gotham	et	al.,	2011,	p.	4).	In	sum,	the	authors	believe	that	a	city	has	both,	vulnerable	 and	 resilience	 components.	 It	will	 be	 discussed	 later	 that	 time	 is	 the	main	element	that	determines	if	an	urban	community	is	either	vulnerable	or	resilient.			In	 conclusion,	 the	 respective	 definitions	 of	 these	 two	 concepts	 are	 highly	contested	and	 subjective;	 it	 is	 challenging	 to	 find	one	way	 that	 is	 commonly	 approved	and	agreed	on.	For	the	purpose	of	this	research,	the	relationship	between	resilience	and	vulnerability	is	considered	an	intricate	one:	they	are	not	separate,	they	are	not	opposite,	but	yet	they	are	linked.	The	indicators	affecting	them	respectively	are	reciprocal,	but	the	concepts	 are	 not.	 For	 instance,	 if	 a	 government	 has	 a	 weak	 political	 power,	 a	 weak	economy,	or	broken	social	structures	or	a	combination	of	these,	and	is	not	well	prepared,	then	 these	 indicators	 reinforce	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 the	 area.	 If	 it	 is	 the	 opposite—a	government	with	 strong	political	power,	 is	well	prepared,	with	a	 strong	economy,	 and	with	 strong	 social	 structures—these	 indicators	 play	 a	 positive	 role	 in	 enhancing	 the	area’s	 resilience.	 Therefore,	 vulnerability	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	 state	 that	 can	 be	 evaluated	and	measured	by	a	set	of	indicators	(these	indicators	can	change	depending	on	the	type	of	disaster	and	where	it	takes	place),	whereas	resilience	is	a	continuous	process	that	is	not	necessarily	 evaluated	or	measured	only	by	a	 limited	 set	of	 indicators;	 resilience	 is	more	than	the	sum	of	the	indicators	affecting	it.		This	 makes	 resilience	 an	 even	 more	 complex	 concept	 to	 look	 at,	 because	 time	makes	 it	a	 ‘continuously-evolving’	concept.	 In	this	case,	vulnerability	can	be	part	of	the	
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resilience	 process:	 communities	 can	 be	 both	 vulnerable	 and	 resilient	 when	 facing	 a	calamity,	 but	 in	 order	 for	 a	 city	 to	 be	 resilient,	 it	 should	 be	 aware	 of	 its	 vulnerability.	Before	 a	disaster,	 a	 city	 can	predict	how	vulnerable	 it	 is	 depending	on	 the	nature	of	 a	disaster	by	putting	together	a	set	of	indicators	and	measuring	its	vulnerability.	This	way,	it	 can	 limit	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 disaster	 by	 having	 a	 good	 understanding	 of	 its	weaknesses.	But	it	is	different	with	resilience.	It	is	more	difficult	to	predict	how	resilient	a	city	is,	and	it	is	only	after	the	fact	that	a	city	discovers	its	strengths.	It	is	a	process	that	takes	place	over	a	long	period	of	time,	and	the	timeframe	can	vary	from	city	to	city	and	from	urban	community	to	another.		
3.2.5.	The	Impact	of	the	Cultural	Landscape	on	Resilience	The	 reason	 why	 it	 is	 important	 to	 talk	 about	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 when	resilience	 is	 at	 stake	 is	 because	 the	 landscape	 that	 is	 inhabited	 by	 people	 has	 been	modified	to	fit	their	needs.	When	a	community’s	resilience	is	evaluated,	then	the	cultural	landscape	becomes	a	primordial	element	of	a	community’s	come	back.		When	 the	 focus	 is	on	resilience,	 the	element	of	 culture	becomes	of	 interest	at	 it	plays	a	role	in	better	understanding	how	communities	behave	in	a	disaster	situation.	As	portrayed	 earlier,	 the	 intangible	 indicators	 affecting	 resilience	 are	 part	 of	 the	 cultural	landscape	 (Figure	 2.6),	 which	 leads	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 resilience	 and	 the	 cultural	landscape	 are	 related.	 Since	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 is	 unique	 to	 each	 community,	neighborhood,	and	city,	it	is	difficult	to	define	the	relationship	between	resilience	and	the	cultural	landscape	in	a	non-abstract	manner.		As	 stated	 in	 the	 above	 section,	 3.2.4,	 resilience	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	 continuously	evolving	process	 that	changes	over	 time,	and	 is	affected	by	different	 indicators.	Due	 to	the	fact	that	the	intangible	indicators	affecting	it	are	part	of	the	cultural	landscape,	this	implies	 that	 understanding	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 is	 crucial	 as	 it	 leads	 to	 a	 better	understanding	of	the	resilience	of	a	community.	Therefore,	the	cultural	landscape	is	not	part	of	resilience,	but	it	compliments	it,	especially	when	urban	communities	are	at	stake.	Scholars	 certainly	 need	 to	 familiarize	 themselves	 with	 the	 cultural	 landscape,	 what	 it	stands	for,	and	how	it	came	to	be	what	it	is	in	order	to	see	how	it	can	affect	resilience.	In	
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the	case	of	the	LNW,	the	social	networks	prior	to	Katrina	were	already	very	strong,	but	they	were	shattered	after	the	Hurricane,	and	that	makes	them	an	interesting	element	to	research.	 It	 doesn’t	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 will	 only	 affect	resilience	positively;	 it	 can	 also	 affect	 it	 negatively,	 and	 this	will	 be	 the	 subject	 of	 this	research	 where	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 whether	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 strengthened	 the	resilience	of	the	LNW,	weakened	it,	or	both.	This	investigation	focuses	on	components	of	the	cultural	landscape:	place	attachment,	social	networks	(formal	and	informal),	cultural	identity,	and	memory;	and	on	components	of	 the	community:	empowerment,	diversity,	auto-organization,	and	knowledge/	social	learning.		
3.3.	Resilience:	Is	it	a	Complex	Concept?	
3.3.1.	How	do	Time	and	Space	Affect	Resilience?	Since	resilience	is	a	continuously	evolving	concept	then	the	element	of	time	plays	an	 important	 role	 in	determining	 the	 resilience	of	 any	 community.	And	how	resilience	impacts	 the	 spatial	 configuration	 is	 also	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account.	 Time	 and	 space	 go	hand	in	hand	in	post	disaster	situations,	especially	when	resilience	 is	at	stake.	Besides,	understanding	how	time	and	space	impact	the	level	or	resilience	adds	to	the	complexity	of	the	concept.		
Time	and	Resilience	As	discussed	 in	 section	3.2.4,	 the	 relationship	 between	 resilience	 and	 time,	 and	between	resilience	and	space,	is	an	important	one.	It	remains	very	challenging	to	predict	the	resilience	of	an	area	prior	to	the	occurrence	of	a	disaster.	Consequently,	it	can	only	be	evaluated	after	the	calamity	takes	place.	The	location	of	resilience	according	to	the	scale	of	 time	 is	 a	 crucial	 one.	 Resilience	 is	 part	 of	 any	 community	 or	 city	 and	 it	 is	 always	present	 (Reghezza-Zitt	et	al.,	2012).	 It	only	manifests	 itself	at	 the	moment	 the	disaster	starts,	and	it	can	change	to	any	level	depending	on	the	area	and	the	nature	of	the	event.	In	this	research	the	concept	of	‘state	of	resilience’	will	be	used.	The	state	of	resilience	is	the	previously	 established	 ability	 of	 an	 individual,	 community,	 or	 area	 (an	 ability	 they	did	not	know	they	had	until	after	the	event	takes	place)	to	resist	or	withstand	a	disaster.	
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For	example,	 if	 a	person	does	not	die,	 a	home	 is	partially	or	not	destroyed,	or	an	area	resisting	harsh	conditions,	then	these	are	signs	of	an	already	existing	resilience—a	state	of	resilience—one	which	has	 its	roots	 long	before	the	disaster	actually	took	place.	This	can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 following:	 a	 specific	 know-how	 from	 the	 individual	 about	survival,	 a	 home	 that	 was	 built	 with	 resisting	 materials,	 or	 any	 other	 factor	 that	 can	increase	the	survival	rates	of	individuals	or	physical	structures.		Yet,	the	consequences	of	the	event	and	the	decisions	made	after	the	occurrence	of	the	disaster	do	not	necessarily	imply	that	the	 individuals,	communities,	or	cities	are	more	or	 less	resilient	as	 it	 is	all	a	case-by-case	scenario.		Another	reason	why	time	is	of	importance	to	understanding	resilience	is	because	the	 data	was	 collected	 seven	 years	 after	 the	 hurricane.	 All	 along	 this	 time	 span,	many	changes	 took	 place	 in	 New	Orleans	 and	 in	 the	 LNW.	Most	 researchers	 look	 at	 a	 post-disaster	 situation	 immediately	 after	 the	 occurrence	 of	 the	 calamity.	 As	 much	 as	 it	 is	important	 to	 assess	 the	 situation	 right	 after	 the	 disaster	 takes	 place,	 it	 is	 even	 more	valuable	to	look	at	the	area	years	after	the	dust	has	settled.	In	the	case	of	the	LNW,	the	importance	of	social	networks	and	place	attachment	appeared	only	years	after	Katrina.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	even	if	the	area	has	not	been	rebuilt,	it	is	the	strong	ties	and	networks	that	keep	people	from	leaving	the	LNW.	If	these	social	networks	did	not	exist,	the	local	government	as	well	and	the	residents	would	have	left	behind	the	whole	area.	As	it	 turns	 out,	 the	 residents’	 attachment	 to	 their	 community	 and	 their	 neighborhood	revealed	 the	 capacity	 of	 people	 to	 face	multiple	 obstacles	 just	 to	 fight	 and	 stay	 in	 the	LNW.			 According	 to	 the	 Encyclopedia	 of	 Natural	 Hazards,	 there	 are	 multiple	 phases	 in	disaster	 management,	 and	 they	 include:	 1)	 mitigation,	 2)	 preparedness,	 3)	 relief,	 or	response,	 and	 4)	 recovery	 (Bobrowsky,	 2013).	 Throughout	 each	 one	 of	 these	 phases,	things	 change,	 and	 so	 does	 resilience,	 which	 reinforces	 the	 argument	 that	 resilience	evolves	over	time.	Also,	some	authors	acknowledge	three	temporalities	of	resilience:	1)	short-term	 resilience:	 rebuilding	 infrastructures	 and	 networks,	 2)	 medium-term	resilience:	 return	 of	 the	 inhabitants	 and	 re-stimulate	 the	 economy,	 and	 3)	 long-term	
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resilience:	 social	and	cultural	development	 (Maret	&	Cadoul,	2008;	Oliver	et	al.,	2014).	Also,	 other	 authors	 refer	 to	 the	 temporality	 of	 resilience	 as	 three	 distinctive	 states,	 “a	definitive	 disappearance,	 the	 survival	 of	 the	 system	 as	 it	was,	 and	 a	 structural	 change	that	corresponds	to	a	radical	structural	change	of	the	system.”	(Reghezza-Zitt	et	al.,	2012,	p.	3)			 Resilience	 cannot	 be	 a	 static	 concept.	 From	 the	 moment	 any	 disaster	 strikes,	 a	community’s	 resilience	 is	put	 to	 the	 test.	With	an	existing	state	of	 resilience,	 resilience	itself	 is	put	to	the	test	from	the	moment	the	disaster	takes	place	until	 it	ends,	and	long	after	the	dust	has	settled.	Dealing	with	all	the	consequences	that	come	after	a	calamity,	whether	 it	 is	 the	 physical	 destruction	 or	 the	 personal	 loss,	 and	 overcoming	 all	 the	adversity	that	arise	along	the	way	to	finally	find	a	balance	where	the	whole	experience	is	part	of	a	distant	past.	The	newfound	balance	is	not	necessarily	similar	to	the	one	before	the	disaster;	it	is	a	new	form	of	equilibrium.	In	this	research,	the	aim	is	to	reach	a	better	and	more	sustainable	balance	where	the	same	mistakes	will	not	be	repeated.			
Levels	of	Geography	and	Resilience	As	it	is	with	time,	resilience	changes	with	the	different	scales	as	well.	Nelson	et	al.	(2007)	 point	 in	 their	 article,	 the	 rebuilding	 process	 happens	 at	 three	 scales:	 (1)	 the	individual/household	level,	(2)	the	neighborhood	level,	and	(3)	the	citywide	level.	Also,	the	rebuilding	process	 is	part	of	evaluating	the	resilience	of	a	city	and	since	rebuilding	takes	place	at	 three	 scales,	 resilience	 changes	according	 to	 the	different	 scales	as	well.	This	 research	 proposes	 looking	 beyond	 these	 three	 levels.	 With	 resilience	 being	 a	broader	dynamic	than	the	rebuilding	process	per	se,	 it	varies	over	more	than	the	three	scales	mentioned	earlier.	Therefore,	the	following	explains	how	resilience	takes	place	at	multiple	levels,	and	Figure	3.3	summarizes	it:		- At	 the	 individual	 level:	 people	 deal	 and	 react	 to	 disasters	 in	 different	 ways.	There	 is	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 individual	 in	regards	to	others,	as	two	people	cannot	be	equally	resilient.		
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- At	 the	 household	 level:	 the	 rebuilding	of	 each	household	happens	 in	different	ways.	 This	 process	 varies	 according	 to	 insurance,	 wealth,	 health,	 and	 local	authority’s	involvement.	Since	people	function	as	a	community,	the	rebuilding	of	residential	homes	creates	a	domino	effect	whereby	 the	more	homes	are	rebuilt,	the	more	they	will	promote	and	incite	others	to	rebuild.		- At	 the	 neighborhood	 level:	 there	 are	 many	 elements	 in	 a	 neighborhood	(residences,	 commercial	areas,	 services,	etc.),	and	 things	can	vary	depending	on	old	or	new	zoning	laws	and	on	new	rebuilding	plans.	The	neighborhood	is	directly	affected	by	the	local	economy,	the	existing	social	structures,	and	the	political	and	government	involvement.	Also,	 different	 neighborhoods	 rebuild	 themselves	 either	 differently	 or	 at	 a	different	 speed,	which	 implies	 that	 the	 resilience	of	one	neighborhood	could	be	different	 from	 the	 resilience	 of	 another.	 For	 instance,	 the	 rebuilding	 of	 a	 city’s	financial	district	or	downtown	will	be	 faster	 than	 the	rebuilding	of	a	residential	neighborhood.	 A	 rebuilt	 financial	 district	 or	 downtown	 helps	 in	 promoting	recovery	and	job	creation,	therefore	boosting	the	economy.		- At	the	city	 level:	with	neighborhoods	rebuilding	themselves	differently	and	at	a	different	pace,	then	the	resilience	of	the	whole	city	varies.	The	relationship	of	the	city	 to	 its	 neighboring	 cities	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 accelerating	 or	decelerating	 the	 rebuilding	 process,	 thus	 affecting	 its	 resilience.	 Also,	 the	resilience	 of	 a	 city	 is	 directly	 related	 to	 the	 image	 it	 portrays,	 the	 economy	 it	wants	to	have,	and	the	political	structure	it	aims	for.		Also	the	resilience	of	a	city	is	impacted	whether	it	lost	a	big	part	of	its	population	or	if	it	is	receiving	a	large	number	of	people	from	another	city.		- At	 the	 state/province	 level:	depending	on	the	disaster	that	took	place	and	the	presence	 of	 a	 state/province	 (if	 it	 applies),	 the	 resilience	 of	 a	 state	 is	 affected	especially	 at	 the	 economic	 and	 political	 levels,	 especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 large	population	migration.		- At	 the	 country	 level:	depending	on	the	disaster	that	 took	place	and	the	size	of	the	 country,	 a	 disaster	 can	 affect	 the	 whole	 country	 or	 only	 a	 part	 of	 it.	 And	
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depending	on	these	factors,	the	resilience	of	a	country	can	vary.	 	For	example,	it	varies	if	the	disaster	destroyed	a	large	portion	or	not,	because	then	the	resources	can	 be	 allocated	 to	 the	 affected	 areas.	 If	 most	 of	 the	 country	 is	 destroyed,	 the	circumstances	call	for	a	state	of	emergency	and	for	international	help,	which	can	delay	the	rebuilding	and	recovery	process.		
	Figure	3.3:	The	different	scales	at	which	resilience	varies:	the	individual	level,	the	household	level,	the	neighborhood	level,	the	city	level,	the	state/province	level,	and	the	country	level.	(source:	author)	This	 research	 aims	 at	 taking	 all	 the	 information	 proposed	 and	 understand	resilience	at	the	different	scales	where	it	comes	at	play	so	as	to	highlight	the	lack	in	data	when	 it	 comes	 to	 disaster	 research.	 This	 especially	 applies	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 taking	cultural	identity	into	consideration.	Here	are	two	examples	that	demonstrate	the	manner	in	which	different	scales	impact	on	the	level	of	resilience.	The	first	example	is	Hurricane	Katrina	 in	 New	 Orleans	 (2005).	 The	 calamity	 caused	 direct	 physical	 damage	 to	 a	 few	cities	in	the	south	east	coast	of	the	U.S.,	and	the	consequences	had	a	direct	impact	on	the	neighboring	cities	and	states,	with	the	whole	country	being	affected	indirectly,	as	it	did	not	affect	the	functionality	of	the	government.	The	second	example	is	the	earthquake	in	Haiti	 (2010)	where	 a	 large	portion	of	 the	 country	was	destroyed	by	 the	 impact	 of	 the	earthquake	 and	 its	 aftershocks.	 The	 level	 of	 devastation	 directly	 affected	 the	 whole	country	 at	 all	 levels,	 rendering	 the	 government	 almost	 entirely	 dysfunctional	 for	 an	extended	period	of	time.	Not	enough	research	has	been	done	on	the	importance	of	scale	
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on	post-disaster	research.	This	research	aims	at	proposing	an	overall	perspective	on	the	concept	of	resilience	with	all	the	elements	affecting	it,	as	well	as	opening	new	doors	for	new	research	perspectives.		There	is	a	gap	in	the	literature	when	it	comes	to	relating	resilience	to	the	different	scales	of	the	geography.	One	of	the	limitations	this	research	faces	is	to	evaluate	precisely	the	manner	in	which	the	different	scales	affect	resilience.	Yet	it	is	important	to	take	these	variations	 into	 account	 for	 two	 reasons:	 1)	 because	 it	 allows	 grasping	 the	 disaster	situation	with	all	 its	complexity,	and	2)	because	it	can	be	the	subject	of	future	research	projects.	In	this	dissertation,	the	choice	of	study	is	on	one	neighborhood,	the	LNW,	and	thus	 the	 study	will	be	 focused	on	 the	 individual,	 the	household,	 and	 the	neighborhood	level.	Yet,	it	is	of	great	significance	to	relate	the	LNW	to	the	rest	of	the	city	and	the	impact	it	 has	 on	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 city,	 especially	 with	 all	 the	 nationwide	 attention	 this	neighborhood	received	over	the	years	following	Katrina.		
3.3.2.	Is	Resilience	a	Measurable	Concept?	“Risks	and	catastrophes	are	complex	objects”9	claim	Dauphiné	et	al.	(2013,	p.	10).	Complexity	can	originate	from	the	large	number	of	components	making	a	system,	be	the	result	 of	 a	 non-linear	 evolution	 of	 a	 relatively	 simple	 system,	 and	 result	 from	 the	combination	of	multiple	spatial	scales	or	organizational	levels.	This	research	argues	that	the	 concept	 of	 resilience	 is	 more	 than	 the	 sum	 of	 its	 indicators.	 It	 remains	 a	 highly	contested	concept,	especially	along	these	lines:	1)	the	continuous	debate	about	it	being	a	process	 or	 an	 outcome,	 2)	measuring	 it	 and	 quantifying	 it	with	 tangible	 indicators,	 3)	adding	to	that	the	intangible	indicators	and	the	cultural	landscape,	and	4)	the	elements	of	time	and	space.	All	these	combined	render	the	concept	of	resilience	a	complex	one	that	is	 hard	 to	measure.	 As	Morin	 (2008	 [1990],	 p.	 5)	 states,	 “What	 is	 complexity?	 At	 first	glance,	 complexity	 is	 a	 fabric	 (complexus:	 that	 which	 is	 woven	 together)	 of	heterogeneous	 constituents	 that	 are	 inseparably	 associated:	 complexity	 poses	 the	paradox	of	the	one	and	the	many.”																																																									
9	“Les	risques	et	les	catastrophes	sont	des	objets	complexes”,	translation	by	the	author.		
	 71	
He	 also	 adds	 that	 complexity	 has	 two	 faces:	 one	 side	 is	 the	 “fabric	 of	 events,	actions,	 interactions,	 retroactions,	 determinations,	 and	 chance	 that	 constitute	 our	phenomenal	world”,	and	the	second	being	a	messy	face	that	is	responsible	for	the	lack	of	order	 and	 certainty.	 In	 his	 opinion,	 “The	necessity	 of	 knowledge	 to	 put	 phenomena	 in	order	by	repressing	disorder,	by	pushing	aside	the	uncertain	(…),	to	select	the	elements	of	 order	 and	 certainty,	 and	 to	 eliminate	 ambiguity,	 to	 clarify,	 distinguish,	 and	hierarchize.”	(Morin,	2008	[1990],	p.	5)		And	 this	 way	 of	 presenting	 complexity	 is	 applicable	 to	 resilience,	 where	 the	complexity	 of	 resilience	 renders	 it	 a	 phenomenon	 of	 interwoven	 elements.	 This	complexity	represents	the	strength,	the	return,	the	bounce	back/forward	of	a	community	that	underwent	extreme	conditions	and	difficulties.	Yet,	it	can	encompass	so	much	chaos	and	 uncertainty	 that	 it	 makes	 it	 even	 more	 problematic	 to	 fathom.	 And	 knowledge	should	help	in	determining	the	elements	of	order	and	clarity,	and	repress	the	elements	of	disorder	 and	ambiguity.	 In	 addition,	 this	 chapter	 shows	how	challenging	 is	 the	 task	of	determining	the	resilience	of	a	system,	which	emphasizes	its	complexity.	Also,	Reghezza-Zitt	et	al.	(2012)	state	that	there	are	no	satisfactory	way	to	present	a	resilient	system,		It	 becomes	 evident	 that,	 to	 be	 resilient,	 a	 system	 must,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 be	redundant,	diversified	and	efficient;	autonomous	and	collaborative;	stiff,	 flexible	and	adaptable;	capable	of	learning	from	the	past	and	to	face	future	uncertainties;	etc.,	which,	every	time	is	evidently	contradictory	and	do	not,	in	the	end,	allow	to	find	satisfying	solutions,	either	 from	a	heuristic	or	an	operational	point	of	view.	Reghezza-Zitt	et	al.	(2012,	p.	8)	As	 shown	 in	 section	 3.2.1,	 some	 authors	 have	 tried	 to	 measure	 and	 quantify	resilience.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 look	 at	 this	 concept	 in	 a	 holistic	manner,	 which	 involves	taking	 into	 account	 non-quantitative	 elements.	 There	 are	 too	 many	 factors	 that	contribute	to	its	evolution,	and	trying	to	assess	them	through	purely	quantitative	means	is	a	very	challenging	task.	Other	than	the	multitude	of	indicators,	tangible	or	intangible,	there	is	the	element	of	time.	Due	to	its	continuous	nature,	it	makes	resilience	an	evolving	concept.	So,	how	do	we	measure	such	a	concept?	Also,	the	element	of	space	and	the	scale	
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used	to	measure	or	evaluate	resilience,	play	both	a	very	 important	role	 in	determining	how	the	concept	is	perceived.	Do	we	try	to	measure	resilience	at	every	scale	or	different	timeframes?	 After	 all,	 maybe	 measuring	 resilience	 is	 not	 the	 most	 efficient	 way	 to	understanding	 the	 concept	 in	 its	 fullest.	 A	 distinction	 should	 be	 made	 between	 the	concept	 and	 the	 tool.	 The	process	 of	measuring	 resilience	 should	be	 considered	 a	 tool	while	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience	 is	 a	 continuously	 evolving	 one.	 This	 research	 positions	itself	with	 the	 latter.	The	methods	presented	earlier	 are	 relevant	 to	 show	an	aspect	of	resilience,	 at	 a	 very	 specific	 time	 and	 place,	 and	 should	 be	 considered	 a	 preliminary	indication	of	how	a	community	is	doing	after	the	occurrence	of	a	disaster.	This,	however,	is	 insufficient.	After	compiling	the	indicators	relevant	to	the	case	study,	more	thorough	and	in-depth	interviews	had	to	be	conducted	with	both	the	community	at	stake	and	with	the	 implicated	 stakeholders	 in	 order	 to	 have	 a	 proper	 assessment	 of	 the	 overall	resilience	of	the	community,	the	neighborhood,	and	the	whole	city.		
3.4.	Elements	to	Retain			In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 focus	 is	 geared	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience	 and	 how	 it	 is	looked	 at	 in	 regards	 to	 disasters,	 and	 all	 what	 subsequently	 comes.	 In	 Chapter	 2,	 the	highlight	was	 on	 the	 existing	 literature	 and	 the	 (too	many)	 definitions	 of	 the	 concept.	Here,	the	emphasis	is	on	looking	at	resilience	from	all	angles,	which	includes	the	various	methods	used	to	measure	 it,	 its	relation	to	vulnerability,	and	the	way	 it	relates	 to	 time	and	space.	Resilience,	as	earlier	mentioned,	 is	more	 than	 the	mere	sum	of	all	 its	parts.	Beyond	 the	 theoretical	 groundings,	 this	 research	 emphasizes	 the	 fact	 that	 resilience	 is	affected	by	the	cultural	landscape	and	intangible	elements.	The	aim	here	is	to	propose	a	new	way	of	 looking	at	community	resilience	and	 to	consider	 the	extent	 to	which	place	attachment,	 social	 networks,	 cultural	 identity,	 and	 memory	 can	 contribute	 to	 rebuild	stronger	and	empowered	communities	that	are	more	informed	and	built	on	know-how.	By	 acknowledging	 the	 inherent	 complexity	 of	 resilience,	 the	 concept	 takes	 on	 a	fuller	meaning.	This	 indicates	that	disaster	researchers	should	take	a	step	back	and	re-evaluate	the	concept.	Thus	far,	the	studies	referring	to	resilience	have	taken	the	concept	for	granted	and	undermined	it.		
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It	 is	 important	 to	 look	 at	 resilience	 from	 a	 holistic	 perspective,	 one	 in	 which	measuring	it	through	quantitative	data	alone	is	insufficient	to	conceptualize	the	concept.	Of	 course,	 even	 if	 this	 chapter	 criticizes	 the	 different	 methods	 of	 measuring	 it,	 they	admittedly	 are	 essential	 in	 providing	 an	 early	 understanding	 of	 the	 state	 of	 any	community	 or	 city	 at	 stake.	 However,	 such	 data	 by	 itself	 is	 not	 sufficient	 in	 fully	evaluating	resilience,	whether	 through	 the	use	of	practical	 tools	or	conceptual	ones.	 In	addition,	 understanding	 the	 relation	 that	 resilience	 has	 to	 vulnerability	 and	 to	 the	cultural	 landscape	 leads	 to	 a	 better	 comprehension	 of	 the	 elements	 contributing	 to	increasing	or	decreasing	it.	This	research	proposes	to	look	at	vulnerability	as	a	state	that	is	part	of	resilience,	and	by	doing	so,	it	becomes	not	only	an	easier	concept	to	measure,	but	 it	provides	an	 indication	of	 the	state	of	 the	community	prior	 to	 the	disaster.	As	 for	the	 cultural	 landscape,	 it	 helps	 in	 determining	 the	 cultural	 elements	 that	 constitute	 a	community,	which	will	determine	the	elements	that	contribute	(or	not)	to	the	return	and	the	 rebuilding	 of	 a	 community.	 Also,	 at	 the	 community	 level,	 this	 cultural	 landscape	reinforces	elements	like:	empowerment,	social	learning,	knowledge,	diversity,	and	auto-organization	 in	 order	 to	 help	 citizens	 be	more	 knowledgeable	 and	 independent,	while	taking	 matters	 into	 their	 own	 hands.	 Researchers	 should	 look	 at	 the	 tangible	 and	measurable	 indicators	 as	well	 as	 the	 intangible	 indicators	 (place	 attachment,	memory,	social	 networks,	 etc.),	 time,	 and	 scale	 as	 all	 these	 elements	 affect	 how	 resilience	 is	evaluated,	thus	perceived.		Disaster	 research	 should	 be	 geared	 toward	 improving	 people’s	 lives	 and	providing	a	safe	and	stable	environment	 for	people	 to	 thrive	 in.	When	the	citizens	of	a	particular	 city	 or	 community	 suffer	 due	 to	 a	 disaster,	 they	 should	 not	 have	 to	 worry	about	 how	 to	 come	back	 and	 rebuild.	 This	 is	where	disaster	 research	 intervenes.	 This	research	demonstrates	that	measuring	resilience	is	not	enough	to	tackle	the	complexity	of	 a	 post-disaster	 situation,	 and	 there	 are	 many	 more	 elements	 to	 take	 into	 account,	particularly	the	elements	of	the	cultural	landscape,	because	they	help	people	recover	and	settle	back	 into	 their	neighborhood	and	home	while	maintaining	 their	social	networks.	Such	a	perspective	puts	the	focus	on	resilience	and	the	elements	that	affect	the	concept	
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at	the	operational	and	at	the	theoretical	level.	Using	the	LNW	as	a	case	study	provides	a	genuine	application	of	how	the	concept	can	be	used	constructively	and	coherently.		
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Chapter	4: Using	Mixed	Methods	Research	Design	
4.1.	Overview		This	chapter	focuses	on	the	methodological	approach,	process,	and	methods	used	in	 the	 course	 of	 this	 research.	 The	 attention	 is	 geared	 on	 the	 period	 post	 Hurricane	Katrina.	The	data	collected	is	both	qualitative	and	quantitative,	but	the	author	uses	the	terms	 primary	 and	 secondary	 data	 (this	will	 be	 explained	 further	 in	 section	 4.4.2).	 In	Chapter	3,	 the	 author	 showed	 the	 importance	of	 time	 in	disaster	 research,	 an	 element	that	 is	 also	 pertinent	 when	 tackling	 the	 methodology	 process.	 Time	 is	 critical	 as	researchers	may	focus	on:	1)	the	period	before	the	event,	2)	the	timeframe	of	the	event,	and	 3)	 the	 period	 following	 the	 event.	 As	 noted	 by	 Pigeon	 (2002),	 and	 other	multiple	authors	(Chardon	et	al.,	1994;	D'Ercole	et	al.,	1994;	Maret	&	Goeury,	2008;	Thouret	et	al.,	1996),	using	an	a	posteriori	approach	is	most	relevant	to	evaluate	the	vulnerability	of	a	geographic	 area	 (a	 neighborhood	 or	 a	 city)	 when	 studying	 disasters.	 Although	 it	 is	opportune	to	review	all	three	periods,	this	research	aims	at	putting	the	most	attention	on	the	period	post	Hurricane	Katrina,	while	using	a	mixed	method	design.	This	method	aims	at	providing	a	more	cumulative	perspective	on	the	LNW,	along	with	a	possibility	for	data	triangulation	for	validation	purposes.		The	 main	 contribution	 of	 this	 methodology	 helps	 mainly	 in	 answering	 the	research	question	regarding	the	relationship	between	place	attachment,	social	networks,	and	memory	with	the	creation	of	resilient	communities.	Consequently,	such	a	choice	of	methods	brings	about	more	comprehensive	sets	of	results	for	a	very	complex	situation,	thus	simplifying	it.	The	aim	is	to	look	at	the	cultural	landscape	and	at	the	elements	that	constitute	it	in	order	to	evaluate	how	they	affect	community	resilience.	This	is	also	done	for	 the	 aforementioned	 purpose	 of	 highlighting	 the	 importance	 of	 taking	 into	 account	cultural	 elements	 in	 post-disaster	 research,	 for	 planners	 and	 decision-makers	 tend	 to	disregard	 them.	The	dissertation	points	out	 these	elements	and	shows	how	much	 they	contribute	 to	people’s	 returning	when	 their	home	 is	 completely	devastated.	Therefore,	the	 cultural	 landscape	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 promoting	 community	 resilience	 and	 a	 mixed	
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methods	 design	 helps	 in	 reaching	 such	 a	 conclusion.	 But	 to	 what	 extent	 does	 place	attachment/topophilia	and	social	networks	contribute	to	rebuilding	a	community?		This	research	study	focuses	on	the	LNW	after	Hurricane	Katrina,	and	the	majority	of	 the	data	was	collected	during	the	summer	of	2012.	The	following	section	provides	a	theoretical	and	a	practical	explanation	for	the	methodological	choice.	Also	introduced	are	the	method	 used,	 the	 obstacles	 faced	 during	 the	 process	 of	 gathering	 the	 information,	along	with	the	data	and	how	it	was	collected.			
4.2.	The	Theoretical	Reasoning	behind	The	Methodology	
4.2.1.	A	Theoretical	Perspective	"Study	what	interest	and	is	of	value	to	you,	study	it	in	the	different	ways	that	you	deem	appropriate,	and	utilize	 the	results	 in	ways	 that	can	bring	about	positive	 consequences	within	 your	 value	 system."(Tashakkori	 et	 al.,	 1998)	(p.	30)	For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 study,	 a	 mixed	 methods	 research	 approach	 has	 been	adopted.	Creswell	 et	al.	 (2007)	define	 this	method	as	a	 research	design	with	anchored	philosophical	assumptions	and	a	way	to	research	a	specific	problem.	The	author	states	that	as	a	methodology,	it	relies	on	philosophical	assumptions	that	“guide	the	direction	of	the	 collection	 and	 analysis	 of	 data	 and	 the	 mixture	 of	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	approaches	in	many	phases	in	the	research	process.”	(Creswell	et	al.,	2007,	p.	5)	Mixed	methods	research	promotes	the	collection,	analysis	and	mixing	of	both	types	of	data,	all	of	which	can	be	done	in	one	case	study	or	in	multiple	case	studies.	The	author	states,	“its	central	premise	is	that	the	use	of	quantitative	and	qualitative	approaches	in	combination	provides	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 research	 problems	 that	 either	 approach	 alone.”	(Creswell	et	al.,	2007,	p.	5)	Mixed	methods	 research	 was	 relatively	 new	when	 compared	 to	 the	 commonly	recognized	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 methods,	 but	 researchers	 have	 used	 it	extensively	 over	 the	 past	 twenty	 or	 more	 years.	 And	 now,	 it	 is	 a	 widely	 accepted	methodology	in	social	science	and	in	planning	studies.	This	choice	of	method	is	justified	
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as	follows:	1)	mixed	methods	research	fills	in	the	gaps	that	qualitative	and	quantitative	research	 cannot	 fill,	 2)	 it	 offers	 more	 exhaustive	 evidence	 when	 studying	 a	 research	problem	 than	 the	 other	 methods,	 3)	 it	 helps	 in	 answering	 research	 questions	 that	qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 cannot	 do	 alone,	 it	 encourages	 the	 usage	 of	 multiple	paradigms,	 4)	 and	 it	 is	 ‘practical’	 where	 the	 researcher	 has	 the	 freedom	 to	 use	 any	method	when	dealing	with	a	research	problem	(Creswell	and	Plano	Clark,	2007).	These	are	important	points	for	a	research	project	such	as	this	one,	as	it	allows	the	researcher	to	use	 all	 types	 of	 data	 that	 help	 in	 understanding	 the	problem.	 Since	Hurricane	Katrina,	many	 researchers	 have	worked	 and	 published	 about	New	Orleans	 and	 the	 issues	 that	came	 out	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 storm.	 The	 author’s	 intent	 is	 to	 take	 all	 relevant	 data	 into	account	so	as	to	get	a	more	holistic	perspective	on	the	LNW.		
4.2.2.	Pragmatism	behind	Mixed	Methods	Research	Philosopher	 Charles	 Sanders	 Peirce	 founded	 pragmatism	 in	 the	 nineteenth	century.	He	borrowed	the	term	from	Kant	and	interpreted	it	as	his	own	in	the	realm	of	scientific	 investigation.	 Several	 authors	 followed	 his	 footsteps,	 among	 them	 were:	William	 James,	 John	 Dewey,	 George	 Herbert	 Mead,	 and	 Arthur	 F.	 Bentley.	 The	 figure	below	 (Figure	 4.1)	 presents	 briefly	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 pragmatism:	 the	authors/founders,	the	different	theories	influencing	it,	and	how	it	impacted	the	research	field	 (Maxcy,	 2003).	 According	 to	 Tashakkori	 et	 al.	 (1998,	 2003),	 there	 are	 multiple	reasons	 why	 pragmatism	 is	 the	 paradigm	 behind	 mixed	 methods	 research:	 1)	pragmatism	 encourages	 the	 usage	 of	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 research	 in	 a	 single	study	 and	 at	 multiple	 levels	 of	 the	 research,	 2)	 pragmatism	 gives	 more	 value	 to	 the	research	 question	 than	 the	 method	 used,	 3)	 pragmatism	 refutes	 the	 ‘incompatibility	thesis’	and	is	open	to	both	points	of	views:	constructivism	and	positivism,	4)	the	choice	of	methods	to	be	used	depends	solely	on	the	research	question,	and	5)	pragmatism	has	a	‘practical’	and	applied	research	philosophy.	
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	Figure	4.1:	The	origins	of	Pragmatism	(inspired	by	Maxcy	(2003))	
4.3.	Methodological	and	Data	Collection	Process	
4.3.1.	Initial	Research	Intentions	and	Assumptions	Before	going	to	New	Orleans	to	collect	the	data,	the	assumption	that	gathering	the	information	needed	to	complete	the	research	was	going	to	be	available	and	easy	to	find	was	misleading.	To	answer	 the	research	question	 ‘what	 is	 the	role	of	place	attachment	and	social	networks	 in	 the	creation	of	 resilient	urban	communities	 in	 the	Lower	Ninth	Ward	after	Hurricane	Katrina?’	the	initial	design	was	to	follow	a	mixed	method	research	strategy.	The	intentions	were	to	interview	the	residents	of	the	LNW	and	present	the	facts	from	their	perspective	and	point	of	view.	The	target	was	to	interview	50	to	60	residents	and	collect	surveys	about	each,	and	to	gather	statistics	about	the	neighborhood.	The	goal	was	to	talk	to	as	many	people	as	possible:	children,	young	adults,	adults,	and	elderly	in	order	 to	 get	 the	most	 accurate	perspective	and	 to	be	able	 to	portray	 the	 reality	of	 the	situation.	If	time	permitted,	the	researcher	hoped	to	gather	the	same	residents	into	focus	groups	and	collect	road	maps	so	as	to	identify	the	neighborhood	through	their	eyes	and	experiences.	 Soon	 after	 the	 study	 began,	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 answering	 the	 research	question	 needed	 a	 thorough	 look	 at	 other	 sub-questions.	 To	 evaluate	 the	 strength	 of	
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place	 attachment	 and	 the	 social	 networks,	 the	 author	 had	 to	 answer	 to	 the	 following	questions:	- Why	is	the	LNW	behind	in	the	rebuilding	process?		- How	 were	 the	 social	 networks	 formed	 in	 the	 LNW?	 What	 is	 the	 relationship	between	 social	 networks	 and	 place	 attachment	 in	 the	 LNW?	And	 how	 are	 both	elements	a	symbol	of	strength?	- What	are	people	attached	to	in	the	neighborhood?	Their	home?	Their	family?		- What	was	the	cultural	landscape	before	the	hurricane?	And	after?	- Why	are	people	still	fighting	to	return	and	rebuild?		- What	is	the	role	of	planners,	non-profit	organizations	(NPOs),	and	city	officials	in	the	rebuilding	process?		The	 plan	 was	 to	 enter	 the	 neighborhood	 by	 the	 door	 of	 two	 non-profit	organizations	 (Lowernine.org	 and	 Lower	 9th	 Ward	 Neighborhood	 Empowerment	Network	Association	-	NENA),	and	do	some	volunteer	work	in	order	to	gain	their	trust.	Through	 the	 help	 of	 Professor	 Michelle	 Thompson	 (Associate	 Professor,	 University	 of	New	Orleans),	contact	with	key	people	had	been	established	while	still	in	Montreal,	and	appointments	were	 taken	 from	 them	 so	 that	 the	data	 collection	process	 could	 start	 as	soon	as	possible.	Soon	enough,	it	was	clear	that	there	was	some	resistance	from	the	NPO	representatives,	and	things	needed	to	be	handled	differently	once	in	NOLA.		
4.3.2.	Ethics	in	Research		With	a	case	like	post-Katrina	New	Orleans,	and	more	specifically	the	LNW,	ethical	approval	was	a	required	and	very	important	part	of	the	research	process.	The	researcher	needed	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 trauma	 that	 the	 interviewees	 had	 gone	 through	 and	special	care	had	to	be	considered	as	not	to	harm	the	citizens.	According	to	Creswell	et	al.	(2007,	p.	113),		Researchers	 need	 permission	 to	 collect	 data	 from	 individuals	 and	 sites.	 This	permission	can	be	gained	at	 three	 levels:	 from	 individuals	who	are	 in	 charge	of	
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sites;	from	people	providing	the	data	(and	their	representatives,	such	as	parents);	and	from	campus-based	institutional	review	boards	(IRBs).	Also,	 the	 author	 was	 aiming	 at	 interviewing	 young	 children.	 According	 to	 the	ethical	 boards	 of	 both	 Université	 de	Montréal	 (UdeM)	 and	 University	 of	 New	 Orleans	(UNO),	 these	 were	 considered	 a	 vulnerable	 population,	 which	 required	 a	 special	committee	for	approval.	The	researcher	had	to	get	both	institutions’	ethical	approval	in	order	 to	 proceed	with	 the	 interviewing	 process.	 To	 get	 IRB	 approval,	 UNO	 required	 a	certificate	 of	 completion	 from	 the	 National	 Institute	 of	 Health	 (NIH)	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	Primary	Investigator	(Michelle	Thompson)	and	both	Co-Investigators	(Nada	Toueir	and	Isabelle	 Thomas).	 This	 required	 taking	 an	 on-line	 course	 about	 “Protecting	 Human	Research	 Participants”	 (refer	 to	 Appendix	 B	 for	 copies	 of	 the	 certificates).	 Both	institutions	 required	 a	 special	 committee	 to	 approve	 the	 ethical	 certificate	 due	 to	 two	reasons:	 1)	 the	 trauma	 and	 the	 loss	 that	 the	 citizens	 have	 been	 through	 was	 very	significant,	and	2)	the	interviewing	of	minor	children	is	a	very	delicate	matter	 in	social	sciences	 (refer	 to	 Appendix	 B	 for	 copies	 of	 ethical	 board	 approvals).	 Both	 institutions	took	 the	 issue	 very	 seriously.	 Consent	 forms	 were	 written	 to	 accommodate	 the	interviewees.	 The	 researcher	 decided	 to	 keep	 the	 identities	 of	 the	 interviewees	anonymous,	 and	 assign	 a	 code	 for	 each	 (refer	 to	 table	 4.2).	 This	 process	 allowed	 the	participants	to	feel	free	to	share	any	information,	knowing	that	their	identities	would	be	protected.	It	was	made	clear	to	the	participants,	in	the	consent	forms	and	it	was	repeated	orally,	that	they	could	stop	the	interview	process	if	they	felt	the	need	to	or	if	they	felt	any	level	 of	 discomfort.	 The	purpose	was	 to	 give	 the	participants	 the	 freedom	and	 ease	 to	participate	in	the	research	project.	Also,	it	became	clear	to	the	author	that	the	residents	suffered	 from	“Katrina	Fatigue”,	 “Interview	Fatigue”,	and	“Survivor	Fatigue”,	which	has	been	documented	in	the	work	of	Thompson	et	al.	(2015).	Finally,	the	consent	forms	and	questionnaires	were	ready	and	approved	by	the	ethical	board	of	both	institutions	UdeM	and	UNO	(refer	to	Appendices	C	and	D	for	copies	of	consent	forms	and	questionnaires).	Contact	was	established	with	key	informants	through	UNO,	who	was	hosting	the	author,	and	Professor	Michelle	Thompson	supervised	the	work.	Professor	Thompson	helped	in	
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establishing	connections	with	local	people	and	stakeholders.	The	latter	became	the	key	people	connecting	the	author	to	LNW	residents	and	NPO	representatives.		
4.3.3.	Obstacles	during	the	Data	Collection	Process	The	first	phase	of	the	data	collection	began	upon	arrival.	The	purchase	of	a	phone	number	with	 the	 local	 area	 code	was	 important	 in	 case	 phone	 interviews	were	 to	 be	conducted,	 and	 to	 contact	 residents	 and	 potential	 interviewees.	 Also,	 having	 a	 local	number	helps	is	gaining	people’s	trust	and	shows	them	that	the	research	has	anchorage	in	the	area.	Emails	were	sent	to	key	informants	to	schedule	appointments	with	them	in	order	to	evaluate	the	situation	and	the	amount	of	data	that	could	be	collected	within	the	allocated	time	(3	months).	There	was	no	response	from	NENA,	while	the	representative	of	Lowernine.org	agreed	to	meet	 in	order	 to	better	understand	the	research	 intentions	and	how	to	proceed.	The	representative	showed	a	lot	of	resistance	and	made	it	clear	that	interviewing	the	residents	entailed	paying	for	their	time.	This	was	not	possible	for	many	reasons,	 mainly	 because	 it	 was	 deemed	 unethical	 to	 pay	 the	 residents,	 and	 it	 may	compromise	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 results	 and	 where	 residents’	 stories	 might	 change.	 In	addition,	 it	was	not	approved	by	the	ethical	boards	of	either	UdeM	or	UNO,	and	 it	was	financially	impossible	for	the	author	to	do	so.	The	NPO	representative	also	explained	that	the	residents	suffered	from	‘interview	fatigue’	and	had	been	interviewed	extensively	by	many	researchers	who	just	came	to	the	LNW	to	gather	information.	The	residents	did	not	see	or	receive	anything	in	return	for	their	cooperation	with	various	interviewers,	which	compromised	 their	 trust	 in	people	 coming	 from	outside	 the	neighborhood.	 In	order	 to	enter	 the	 closely-knit	 community	 of	 the	 LNW,	 a	 point	 of	 entry	 was	 needed,	 and	 the	residents	 needed	 to	 understand	 the	 objective	 of	 this	 research	 project.	 The	 aim	was	 to	present	facts	from	their	perspective,	through	their	eyes,	and	to	propose	short	and	long-term	 solutions	 for	 the	 recovery	 of	 their	 neighborhood.	What	 needed	 clarification	was	what	they	wanted	for	the	future	of	their	neighborhood	and	how	they	wanted	it.	Also,	it	was	crucial	to	understand	what	made	this	neighborhood	special,	why	are	they	attached	to	it	to	the	point	that	they	want	to	return	despite	its	vulnerability?	And	finally,	did	they	learn	 from	past	 experiences?	Did	memory	 of	 past	 events	 play	 a	 role	 in	 understanding	
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their	vulnerability?		Obstacles	 were	 faced	 early	 on:	 the	 NPO	 representatives’	 lack	 of	 assistance,	 the	distrust	 residents	 have	 in	 the	many	 researchers	 that	 came	 to	 interview	 them,	 and	 the	various	types	of	traumatisms	they	have	endured	since	the	storm.	A	change	of	strategies	was	deemed	necessary	after	five	weeks	have	passed	without	a	single	interview	in	hand.	Professor	 Thompson	 helped	 in	 establishing	 contact	 with	 fellow	 urban	 planners	 and	professionals	 who	 are	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 involved	 in	 the	 LNW.	 The	more	meetings	could	 take	place	with	people,	 the	higher	 the	 chances	were	 to	get	 in	 touch	with	others.	Before	long,	it	was	clear	that	the	initial	approach	had	been	the	wrong	one.		
4.3.4.	A	New	Research	Strategy		After	 a	 month	 with	 no	 interviews	 and	 many	 meetings	 with	 professionals,	 it	became	even	 clearer	 that	 interviewing	both	 residents	 and	professionals	was	 crucial	 to	understand	why	the	LNW	had	not	been	rebuilt	and	to	answer	the	research	question.	And	it	 turned	 out	 that	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 relationship	 between	 place	 attachment,	social	networks	and	resilience,	 the	author	had	 to	 investigate	 further	 the	causes	 for	 the	LNW’s	 late	 rebuilding.	 This	 is	 where	 it	 became	 imperative	 to	 talk	 to	 residents,	 NPO	representatives,	city	officials,	urban	planners,	and	anyone	who	was	involved	directly	or	indirectly	 in	 the	 LNW.	 Attending	 community	 meetings	 was	 important	 to	 learn	 more	about	 the	 LNW	 and	 about	 the	 city.	 Among	 these	meetings	were:	 Blight	 Stat	meetings,	New	Orleans	Redevelopment	Authority	(NORA)	meetings,	Neighborhood	Empowerment	Network	Association	(NENA)	meetings,	Lower	Ninth	Center	for	Sustainable	Engagement	and	 Development	 (CSED)	 meetings,	 and	 Lower	 Ninth	 Ward	 Food	 Plan	 meetings.	 The	questionnaires	 had	 to	 be	 modified	 to	 match	 the	 new	 research	 perspective,	 and	 the	ethical	boards	of	both	universities	had	to	approve	them.	At	that	stage,	 it	was	crucial	 to	know	and	understand	why,	7	years	after	Hurricane	Katrina,	the	neighborhood	was	late	in	the	 rebuilding	 process	 from	 the	 perspectives	 of	 the	 professionals	 and	 the	 residents.	Equally	 important	 was	 to	 understand	 how	 each	 party	 defined	 and	 identified	 the	neighborhood	 before	 and	 after	 the	 hurricane.	 It	was	 paramount	 to	 have	 the	 residents	talk	willingly	and	share	their	stories.	The	author	was	bound	to	a	specific	timeframe	due	
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to	limited	funding,	and	all	the	data	needed	to	be	collected	between	May	and	August	2012.	At	 first,	 the	author	wanted	 to	be	as	objective	as	possible	and	keep	a	distance	with	 the	interviewees.	 It	was	 clear	 that	while	 retaining	a	 scientific	 approach,	 a	different	way	 to	reach	 out	 to	 them	 and	 have	 them	 connect	 with	 the	 researcher	 had	 to	 be	 found.	 The	researcher	wanted	to	create	a	 feeling	of	ease	with	the	residents	and	gain	their	trust	so	they	would	feel	comfortable	to	share	their	stories	without	the	formality	of	an	interview.	Consequently,	 memorizing	 the	 questions	 was	 essential	 so	 the	 interviews	 could	 be	inserted	into	more	casual	conversations.	Also,	interviewing	minors	turned	out	to	be	a	big	challenge,	because	 there	was	a	 lot	of	 resistance	 from	 the	parents.	A	 longer	visit	would	have	 been	 required	 to	 establish	 that	 level	 of	 trust	 with	 the	 parents,	 and	 that	 was	unfortunately	 impossible.	 Also,	 the	 author	 faced	 some	 roadblocks	 of	 a	 more	 personal	nature.	 Being	 Caucasian	 did	 not	 help	 in	 getting	 interviews,	 since	 the	 residents	 were	majority	African	American	 and	had	 already	been	questioned	by	 other	 ‘white’	 scholars.	However,	 being	 Lebanese,	 having	 gone	 through	 a	 war,	 and	 having	 been	 evacuated	somehow	 helped	 the	 author,	 for	 it	 gave	 her	 an	 experience	 with	 uprootedness	 and	displacement	that	the	residents	could	associate	with.	The	fact	that	both	parties	endured	similar	events	opened	the	doors	to	mutual	trust	and	understanding.	From	that	point	on,	it	 became	 easier	 to	 find	 residents	 to	 interview.	 The	 exchanges	 took	 the	 form	 of	conversations	 between	 two	 individuals	 who	 have	 a	 mutual	 understanding	 of	experiencing	a	specific	event	and	similar	circumstances.	The	second	month	in	NOLA	was	the	one	where	most	 interviews	were	conducted.	Talking	to	residents	and	professionals	shed	the	light	on	the	reality	of	the	situation,	and	results	started	emerging	from	the	data	collection.		
4.4.	Method	and	the	Data	
4.4.1.	Research	Design	and	Triangulation		From	 a	 methodological	 standpoint,	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 research	 is	 on	 using	 both	qualitative	 (QUAL)	 and	 quantitative	 (QUAN)	 approaches	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	‘triangulation’	design	 (Creswell	 and	Plano	Clark,	2007).	The	use	and	application	of	 the	mixed	method	research	only	started	in	1959	by	Campbell	and	Fisk,	and	it	was	not	until	
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1979	 that	 triangulating	 the	 data	 became	 widespread	 (Creswell,	 2009).	 According	 to	Olsen	(2004,	p.	3),	“the	mixing	or	methodologies,	e.g.	mixing	the	use	of	survey	data	with	interviews,	 is	 a	 more	 profound	 form	 of	 triangulation.”	 In	 social	 studies,	 triangulation	contributed	 greatly	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 discipline,	which	 has	 been	 relying	 on	mixing	between	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 data	 (Olsen,	 2004).	 By	 mixing	 approaches,	triangulation	leads	to	multiple	viewpoints	about	the	studied	phenomena:	“the	resulting	dialectic	of	 learning	thrives	on	the	contrasts	between	what	seems	self-evident	 in	 interviews,	 what	 seems	 to	 underlie	 the	 lay	 discourses,	 what	appears	 to	 be	 generally	 true	 in	 surveys,	 and	 what	 differences	 arise	 when	comparing	all	these	with	official	interpretations	of	the	same	thing.”	(Olsen,	2004,	p.	4)	Also,	 the	 reason	 for	 using	 the	 ‘triangulation	 design’	 (Figure	 4.2)	 is	 to	 “obtain	different	but	complementary	data	on	the	same	topic”	(Morse,	1991,	p.	120).	 It	helps	 in	merging	 between	 the	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 of	 both	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	methods	(Creswell	et	al.,	2007).	The	main	characteristic	of	this	design	method	is	that	it	consists	 a	 one-phase	 procedure	 where	 both	 methods	 are	 implemented.	 The	 methods	subsequently	merge	at	the	result	level,	where	they	are	compared.	In	this	research,	some	of	 the	 data	 was	 complementary,	 and	 some	 came	 to	 fill	 in	 the	 blanks.	 Creswell	 et	 al.	(2007)	 present	 different	 models	 in	 the	 triangulation	 design.	 We	 will	 follow	 the	convergence	 model	 (Figure	 4.3).	 In	 this	 model,	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 data	 are	collected	separately,	and	only	the	results	converge.	Usually,	“researchers	use	this	model	when	they	want	to	compare	results	or	to	validate,	confirm,	or	corroborate	quantitative	results	with	qualitative	findings.	The	purpose	of	this	model	 is	 to	end	up	with	valid	and	well-substantiated	 conclusions	 about	 a	 single	 phenomenon”(Creswell	 et	 al.,	 2007,	 p.	229).	
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	Figure	4.2:	Triangulation	Design.	(source:	Creswell	and	Plano	Clark,	2007)	
	Figure	4.3:	Triangulation	Design:	Convergence	Model.	(source:	Creswell	and	Plano	Clark,	2007)	In	this	research,	triangulation	is	an	important	step	as	it	allows	in	confronting	the	two	 types	 of	 data	 by	 putting	 side-by-side	 numbers,	 interviews,	 documentation,	 and	observations.	Validation	was	achieved	using	the	totality	of	all	the	collected	data.	This	is	explained	by	the	fact	that	the	statistical	data	reflected	a	reality	of	the	neighborhood	that	did	not	coincide	with	the	interviews	conducted.	The	initial	phase	of	the	research	was	to	collect	 numbers	 that	 reflected	 the	 state	 of	 the	 LNW	 before	 and	 after	 Katrina.	 The	numbers	were	 very	 different,	 which	was	 understandable	 due	 to	 the	 immensity	 of	 the	calamity:	 the	LNW	lost	a	 large	portion	of	 its	population	and	was	greatly	damaged	as	 it	went	 from	 a	 total	 of	 19,515	 residents	 in	 2000	 to	 5,556	 residents	 in	 2010,	 which	represents	 a	 72%	 population	 loss.	 	 When	 focusing	 on	 the	 numbers	 post-Katrina,	 the	neighborhood	 showed	 to	 be	 very	 weak	 because	 how	 can	 a	 neighborhood	 be	 rebuilt	without	the	majority	of	its	residents?	This	will	be	elaborated	on	in	Chapter	6	and	section	6.2.	Also,	mentioned	in	section	5.2.7,	one	of	the	proposed	rebuilding	plans,	the	Bring	New	Orleans	Back	(BNOB),	it	was	proposed	to	turn	the	LNW	into	a	marsh	area.		
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It	became	crucial	to	research	the	neighborhood	with	a	different	perspective.	This	is	 when	 the	 author	 decided	 to	 go	 on-site	 and	 interview	 people	 to	 verify	 whether	 the	numbers	 provided	 an	 accurate	 picture.	 In	 the	 end,	 the	 validation	 process	 was	mostly	done	 by	 the	 maps,	 the	 articles,	 and	 the	 author’s	 observations.	 Therefore,	 the	 author	decided	 to	 change	 the	 data	 collection	 terminology	 and	 to	 proceed	 with	 primary	 and	secondary	 data,	 instead	 of	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative.	 Numbers	 and	 interviews	were	not	enough	to	reach	the	desired	results;	it	was	the	permutation	of	numbers,	interviews,	newspaper	articles,	field	observations,	researcher	notes,	and	documentation	that	helped	in	formulating	answers	to	the	research	question.		Therefore,	 this	research	project	 focuses	on	the	disaster	as	a	phenomenon,	along	with	its	consequences	on	the	people	and	the	cultural	landscape.	This	objective	could	be	reached	 by	 taking	 into	 account	 different	 types	 of	 data	 for	 validation	 and	 triangulation	purposes	in	order	to	determine	the	resilience	of	the	community	of	the	LNW,	and	whether	or	not	place	attachment	and	social	networks	play	a	role	in	promoting	resilience.		
4.4.2.	Research	Method	A	mixed	method	research	approach	allows	for	a	better	comprehensive	and	global	perspective	on	what	is	going	on	in	the	LNW.	It	was	important	to	understand	why	it	has	fallen	behind	in	the	rebuilding	process,	while	taking	 into	account	the	complexity	of	 the	neighborhood	 and	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	 situation	 post-Katrina.	 The	 assumption	 of	 this	research	 is	 that	 the	 late	 rebuilding	 process	 is	 affecting	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 area.	 By	understanding	 the	 reasons	behind	 the	 late	 rebuilding,	 and	why	 the	 residents	have	not	returned,	even	if	they	are	strongly	attached	to	their	neighborhood,	becomes	clearer.	In	 social	 sciences,	 it	 is	 imperative	 to	 look	 at	 both	 numbers	 and	 stories,	 as	 each	have	little	meaning	without	the	other.	Numbers	portray,	objectively,	the	factual	reality	of	the	 scrutinized	 event,	 while	 the	 stories	 portray,	 subjectively,	 the	 social	 reality	 of	 the	event	 or	 circumstances.	 This	 research	 uses	 one	 specific	 case	 study	 where	 it	 is	 the	recommended	approach	when	investigating	contemporary	events	(Yin,	2003).	According	to	the	same	author,	“the	case	study	relies	on	many	of	the	same	techniques	as	a	history,	but	 it	 adds	 two	 sources	 of	 evidence	 not	 usually	 included	 in	 the	 historian’s	 repertoire:	
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direct	observation	and	[…]	interviewing.”(Yin,	2003,	p.	8)	This	method	is	appropriate	to	this	research	as	it:	
• Copes	with	 the	 technically	distinctive	situation	 in	which	 there	will	be	many	more	variables	of	interest	than	data	points,	and	as	one	result	
• Relies	 on	 multiple	 sources	 of	 evidence,	 with	 data	 needing	 to	 converge	 in	 a	triangulating	fashion,	and	as	another	result	
• Benefits	 from	 the	 prior	 development	 of	 theoretical	 propositions	 to	 guide	 data	collection	and	analysis.	(Yin,	2003,	p.	13)	This	research	uses	mixed	methods	with	an	embedded/explanatory	design	while	using	one	case	study.	The	embedded	design	is	where	“one	data	set	provides	a	supportive,	secondary	role	in	a	study	based	primarily	on	the	other	data	type”	(Creswell	et	al.,	2007,	p.	67).	The	 foundations	of	 this	design	method	are	that	one	set	of	data	 is	not	enough	to	answer	the	research	question(s).	The	explanatory	design	“is	a	two-phase	mixed	methods	design	 […]	 the	 overall	 purpose	 of	 this	 design	 is	 that	 qualitative	 data	 helps	 explain	 or	build	 upon	 initial	 quantitative	 results”	 (Creswell	 et	 al.,	 2007,	 p.	 72).	 In	 this	 study,	 the	initial	 data	 collected	 was	 quantitative,	 as	 it	 relied	 on	 the	 numbers	 and	 indicators	gathered	by	the	U.S.	Census	Bureau	and	the	Data	Center.	Initial	conclusions	were	drawn,	which	helped	 in	designing	the	 interview	questionnaires.	Therefore,	 this	research	starts	with	the	collection	and	analysis	of	quantitative	data	and	continues	with	more	emphasis	on	a	qualitative	analysis	of	data	and	method.		Although	 this	 research	 relies	on	a	more	qualitative	data	 collection	and	analysis,	the	 use	 of	 the	 terminology	 ‘qualitative’	 and	 ‘quantitative’	 does	 not	 reflect	 the	 overall	research	approach.	The	 initial	goal	of	 this	 research	was	 to	 investigate	 the	role	of	place	attachment	 and	 social	 networks	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 resilient	 LNW	 through	 the	perspective	 of	 the	 residents,	 exclusively.	 Soon	 after	 the	 study	 had	 started	 that	 the	researcher	 realized	 that	 the	 situation	was	much	more	 complex	 than	 hitherto	 thought,	making	 it	 necessary	 to	 explore	 several	 data	 sources	 (perspectives	 of	 all	 the	 actors	involved	in	the	LNW,	as	well	as	any	data	source	that	helped	in	bringing	more	light	to	the	reality	behind	the	late	rebuilding	process).	Also,	the	multiplicity	in	sources	was	needed	
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for	the	triangulation	of	the	data	for	validation	purposes.	The	use	of	the	terms	qualitative	and	quantitative	did	not	give	justice	to	the	complexity	of	the	neighborhood.	This	led	to	a	sub-division	 of	 the	 data.	 Instead	 the	 use	 of	 ‘primary	 and	 secondary	 sources’	 was	 the	choice	 made	 where	 primary	 sources	 stand	 for	 open-ended	 interviews	 and	 field	observations,	and	secondary	sources	stand	for	maps,	census	data	and	newspaper	articles	(Figure	4.4).	The	collected	secondary	source	data	plays	an	important	role	in	identifying	and	explaining	the	reasons	why	the	LNW	has	not	been	rebuilt	yet,	and	the	reason	why	a	large	portion	of	the	residents	did	not	return	to	the	neighborhood.		
	Figure	4.4:	Type	of	data	collected.	(source:	author)	In	order	to	 locate	the	research	objectives,	an	initial	review	of	what	the	numbers	reflected	 about	 the	 neighborhood	 was	 undertaken,	 and	 statistical	 data	 from	 the	 Data	Center	and	US	census	were	collected.	This	led	to	some	further	questions,	as	the	numbers	revealed	 a	 weak	 neighborhood	 with	 fewer	 residents	 from	 all	 generations,	 lower	homeownerships,	poorer	people,	and	lower	employment	rates	(this	is	explained	further	in	 chapter	 6).	 Yet,	 residents	 were	 moving	 back,	 building,	 and	 revitalizing	 their	neighborhood.	 Thus,	 a	 discrepancy	 was	 seen	 between	 the	 numbers	 and	 the	 actual	situation	of	the	LNW.	This	is	where	the	qualitative	part	of	the	research	became	pertinent,	consisting	of	open-ended	questionnaires	that	were	designed	for	the	residents	and	for	the	professionals.	The	interviews	targeted	LNW	residents	and	NPO	representatives	working	in	the	neighborhood,	as	well	as	urban	planners	and	city	officials	who	intervene	and	are	
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active	 in	 the	 LNW.	 It	 is	 primarily	 the	 combination	 of	 both	 data	 that	 lead	 to	 a	 better	understanding	of	the	problem	at	hand	and	to	reach	more	comprehensive	results.		In	addition,	the	way	the	type	of	data	is	triangulated	brings	the	data	closer	to	the	resilience	model	proposed	 in	Chapter	3.	 Even	 if	 the	 author’s	model	does	not	 take	 into	account	 vulnerability,	 this	 research	 investigated	 the	 elements	 that	 rendered	 the	neighborhood	vulnerable,	as	they	were	mostly	related	to	the	decisions	that	were	made	over	the	course	of	history.	The	purpose	of	the	proposed	model	is	to	evaluate	the	LNW’s	community	resilience	by	relying	on	tangible	and	intangible	indicators	through	the	use	of	a	mixed	method	research	design,	while	adding	maps	of	the	area.	This	study	falls	directly	into	 the	 proposed	 resilience	model.	 The	 triangulation	 of	 the	 data	 takes	 place	with	 the	interviews	that	were	collected,	as	well	as	 the	content	analysis,	 the	secondary	data,	and	the	 neighborhood	 organizations	 (Figure	 4.5).	 The	 latter	were	 set	 up	 to	 help	 residents	rebuild	 their	 homes,	 and,	 in	 the	 process,	 they	 became	 a	 form	 of	 social	 network	 that	helped	 the	people	 at	 the	psychological	 level,	 as	 they	became	 sanctuaries	 to	 those	who	needed	to	share	their	story.		
	
Figure	 4.5:	 Triangulation	 of	 the	 data	 showing	 that	 the	 collection	 of	 mixed	 data	 leads	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	neighborhood	transformation	with	the	NPOs	becoming	a	new	form	of	social	networks.	(source:	author)	To	select	 the	sample	of	people	 to	be	 interviewed,	 the	researcher	had	 to	 identify	the	 individuals	 that	could	deliver	 the	relevant	 information.	According	 to	Creswell	et	al.	(2007,	 p.	 112)	 “purposeful	 sampling	 means	 that	 researchers	 intentionally	 select	
NPOs	(becoming	a	new	form	of	social	network)			
Interviews	(content	analysis)	 Secondary	sources	(newspaper	articles	+	census	data	+	maps)	
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participants	who	have	experience	with	the	central	phenomenon	or	the	key	concept	being	explored.”	 The	 obstacles	 faced	 to	 find	 participants	 for	 the	 interviews	 notwithstanding,	the	 researcher	 intentionally	 selected	 a	 sample	 of	 people	 who	 represented	 the	 LNW	(residents,	professionals,	and	city	officials).	A	total	of	28	interviews	were	conducted,	and	the	 interviewing	process	came	to	an	end	when	the	statements	of	 the	professionals	and	the	residents	were	deemed	repetitive.	The	interviews	were	conducted	as	follows	and	are	summarized	in	Table	4.1:	8	with	active	residents	of	the	LNW,	1	with	a	LNW	reverend,	8	with	NPOs,	14	planners	and	experts,	2	city	officials,	1	researcher.	The	aim	was	 to	hear	from	a	variety	of	perspectives	that	reflected	the	range	of	people	involved	in	the	LNW.		It	was	clear	to	the	author	that	there	were	different	categories	of	people	who	contributed	to	the	local	of	the	LNW,	not	 just	the	residents.	Due	to	the	multiple	roles	that	some	people	took	on,	some	of	them	overlapped	in	the	different	categories.		
4.4.3.	Data	Description		
Primary	Sources	
Research	Observations	“Being	alive	 renders	us	natural	observers	of	our	everyday	world	and	our	behavior	in	it.”	(Merriam,	2009,	p.	117)	This	research	mainly	used	direct	observation	to	assess	the	situation	in	the	LNW.	According	to	Merriam	(2009,	p.	117),	“observations	take	place	in	the	setting	where	the	phenomenon	 of	 interest	 naturally	 occurs”.	 	 The	 author	 made	 direct	 observations	 at	community	 meetings,	 during	 informal	 conversations,	 and	 other	 pertinent	 events	 that	took	place	during	the	data	collection	process.	It	was	important	to	know	in	advance	what	to	 observe,	 and	 it	 was	 through	 proper	 determination	 of	 the	 problem—as	 well	 as	 the	questions	 presented	 in	 the	 theoretical	 framework—that	 the	 elements	 in	 need	 of	 be	scrutinized	were	pinpointed	(Merriam,	2009).	Also,	being	familiar	with	the	context	was	crucial.	 It	 is	 recommended	 that	 “the	 researcher	 establish	 rapport	 by	 fitting	 into	 the	participants’	routines,	finding	some	common	ground	with	them,	helping	out	on	occasion,	being	friendly,	and	showing	interest	in	the	activity.”	(Merriam,	2009,	p.	123)	Notes	were	
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taken	 after	 every	 community	 meeting,	 informal	 conversation	 with	 a	 resident,	 or	 any	personal	 observations	 during	 the	 researcher’s	 stay	 in	 New	 Orleans.	 A	 total	 of	 11	community	 meetings	 were	 attended	 by	 the	 researcher,	 and	 these	 involved:	 NORA	monthly	meetings,	Blight	Stat	monthly	meetings,	Lower	Ninth	Ward	Flood	Plan	monthly	meetings,	 NENA	 bi-weekly	 meetings,	 and	 CSED	 bi-weekly	 meetings.	 Blight	 Stat	 and	NORA	meetings	were	organized	by	the	city,	and	their	attendance	varied	between	50	and	100	people	per	meeting.	LNW	community	meetings	focused	more	on	the	residents,	with	attendance	varying	between	15	and	20	people	per	meeting.	The	organizations	 that	are	established	 in	 the	area	play	an	 important	role	 in	 the	rebuilding	process,	because	 these	are	the	main	contributors	in	helping	residents	clear	their	titles	and	to	help	rebuild.	Some	organizations	like:	NENA,	Make	it	Right,	Lowernine.org,	Common	Ground,	and	CSED	have	managed	to	gather	a	lot	of	funds	to	improve	the	situation	of	the	residents.			The	time	spent	with	the	residents	or	the	LNW’s	actors	was	documented	at	the	end	of	 the	day,	 as	 some	residents	did	not	 feel	 comfortable	with	being	 interviewed,	or	with	signing	a	consent	form	(though	these	remain	undocumented,	about	15	residents	did	not	accept	to	sit	in	for	an	interview	and	preferred	to	conduct	informal	conversations).	During	the	data	collection,	the	researcher	made	sure	to	introduce	herself	to	the	group	of	people	present,	 explain	 her	 objectives,	 and	her	 research.	 All	 the	 observations	were	 under	 the	form	of	notes	taken	during	the	different	events.		Also,	one	of	the	old	residents	of	the	LNW	agreed	to	take	a	tour	of	what	used	to	be	his	 old	 neighborhood.	 The	 tour	 was	 taken	 around	 the	 LNW	 with	 the	 resident	 and	pictures,	and	notes	were	taken.	The	focus	was	mainly	on	memories	of	the	neighborhood	to	better	understand	the	cultural	landscape	prior	to	Hurricane	Katrina.	The	 observations	 and	 the	 note-taking	 process	 helped	 in	 identifying	 current	landmarks	 used	 by	 the	 residents,	 and	 determined	 the	 actors	 and	 residents	 that	 were	involved	in	the	neighborhood	the	most.	 Identifying	the	landmarks	helps	in	defining	the	cultural	 landscape	 post	Hurricane	Katrina,	 and	 use	 it	 as	 a	 comparison	with	what	 they	identify	with.		Also,	it	helped	in	relating	what	the	interviewees	said	with	the	situation	on	the	ground,	including	developments	in	terms	of	road	improvements,	police	involvement,	
	 92	
and	level	of	security.		
Open-Ended	Interviews/	Content	Analysis	The	 bulk	 of	 this	 research’s	 results	 was	 based	 on	 the	 interviews	 conducted.	 As	Merriam	 (2009,	 p.	 88)	 state,	 “interviewing	 is	 necessary	 when	 we	 cannot	 observe	behavior,	feelings,	or	how	people	interpret	the	world	around	them.	It	is	also	necessary	to	interview	 when	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 past	 events	 that	 are	 impossible	 to	 replicate.”	Obviously,	replicating	an	event	such	as	Hurricane	Katrina	was	not	a	possibility,	nor	even	a	desired	objective.	The	research	was	focusing	on	the	people’s	recollection	of	the	events	and	how	it	affected	their	community.	Hence,	semi-structured	or	open-ended	interviews	were	conducted	in	order	to	make	the	process	less	formal	and	more	conversation-like	so	as	 to	 minimize	 the	 feeling	 of	 re-living	 the	 whole	 experience.	 The	 respondents	 were	chosen	according	to	two	criteria:	being	a	resident	of	 the	LNW,	or	being	 involved	in	the	LNW	either	through	a	NPO	or	the	government	(refer	to	Table	4.1).		Table	4.1:	Interviews	with	both	residents	and	professionals	(*some	interviewees	had	more	than	one	role).	(source:	author)	
Interviewee*	 Number	of	interviews	
Residents	Reverend	 1	Residents	 8	NPO	representatives	 2	
Professionals	Urban	Planners	 8	Professors	 3	NPO	representatives	 6	City	Officials	 2	Other	 3		Taking	 into	 account	 the	 trauma	 that	 the	 citizens	 have	 faced	 during	 and	 after	Hurricane	 Katrina,	 it	 was	 particularly	 challenging	 to	 get	 any	 interviews.	 Building	 a	
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relationship	 of	 trust	with	 the	 interviewees	was	 accomplished	 through	 various	means:	helping	key	people,	making	appearances	at	community	meetings,	and	sharing	personal	information	about	 the	research	and	 the	 investigator.	All	 interviews	were	recorded	and	manually	transcribed	by	the	researcher,	and	all	the	data	is	kept	in	a	locked	drawer.	The	informants’	 names	 are	 not	 to	 be	 revealed,	 and	 each	 person	 is	 refereed	 to	 through	 an	assigned	coded	(refer	to	Table	4.2	for	the	codes).		Table	4.2:	Summary	of	codes	used	for	the	interviews.	(source:	author)	
Code	for	interviewees	 Description	of	code	NL9W_R	 Non-LNW	resident	NL9W_P	 Non-LNW	planner	NL9W_NPO	 Non-LNW	non-profit	organization	representative	NL9W_CO	 Non-LNW	city	official	NL9W_RS	 Non-LNW	researcher	NL9W_PH	 Non-LNW	philanthropist	L9W_R	 LNW	resident	L9W_P	 LNW	planner	L9W_NPO	 LNW	non-profit	organization	representative	L9W_RV	 LNW	reverend			Once	 the	 data	was	 gathered,	 sorted,	 and	 transcribed,	 came	 the	 coding	 process,	done	 in	accordance	with	 rules	outlined	by	Merriam	 (2009)	and	Creswell	 et	 al.	 (2007):	first,	 the	 interviewees	 names	 were	 coded	 to	 protect	 their	 privacy;	 and	 second,	 the	interviews	were	coded	using	content	analysis.	According	to	Krippendorff	(1980,	p.	7)	“as	a	 research	 technique,	 content	 analysis	 involves	 specialized	 procedures	 for	 processing	scientific	 data.	 Like	 all	 research	 techniques,	 its	 purpose	 is	 to	 provide	 knowledge,	 new	insights,	a	representation	of	“facts,”	and	a	practical	guide	to	action.	It	is	a	tool.”	Content	analysis	can	be	used	for	multiple	reasons,	one	of	which	is	to	code	open-ended	interviews	(Weber,	1990).		
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Then	 came	 the	 analysis	 process.	 In	 Chapter	 2,	 the	 review	 of	 the	 literature	demonstrated	that	place	attachment,	memory,	and	social	networks	play	a	role	in	making	urban	communities	more	resilient	after	a	disaster.	The	researcher	wished	to	investigate	whether	 this	 is	 also	 applicable	 to	 the	 LNW,	 and	 the	 open-ended	 questionnaires	 were	designed	for	that	purpose.	Also,	the	aim	of	the	questionnaires	was	to	help	in	answering	the	research	question.	The	author	focused	on	asking	questions	that	portray	the	cultural	landscape	 before	 and	 after	 the	 Hurricane,	 remember	 memories	 of	 past	 events,	understand	why	people	want	to	return	even	after	all	the	loss	they	endured,	whether	they	trust	 the	 levees,	 and	why	 in	 their	 opinion	 is	 the	 neighborhood	 not	 yet	 rebuilt	 7	 years	after	the	calamity	took	place.	Here	are	the	different	keywords	that	stemmed	out:		- The	 cultural	 landscape:	 this	 category	 portrays	what	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 of	 the	LNW	was	before	and	after	the	hurricane,	and	how	the	residents	perceive	it.	- Memory	of	event	and	past	events:	this	category	focuses	on	hurricane	Katrina	and	on	previous	hurricanes.	- Place	attachment	and	social	networks:	this	category	describes	the	strong	bonds	that	exist	in	the	neighborhood,	and	the	attachment	people	have	to	their	home,	family,	and	neighborhood.		- Auto-organization/Learning/Diversity:	this	category	puts	forth	the	initiatives	taken	by	the	community	in	order	to	be	independent	and	self-reliant.	- The	 levees	 and	 safety:	 this	 category	 shows	 how	 the	 levees	 are	 perceived	 by	 the	residents,	as	well	as	by	the	professionals.	- The	 role	 of	 non-profit	 organizations	 and	meetings:	 since	 non-profit	 organizations	and	meetings	play	an	important	role	in	the	rebuilding	process,	this	category	shows	how	people	feel	about	these	two	and	what	role	they	play.		- Rebuilding	plans:	this	category	focuses	on	the	rebuilding	plans,	the	role	they	played	and	continue	to	play,	and	what	people	think	about	them.		- Perception	–	professionals:	this	category	portrays	the	opinion	and	the	perception	of	the	professionals	about	the	LNW	and	the	rebuilding	process.	- Perception	 –	 residents:	 this	 category	 shows	 the	 opinion	 and	 perception	 of	 the	residents	about	themselves,	their	neighborhood,	and	the	rebuilding	process.		
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- Hope	and	future:	this	category	emphasizes	on	hope	and	what	people	think	about	the	future	of	the	LNW	and	of	the	city	of	New	Orleans.		
Secondary	Sources		
Documentation	“Documents	 are,	 in	 fact,	 a	 ready-made	 source	of	 data	 easily	 accessible	 to	the	imaginative	and	resourceful	investigator.”	(Merriam,	2009,	p.	139)	This	research	uses	popular	culture	documents,	“these	are	public	in	nature	and	so	are	sometimes	categorized	under	public	records.”	(Merriam,	2009,	p.	143)	The	collected	documents	include:	newspaper	articles	from	the	Times	Picayune,	Nola.com,	and	the	New	
York	Times.	The	Times-Picayune,	 established	 in	1837,	 is	a	well	 renowned	newspaper	 in	New	Orleans,	especially	with	 its	 coverage	of	Hurricane	Katrina	 in	2005,	and	 the	Saints	winning	 the	 Super	 Bowl	 in	 2009.	 Since	October	 2012,	 for	 financial	 reasons,	 the	 paper	stopped	printing	on	a	daily	basis	and	it	published	online	via	the	website	Nola.com.	This	was	 a	major	disappointment	 for	New	Orleanians	 as	 reading	The	Times-Picayune	was	 a	daily	 ritual.	 They	 strongly	 identified	with	 their	 newspaper,	 and	were	 very	 proud	 of	 it.	Therefore,	 printing	 the	 paper	 three	 times	 a	 week	 meant	 losing	 a	 part	 of	 the	 city’s	identity.	 Also,	 The	 New	 York	 Times,	 a	 nationally	 and	 internationally	 renowned	newspaper,	 published	 a	 lot	 of	 articles	 about	 New	 Orleans	 and	 Hurricane	 Katrina.	 All	these	 newspapers	 are	 a	 reliable	 source	 of	 secondary	 data	 and	 are	 used	widely	 in	 this	research.	Also,	visual	documents	such	as	films	and	documentaries	are	also	used	as	part	of	the	 data	 collection	 process.	 The	 challenge	 in	 this	 type	 of	 data	 gathering	 is	 finding	 the	relevant	material.	 Thus,	 the	 researcher	 has	 to	 keep	 an	 open	mind	when	 in	 search	 for	information	(Merriam,	2009).	This	is	noteworthy,	as	things	appeared	very	different	once	in	 New	 Orleans.	 The	 author	 initially	 thought	 that	 accessing	 the	 information	 and	interviewing	residents	was	going	 to	be	a	 straightforward	 task,	when	 it	was	not.	 It	was	only	 when	 attending	 community	 meetings	 and	 talking	 to	 anyone	 who	 agreed	 to,	 that	things	started	unraveling.	Also,	looking	through	newspaper	articles	helped	the	author	in	
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changing	 perspectives.	 It	 required	 a	 certain	 open-mindedness	 to	 see	 that	 a	 change	 in	strategy	was	needed.			Consulting	the	published	documents	describing	the	different	proposed	rebuilding	plans	 was	 imperative.	 It	 was	 notably	 through	 these	 documents	 that	 the	 researcher	realized	that	the	plans	did	not	take	into	account	community	ties	and	place	attachment	in	the	rebuilding	process	(refer	to	section	5.4.2).	Even	though	the	NONRP	and	UNOP	plans	were	 based	 on	 community	 participation,	 they	 do	 not	 mention	 them	 in	 their	 reports	(http://nolaplans.com/).		Other	information	was	gathered	from	the	Data	Center,	articles,	WhoDataNOLA.org	articles	 and	 maps,	 and	 books	 about	 New	 Orleans	 and	 the	 LNW.	 The	 Data	 Center,	previously	 known	 as	 the	 Greater	 New	 Orleans	 Data	 Center,	 is	 a	 colossal	 asset	 for	professionals	conducting	research	on	the	New	Orleans	area.	It	is	the	most	reliable	source	of	information	about	the	Southern	Louisiana	area:	“The	Data	Center	realizes	its	mission	to	 build	 prosperous,	 inclusive,	 and	 sustainable	 communities	 by	 making	 informed	decisions	possible.”10The	Data	Center	compiles	its	data	on	a	yearly	basis	mainly	from	the	US	Census	Bureau,	and	processes	 it	 in	order	to	present	 it	 in	 the	most	pertinent	way	to	“everyone	who	needs	data	to	do	their	work.”11.	The	center	gathers	data	and	information,	publishes,	 and	 organizes	 it	 in	 order	 to	 show	 the	progress	 the	 different	 neighborhoods	have	gone	through,	or	where	they	are	falling	behind.	The	Data	Center	is	a	very	useful	tool	to	this	research.	The	people	working	in	that	organism	are	professionals	in	the	field,	and	have	 a	wide	 experience	 in	 collecting	 and	 analyzing	 quantitative	 data.	 The	 information	they	publish	is	used	by	both	the	city	and	researchers	to	get	an	objective	perspective	on	the	developments	since	Hurricane	Katrina.	The	indicators	collected	from	the	Data	Center	were	useful	in	drawing	preliminary	conclusions	that	helped	in	designing	the	qualitative	questionnaires,	 but	 they	 were	 inconclusive	 when	 it	 came	 to	 determine	 the	 level	 of	attachment	 residents	 have	 with	 their	 neighborhood.	 Also,	 these	 indicators	 were	compared	 to	 the	 indicators	 compiled	 in	 Table	 3.1	 from	 the	 different	 authors	 like																																																									
10	The	Data	Center	http://www.datacenterresearch.org/about-us/the-data-center-an-overview/	11	The	Data	Center	http://www.datacenterresearch.org/about-us/the-data-center-an-overview/	
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Birkmann	 et	 al.	 (2010);	 Cutter	 et	 al.	 (2008);	 Cutter	 et	 al.	 (2003);	 Cutter	 et	 al.	 (2010);	Dauphiné	et	al.	(2007);	Pelling	(2003).	This	comparison	was	done	in	order	to	determine	their	relevancy	in	resilience	research	and	whether	they	were	good	measurement	tools	of	the	 resilience	 of	 the	 LNW.	 The	 indicators	 and	 sub-indicators	 collected	 from	 the	 Data	Center	are	summarized	as	follows	and	many	of	them	appear	in	Table	3.1:	- People	and	Household	Characteristics	
o Total	numbers	
o Gender	
o Age	
o Racial	and	ethnic	diversity	
o Households	by	type	
o Children	in	households	
o Elderly	in	households	- Housing	and	Housing	Costs	
o Occupancy	status	
o Renters	and	owners	
o Mortgage	status	
o Housing	affordability	by	owner/renter	status	- Income	and	Poverty	
o Household	
o Average	household	income	
o Income	distribution	
o Population	in	poverty	- Transportation	
o Vehicles	available	
o Type	of	transportation,	workers	16+	
o Travel	time	to	work,	workers	16+	- Education	Attainment	
o Level	of	schooling,	18+	- Language	
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o English	as	second	language	- Employment	
o Workers	living	in	the	neighborhood	by	wage	level	
o Workers	living	in	the	neighborhood	by	industry	sector	
	Figure	4.6:	Map	of	Planning	District	8	(PD8)	showing	the	divide	between	Holy	Cross	and	the	Lower	Ninth	Ward.	(source:	author)	Presented	 in	 chapter	 6	 are	 the	 indicators	 collected	 by	 the	 Data	 Center	 for	 the	Planning	 District	 8	 (PD8),	 which	 includes	 the	 Lower	 Ninth	Ward	 and	 the	 Holy	 Cross	areas.	The	area	south	of	St	Claude	Avenue,	Holy	Cross,	is	at	or	above	sea	level	because	it	is	located	along	the	Mississippi	River.	It	is	thus	naturally	higher	than	the	rest	of	the	LNW,	and	it	developed	faster	than	the	area	north	of	St	Claude	Avenue,	Lower	Ninth	Ward.	Most	of	 the	 historic	 buildings	 (the	 steamboat	 houses)	 and	older	 structures	 are	 found	 in	 the	Holy	Cross	area	(refer	to	Appendix	E).	The	LNW	it	is	mostly	residential	(shotgun	houses),	with	 some	 local	 businesses.	 This	 subdivision	 of	 the	 neighborhood	 is	 not	 just	geographical,	 but	 also	 socio-cultural.	 It	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 residents’	 attitude	 and	perception	 (this	 will	 be	 elaborated	 further	 in	 chapter	 6).	 Also,	 the	 levee	 breach	 took	place	 in	 the	 Lower	 Ninth	 Ward	 that	 caused	 a	 lot	 more	 damage	 to	 this	 part	 of	 the	neighborhood	 than	 it	did	 to	 the	 southern	part—which	 suffered	 from	high	water	 levels	and	 wind	 damage—,	 and	 it	 made	 it	 seem	 that	 Holy	 Cross	 was	 recovering	 faster.	 In	
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addition,	 Holy	 Cross	 received	more	 attention	 from	 the	 city	 when	 the	 Historic	 District	Landmarks	 Commission	 declared	 it	 an	 area	 with	 historic	 value	 (Commission,	 2013).	Therefore,	 when	 using	 the	 term	 ‘Lower	 Ninth	Ward’	 it	 refers	 to	 the	 area	 north	 of	 St	Claude	Avenue,	 and	 ‘Holy	 Cross’	 for	 the	 areas	 south	 of	 St	 Claude	Avenue,	 as	 shown	 in	Figure	 4.6.	 The	US	Census	Bureau	 collects	 the	 information	 according	 to	 ‘census	 tracts’	and	Holy	Cross	has	 two	(tracts	8	and	7.02)	and	 the	Lower	Ninth	Ward	has	 five	 (tracts	7.01,	 9.01,	 9.02,	 9.03,	 and	 9.04)..	 The	 Data	 Center	 uses	 the	 US	 Census	 Bureau	 for	 its	information	 and	 presents	 the	 data	 for	 the	 two	 sub-neighborhoods.	 Therefore,	 the	indicators	presented	in	Chapter	6	show	the	Holy	Cross	Area	and	the	Lower	Ninth	Ward	Area	in	comparison	to	the	Orleans	Parish	Area.	
WhoDataNOLA	Maps	and	Regional	Planning	Commission	Maps	Maps	 of	 the	 LNW	 were	 useful	 secondary	 sources.	 Two	 types	 of	 maps	 were	 of	particular	 interest:	 first,	 aerial	 photographs,	 and	 maps	 gathered	 from	 the	 Regional	Planning	Commission	(RPC),	 since	 they	show	the	evolution	of	 the	LNW	post	Hurricane	Katrina	 (refer	 to	 Appendix	 A).	 Second,	 property	 condition	 surveys	were	 conducted	 by	WhoDataNOLA.org	 (refer	 to	 Appendix	 G).	 WhoDataNOLA.org	 is	 a	 tool	 developed	 by	Professor	Michelle	Thompson	(UNO),	 in	a	collaborative	effort	between	UNO,	 the	city	of	New	Orleans,	and	the	RPC	to	do	property	surveys	in	different	neighborhoods	of	the	city,	including	 the	 LNW.	 The	 data	 is	 closely	 monitored	 by	 UNO	 professor	 Thompson	 and	several	 planning	 students,	 who	 have	 experience	 in	 this	 type	 of	 data	 collection	 and	analysis.	Volunteers	working	for	Lowernine.org—that	is	located	in	the	LNW—conducted	the	surveys.	The	organizing	team	explains	the	data	collection	process	to	the	volunteers	and	processes	all	the	information	with	the	help	of	the	software	ARC-GIS.	The	researcher	helped	in	the	organization	and	volunteered	in	the	surveying	process	during	the	summer	of	2012.		WhoDataNOLA.org	has	been	developed	as	a	tool	to	assist	the	city	of	New	Orleans	in	 mapping	 some	 of	 the	 neighborhoods.	 It	 also	 helps	 organizations	 to	 have	 more	information	 about	 properties	 in	 their	 areas.	 The	 maps	 are	 also	 very	 useful	 to	 the	residents	 of	 the	 neighborhood,	 or	 for	 future	 residents	 looking	 into	 investing	 in	 the	
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neighborhood	 at	 hand.	 Since	 blight	 is	 an	 issue	 in	 the	 city,	 this	mapping	 tool	 becomes	quite	handy	in	assessing	property	conditions	for	future	buyers	and	investors.		
What	Type	of	Data	and	at	What	Level?	
	Going	 back	 to	 the	 resilience	 model	 proposed	 in	 Chapter	 3	 (Table	 3.1),	 the	collected	data	 for	 this	research	aims	at	 fitting	 into	the	proposed	model.	Therefore,	 it	 is	necessary	to	show	what	type	of	data	was	collected,	at	which	level	does	it	intervene,	and	how	 does	 it	 help.	 This	 information	 could	 help	 future	 research	 and	 could	 very	well	 be	applied	to	other	case	studies	(refer	to	Table	4.3).	Table	4.3:	Table	summarizing	the	type	of	data	collected,	which	geographic	level	it	affects,	and	which	decision-makers	does	it	help.	(source:	author)	
Type	of	Data	 At	What	Level?	 Who	does	it	Help?	Open-ended	interviews	(primary	source)	 Individual		Household	Neighborhood	
Researchers:	identify	intangible	indicators.	Planners:	determine	the	cultural	value	of	the	area	so	as	to	propose	a	viable	rebuilding	plan.	Government	officials:	identify	the	cultural	elements,	the	social	networks,	and	landmarks.	Field	observations	(primary	source)	 Individual		Household	Neighborhood	City	
Researchers:	the	importance	of	using	mixed	methods	and	collect	multiple	data/	compare	interview	content	with	the	reality	of	the	situation/	become	part	of	the	research.	Planners:	look	at	the	study	area	with	a	different	perspective	and	compare	numbers	to	the	actual	situation.	Newspaper	articles	(secondary	source)	 Neighborhood	City	 Researchers:	verify	events/	evaluate	different	perceptions/	stay	up	to	date	with	current	events.	Government	officials:	keep	track	of	what	is	happening	and	how	the	rebuilding	process	is	progressing.		Data	Center	and	US	Census	data	(secondary	source)	 Neighborhood	City	State	Country	
Researchers:	use	census	numbers	to	compare	pre-	and	post-disaster	situations.	Identify	tangible	indicators.		Planners:	use	census	numbers	to	reach	rebuilding	goals.	Identify	indicators	and	how	they	help	in	the	rebuilding	process.	Government	officials:	compare	pre-	and	post-disaster	numbers	and	manage	funds	to	reach	rebuilding	goals.		Maps	(WhoDataNOLA	and	RPC)	 Neighborhood	City	State	
Researchers:	use	spatial	transformation	and	map	pre-	and	post-	disaster	changes.		Planners:	use	maps	as	reference	to	communicate	with	residents	and	government	officials.	Use	
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Country	 maps	as	a	tool	for	communication.	Government	officials:	use	maps	as	a	tool	to	show	change	and	improvements.		Residents:	use	maps	to	evaluate	the	condition	of	their	neighborhood	and	can	help	update	maps	with	the	help	of	user-friendly	applications	
4.5.	Elements	to	Retain			This	 research	 stands	 out	with	 its	methodology	 and	 research	 design.	 By	 using	 a	mixed	methods	design,	it	is	tackling	the	research	problem	and	questions	from	a	different	perspective.	 Both	 research	 problem	and	question	 required	 the	 use	 of	 a	mixed	method	design.	With	such	a	method,	it	was	not	only	possible	to	answer	the	questions	about	the	slow	rebuilding	of	the	neighborhood,	the	strong	ties	between	the	residents	and	the	LNW,	and	whether	 the	 community	 is	 resilient	 and	 how.	 The	method	 also	 helped	 in	 looking	beyond	the	research	question	and	conceptualizing	the	idea	of	resilience	with	more	depth	by	tying	 it	 to	several	variables	such	as	 time	and	space,	different	geographic	scales,	and	different	levels	of	resilience.		Therefore,	the	various	methods	used	to	collect	and	analyze	the	data	provide	a	wide	overlook	at	the	problem	at	hand.			Figure	 4.7	 (shown	 below)	 summarizes	 how	 the	 research	 was	 conducted.	 The	graph	highlights	 the	phenomenon	 that	 is	being	 scrutinized,	Hurricane	Katrina,	 and	 the	concepts	that	are	being	tackled,	which	include	the	cultural	landscape,	vulnerability,	and	resilience.	They	all	are	interrelated	and	connected	at	the	community	level;	they	are	social	constructions	with	intangible	elements.	Through	the	case	study	of	the	LNW	and	the	use	of	 a	 mixed	 method	 research	 design,	 the	 research	 was	 able	 to	 reach	 results	 at	 the	theoretical	level	and	the	case	study	level.						 	
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Figure	4.7:		Graph	summarizing	the	overall	dissertation	whole	showing	how	the	case	study	plays	the	role	of	a	filter	through	which	percolated	the	case-study	results.	(source:	author)	
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Chapter	5: Historical	Facts	Behind	the	LNW	and	the	City	
5.1.	Overview		This	chapter	presents	the	LNW	case	study.	The	LNW	constitutes	one	of	the	newer	neighborhoods	in	the	city	of	New	Orleans,	and	yet	the	most	neglected.	To	understand	the	LNW,	 it	 is	 imperative	 to	 look	 at	 the	 entire	 city	 from	a	historical,	 cultural,	 and	political	perspective,	while	paying	special	attention	to	the	role	of	memory	in	the	development	and	evolution	of	such	a	unique	place.	This	 leads	 to	a	better	understanding	of	 the	LNW:	 the	historical	 evolution,	 the	 exclusion,	 the	 elements	 contributing	 to	 its	 present	 state,	 the	cultural	landscape,	the	levees,	the	impact	of	Hurricane	Katrina,	and	the	rebuilding	plans.	Looking	at	 the	 city	 and	 the	neighborhood	helps	 in	grasping	what	 the	LNW	was	before	Katrina,	 and	where	 it	 stands	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 city	 at	 large.	 It	 is	 through	 the	historical	evolution	of	the	city	and	of	the	LNW	that	the	research	problem	presented	in	this	study	can	be	understood.	This	section	highlights	the	many	decisions	and	historical	facts	that	took	place	as	they	contributed	directly	to:	the	establishment	of	the	strong	bonds	people	have	with	the	LNW,	and	the	on-going	vulnerabilities	that	made	the	area	so	weak	when	facing	Hurricane	Katrina.	Understanding	 the	events	 that	 took	place	 in	 the	LNW	and	 in	 the	 city	makes	 it	possible	to	fathom	the	real	vulnerability	and	obstacles	that	people	faced	and	continue	to	face.	Without	such	a	cumulative	look,	it	is	harder	to	change	and	improve	the	lives	of	the	residents	 of	 the	 neighborhood.	 It	 is	 the	 decisions	 that	 were	 made	 over	 the	 course	 of	history	 that	make	 the	LNW	a	 culturally	unique	place	with	 its	 own	and	 strong	 identity.	This	chapter	provides	a	historical	overview	with	the	objective	of	pointing	out	the	cultural	evolution	of	the	area,	which	becomes	crucial	in	the	rebuilding	process	of	the	LNW.	It	 is	this	unique	cultural	identity	that	kept	people	from	leaving	this	very	vulnerable	area,	and	it	is	also	the	reason	they	accept	to	live	in	such	a	fragile	environment.	It	is	everything	they	have	and	they	are	attached	to	it	despite	its	vulnerabilities.		This	 chapter	 aims	 at	 portraying	 the	 most	 important	 and	 relevant	 events	 that	made	 the	LNW	a	unique	place,	 albeit	 one	 full	 of	 contradictions	and	 controversies.	 It	 is	
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this	 discrepancy	 that	 makes	 it	 a	 unique	 place	 to	 study.	 This	 chapter	 is	 mainly	 an	exploration	of	known	facts,	but	put	 in	a	way	that	makes	 them	meaningful	 from	a	post-disaster	 analytical	 perspective.	 This	 chapter	 relies	 notably	 on	 the	 works	 of	 historian	Richard	Campanella,	as	well	as	published	material	and	historical	books.	The	emphasis	is	on	 the	origin	of	 the	 issues	 at	hand:	why	 is	 the	LNW	behind	 in	 the	 rebuilding	process?	What	makes	it	a	unique	place	culturally?	And	why	is	it	such	a	vulnerable	neighborhood?	In	 summary,	 these	 questions	 will	 portray	 the	 historical,	 socio-economic,	 and	environmental	realities	of	the	neighborhood.		
5.2.	The	Lower	Ninth	Ward	(LNW)	
5.2.1.	Historical	Evolution	of	the	LNW	
The	LNW	in	its	Early	Days…	To	understand	the	cultural	importance	of	the	LNW,	it	is	very	important	to	look	at	its	 evolution	 from	 the	moment	 it	was	 created.	This	 historical	 look	 is	 important	 to	 this	research	 because	 it	 highlights	 the	 nuances	 behind	 its	 cultural	 identity.	 The	 elements	behind	this	identity	are	part	of	the	cultural	landscape,	and	it	is	thus	important	to	define	and	describe	it.	The	aim	is	to	see	whether	or	not	the	elements	of	the	cultural	landscape	help	 in	 the	 creation	of	 resilient	 communities	 in	 the	 case	of	 a	disaster.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	focus	is	on	the	LNW	after	Hurricane	Katrina.	Before	portraying	the	historical	evolution	of	the	area,	it	is	opportune	to	locate	the	neighborhood	as	it	plays	a	role	in	emphasizing	its	vulnerability.		Being	one	of	the	recently	developed	areas	in	New	Orleans,	the	LNW	delineates	the	eastern	side	of	 the	city	separating	 it	 from	St.	Bernard	Parish12		(Figures	5.1	and	5.3).	 It	used	to	be	half	above	water	and	half	below.	Before	the	building	of	the	levees,	the	area	to	the	 south	 (above	 water	 and	 mainly	 farmland)	 was	 first	 developed	 to	 house	 new	immigrants	who	were	poor	yet	willing	to	work	in	the	city.	The	port	of	New	Orleans	was																																																									
12	St.	Bernard	Parish	is	important	to	highlight,	as	it	will	later	play	a	role	in	segregating	the	LNW	from	its	residents	by	selectively	transforming	its	residents	in	majority	white.	And	when	segregation	comes	to	an	end,	the	area	closes	itself	to	its	next-door	residents.	This	will	be	described	in	detail	later	in	the	chapter.		
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its	 primary	 attraction	 and	 contributed	 to	 the	 rapid	 expansion	 of	 the	 urban	 setting	(Toueir,	2015).	As	portrayed	in	figure	5.2,	the	first	signs	of	development	took	place	in	the	early	1800s	and	expanded	over	the	years	with	a	growing	number	of	immigrants	and	the	building	of	the	levees,	which	contributed	to	the	transformation	of	the	swampy	areas	into	residential	ones.		
Figure	5.1:	The	city	of	New	Orleans	and	the	LNW	highlighted	in	orange.	(souce:	author)	The	LNW	was	first	named	the	Third	Municipality	and	had	a	negative	connotation	as	 it	 referred	 to	 the	poor	area	of	 town.	The	French	Quarter	was	 the	First	Municipality,	and	Uptown	was	the	Second	Municipality	(Campanella,	2008;	Kelman,	2003).	It	was	only	till	the	mid	to	late-1800s	that	the	city	was	divided	into	wards,	and	the	Ninth	Ward	was	created	 (Figure	 5.2).	 Toueir	 (2015)	 explains	 the	 direct	 relation	 between	 the	 historical	evolution	of	 the	LNW	and	 its	 social	vulnerability.	The	author	argues	 that	 the	decisions	made	by	local	officials	contributed	directly	to	the	alarming	devastation	when	Hurricane	Katrina	hit.	Also,	the	author	presents	the	main	events	that	made	the	neighborhood	what	it	 is	 today	with	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 Industrial	 Canal	 in	 1923,	 the	 end	 of	 segregation	 in	1961,	and	Hurricane	Betsy	in	1965.	What	used	to	be	a	racially	mixed	and	mixed-income	
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neighborhood	in	the	1960s	became	a	majority	African	American	and	poor	neighborhood	by	the	year	2000	(Campanella,	2006,	2008;	Toueir,	2015).		
…	An	unusual	topography…		The	development	of	 the	LNW	was	triggered	mainly	by	 the	 fast	growing	rate	 the	city	was	experiencing	and	the	need	to	house	the	new	immigrants	that	were	coming	from	the	 different	 corners	 of	 the	 world.	 Levees	 were	 built,	 wetlands	 were	 drained,	 and	swampy	 areas	 became	 habitable.	 This	 gave	 an	 opportunity	 for	 the	 city	 to	 house	 its	growing	population	and	 it	 gave	 the	opportunity	 for	new	 immigrants,	 or	 free	people	of	color,	to	own	their	own	homes	while	residing	close	to	the	city	(Toueir,	2015).	Over	the	years,	the	LNW	became	the	neighborhood	with	the	highest	homeownership	rates	when	compared	to	the	rest	of	the	city	(Campanella,	2008).	
	 Figure	5.2:	New	Orleans,	1700-2000:	Morphology	of	Urban	Growth.	(source:	Campanella,	2006)		 	
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	Figure	5.3:	Map	of	the	LNW	and	the	different	water	bodies	surrounding	it.	(source:	author)	Due	to	its	uneven	topography,	the	area	closest	to	the	Mississippi	(Holy	Cross)	is	higher	than	the	northern	area	(north	of	St.	Claude	Avenue)	(Figure	5.3).	Hence,	it	was	developed	before	and	attracted	many	working	class	residents.	This	natural	phenomenon	provided	added	value	to	the	area,	as	 it	was	prone	to	 less	 flooding	than	 its	northern	counterpart.	And	 this	 contributed	 to	 attributing	 the	 Holy	 Cross-area	 a	 historic	 value	 (Figure	 5.4),	giving	 the	 homes	 more	 value	 than	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 LNW	 (Toueir,	 2015).	 These	 events	caused	 much	 disparity	 within	 the	 neighborhood	 and	 the	 Industrial	 Canal,	 the	 end	 of	segregation,	and	finally	Hurricane	Katrina	only	exacerbated	the	situation.		
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	Figure	5.4:	Urban	growth	measured	by	building	age,	1939.	(source:	Campanella,	2006)	
Physical,	Social,	and	Economic	Exclusion	of	the	LNW	Over	the	years,	 the	LNW	was	slowly	excluded	from	the	rest	of	the	city.	Not	only	was	it	perceived	as	the	poor	neighborhood,	but	also,	the	building	of	the	Industrial	Canal	separated	 the	 LNW	 physically,	 socially,	 and	 economically.	 In	 addition,	 the	 area	 is	surrounded	by	water:	 the	Mississippi	River	 from	 the	 south,	 the	Bayou	 from	 the	north,	and	 the	Canal	 from	 the	west.	 The	neighborhood	 also	demarcated	 the	 limits	 of	Orleans	Parish	to	the	east	with	St.	Bernard	Parish,	which	created	an	invisible	physical	barrier,	as	the	whites	of	St.	Bernard	Parish	did	not	welcome	the	blacks	of	the	LNW	(Toueir,	2015).	This	physical	isolation	led	to	social	and	economic	exclusions	as	well,	as	it	became	harder	to	travel	across	the	bridges	for	jobs,	especially	with	the	lack	of	public	transportation	at	the	time,	which	had	residents	feeling	undesired	by	the	rest	of	the	city.	Also,	having	built	homes	on	 low-lying	areas	meant	 that	 these	homes	were	easily	 flooded	with	any	major	
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rainfall	or	storm.	That	meant	the	homes	had	to	be	regularly	fixed,	which,	in	a	low-income	neighborhood,	is	often	impossible.	This	meant	that	LNW	homes	were	in	dire	conditions.		Halfway	 through	 the	 century,	 the	 city	 focused	 on	 expanding	 and	 connecting	 to	neighboring	areas:	building	a	suburban-style	development	in	the	Ninth	Ward	to	draw	in	middle	 class	 black	 New	 Orleanians,	 the	 Causeway	 over	 Lake	 Pontchartrain,	 the	Mississippi	River	Bridge	connecting	the	city	to	the	West	Bank,	and	the	Mississippi	River-Gulf	Outlet	 (MR-GO),	which	shortened	routes	 for	ships	coming	 from	the	Gulf	of	Mexico	(this	 project	 started	 in	 1958	 and	 ended	 in	 1968).	 The	 building	 of	 the	 MR-GO	 caused	much	environmental	damage	to	the	wetlands,	marshes,	and	cypress	forests	that	played	the	role	of	a	buffer	zone	to	the	LNW	when	hurricanes	hit.	The	MR-GO	affected	the	local	fauna	 and	 flora	 and	 destroying	 populations	 of	 fish,	 shrimps,	 and	 trees,	 as	 well	 as	exposing	 the	 land	 to	 strong	 winds	 and	 high	 waters	 (Campanella,	 2006,	 2008;	Freudenburg	et	al.,	2009).		The	events	mentioned	thus	far	highlight	several	reasons	for	the	vast	devastation	of	the	LNW	post	Hurricanes	Katrina	and	Rita.	But	it	is	the	compilation	of	the	actions	and	decisions	 that	 segregated	 the	 LNW	 from	 its	 surrounding	 areas	 that	 contributed	 to	 the	creation	of	stronger	bonds	amongst	residents,	and	the	deep	roots	that	were	established	over	 the	 years.	 As	 Toueir	 (2015,	 pp.	 241-242)	 argues,	 “the	 elements	 that	 made	 it	culturally	 unique	 and	 held	 it	 together	 as	 a	 neighborhood	 and	 community,	 became	 the	very	elements	that	contributed	to	its	vulnerability.”	
5.2.3.	Betsy	and	the	End	of	Segregation	On	 September	 9th	 1965,	Hurricane	Betsy	 hit	 the	 city	 of	New	Orleans	 and	 had	 a	similar	 impact	as	Katrina	in	2005,	albeit	the	city	was	more	prepared	for	the	disastrous	consequences	of	a	hurricane	in	1965	than	it	was	in	2005	(Colten	et	al.,	2009).	People	had	a	 two-day	warning	 to	 evacuate	 or	move	 to	 higher	 grounds,	many	 small	 shelters	were	used,	 which	 helped	 in	 creating	 smaller,	 but	more	 organized	 rescue	 groups,	 instead	 of	using	the	superdome	or	the	local	malls.	Also,	 in	1965,	New	Orleans	did	not	possess	the	interstates	and	highways	it	does	now,	and	people	did	not	own	as	many	cars	as	they	do	today.	 When	 people	 had	 to	 evacuate,	 they	 went	 to	 stronger	 structures	 (like	 brick	
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buildings),	 and	 they	 “felt	 safe	 in	 the	 city	 and	 “rode	 out”	 the	 storm	 at	 home	 or	 in	neighborhood	schools	or	civic	buildings;	coastal	residents	evacuated	to	levee-protected	New	Orleans.”	 (Campanella,	 2008,	p.	 321)	Those	who	evacuated	never	 ran	out	of	 food	and	water	and	the	city	was	functioning	normally	a	month	after	Betsy,	even	if	parts	of	the	city	 were	 under	 water	 (Colten	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Only	 20%	 of	 the	 city	 flooded	 in	 1965	 in	comparison	to	80%	in	2005,	and	the	hardest	hit	area	was	the	LNW,	and	more	specifically	the	 area	 north	 of	 St.	 Claude,	 where	 water	 rose	 between	 three	 and	 nine	 feet.	 It	 took	around	 two	 weeks	 to	 pump	 out	 the	 floodwaters	 of	 Hurricane	 Betsy.	 According	 to	Campanella	 (2008,	 p.	 323),	 lessons	 were	 not	 learned	 and	 “Hurricane	 Katrina	 would	reveal	the	folly	of	this	effort	forty	years	later,	demonstrating	a	truism	long	recognized	by	hazard	planners:	the	aftermath	of	one	disaster	becomes	the	prelude	to	the	next.”	Being	one	of	most	recent	neighborhoods	in	New	Orleans,	the	LNW	attracted	more	and	more	residents	with	the	building	of	better	and	improved	levees,	but	it	was	and	still	is	a	 very	 vulnerable	 area	 because	 it	 lies	 between	 three	 and	 twelve	 feet	 below	 sea	 level	(Campanella,	2006;	Landphair,	2007).	In	1960-61,	de	jure	racial	segregation	came	to	an	end	and	the	integration	of	schools	was	implemented.	In	1965,	Hurricane	Betsy	took	place	and	caused	major	flooding	in	the	LNW	(Campanella,	2006).	A	combination	of	these	two	events	 eased	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 ethnic	 mix,	 the	 LNW	 turning	 then	 from	 a	diversified	 working-class	 neighborhood	 to	 a	 predominantly	 low-income	 African	American	neighborhood	(Landphair,	2007).	Most	of	the	new	residents	who	came	to	find	a	 new	 home	 in	 the	 LNW	were	 either	 the	 relatives	 of	 those	who	 stayed,	 or	 those	who	moved,	from	Fazendeville.	Fazendeville	was	a	small	rural	community	outside	the	city	and	was	part	of	St.	Bernard	Parish.	When	the	city	bought	the	homes	to	turn	it	into	a	National	Park,	 the	100-year	 old	 community	had	 to	 find	 a	 new	place	 to	 settle	 and	moved	 to	 the	LNW	 (Chapman,	 2004).	 The	 residents	 of	 Fazendeville	moved	 their	 church	 as	well,	 the	‘Battleground	Baptist	 Church’	 and	maintained	 their	 closely-knit	 community	 (Chapman,	2004;	Toueir,	2015).	
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5.2.4.	The	Cultural	Landscape	of	the	LNW	The	 cultural	 landscape	 in	 the	 LNW	 is	 unique	 and	 took	 its	 form	 over	 the	generations.	In	retrospect,	the	neighborhood	is	relatively	new;	it	dates	back	to	the	1850s,	and	in	comparison	to	other	neighborhoods	and	other	cities	that	date	centuries,	the	LNW	acquired	 its	 own	 identity	 in	 a	 very	 short	 span	 of	 time.	 Since	 its	 inception,	 the	neighborhood	was	home	to	the	working	class,	immigrants,	and	low-income	people.	Over	the	years,	a	series	of	decisions	were	made	to	build	levees	to	develop	more	areas,	such	as	the	 Industrial	 Canal,	 and	 the	 MR-GO.	 Many	 hurricanes	 hit	 New	 Orleans,	 some	 more	damaging	than	others,	but	these	did	not	prevent	the	residents	of	the	LNW	to	leave.	The	uneven	 topography	 of	 the	 area,	 with	 the	 north	 being	 below	 sea	 level	 whereas	 the	southern	parts	being	above	sea	level,	was	not	enough	to	give	people	an	incentive	to	look	for	another	place	to	live.	All	these	factors	lead	to	a	community	that	has	no	one	to	turn	to	other	than	itself.	As	the	generations	went	on,	people	and	their	whole	family	stayed	in	the	neighborhood	 creating	 strong	 ties	 amongst	 each	 other.	 Women,	 especially	grandmothers,	are	the	symbol	of	stability	as	they	used	to	keep	an	eye	on	the	kids,	while	the	 parents	 went	 to	 work	 during	 the	 day.	 It	 is	 mostly	 women	 who	 take	 care	 of	 the	community	and	 take	part	 in	organizing	 social	 events.	Also,	 sitting	on	 the	 steps	outside	the	 homes	 is	 a	 major	 component	 of	 the	 LNW’s	 everyday	 culture,	 as	 it	 was	 a	 way	 to	socialize	 with	 the	 neighbors	 and	 a	 source	 of	 security	 for	 the	 kids,	 who	 feel	 they	 are	outside	but	not	too	far	(Jackson,	2005;	Social	et	al.,	2007).	The	 LNW	 is	 a	 neighborhood	 with	 church-going	 residents.	 People	 care	 deeply	about	 their	 congregation,	 and	 going	 to	 church	 on	 Sunday	 is	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 their	lives,	with	people	gathering	afterward	for	barbequing	or	any	social	event.	Elderly,	who	usually	 are	 aunts	 and	 uncles,	 or	 grandparents	 to	many	 of	 the	 children,	 are	 addressed	with	respect	“Mrs”	and	“Mr”,	or	the	appropriate	surname	(Jackson,	2005).	This	trend	is	present	 in	 the	 entire	 city,	 but	 more	 specifically	 in	 the	 LNW.	 Residents	 of	 this	neighborhood	 have	 only	 each	 other	 to	 fall	 back	 on	 to,	 and	 people	 lived	 there	 for	generations,	which	created	long-term	bonds	and	very	strong	ties	amongst	relatives	and	neighbors.		
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Most	of	the	people	living	there	relate	to	each	other:	they	are	of	African	American	decent;	they	work	with	each	other;	they	keep	an	eye	on	each	other’s	children;	and	they	go	to	the	same	church.	Being	separated	from	the	rest	of	the	city	by	the	Industrial	Canal	is	the	element	these	residents	have	in	common.	 	All	these	reasons	make	for	a	very	strong	and	 unique	 cultural	 landscape,	 which	 created	 a	 very	 strong	 sense	 of	 belonging	 and	attachment	to	a	highly	vulnerable	area.		
5.2.5.	The	“Safe	Development	Paradox”	and	the	Levees	According	to	Burby	(2006,	p.	173),	“safe	development”	stands	for	the	simple	idea	“that	land	exposed	to	natural	hazards	can	be	profitably	used	if	steps	are	taken	to	make	it	safe	 for	 human	 occupancy”.	 The	 author	 argues	 that	 since	 1947,	 in	 the	 New	 Orleans	Metropolitan	 area,	 Congress	 offered	 federal	 assistance	 to	 build	 levees	 in	 order	 “to	convert	 ninety-six	 hundred	 acres	 from	wetland	 to	 “productive	 use.””	 (Burby,	 2006,	 p.	174)	 Over	 the	 last	 century,	 controlling	 floods	 has	 been	 a	 major	 concern	 for	 the	 city.	Building	 dams	 and	 levees	 was	 deemed	 the	 appropriate	 solution.	 While	 having	 these	structures	 helped	 a	 lot	 in	 generating	 electricity,	 controlling	water	 flows,	 and	 seasonal	floods,	 it	 also	 created	 a	 sense	 of	 security	 amongst	 the	 neighboring	 communities.	 The	construction	 process	 generated	 jobs	 that	 attracted	 more	 people	 to	 these	 vulnerable	areas,	 thus	 creating	 important	 urban	 expansions	 around	 these	 sites.	 Over	 time,	 newer	generations	became	accustomed	to	the	modified	landscape	and	quickly	forgot	about	the	floods	that	occurred	in	the	past.	The	risk	is	that	when	one	of	these	new	structures	fails	or	a	major	disaster	 takes	place,	people	are	quickly	 reminded	 that	 the	safety	 they	 felt	was	nothing	more	than	an	illusion.		When	 Hurricane	 Betsy	 (1965)	 caused	 major	 damage	 to	 the	 city,	 a	 reasonable	solution	was	to	raise	the	levees	and	create	‘safe’	neighborhoods	for	the	working	class	to	live	close	to	the	city.		Although	Hurricane	Betsy	revealed	the	potential	for	widespread	flooding	[…],	the	construction	 of	 improved	 hurricane	 protection	 works	 and	 availability	 of	 flood	insurance	 evidently	 persuaded	 thousands	 of	 households	 that	 the	 region	 was	reasonably	safe.	(Burby,	2006,	p.	175).		
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After	Betsy,	the	construction	of	the	‘Hurricane	Protection	Project’	was	authorized	in	order	 to	protect	a	 larger	area	 from	 flooding	and	storm	surges	 (Burby,	2006;	Colten,	2009).	A	year	after	their	completion,	the	levees	where	put	to	the	test,	as	they	protected	the	city	of	New	Orleans	from	another	major	hurricane	that	hit	the	city	in	1969,	Hurricane	Camille.	It	was	a	category	3	and	had	a	similar	path	as	Katrina	with	even	stronger	winds	(almost	200	miles	per	hour),	but	the	levees	held	in	place	and	the	city	was	safe	(Colten,	2009;	Freudenburg	et	al.,	2009).	Due	to	the	presence	of	these	levees,	the	city	was	able	to	build	new	neighborhoods	and	thus	to	collect	more	taxes	from	residents.	The	central	city	of	New	Orleans	has	been	economically	weak	for	a	long	time	and	this	urban	development	was	seen	as	an	opportunity.	New	Orleans	did	not	build	a	diversified	economy,	but	rather	relied	 heavily	 on	 tourism	 and	 on	 its	 port,	 as	 it	 was	 the	 optimal	 entry	 point	 for	 ships	coming	from	Europe.	The	urban	services	in	the	central	city	were	weak,	the	school	system	was	 inadequate,	 and	 the	 planning	 practices	 inappropriate	 for	 a	 flood	 prone	 city	(Freudenburg	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Nelson	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 There	 were	 no	 advocates	 to	 promote	disaster	 awareness	 and	 the	 political	 culture	 was	 not	 in	 the	 promotion	 of	 building	restrictions.		
5.3.	The	LNW	Strongly	Influenced	by	the	City’s	Evolution	
5.3.1.	Historical	Evolution	of	the	City	The	facts	presented	in	this	section	are	based	on	the	works	of	Richard	Campanella,	and	more	specifically	his	book	entitled	“Geographies	of	New	Orleans”	published	in	2006.	This	book	provides	a	broad-based	historical	overview	on	the	evolution	of	the	city	of	New	Orleans.		In	 the	1720s,	 the	 area	began	 showing	more	 and	more	potential	 for	 growth	and	that	revived	the	interest	to	invest	in	building	the	city	of	New	Orleans.	With	that	came	the	first	 large	group	of	slaves	to	Louisiana	along	with	European	recruits	(France,	Germany,	and	Switzerland),	and	by	the	end	of	the	decade,	there	was	a	better	and	improved	levee	system,	a	 larger	population,	and	a	bigger	city	 footprint.	 In	the	1760s,	New	Orleans	was	passed	over	to	Spain.	The	rest	of	the	century	was	mainly	about	enlarging	and	improving	
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the	city,	which	was	accomplished	through	building	more	streets,	churches,	hospitals,	and	cemeteries.	In	the	process,	the	population	kept	on	growing	and	reached	around	5,000	in	1785,	with	many	French	speaking	settlers	(mostly	French	and	Acadians)	moving	in	the	city.	
A	Cultural	New	Orleans		During	 the	 early	 1800s,	 New	 Orleans	 and	 Louisiana	 were	 handed	 over	 by	 the	French	 to	 the	United	States.	The	 first	decade	of	 the	 century	 saw	growth,	development,	and	population	 growth,	 as	New	Orleans	housed	 immigrants,	 slaves,	 and	 free	people	of	color;	all	these	factors	contributed	to	the	spatial	transformation	of	the	region.	By	1812,	Louisiana	 became	 officially	 the	 eighteenth	 U.S.	 state.	 New	 immigrants	 settled	 in	 the	swampy	 areas	 on	 the	 outskirts	 of	 the	 city,	 now	known	as	 the	Upper	 and	Lower	Ninth	Ward.	New	Orleans’	 reputation	began	 growing	 in	 the	1820s,	 and	 it	was	 famous	 for	 its	ethnic	diversity	 and	 for	being	 a	 “unique	and	exotic	 city”	 (Campanella,	 2006,	p.	 10).	By	1836,	the	city	was	divided	into	municipalities:	“lower	First	and	Third	municipalities	are	mostly	 Creole	 and	 immigrant;	 upper	 Second	 municipality	 is	 mostly	 American	 and	immigrant	(…)	producing	perception	of	Canal	Street	as	dividing	line	between	Creole	and	American	 cultures.”	 (Campanella,	 2006,	 p.	 12)	 As	 previously	 mentioned,	 the	 Third	Municipality	was	where	 the	LNW	 is	now	 located,	 and	 it	was	always	perceived	as	poor	and	 dirty	 area.	 The	 1840s	 and	 1850s	 were	 years	 of	 prosperity	 and	 growth	 for	 New	Orleans.	The	 immigrant	population	kept	on	growing,	which	 impacted	 the	 expansion	of	the	 city’s	 limit,	 its	 infrastructure,	 and	 its	 culture.	 	 By	 1860,	 the	 city	 had	 a	 population	totaling	174,491	inhabitants.	Postbellum	New	Orleans	continued	to	grow	and	to	attract	more	people,	especially	emancipated	slaves	who	doubled	the	black	population.	Also,	the	local	 architecture	was	 transformed	 into	 a	more	modern	and	 international	 look.	By	 the	late	 1800s,	 the	 city	 witnessed	 a	 remarkable	 change	 and	 major	 technological	improvements	(electricity,	transportation,	and	communication),	and	with	the	expansion	of	 the	 streetcar,	 the	 richer	 families	who	used	 to	 live	 in	 the	 city	 center	moved	 to	 “new	garden	suburbs”,	allowing	the	new	immigrants	and	working	class	 to	settle	 in	 the	 inner	city	where	jobs	were	available	(Campanella,	2006).	
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The	mix	of	the	different	cultures	that	came	to	settle	down	in	New	Orleans	allowed	the	city	to	form	a	unique	cultural	identity	that	seeped	through	all	of	its	neighborhoods.		
Floods	as	Part	of	the	Local	Cultural	Identity	The	turn	of	the	20th	century	marks	the	city’s	cultural	identity.	Jazz	music	emerged	and	became	a	very	popular	style	in	New	Orleans,	and	then	nationwide.	Over	the	first	two	decades,	 the	 city	 kept	 on	 growing	 with	 more	 neighborhoods	 and	 the	 building	 of	 the	Industrial	Canal	(1918-1923).	 In	the	meantime,	 in	1915,	the	city	witnessed	a	hurricane	(this	 was	 before	 they	 started	 naming	 hurricanes)	 that	 inflicted	 a	 lot	 of	 damage	 and	caused	the	instability	to	many	of	its	buildings,	mainly	churches.	The	1920s	were	years	of	cultural	intellectual	prosperity;	they	were	labeled	the	“French	Quarter	Renaissance”,	and	gave	New	Orleans	a	place	on	the	literary	map.		In	 1927,	 the	 famous	 ‘Great	 Mississippi	 River	 Flood’	 became	 the	 worst	 natural	disaster	 in	 the	 Nation,	 flooding	 26,000	 square	 miles,	 killing	 hundreds	 of	 people,	 and	displacing	 half	 a	million	 people.	 After	 the	 flood,	 and	 through	 the	 Flood	 Control	 Act	 of	1928,	 the	city	reinforced	 its	 levees,	 floodwalls,	 reservoirs,	etc.,	and	even	 if	 the	city	was	“spared	 from	 flooding,	 but	 controversial	 dynamiting	 of	 the	 levee	 in	 St.	 Bernard	 and	Plaquemines	parishes	to	ensure	city’s	safety	creates	lasting	ill-will	between	city	dwellers	and	 rural	 neighbors.”(Campanella,	 2006,	 p.	 18)	 This	 event	 will	 remain	 engraved	 into	people’s	memories,	especially	for	the	residents	of	the	LNW;	this	will	be	tackled	later	 in	Chapter	6.	In	1930,	the	population	of	New	Orleans	reaches	a	total	of	458,762	inhabitants	among	which	28	percent	were	black.	The	1940s	were	marked	by	the	Second	World	War,	which	affected	not	only	the	city	but	also	the	entire	nation.	
Major	Transformations	Affecting	the	City	and	the	LNW		The	 1960s	 brought	 a	 lot	 of	 changes.	 The	 decade	 started	 in	 1961	 with	 the	desegregation	 process,	 which	 initiated	 a	 lot	 of	 discomfort	 and	 unease	within	 the	 city.	While	white	population	 left	 to	either	white	neighborhoods	or	 to	 the	suburbs,	 the	city’s	economy	kept	growing	due	to	the	development	of	the	oil	industry.	In	1965,	New	Orleans	was	hit	by	Hurricane	Betsy,	a	Category	3	storm	that	caused	major	flooding	to	the	Ninth	
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Ward,	 leading	 to	 more	 levees	 building	 in	 marshy	 and	 swampy	 areas.	 The	 rest	 of	 the	decade	was	prosperous	with	 the	building	of	 the	 first	 skyscraper,	 the	 franchising	of	 the	Saints	 (the	 local	 NFL	 team),	 and	 the	 building	 of	 the	 I-10	 highway.	 However,	 in	 1969,	hurricane	Camille	hit	 the	Mississippi	 area	 and	 caused	major	devastation,	 but	 it	 spared	New	 Orleans	 itself.	 In	 1970,	 the	 population	 started	 declining,	 and	 over	 the	 next	 few	years,	 the	 city	 embraced	 its	 cultural	 identity.	 The	 city	 began	 promoting	 its	 touristic	features—the	 New	Orleans	 Jazz	 and	 Heritage	 Festival	 and	Mardi	 Gras—,	while	 it	 also	improved	and	renovated	a	lot	of	its	historic	landmarks	in	and	outside	the	French	Quarter	and	 Garden	 District	 areas.	 In	 addition,	 Mardi	 Gras	 Indians	 became	 a	 major	 cultural	marker,	especially	among	residents	in	the	LNW,	where	designing	costumes	and	parades	are	part	of	the	local	culture	and	identity.		In	1973,	the	second	worst	Mississippi	River	flood	took	place	and	threatened	the	whole	area.	A	 few	years	 later,	 the	Louisiana	Superdome	was	built	and	became	a	major	landmark	in	the	city	(which	continues	to	be	today).	The	end	of	the	decade	witnessed	an	important	 migration	 of	 the	 Vietnamese	 community,	 who	 settled	 mainly	 in	 the	 newly	developed	areas	of	town,	present-day	New	Orleans	East.	In	the	80s,	the	city’s	population	continued	 to	 change,	 with	 the	 African	 Americans	 reaching	 55	 percent	 of	 the	 total	population.	 The	 1980s	 also	 witnessed	 more	 development,	 higher	 levees,	 and	 a	 new	appreciation	for	Creole	cuisine.	In	1983-84	the	city	was	severely	hit	by	the	worldwide	oil	crash,	and	for	the	rest	of	the	decade	the	economy	of	New	Orleans	was	in	decline,	pushing	more	and	more	people	out.	By	1990,	 the	city’s	population	was	496,438,	with	 the	black	population	reaching	62	percent.	The	century	ended	with	a	lot	of	ups	and	downs.	On	one	hand,	 the	city	got	more	and	more	attention,	with	 its	unique	architectural	value	and	 its	downtown	 area	 booming	 with	 new	 hotels	 and	 businesses.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 racial	tensions	grew	exponentially,	a	major	storm	hit	in	1995,	followed	by	hurricane	George	in	1998.	 A	 shift	 was	 also	 notable	 in	 the	 business	 sector,	 which	 saw	 locally-owned	businesses	giving	way	to	big	chain	businesses	(Campanella,	2006).		
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The	Years	before	Hurricane	Katrina	In	 2000,	 the	 city’s	 overall	 population	 continued	 to	 decline,	 while	 its	 black	population	continued	to	grow,	making	it	much	less	ethnically	diverse	when	compared	to	its	past.	The	early	2000s	were	full	of	changes,	especially	at	the	housing	level.	Many	public	housing	 projects	 were	 demolished	 and	 converted	 to	 mixed-income	 housing,	 and	 the	downtown	area	started	filling	up	with	condominiums.	The	terrorist	attacks	of	September	2001	affected	the	whole	nation,	and	the	city	feared	an	attack	on	its	port.	The	population	kept	declining,	 and	with	 tourists	 spending	up	 to	 $4billion	per	 year,	 tourism	generated	thousands	of	jobs,	becoming	the	main	booster	for	the	economy.	In	2004,	Hurricane	Ivan	hit	the	south	east	coast,	causing	a	lot	of	damage.	Ivan	spared	New	Orleans,	even	though	the	 city	 was	 under	 a	 mandatory	 evacuation	 order	 that	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	 planning	nightmare	because	of	all	the	congestion	it	caused.	This	prompted	city	officials	to	put	in	place	new	evacuation	plans	that	prioritized	the	evacuation	of	the	most	vulnerable	areas	to	the	least	vulnerable	areas.		
5.3.2.	A	Multicultural	and	a	Multiethnic	New	Orleans		“The	Crescent	City	was	the	talk	of	early-1800s	America,	a	century	old	society	at	the	gateways	of	the	Mississippi	Valley.”	(Campanella,	2006,	p.	199)	New	Orleans	is	 internationally	known	for	being	the	birthplace	of	 Jazz	music,	 the	home	of	the	best	southern	and	Creole	cuisine,	and	the	place	for	the	biggest	festivals	and	Mardi	Gras	parades	in	the	whole	nation.		Table	5.1:	Diversity	in	major	American	cities,	1850	-	New	Orleans	5th	nationwide	(Analysis	based	on	"Statistical	View	of	the	United	States—Compendium	of	the	Seventh	Census"	(1854)	by	J.D.B	De	Bow.	(source:	Campanella,	2006)	Total	Population		 119,460	Locally	Born	(in	city	or	state)	 34,101	Born	Elsewhere	in	US	 16,369	Born	in	England,	Wales,	or	Scotland	 3,524	Born	in	Ireland	 20,200	Born	in	Germany,	Prussia,	or	Austria	 11,554	Born	in	France	 7,522	Born	in	Spain	 1,150	
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Born	in	Italy	 658	Free	People	of	Color	 9,961	Slaves	 18,068	Total	US	Born	 50,470	Total	Foreign	Born	 48,601	Total-	Whites	 91,431	Percent	Foreign-Born	plus	Black	to	Total	population	 64%	Percent	Foreign-Born	plus	Black	to	White	population	 84%	Percent	Foreign-Born	to	White	population	 53%	Percent	Foreign-Born	plus	Free	Colored	to	White	Population		 64%	Percent	Locally	Born	to	Total	Population		 29%	Number	of	Ethnic/Nativity	Groups	Exceeding	5%	of	Total	Population		 7		In	 the	early	1800s,	New	Orleans	had	a	national	and	 international	reputation	 for	being	the	most	ethnically	diverse	city;	it	was	described	and	praised	by	many	renowned	authors	for	being	a	multilingual	city	where	every	nationality	was	represented,	and	where	people	came	from	all	over	the	world	to	gather	in	this	one	place	(Campanella,	2006).	With	all	the	immigrants	arriving	to	the	Unites	States	during	that	period,	New	Orleans	“was	the	nation’s	 number-two	 immigrant	 port,	 ahead	 of	 Boston	 and	 behind	 New	 York”	(Campanella,	2006,	p.	193).	In	 the	 1820s,	 New	Orleans	was	 the	 fifth	 largest	 city	 in	 the	 country	 in	 terms	 of	population	size.	Back	then,	census	data	was	collected	and	put	in	the	following	categories:	whites,	non-naturalized	foreigners,	free	colored	people,	and	slaves.	Campanella	(2006,	p.	195)	states,	 “if	diversity	 is	 reflected	by	 the	number	of	 foreigners	and	blacks	 (both	 free	and	enslaved)	compared	to	the	total	population,	then	Orleans	Parish	ranks	number	two	in	the	nation,	at	57	percent.”	And	if	slaves	were	excluded	from	the	data,	Orleans	Parish	became	the	most	diverse	parish	in	the	whole	nation	(Table	5.1)	New	Orleans	distinguished	itself	from	the	rest	of	the	big	American	cities	with	its	unique	history.	Being	established	by	the	French,	and	then	colonized	by	the	Spanish	 for	forty	years,	rendered	it	politically	different.	It	was	a	French-speaking	city	surrounded	by	English-speaking	cities,	and	it	was	mainly	Catholic	whereas	the	others	were	Protestant.	
	 119	
The	French	influence	on	the	history,	the	culture,	and	the	legal	system	left	New	Orleans	a	unique	American	city,	even	nowadays.	It	was	the	city	that	attracted	mostly	newcomers,	inventors,	and	developers.			By	1850,	the	city	being	one	of	the	most	ethnically	diverse	in	the	nation	with	the	lowest	percentage	of	locally	born	people	earned	its	‘	Ethnic	Gumbo’	label.		Almost	three	out	 of	 four	 residents	were	 born	 outside	New	Orleans,	mainly	 from	 France,	 Spain,	 and	Italy.	 At	 the	 time,	 slaves	 were	 in	 demand	 because	 of	 the	 much-needed	 labor	 force,	“force	 was	 also	 the	 factor	 behind	 the	 arrival	 of	 some	 early	 colonial	 settlers,	 whose	deportation	 to	 the	 Louisiana	 colony	 was	 the	 only	 alternative	 to	 imprisonment.”	(Campanella,	2006,	p.	199)	The	decades	succeeding	 the	 ‘Louisiana	Purchase’	brought	a	lot	of	wealth	and	prosperity	to	the	city,	attracting	all	types	of	ambitious	peoples,	from	the	wealthiest	 to	 the	 poorest.	 However,	 halfway	 through	 the	 century,	 the	 lack	 of	industrialization	 caused	 the	 city	 to	 lose	 many	 of	 its	 needed	 immigrants,	 who	 were	replaced	by	under	skilled	and	poor	laborers.	After	emancipation,	the	city	also	attracted	many	freedmen	(both	Creoles	and	Anglos)	from	rural	areas	that	added	to	the	diversity	of	the	black	population.		
5.3.3.	Memory	and	the	City	of	New	Orleans	Memory	 is	 part	 of	 a	 city’s	 architectural	 history.	 It	 is	 present	 in	 its	 buildings,	memorials,	and	museums:	Architecture	 and	 city	 places,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 give	 particular	 form	 to	 our	memories;	they	are	the	mnemonic	codes	that	awaken	recall.	(…)	So	it	is	of	the	city:	its	topographical	landscape	has	been	constantly	restored,	replaced,	and	renewed	from	epoch	to	epoch.	Yet	the	name	of	a	city’s	streets	and	squares,	the	gaps	in	its	very	 plan	 and	 physical	 form,	 its	 local	monuments	 and	 celebrations,	 remains	 as	traces	and	ruins	of	their	former	selves.	They	are	tokens	or	hieroglyphs	from	the	past	to	be	literally	reread,	reanalyzed,	and	reworked	over	time.	Images	that	arise	
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from	particular	historic	circumstances	come	to	define	our	sense	of	tradition;	they	literally	manage	our	knowledge	of	the	historic.	(Boyer,	1994,	p.	322)		In	New	Orleans,	 the	architecture,	 and	especially	 the	French	Quarter,	 are	part	of	the	city’s	and	the	people’s	identity	and	memory.	The	strong	historical	influence	of	many	cultures	 is	 vividly	 present	 in	 today’s	 New	 Orleans,	 and	 more	 specifically	 the	 street	names,	 the	 culture,	 the	 music,	 and	 the	 food.	 This	 specific	 aspect	 of	 the	 local	 cultural	identity,	with	its	unique	combination	of	French,	Spanish,	and	Creole	cultures,	infiltrated	throughout	the	entire	city.	Although	history	and	culture	started	in	the	View	Carré,	before	long	it	was	imprinted	in	the	identity	of	all	the	residents	and	the	whole	city.	Many	authors	described	New	Orleans	 in	 the	 1800s,	 and	 its	multicultural,	multiethnic	 aspects	 always	made	it	stood	out	from	the	rest	of	the	cities.	These	specific	traits	are	still	present	today.	The	cultural	identity	of	the	city	is	so	strong	that	it	survived	in	people’s	memories.	Boyer	(1994,	p.	343)	states,		The	 viewer’s	 memory	 was	 externalized	 onto	 visual	 surface	 indicators,	architectural	forms	and	atmospheric	details,	which	repetitively	shown	as	a	series	eventually	fabricated	a	conventional	portrait	of	the	town.	From	that	time	forward,	the	anecdotal	characterizations	of	New	Orleans,	having	been	placed	in	the	archive	of	America’s	collective	memory,	were	easy	to	recognize	and	recall.		
5.3.4.	Impact	of	Race	and	Class	on	New	Orleans	From	its	inception,	New	Orleans,	like	most	American	cities,	had	to	face	problems	related	 to	 race	and	class.	From	 its	early	days,	New	Orleans	was	home	 to	 slaves	and	 to	free	 people	 of	 color.	 New	 Orleans’	 reputation	 preceded	 it	 across	 borders	 and	 oceans.	People	came	from	Europe	and	from	multiple	places	to	settle	down	in	the	Crescent	City	(New	 Orleans	 is	 called	 the	 Crescent	 City	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 looks	 like	 a	 crescent	because	it	follows	the	shape	of	the	Mississippi	River).	But	slavery	was	also	widespread.	In	 New	Orleans,	 the	 end	 of	 legal	 racial	 segregation	 in	 the	 early	 1960s	was	 a	marking	point	 for	 the	African	Americans	 living	 in	 the	city,	as	well	as	 for	 the	 identity	of	 the	city.	Campanella	(2006)	describes	the	desegregation	process	as	“paradoxical	yet	typical”.	It	is	paradoxical	because	Black	and	White	New	Orlenians	were	more	integrated	before	1961	
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(the	year	racial	segregation	ended)	than	they	were	after	or	even	now.	They	knew	how	to	co-exist	in	a	time	where	racial	exclusion	was	acceptable,	and	they	each	moved	into	their	own	neighborhoods	when	 segregation	 came	 to	an	end.	That	was	especially	 true	 in	 the	
LNW,	 where	 the	 end	 of	 segregation	 contributed	 greatly	 to	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	neighborhood	from	a	racially	mixed	(and	mixed-income)	area	and	to	an	overwhelmingly	African	American,	impoverished	one.	Campanella	(2006,	p.	297)	states,	“The	result	today	is	a	spatial	distribution	of	African	Americans	 that	 is	de	facto	 segregated	 in	many	ways,	yet	still	more	integrated	than	many	major	American	cities.”	Most	enslaved	African	Americans	worked	as	domestics,	and	most	of	them	resided	close	to	their	employers	in	“the	distinctive	slant-roof	quarters	appended	to	the	rears	of	townhouses	and	cottages”	(Campanella,	2006,	p.	297).	This	was	referred	to	as	the	“back-alley	pattern”.	Other	slaves,	who	did	not	work	in	the	domestic	service,	lived	in	small	and	simple	constructions	along	the	swamps	referred	to	as	the	“back-of-town”	area,	because	it	was	 right	 behind	 the	 French	 Quarter	 in	 the	 central	 neighborhoods.	 While	 enslaved	people	lived	in	cottages	on	the	lower	side	of	Canal	Street,	free	people	of	color	lived	on	the	Creole	 side	of	 town	 (Figure	5.5).	 The	 latter,	mainly	 artisans,	 builders,	 or	 businessmen,	
Figure	5.5:	Geography	of	African-American	community	of	New	Orleans,	1860.	(source:	Campanella,	2006)		
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represented	 45%	 of	 the	 black	 population	 in	 the	 early	 1800s.	 Free	 people	 of	 color	preferred	 the	 neighborhoods	 situated	 downriver	 (now	 known	 as	 the	 Bywater,	 Upper,	and	 Lower	 Ninth	Ward),	 as	 they	 were	 more	 French-speaking,	 since	 “many	 arrived	 in	1809	as	refugees	from	Saint-Domingue,	but	many	more	were	native	sons	and	daughters	of	 mixed	 racial	 ancestry,	 Catholic	 in	 faith,	 French	 in	 language,	 and	 Creole	 in	culture.”(Campanella,	2006,	p.	298)			Even	with	the	large	number	of	poor	black	New	Orleanians	living	in	the	 ‘back-of-town’	 area	 (Figure	 5.5),	 “there	were	 no	 expansive,	 exclusively	 black	 neighborhoods	 in	antebellum	 New	 Orleans.	 Even	 Faubourg	 Tremé,	 which	 is	 sometimes	 described	 as	American’s	oldest	black	neighborhood,	was	racially	mixed”	(Campanella,	2006,	p.	300)				
5.4.	Hurricanes	and	New	Orleans		
5.4.1.	New	Orleans:	A	Vulnerable	City?	Hurricanes	are	common	 in	 the	south	east	 coast	of	 the	United	States.	Every	year	hurricanes	 come	 and	 hit	 the	 gulf	 coast,	 according	 to	 the	 National	 Hurricane	 Center13.		New	Orleans	has	been	 struck	by	many	hurricanes	 and	 floods	 over	 the	 years,	 the	most	notorious	being	The	Great	Flood	(1927),	Audrey	 (1957),	Betsy	 (1965),	Camille	 (1969),	Katrina	(2005).	Due	to	its	strategic	location,	a	lot	of	hurricanes	make	landfall	in	or	near	the	 city,	 and	 that,	 combined	 with	 its	 topography,	 renders	 it	 prone	 to	 major	 flooding	(Colten,	 2009).	 Many	 strong	 hurricanes	 also	 missed	 the	 city	 of	 New	 Orleans:	 Danny	(1997),	George	(1998),	Isodore	(2002),	Lili	(2002),	Bill	(2003),	and	Ivan	(2004),	but	with	respects	to	sheer	destruction,	these	events	pale	in	comparison	to	what	was	yet	to	come	in	 2005	 (Colten,	 2009).	 New	 Orleans	 presented	 many	 aspects	 that	 made	 it	 highly	vulnerable	to	Katrina,	both	geographically	and	socially.	Geographically,	 it	 is	 below	 sea	 level,	 and	 is	 continuously	 subsiding	 because	sediments	do	not	get	deposited	due	to	the	ongoing	pumping	of	 the	water	(Campanella,	2006;	Colten,	2009).	The	 levees	protecting	 the	city	have	 to	be	maintained	regularly.	 In																																																									
13 http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/ the	 hurricane	 season	 starts	 on	 June	 1st	 and	 lasts	 till	 November	 30th,	 which	 is	 six	months	of	exposure	to	life	threatening	events.		 
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the	 advent	 of	 a	 breach,	 the	 city	 is	 inundated	 right	 away;	 therefore,	 levees	 have	 a	 dual	role:	to	protect	the	city	and	to	expose	it	to	major	flooding.		Not	 only	did	 this	dependence	on	 the	 levees	make	 the	 city	more	 vulnerable,	 but	specific	actions	have	resulted	in	a	major	deterioration	of	the	natural	ecosystem	over	the	years	(Campanella,	2006).	Among	these	actions,	the	numerous	canals	constructed	in	the	wetlands	 to	 look	 for	 oil	 had	 a	 strong	 negative	 impact	 on	 this	 fragile	 environment.	Moreover,	 the	MR-GO	project	was	proposed	in	the	 late	50s,	and	was	only	completed	in	1968.	 During	 the	 construction	 period,	 Hurricane	 Betsy	 (1965)	 hit	 and	 the	 resulting	floods	were	higher	than	anticipated.	It	was	then	that	MR-GO	was	labeled	“the	hurricane	highway”	(Freudenburg	et	al.,	2009).	It	increased	the	destructive	impact	of	Betsy	and	did	the	same	for	Katrina	when	 it	hit	 forty	years	 later.	The	 level	of	devastation	was	beyond	anyone’s	expectations.		In	particular,	MR-GO	had	a	major	 impact	on	the	area’s	biodiversity	and	wetland	environment.	Connecting	the	Gulf	of	Mexico	to	Lake	Pontchartrain,	salt	water	 found	its	way	into	the	lake’s	fresh	water,	which	affected	the	fish	and	shrimp	population,	along	with	the	 forests	 of	 cypress	 trees	 that	 were	 holding	 together	 the	 fragile	 soil.	 Cypress	 trees	cannot	 thrive	 in	 salt	 water;	 they	 gradually	 died.	 This	 not	 only	 exposed	 the	 city	 to	stronger	winds,	but	also	contributed	to	 the	 loss	of	 land,	which,	 in	 turn,	made	the	canal	wider	over	the	years.	The	loss	of	land	meant	that	the	canal	needed	dredging	every	year	in	order	 to	maintain	 its	depth	 to	permit	 larger	 ships	 to	pass,	which	 allowed	more	 salt	water	to	enter	and	kill	more	trees.	It	was	a	vicious	circle	that	finally	came	to	an	end	when	the	 city	 finally	 decided	 to	 close	 the	 MR-GO	 in	 2008	 (Freudenburg	 et	 al.,	 2009).	Unfortunately,	 the	damage	 is	so	great	 that	 it	will	 take	years	and	years	 to	restore	 these	wetlands.	Not	 only	 were	 wetlands	 destroyed	 by	 the	 canals	 and	 oil	 exploitation,	 but	 the	Mississippi’s	dams	kept	the	flood	waters	away	from	the	city	contributed	to	less	sediment	deposition	 and	prevented	 the	 delta	 from	 regenerating	 itself.	 The	 combination	 of	 these	actions,	linked	with	wetlands	destruction,	weakened	the	city	and	the	community	of	New	Orleans	in	the	advent	of	a	major	hurricane.	
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Socially,	 the	 city’s	 population	 changed	 a	 lot	 over	 time.	 Since	 the	 1950s,	 the	population	of	New	Orleans	has	been	declining14,	and	the	majority	of	the	people	living	in	New	Orleans	are	African	American	who	belong	to	the	lower	income	class,	which	makes	all	their	residences	vulnerable	to	flooding	due	to	poor	maintenance	and	cheaper	quality	of	houses.	Most	of	these	residents	live	in	the	lowest	parts	of	the	city,	which	also	increases	their	susceptibility	to	floods.		
5.4.2.	Hurricane	Katrina		On	August	23,	2005	Hurricane	Katrina	began	forming	on	the	eastern	shores	of	the	Bahamas.	It	strengthens	on	its	way	to	New	Orleans,	reaching	a	Category	4	storm	to	make	landfall	 on	August	29,	2005.	Hurricane	Katrina	 caused	unprecedented	devastation	and	destruction.	 It	 remains	 to	 this	 day	 the	 costliest	 disaster	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	 United	States.	Thousands	of	people	could	not	evacuate,	and	found	themselves	trapped	on	their	rooftops,	 in	 the	 Superdome,	 or	 in	 the	 Convention	 Center,	 the	majority	 of	 which	 were	poor	 and	 African	 American.	 The	 days	 that	 followed	 the	 deluge	 were	 even	 more	catastrophic	 due	 to	 the	 chaos	 caused	 by	 lack	 of	 organization	 and	 assistance.	 Looting,	shooting,	 and	 fires	 became	 commonplace	 (Campanella,	 2006).	 A	 week	 after	 the	hurricane,	the	appalling	death	toll	had	reached	an	official	mark	of	1,078	in	total.	Katrina	turned	New	Orleans	into	a	“ghost	city”,	with	the	majority	of	its	inhabitants	scattered	all	over	 the	 country,	with	no	electricity	or	 running	water.	The	 flood	was	pumped	out	 fast	enough	to	allow	some	of	the	residents	to	return	by	September.	Unfortunately,	Hurricane	Katrina	was	not	the	only	blow	that	hit	the	city:	on	September	23-24,	Hurricane	Rita	hit	the	region.	Most	repairs	done	beforehand	were	in	vain,	and	some	areas	got	flooded	again.	The	city	struggled	to	get	back	on	its	feet.	There	were	many	issues	to	deal	with,	and	the	situation	was	overwhelming	 to	everyone,	 though,	at	 least,	both	hurricanes	had	opened	the	eyes	of	 the	residents	as	well	as	 the	 local	officials	 in	 terms	of	disaster	management,	planning,	and	evacuation	(Campanella,	2006).	People	had	little	or	no	time	to	mourn	their	loved	ones.	They	had	to	get	back	on	their	feet	and	figure	out	a	way	to	rebuild,	and	rebuild	
																																																								
14	http://www.datacenterresearch.org/reports_analysis/population-loss-and-vacant-housing/	
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fast.	But	what	 the	hurricanes	did	was	more	 than	 flooding	 the	 city	of	New	Orleans	 and	exposing	its	vulnerability.	The	hurricanes	took	away	a	piece	of	the	city	and	its	identity,	of	the	people	and	their	memories,	and	of	the	local	history	and	culture.			
	Figure	5.6:	Flood	map	of	New	Orleans	on	the	day	Hurricane	Katrina	hit.	(source:	The	Times	Picayune)	When	Hurricane	Katrina	 hit,	 the	 levees	were	 breached,	 the	majority	 of	 the	 city	was	 flooded,	 and	 especially	 the	 LNW	 (Figure	 5.6).	 People	 lost	 their	 lives	 and	many	 of	those	who	survived,	lost	everything.		As	the	experience	of	New	Orleans	illustrates,	federal	policy	had	its	intended	effect	of	facilitating	and	sustaining	development	in	hazardous	areas.	The	paradox	is	that	in	 trying	 to	 make	 the	 most	 hazardous	 parts	 of	 New	 Orleans	 safe	 for	 urban	expansion	it	had	the	unintended	effect	of	contributing	directly	to	the	devastation	resulting	from	Hurricane	Katrina.	(Burby,	2006,	p.	176)	Therefore,	with	levees	protecting	the	city	and	transforming	wetlands	into	livable	neighborhoods,	did	the	‘safety	development	paradox’	contribute	to	weaken	people’s	and	the	city’s	memory?	
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The	 impact	 of	 Hurricane	 Katrina	 was	 devastating	 for	 the	 entire	 city	 of	 New	Orleans,	but	more	specifically	on	the	LNW	(refer	to	Figure	5.6).	Not	only	were	the	levees	overtopped	from	the	northern	side,	but	they	also	failed	and	breached	on	the	eastern	side	of	 the	Industrial	Canal,	resulting	 in	more	water	rushing	 in	 from	Bayou	Bienvenue	from	the	east.	The	combination	of	all	 this	floodwater	drowned	the	LNW	up	to	10-feet	over	a	period	 of	 twenty	 minutes.	 While	 those	 who	 did	 not	 evacuate	 perhaps	 thought	 for	 a	moment	they	would	wake	up	the	next	morning	to	clean	up,	pick	up	the	branches,	and	fix	their	roofs,	they	rather	found	themselves	with	water	up	to	the	roof	and	many	perished	(Campanella,	2008).		Hurricane	 Katrina	 raised	 another	 problem.	 Most	 of	 the	 displaced	 people	 that	could	not	come	back	to	the	city	are	from	an	African	American	origin,	most	belonging	to	the	lower	income	class	and	living	in	the	lowest	neighborhoods.	Falk	et	al.	(2006)	argue	that	even	if	the	reality	may	seem	different,	“Katrina	clearly	moved	the	process	along	in	ways	that	reduce	the	likelihood	that	proportionately	large	numbers	of	displaced	African	Americans	 will	 return	 to	 New	 Orleans.”	 (p.	 121)	 And	 they	 add	 that	 it	 is	 the	 affluent	people,	 regardless	 of	 their	 race,	who	 have	 higher	 chances	 of	 returning	 and	 rebuilding	faster	than	anyone	else.	However,	Laska	et	al.	(2006)	argue	that	“community	resilience	cannot	 be	 achieved	 for	 New	 Orleans	 if	 it	 becomes	 a	 predominantly	 white	 gentrified	community	clustered	in	the	high	ground	[…]And	much	of	the	culture	valued	by	the	world	would	be	 lost	with	 the	absence	of	 the	African	American	 community.”	 (p.	22)	Since	 the	LNW	is	predominantly	African	American,	the	residents	felt	that	their	neighborhood	was	being	 eradicated	 and	 their	 existing	 feelings	 of	 distrust	 grew	 even	 stronger.	 That	 gave	them	more	of	an	incentive	to	prove	to	themselves	(and	to	local	officials)	that	they	were	worth	fighting	for,	and	they	were	determined	to	stay	and	rebuild.		In	addition,	New	Orleanians	showed	the	country	and	the	world	that	they	were	not	willing	 to	give	up	on	 their	city	or	cultural	values.	 In	2006,	six	months	after	Hurricanes	Katrina	 and	 Rita	 took	 a	 piece	 of	 the	 city’s	 identity,	 elected	 officials	 and	 the	 citizens	agreed	to	celebrate	Mardi	Gras.	Many	were	opposed	to	it	because	a	large	majority	of	the	citizens	 were	 still	 living	 in	 exile	 and	 the	 city	 was	 still	 mourning.	 But	 everyone	 was	
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persuaded	that	celebrating	Mardi	Gras	was	going	to	help	overcome	their	devastating	loss	and	remind	the	world	that	the	city	of	New	Orleans	always	celebrated	life	(Guenin-Lelle,	2007).	 Regardless	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 having	Mardi	 Gras	 was	mainly	 driven	 by	 economic	reasons,	 but	 “what	 is	 true	 on	 the	 individual	 level	 is	 also	 true	 on	 the	 collective	 level	because	 the	 traditions	of	Mardi	Gras	 are	deeply	 embedded	 in	 the	 collective	 identity	of	this	city.	[…]	it	was	also	an	important	point	in	reclaiming	what	is	unique	to	New	Orleans’	history	and	culture	at	this	seminal	moment	in	New	Orleans	history.”	(Guenin-Lelle,	2007,	p.	75)		 	
Rebuilding	Plans	In	 New	 Orleans,	 especially	 by	 reason	 of	 its	 uneven	 topography,	 taking	 proper	planning	measures	 is	 crucial	 for	 a	 resilient	 rebuilding	 of	 the	 city	 and	 its	 communities.	Laska	 et	 al.	 (2006)	 say	 that	 “hurricanes	become	disasters	 because	 of	 human	decisions	[…]	 [p]olitical,	 social	 and	 economic	 factors	 determine	what	 land	 is	 developed,	what	 is	built,	and	who	lives	there.”	(p.	17)	They	also	say	that	New	Orleans	is	a	very	good	example	of	 how	 communities	 were	 placed	 at	 risk	 due	 to	 improper	 land	 use	 regulations.	 After	Hurricane	Katrina,	 the	city	was	under	 the	pressure	to	propose	a	rebuilding	plan,	but	 it	was	 challenging	 to	 have	 everyone’s	 consent	 (Nelson	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 For	 example,	government	officials	and	the	people	know	that	it	is	reckless	to	rebuild	the	city	as	it	once	was,	 because	 the	 existing	 conditions	were	 the	main	 cause	 behind	 the	 devastation	 that	took	place.	There	were	multiple	plans	that	were	set	in	place:	the	Bring	New	Orleans	Back	Commission	(BNOB),	the	New	Orleans	Neighborhoods	rebuilding	Plan	(NONRP),	and	the	Unified	New	Orleans	Plan	 (UNOP)	 (Nelson	et	 al.,	 2007).	 Some	of	 these	proposed	plans	affected	the	LNW	negatively	and	some	positively.		
The	BNOB	Plan	The	 BNOB	 plan	 was	 first	 initiated	 after	 Katrina	 in	 September	 2005,	 and	 was	presented	 to	 the	 public	 in	 January	 2006.	 The	 new	 plan,	 initiated	 by	 the	 Urban	 Land	Institute,	was	a	top-down	process	that	gathered	planners	and	decisions	makers	without	
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consulting	local	people	(Figure	5.7).	Therefore,	the	plan	proposed	the	shrinking	of	New	Orleans’	 footprint	 to	 maintain	 the	 most	 important	 services,	 as	 it	 projected	 a	 smaller	population	in	the	future	due	to	the	large	number	of	displaced	people.	This	would	impose	“a	4-month	moratorium	on	building	permits	in	flood-affected	areas,	and	implementing	a	4-month	 neighborhood	 planning	 process	 in	 which	 residents	 of	 the	 city’s	 13	 planning	districts	would	be	able	 to	prove	 the	viability	of	 their	neighborhoods	by	demonstrating	that	a	significant	proportion	of	 the	residents	wanted	to	return.”	 (Nelson	et	al.,	2007,	p.	28)	This	 incentive	meant	 that	 some	residential	 areas	 located	 in	 severely	 flooded	areas	would	be	 converted	 into	green	 spaces	and	parks.	The	proposed	plan	was	published	 in	the	 local	newspaper,	The	Times-Picayune,	with	 large	green	dots	on	 the	areas	 that	were	proposed	to	become	parks,	the	LNW	being	under	one	of	the	dots,	which	lead	to	a	public	outrage	 of	 residents	who	 immediately	 conveyed	 their	 dismay	 to	 the	 city	 (Figure	 5.7).	According	 to	 Ford	 (2010,	 p.	 33),	 “this	 disputed	 plan	 by	 the	 Bring	 New	 Orleans	 Back	Commission	failed	a	city	already	fearful	of	its	future,	and	split	New	Orleans	in	two—into	one	set	of	neighborhood	located	safely	on	the	natural	levees	and	a	second	set	located	on	the	unsafe	low-lying	and	imperiled	land.”		
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	 Figure	5.7:	The	Bring	New	Orleans	Back	Commission	Proposed	Plan	with	the	Green	Dots.	(source:	Bring	New	Orleans	Back	Commission)	
The	NONRP	Plan	In	 December	 of	 2005,	 a	 new	 plan	was	 already	 set	 in	motion,	 the	 New	 Orleans	Neighborhoods	Rebuilding	Plan	(NONRP),	colloquially	known	as	the	Lambert	plans.	With	the	BNOB	plan’s	 lack	of	 success,	 the	NONRP	started	 taking	 form	 in	 the	spring	of	2006.	Focused	on	rebuilding	the	entire	city,	the	plan	took	into	account	public	participation	and	organized	neighborhood	meetings	with	residents.	The	plan’s	purpose	was	twofold,	“the	city	council	wanted	to	focus	the	disparate	efforts	of	all	the	neighborhood	groups	and	to	provide	technical	assistance	to	develop	project	lists	for	procuring	funding	to	facilitate	the	rebuilding	of	neighborhoods	citywide.”	 (Nelson	et	al.,	2007,	p.	30)	The	NONRP	focused	on	 creating	 proper	 storm	 protection	 for	 the	whole	 city	 instead	 of	 shrinking	 the	 city’s	footprint	as	did	the	BNOB	plan,	which	was	more	 in	tune	with	the	objectives	of	 the	city	
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council	members,	who	wanted	their	pre-Katrina	neighborhoods.	The	plan	was	accepted	by	the	city	in	October	2006.		
The	UNOP	Plan	Even	before	the	NONRP	was	finalized,	a	new	plan	had	started	to	form,	the	Unified	New	Orleans	 Plan	 (UNOP).	 This	 plan	 aimed	 at	 creating	 a	 unified	 citywide	 plan	 for	 the	flooded	and	un-flooded	areas,	and	was	designed	as	a	guide	for	the	different	investments	coming	 from	 federal,	private,	public,	or	philanthropic	sources.	Public	participation	was	an	integral	element	in	UNOP’s	designing,	and	public	meetings	were	held	so	that	residents	could	 give	 their	 input,	 contribute,	 and	meet	 with	 planners.	 According	 to	 Nelson	 et	 al.	(2007,	p.	32),	“the	planners	produced	plans	for	each	of	the	city’s	13	districts,	and	a	spate	team	produced	a	single	plan	known	as	 the	Citywide	Strategic	Recovery	and	Rebuilding	Plan	 (or	 the	 citywide	 plan).”	 The	 main	 objectives	 of	 the	 plan	 were	 1)	 to	 give	 people	financial	 incentives	 to	 raise	 their	 homes	 according	 to	 the	 FEMA	 Advisory	 Base	 Flood	Elevation,	2)	to	transform	the	slab-on-grade	residences	and	build	them	on	piers	or	with	fist-floor	basements,	and	3)	to	move	households	and	businesses	to	areas	that	were	less	prone	to	flooding	and	to	areas	with	higher	concentrations	of	people	(Nelson	et	al.,	2007).		The	problem	was	that	the	UNOP	meetings	took	place	while	it	was	already	a	little	over	a	year	 after	 Hurricane	 Katrina,	 and	 “some	 people,	 particularly	 those	 from	 the	 flooded	neighborhoods,	complained	about	“planning	fatigue”,	saying	that	they’d	answered	these	same	questions	for	former	consultants	and	resented	their	precious	time	being	wasted	in	answering	them	again.”(Ford,	2010,	p.	37)	The	plans	mentioned	earlier	were	essential,	as	the	city	needed	a	rebuilding	plan,	one	on	which	it	could	fall	back	to	avoid	chaos.	Whether	it	was	the	BNOB,	the	NONRP,	or	the	UNOP	plans,	it	took	about	two	years	to	propose	a	plan	that	was	accepted	by	the	city	and	the	residents.	It	was	the	UNOP	that	finally	unlocked	“federal	construction	money”	to	start	with	 the	post-Katrina	rebuilding	process	 (Ford,	2010).	But	 time	was	passing,	and	people	in	the	LNW	were	getting	tired	of	their	current	living	situation.	Before	reaching	a	consensus	on	a	rebuilding	strategy,	people	wanted	to	go	back	to	their	homes,	and	a	year	after	 the	 storm,	 some	 residents	 were	 rebuilding	 their	 homes	 (Green	 et	 al.,	 2007).	
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Moreover,	shortly	after	Mardi	Gras	of	2006,	mayor	Nagin	addressed	the	residents	of	the	city	and	encouraged	“the	devastated	neighborhoods	(Lakeview,	the	Lower	Ninth	Ward)	to	 begin	 to	 plan	 for	 themselves”	 (Ford,	 2010,	 p.	 34).	 With	 all	 the	 uncertainty	 and	confusion,	a	reasonable	solution	for	the	residents	of	the	LNW	was	to	rebuild	their	homes	as	 they	 were	 before	 the	 hurricane,	 and	 this	 attitude	 led	 to	 some	 unsound	 rebuilding	techniques.	Also,	 instead	of	taking	into	account	the	work	done	by	planning	contractors,	every	plan	 initiated	a	new	set	of	questions	and	 inquiries	and	that	 lead	the	residents	 to	suffer	from	“planning	fatigue”(Ford,	2010).	“Decisions	being	made	today	will	determine	the	New	Orleans	of	 the	 future.	No	 community	 can	be	viable	without	 a	 cross	 section	of	residents	employed	in	all	the	diverse	roles	required	to	sustain	it.”	(Laska	et	al.,	2006,	p.	22)	All	in	all,	this	slow	rebuilding	process	played	an	important	role	in	preventing	people	from	returning	as	Maret	and	Cadoul	(2008)	predicted.	The	 impact	of	such	random	and	slow	rebuilding	will	be	discussed	later	in	Chapter	6,	which	tackles	the	results	of	the	data	collection.		
5.4.	Elements	to	Retain		This	chapter	displayed	a	historical	overview	of	the	pertinent	facts	that	made	New	Orleans	 the	 unique	 city	 that	 it	 is	 today,	 and	 how	 the	 LNW	 evolved	 over	 the	 years	 to	become	today’s	most	controversial	neighborhood.	The	decisions	made	over	the	course	of	history	shed	the	light	on	many	of	the	reasons	behind	the	vulnerability	of	the	LNW,	as	it	was	addressed	by	Campanella	 (2008)	and	Toueir	 (2015).	This	historical	 study	allowed	for	 a	better	 comprehension	of	 the	 local	 cultural	 identity	behind	 the	 city	 and	 the	LNW.	The	events	highlighted	in	this	chapter	draw	a	portrait	of	the	neighborhood	and	show	its	unique	 value.	 Understanding	 the	 history	 of	 the	 LNW	makes	 it	 clear	 why	 people	 were	strongly	attached	to	their	neighborhood,	and	why	they	decided	to	come	back	and	rebuild	despite	its	vulnerability.	By	highlighting	this	attachment	and	the	origins	of	the	intricate	social	networks,	it	becomes	pertinent	to	look	at	these	elements	in	regards	to	community	resilience.		In	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 following	 chapters,	 it	 was	 crucial	 to	 explain	 and	investigate	 the	 important	 facts	 that	 drew	 the	 historical	 path	 of	 this	 specific	
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neighborhood.	This	 process	made	 it	 possible	 for	 the	 author	 to	develop	 and	design	 the	methodology	 used	 for	 the	 data	 collection,	 and	 then	 the	 questionnaires,	 along	with	 the	type	of	data	 collected	during	 the	 field	 study.	Also,	many	of	 these	 facts	 lead	 to	 a	better	comprehension	of	the	reasons	behind	the	late	comeback	and	rebuilding	of	the	LNW.	The	facts	described	 in	this	chapter	explain	 further	the	choice	of	mixed	methods,	as	 it	 is	 the	combination	 of	 many	 different	 types	 of	 data	 that	 helps	 in	 answering	 the	 research	question	and	bringing	to	 light	some	of	the	 issues	behind	the	controversies	of	 the	LNW.	The	author	believes	that	a	better	understanding	of	these	facts	could	have	mitigated	the	most	 serious	 side	 effects	 of	 the	 disaster:	 the	 considerable	 devastation	 caused	 by	Hurricane	 Katrina,	 to	 the	 delayed	 rebuilding	 of	 the	 neighborhood.	 Although	 mainly	descriptive,	this	chapter	is	vital	to	the	course	of	this	research	process.			 	
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Chapter	6: The	Different	Aspects	of	Resilience	
6.1.	Overview		This	 chapter	 uses	 the	 different	 types	 of	 data	 collected	 in	 order	 to	 evaluate	whether	or	not	place	attachment	and	social	networks	contribute	to	the	resilience	of	the	LNW.	 It	 is	 divided	 into	 four	 parts;	 the	 first	 investigates	 the	 reasons	 behind	 the	 late	rebuilding	of	the	neighborhood	from	a	quantitative	perspective	to	then	compare	it	to	the	qualitative	 data.	 While	 conducting	 the	 interviews,	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 in	 order	 to	understand	the	slow	comeback	of	 the	LNW,	a	cumulative	historical	study	needed	to	be	done	(see	Chapter	5	of	this	dissertation).	The	historical	overview	allowed	the	researcher	to	 understand	 the	 facts	 behind	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 city	 and	 the	 LNW.	 And	 most	importantly,	it	showed	the	extent	to	which	the	area’s	vulnerabilities	were	the	result	of	a	series	of	decisions	made	over	the	course	of	history.		The	 second	 step	was	 to	 identify	 the	 cultural	 landscape,	 and	 in	 the	process,	 two	perceptions	surfaced:	one	of	the	residents	and	how	they	see	the	LNW,	and	the	other	is	of	the	professionals	and	their	perspective	of	the	LNW.	Regardless	of	the	main	reason	for	the	slow	rebuilding	process	(the	historical	characteristics	of	the	LNW,	or	the	aforementioned	differing	 perceptions,	 or	 both),	 many	 residents	 were	 prevented	 from	 returning,	 and	those	who	came	back,	had	to	work	hard.	The	 third	 part	 focused	 on	 drawing	 conclusions	 from	 the	 collected	 tangible	 and	intangible	 indicators,	 which	 led	 to	 inconclusive	 results.	 This	 explains	 why	 it	 was	important	to	use	a	mixed	methods	design,	as	it	allowed	reaching	open-ended	results	that	could	 lead	 to	 further	 research	 projects.	 This	 research	 focuses	 more	 on	 opening	 new	doors	 to	 evaluating	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience	 than	 on	 actually	measuring	 it.	 It	 became	clear	 that	 what	 mattered	 more	 is	 to	 lay	 the	 grounds	 to	 a	 new	 way	 of	 evaluating	resilience.	 And	 to	 actually	 do	 it	 will	 be	 the	 subject	 of	 further	 research	 projects	 that	involves	 specialists	 from	 different	 disciplines	 and	 expertise,	 along	 with	 the	 proper	funding	and	timeframe.		
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Finally,	 the	 fourth	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 is	 on	 the	 newfound	 hope	 in	 the	 LNW.	Also,	it	tackles	the	changes	of	the	residents	and	of	the	neighborhood.	These	changes	are	in	part	positive	and	in	part	negative,	but	how	will	they	affect	the	future	of	the	LNW?	
6.2.	The	LNW	Post-Katrina		
6.2.1.	A	First	Perspective:	What	do	the	Indicators	Imply?	The	 preliminary	 observations	 show	 that	 the	 quantitative	 data	 pertaining	 to	 the	LNW	shows	a	different	reality	 from	the	one	experienced	by	 its	residents.	The	numbers	show	that	20-25%	of	 the	residents	have	returned	while	 talking	 to	 the	residents	shows	that	those	who	have	returned	are	very	involved	in	the	recovery	of	the	neighborhood	and	its	strong	and	improved	return.	The	reasons	why	the	LNW	is	far	behind	schedule	in	the	rebuilding	 process	 are	 due	 to	many	 factors:	 the	 history	 of	 the	 neighborhood,	 the	 title	clearing	 issue,	 the	access	 to	schools	and	health	care,	 the	shrinking	economy,	and	many	more.	There	are	numerous	NPOs	involved	in	the	LNW,	but	their	presence	does	not	seem	to	 yield	 the	 required	 results	 to	 improve	 the	 situation	 of	 the	 neighborhood	 and	 its	residents.	It	turns	out	that	while	some	NPOs	are	working	for	the	LNW	and	its	residents,	others	are	mainly	 interested	 in	making	profit	out	of	a	very	unfortunate	situation.	Also,	there	 is	 a	 gap	 between	 the	 residents’	 perception	 of	 their	 neighborhood	 and	 the	professionals’	perspective.	That	gap	in	large	part	explains	the	reason	why	the	residents	have	 lost	 their	 trust	 in	 the	professionals	and	 the	state	government.	 It	has	been	proven	that	 the	 local	 government	 that	 was	 in	 charge	 during	 and	 after	 the	 hurricane	 was	corrupted	 and	 the	mayor	has	been	 found	guilty	 and	was	prosecuted	 for	 fraud	 charges	(Robertson,	2014).	The	current	government,	the	Landrieu	administration,	has	to	pick	up	the	pieces	and	figure	out	a	way	to	gain	people’s	trust	again	so	they	can	 join	forces	and	work	efficiently	to	bring	back	the	community	and	improve	the	neighborhood.	 	Another	problem	 is	 that	a	 lot	of	 the	younger	residents	or	 the	young	 families	have	 left	 the	LNW	due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 resources	 and	 services,	 and	 those	who	 are	 actively	 returning	 to	 the	neighborhood	belong	to	the	older	generation,	i.e.	those	who	are	the	most	attached	to	the	neighborhood	and	are	not	willing	to	let	it	sink	and	disappear.	
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7	 years	 after	 the	 Hurricane	 the	 neighborhood	 was	 still	 falling	 short	 in	 the	rebuilding	process.	Thus,	it	was	necessary	to	try	to	understand	the	reasons	behind	such	a	late	comeback	when	the	rest	of	the	city	was	following	a	faster	recovery	process.	One	of	the	assumptions	of	this	research	is	that	the	late	rebuilding	of	the	neighborhood	affects	its	resilience	negatively.	This	first	section	aims	at	investigating	whether	this	claim	is	correct	or	 incorrect.	 The	 author	 looks	 at	 different	 data	 (quantitative	 and	 qualitative)	 and	multiple	sources	(primary	and	secondary)	in	order	to	have	the	most	holistic	perspective	on	the	issue.		
	First	set	of	results:	the	Data	Center	indicators	and	sub-indicators	The	first	set	of	results	presented	in	this	section	comes	from	a	compilation	of	the	Data	Center15	indicators.	The	Center	uses	data	published	by	the	U.S.	Census	Bureau16	and	compiles	 it	 using	 indicators	 and	 sub-indicators.	 They	 publish	 data	 about	 each	neighborhood	 and	 the	 whole	 city.	 They	 are	 a	 very	 reliable	 source	 for	 information	gathering,	especially	that	they	offer	researchers	and	anyone	who	is	interested	free	access	to	 this	 continuously	 updated	 information	 through	 their	 website	(http://www.datacenterresearch.org/).	 One	 of	 the	 most	 important	 elements	 they	provide	 is	a	comparison	of	 the	same	indicators	between	the	years	2000	and	2010,	and	Hurricanes	Katrina	and	Rita	took	place	right	in	the	middle	of	these	two	dates.		Since	 the	 interest	 is	PD8,	 the	author	compiled	 the	data	relevant	 to	 the	 two	sub-neighborhoods,	L9	and	HC,	and	then	compared	the	same	data	to	the	rest	of	the	city.	Table	6.1	assembles	all	the	pertinent	data	between	2000	and	2010	of	the	L9,	HC,	and	Orleans	Parish.	 First,	 the	 author	 did	 a	 simple	 comparison	 between	 the	 two	 periods	 and	 used	three	 types	of	marks	 to	 represent	 the	 changes.	An	arrow	pointing	down	 (⇘)	 is	used	 to	show	 that	 the	 change	 is	 negative;	 an	 arrow	 pointing	 up	 (⇗)	 is	 used	 to	 show	 that	 the	change	is	positive;	and	an	equal	sign	(=)	is	used	to	show	that	no	changes	occurred.		These	marks	were	not	indicative	enough	about	the	meaning	behind	these	changes,	and	another	level	 of	 interpreting	 the	 data	 was	 required.	 After	 spending	 time	 with	 the	 different																																																									
15	The	Data	Center	http://www.datacenterresearch.org/		16	The	U.S.	Census	Bureau	http://www.census.gov/		
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stakeholders,	it	became	clear	to	the	author	that	the	marks	were	not	representative	of	the	actual	situation.	It	turned	out	that	a	mark	(⇘)	did	not	necessarily	mean	a	negative	trend,	and	 a	 mark	 (⇗)	 did	 not	 imply	 a	 positive	 trend.	 Through	 the	 perspectives	 of	 the	residents—and	 regardless	 of	 the	 marks—the	 author	 used	 a	 color	 code	 to	 show	 the	negative	 trends	 (in	 red),	 the	positive	 trends	 (in	blue),	 and	 the	neutral	ones	 (in	white).	These	 trends	 are	 explained	 in	 detail	 later	 in	 the	 text.	 The	 data	 is	 presented	 under	different	categories	and	each	has	a	series	of	indicators,	and	they	go	as	such:	- People	and	household	characteristics:	
o Total	numbers	
o Gender	
o Age	
o Racial	and	ethnic	diversity	
o Households	by	type	
o Children	in	households	
o Elderly	in	households	- Housing	and	housing	cost:	
o Occupancy	status	
o Renters	and	owners	
o Mortgage	status	
o Housing	affordability	by	owner/renter	status	- Income	and	poverty:	
o Household	
o Average	household	income	
o Income	distribution	
o Population	in	poverty	- Transportation:	
o Vehicles	available	
o Type	of	transportation,	workers	16+	
o Travel	time	to	work,	workers	16+	- Educational	attainment:	
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o Level	of	schooling,	18+	- Language:	
o English	as	a	second	language	- Employment:	
o Workers	living	in	the	neighborhood	by	wage	level	
o Workers	living	in	the	neighborhood	by	industry	sector	Table	6.1:	Census	numbers	(2000	and	2010)	comparing	the	Holy	Cross	to	Lower	Ninth	Ward	to	Orleans	Parish	-	red	numbers	reflect	a	negative	trend,	blue	numbers	reflect	a	positive	trend,	and	white	numbers	reflect	no	change	(inspired	by	the	Data	Center,	compiled	and	analyzed	by	the	author)	
Indicator	 Sub-Indicator	 Holy	Cross	 Lower	Ninth	Ward	 Orleans	Parish	
People	and	Household	Characteristics		 	 2000	 	 2010	 2000	 	 2010	 2000	 	 2010	
Total	Numbers	 Population	 5,507	 ⇘	 2,714	 14,008	 ⇘	 2,842	 484,647	 ⇘	 343,829	Total	Household	 1,982	 ⇘	 1,040	 4,820	 ⇘	 1,061	 188,251	 ⇘	 142,158	Family	Household	 1,315	 ⇘	 642	 3,467	 ⇘	 683	 112,977	 ⇘	 76,643	
Gender	 Female	 55.7%	 ⇘	 54.7%	 53.7%	 ⇘	 50.3%	 53.1%	 ⇘	 51.6%	Male	 44.3%	 ⇗	 45.3%	 46.3%	 ⇗	 49.7%	 46.9%	 ⇗	 48.4%	
Age	
5	years	old	and	under	 10%	 ⇘	 9.5%	 9.3%	 ⇘	 8.9%	 8.4%	 ⇘	 7.6%	6-11	years	old	 10.2%	 ⇘	 8.7%	 10.9%	 ⇘	 7.1%	 8.4%	 ⇘	 7.6%	12-17	years	old	 12.2%	 ⇘	 8.4%	 10.5%	 ⇘	 7.9%	 9.1%	 ⇘	 6.9%	18-34	years	old	 22.3%	 ⇗	 25.2%	 21.6%	 ⇗	 21.8%	 25.9%	 ⇗	 29.2%	35-49	years	old	 20.1%	 ⇘	 17.6%	 19.8%	 ⇘	 18%	 21.9%	 ⇘	 19.2%	50-64	years	old	 13.9%	 ⇗	 21.4%	 13.9%	 ⇗	 21.9%	 13.8%	 ⇗	 19.4%	65-74	years	old	 5.4%	 ⇗	 5.6%	 7.6%	 =	 7.5%	 6%	 ⇗	 6.1%	
75-84	years	old	 4.1%	 ⇘	 2.7%	 4.9%	 =	 4.9%	 4.2%	 ⇘	 3.4%	
85	years	old	and	older	 1.8%	 ⇘	 0.9%	 1.5%	 ⇗	 1.9%	 1.5%	 =	 1.5%	
Racial	and	ethnic	diversity	
Black	or	African	American	 87.5%	 ⇗	 89.3%	 98.3%	 ⇘	 95.5%	 66.6%	 ⇘	 59.6%	
White	 9.4%	 ⇘	 6.9%	 0.5%	 ⇗	 1.8%	 26.6%	 ⇗	 30.5%	Asian	 0.2%	 	 0.2%	 0%	 ⇗	 0.1%	 2.3%	 ⇗	 2.9%	American	Indian	 0.5%	 ⇘	 0.3%	 0%	 ⇗	 0.3%	 0.2%	 =	 0.2%	
Other	 0.1%	 =	 0.1%	 0.1%	 =	 0.1%	 0.2%	 ⇗	 0.3%	2	race	categories	 0.9%	 ⇗	 1%	 0.6%	 ⇗	 0.8%	 1%	 ⇗	 1.3%	
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Indicator	 Sub-Indicator	 Holy	Cross	 Lower	Ninth	Ward	 Orleans	Parish	Hispanic	(any	race)	 1.4%	 ⇗	 2.1%	 3.1%	 ⇗	 5.2%	 12.5%	 ⇗	 16.3%	
Households	by	type	
Total	Household	 1,982	 ⇘	 1,040	 4,820	 ⇘	 1,061	 188,251	 ⇘	 142,158	
Female	householder	(no	husband	present)	with	children	under	18	 25.1%	 ⇘	 21.7%	 24.9%	 ⇘	 18.7%	 17.7%	 ⇘	 13.7%	
Male	householder	(no	wife	present)	with	children	under	18	 2.9%	 ⇘	 2.8%	 3.4%	 ⇘	 3.6%	 2.7%	 ⇘	 2.4%	
Married-couple	family,	with	children	under	18	 16.5%	 ⇘	 9.7%	 14.8%	 ⇘	 9.4%	 14.8%	 ⇘	 11.1%	
Nonfamily	households,	with	children	under	18	 0.3%	 ⇘	 0.2%	 0.2%	 ⇘	 0.1%	 0.3%	 ⇘	 0.2%	Households	with	no	people	under	18	years	 55.2%	 ⇗	 65.6%	 56.7%	 ⇗	 68.2%	 64.7%	 ⇗	 72.3%	
Children	in	households	
Population	under	18	years	in	households	 1,784	 ⇘	 721	 4,293	 ⇘	 682	 128,785	 ⇘	 72,917	
Children	living	as	head	of	household	 0%	 ⇗	 0.3%	 0%	 =	 0%	 0.1%	 =	 0.1%	
Children	living	with	mother	only	 43.2%	 ⇗	 49.5%	 40.7%	 ⇘	 35.6%	 39.2%	 ⇘	 18.5%	
Children	living	with	father	only	 3.7%	 ⇗	 6%	 4.7%	 ⇗	 7.5%	 4.7%	 ⇗	 6.7%	
Children	living	with	married	parents	 29%	 ⇘	 21.2%	 25.4%	 ⇘	 22.1%	 35.9%	 ⇘	 34.3%	
Children	living	with	grandparents	 18.1%	 ⇘	 18%	 23%	 ⇗	 26.8%	 14.9%	 ⇘	 14.2%	
Children	living	with	other	relatives	 4.4%	 =	 4.4%	 4.9%	 ⇗	 6.7%	 4%	 ⇘	 2.1%	
Children	living	with	non-relatives	 1.6%	 ⇘	 0.6%	 1.3%	 ⇘	 1.2%	 1.5%	 ⇘	 1.2%	
Elderly	in	households	
Elderly	in	households	 535	 ⇘	 251	 1,963	 ⇘	 406	 53,375	 ⇘	 36,152	Living	alone	 44.9%	 ⇘	 27.1%	 26.8%	 ⇘	 25.6%	 34.2%	 ⇘	 32.9%	Living	in	family	households	 51.7%	 ⇗	 68.1%	 71.2%	 ⇗	 71.9%	 62.6%	 ⇗	 62.9%	
Living	in	nonfamily	households	 3.4%	 ⇗	 4.8%	 2%	 ⇗	 2.5%	 3.2%	 ⇗	 4.2%	
Housing	and	Housing	Costs	
Occupancy	status	 Total	housing	units	(full	count)	 2,340	 ⇘	 1,767	 5,601	 ⇘	 2,039	 215,091	 ⇘	 189,896	Occupied	housing	units	 84.7%	 ⇘	 58.9%	 86.1%	 ⇘	 52%	 87.5%	 ⇘	 74.9%	Vacant	housing	units	 15.3%	 ⇗	 41.1%	 13.9%	 ⇗	 48%	 12.5%	 ⇗	 25.1%	Renters	and	Owners	 Total	occupied	housing	units	 1,982	 ⇘	 1,040	 4,820	 ⇘	 1,061	 188,251	 ⇘	 142,158	
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Indicator	 Sub-Indicator	 Holy	Cross	 Lower	Ninth	Ward	 Orleans	Parish	Owner	occupied	 41.8%	 ⇗	 55.5%	 59%	 ⇗	 66.4%	 46.5%	 ⇗	 47.8%	Renter	occupied	 58.2%	 ⇘	 44.5%	 41%	 ⇘	 33.6%	 53.5%	 ⇘	 52.2%	
Mortgage	status	 Owned	with	a	mortgage	or	a	loan	 67.2%	 ⇘	 48.5%	 44.5%	 ⇘	 34.6%	 67%	 ⇘	 60.8%	Owned	free	and	clean	 32.8%	 ⇗	 51.5%	 55.5%	 ⇗	 65.4%	 33%	 ⇗	 39.2%	
	 2000	 	 2008-	2012	 2000	 	 2008-	2012	 2000	 	 2008-	2012	
Housing	affordability	by	owner/renter	status	 Owner	occupied	paying	30%	or	more	of	income	on	housing	 na	 	 24.5%	 na	 	 40.5%	 na	 	 34.6%	Renter	occupied	paying	30%	or	more	of	income	on	housing	 na	 	 86.9%	 na	 	 53.3%	 na	 	 62.9%	
Income	and	Poverty	
Household	
Wage	or	salary	income	 69.9%	 ⇘	 69.7%	 67.2%	 ⇘	 46.6%	 73.3%	 ⇘	 72.6%	Self-employment	income	 7.1%	 ⇗	 10.3%	 5.4%	 ⇗	 7.8%	 8.7%	 ⇗	 9.9%	Interest,	dividends,	or	net	rental	income	 13%	 ⇘	 8.7%	 10.8%	 ⇘	 3.5%	 23.7%	 ⇘	 16.9%	Social	security	income	 28.7%	 ⇘	 24.6%	 35.8%	 ⇗	 49%	 24.7%	 ⇘	 24.2%	Supplemental	security	income	 12.7%	 ⇗	 15.5%	 14.5%	 ⇗	 20.7%	 7.8%	 ⇘	 7.4%	Public	assistance	income	 4.3%	 ⇘	 3.6%	 8.3%	 ⇘	 1.2%	 5.4%	 ⇘	 2.1%	Retirement	income	 15.5%	 ⇘	 11.1%	 15%	 ⇗	 20.9%	 13.4%	 ⇘	 13.1%	Other	types	of	income	 15.6%	 ⇘	 11.1%	 15.9%	 ⇗	 20.9%	 12.4%	 ⇘	 9.9%	Average	household	income	 Average	household	income	(in	2012	dollars)	 $44,375	 ⇘	 $36,463	 $37,894	 ⇘	 $33,557	 $59,497	 ⇗	 $60,280	
Income	distribution	
Less	than	$10,000	 26.9%	 ⇘	 17.1%	 25.1%	 ⇘	 19.6%	 21%	 ⇘	 15.4%	$10,000-14,999	 9.2%	 ⇘	 2.8%	 14.5%	 ⇘	 11.8%	 9.6%	 ⇘	 7.8%	$15,000-19,999	 11.8%	 ⇗	 14.4%	 10.9%	 ⇘	 9.5%	 8.3%	 ⇘	 7.6%	$20,000-24,999	 7.8%	 ⇗	 11.4%	 9.5%	 ⇗	 14.2%	 7.5%	 ⇘	 6.3%	$25,000-29,999	 7.6%	 ⇗	 10.6%	 9.4%	 ⇗	 9.9%	 7.2%	 ⇘	 6%	$30,000-34,999	 6.6%	 ⇘	 5.9%	 5.3%	 ⇗	 6.8%	 6.3%	 ⇘	 5.3%	$35,000-39,999	 4.4%	 ⇘	 3.8%	 5.7%	 ⇗	 8.2%	 5.4%	 ⇘	 4.2%	$40,000-44,999	 6.5%	 ⇗	 7%	 4.2%	 ⇘	 0.9%	 4.6%	 ⇗	 4.7%	$45,000-49,999	 3.6%	 ⇗	 6.4%	 3%	 ⇗	 3.6%	 4%	 ⇘	 3.9%	$50,000-59,999	 7.1%	 ⇗	 9.7%	 6%	 ⇘	 4.3%	 6.1%	 ⇗	 6.8%	$60,000-74,999	 2.6%	 ⇗	 4.2%	 3.2%	 ⇘	 1.6%	 6.5%	 ⇗	 7.7%	$75,000-99,999	 2.7%	 ⇘	 2.1%	 1.7%	 ⇗	 3.6%	 5.7%	 ⇗	 8.6%	$100,000-124,999	 1.7%	 ⇗	 2.4%	 0.9%	 ⇗	 4%	 2.8%	 ⇗	 5.2%	$125,000-149,999	 0%	 ⇗	 1%	 0.1%	 ⇘	 0%	 1.4%	 ⇗	 3.2%	$150,000-199,999	 0.7%	 ⇘	 0.4%	 0.2%	 ⇘	 0%	 1.4%	 ⇗	 3.1%	$200,000	or	more	 0.9%	 ⇘	 0.8%	 0.4%	 ⇗	 2%	 2.2%	 ⇗	 4.1%	
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Indicator	 Sub-Indicator	 Holy	Cross	 Lower	Ninth	Ward	 Orleans	Parish	
Population	in	poverty	 People	living	in	poverty	 29.4%	 ⇗	 34.8%	 36.4%	 ⇘	 31.3%	 27.9%	 ⇘	 27.2%	People	living	at	or	above	poverty	 70.6%	 ⇘	 65.2%	 63.6%	 ⇗	 68.7%	 72.1%	 ⇗	 72.8%	
Transportation	
Vehicles	available	 No	vehicles	available	 36.1%	 ⇘	 12.2%	 32.4%	 ⇘	 26.6%	 27.3%	 ⇘	 18.5%	1	vehicle	available	 38.8%	 ⇗	 45%	 42.3%	 ⇘	 41.7%	 42.3%	 ⇗	 45.4%	2	vehicles	available	 25%	 ⇗	 42.8%	 25.3%	 ⇗	 31.6%	 30.4%	 ⇗	 36.2%	
Type	of	transportation,	workers	16+	
Car,	truck,	or	van	 78.7%	 ⇗	 93.2%	 76.2%	 ⇗	 89.6%	 76.4%	 ⇗	 80.9%	Public	transportation	 17.2%	 ⇘	 3.2%	 17.4%	 ⇘	 5.1%	 13.2%	 ⇘	 6.9%	Bicycle	 0.8%	 ⇘	 0.7%	 1.1%	 ⇘	 0%	 1.2%	 ⇗	 2.1%	Walked	 1.6%	 ⇘	 0%	 2.8%	 ⇗	 4%	 5.2%	 ⇘	 5.1%	Other	means	 0.4%	 ⇗	 0.8%	 2.2%	 ⇘	 0%	 1.3%	 ⇘	 1.1%	Worked	from	home	 1.3%	 ⇗	 2.1%	 0.3%	 ⇗	 1.2%	 2.7%	 ⇗	 3.2%	
Travel	time	to	work,	workers	16+	
Average	travel	time	to	work	(minutes)	 35	 ⇘	 24	 32	 ⇘	 27	 26	 ⇘	 23	Less	than	30	minutes	 40.5%	 ⇗	 69.1%	 51.9%	 ⇗	 60.3%	 66.4%	 ⇗	 71.5%	30	to	44	minutes	 34.9%	 ⇘	 21.6%	 24.9%	 ⇘	 23.7%	 20.3%	 ⇘	 18.4%	45	to	59	minutes	 10.9%	 ⇘	 2.1%	 9.8%	 ⇘	 5.9%	 6.1%	 ⇘	 4.6%	More	than	60	minutes	 13.7%	 ⇘	 7.2%	 13.3%	 ⇘	 10.1%	 7.2%	 ⇘	 5.4%	
Educational	Attainment	
Level	of	schooling,	18+	
Less	than	9th	grade	 8.3%	 ⇘	 4.8%	 11%	 ⇘	 7.5%	 7.2%	 ⇘	 4.5%	9th	to	12th	grade,	no	diploma	 28.1%	 ⇘	 10.3%	 29.1%	 ⇘	 25%	 18.2%	 ⇘	 11.1%	High	school	diploma	or	GED	 26.4%	 ⇗	 40.2%	 29.7%	 ⇗	 41.5%	 24%	 ⇗	 25.5%	Some	college,	no	degree	 25.8%	 ⇗	 28.4%	 21.6%	 ⇘	 18.4%	 22.8%	 ⇗	 23.8%	Associate’s	degree	 3.4%	 =	 3.4%	 2.6%	 ⇘	 1.9%	 3.3%	 ⇗	 3.8%	Bachelor’s	degree	 5.4%	 ⇗	 7.7%	 4.7%	 ⇘	 3.9%	 13.9%	 ⇗	 17.9%	Graduate	or	professional	degree	 2.6%	 ⇘	 5.2%	 1.3%	 ⇗	 1.8%	 9.2%	 ⇗	 12.1%	
Language	
English	as	a	second	language	
Native	English	speaker	or	speaks	English	as	a	second	language	“well”	or	“very	well”	 99.1%	 ⇗	 100%	 99.8%	 ⇗	 100%	 98.7%	 ⇘	 98%	Speaks	Spanish	at	home	and	speaks	English	“not	well”	or	“not	at	all”	 0.9%	 ⇘	 0%	 0.1%	 ⇘	 0%	 0.6%	 ⇗	 1.2%	Speaks	other	languages	at	home	and	speaks	English	“not	well”	or	“not	at	all”	 0%	 =	 0%	 0.1%	 ⇘	 0%	 0.7%	 ⇗	 0.8%	
Employment		 	 2000	 	 2011	 2000	 	 2011	 2000	 	 2011	
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Indicator	 Sub-Indicator	 Holy	Cross	 Lower	Ninth	Ward	 Orleans	Parish	
Workers	living	in	the	neighborhood	by	wage	level	
Total	number	of	workers	living	in	the	neighborhood	 1,924	 ⇘	 1,269	 4,663	 ⇘	 1,192	 172,274	 ⇘	 112,739	$1,250	per	month	or	less	 40%	 ⇘	 28.8%	 42%	 ⇘	 27.9%	 33.8%	 ⇘	 24%	$1,251-$3,333	 49.2%	 ⇘	 47%	 47.7%	 ⇗	 50.6%	 44%	 ⇘	 41.6%	More	than	$3,333	per	month	 10.8%	 ⇗	 24.2%	 10.3%	 ⇗	 21.5%	 22.2%	 ⇗	 34.4%	
Workers	living	in	the	neighborhood	by	industry	sector	
Total	number	of	workers	living	in	the	neighborhood	 1,924	 ⇘	 1,269	 4,663	 ⇘	 1,192	 172,274	 ⇘	 112,739	Agriculture,	Forestry,	Fishing	and	Hunting	 0%	 ⇗	 0.3%	 0.1%	 ⇘	 0%	 0.1%	 =	 0.1%	Mining,	Quarrying,	and	Oil	and	Gas	Extraction	 0.7%	 ⇘	 0.4%	 0.1%	 ⇘	 0%	 0.7%	 =	 0.7%	Utilities	 1.1%	 ⇘	 0.6%	 0.7%	 ⇗	 1.3%	 0.7%	 =	 0.7%	Construction	 3.8%	 ⇗	 4.9%	 4.6%	 ⇗	 6%	 3.1%	 ⇗	 4.3%	Manufacturing	 4.3%	 ⇗	 4.5%	 5.3%	 ⇘	 4.4%	 4.1%	 ⇘	 3.8%	Wholesale	Trade	 3.3%	 ⇗	 3.9%	 2.8%	 ⇘	 2.1%	 3%	 ⇘	 2.7%	Retail	Trade	 12.8%	 ⇗	 14.3%	 11.7%	 ⇗	 17.1%	 10.3%	 ⇗	 11.1%	Transportation	and	Warehousing	 4.2%	 ⇗	 5.4%	 3.7%	 ⇗	 5.5%	 3.9%	 ⇗	 4%	Information	 1.8%	 ⇘	 1.5%	 1.5%	 ⇘	 1.1%	 1.8%	 ⇗	 2%	Finance	and	Insurance	 4%	 ⇘	 3.7%	 3.8%	 ⇘	 2.4%	 4.6%	 ⇘	 3.6%	Real	Estate	and	Rental	and	Leasing	 2.9%	 ⇘	 2.6%	 2.3%	 ⇘	 1.3%	 2%	 ⇘	 1.7%	Professional,	Scientific,	and	Technical	Services	 4.5%	 ⇗	 4.9%	 4.2%	 ⇘	 3%	 5.6%	 =	 5.6%	Management	of	Companies	and	Enterprises	 1.7%	 ⇘	 1.6%	 1.5%	 ⇘	 0.5%	 1.6%	 ⇗	 1.8%	Administration	&	Support,	Waste	Management	and	Remediation	 7.1%	 ⇗	 7.3%	 7.5%	 ⇗	 7.6%	 7%	 ⇘	 6.9%	Educational	Services	 7.4%	 ⇘	 6.1%	 10.1%	 ⇘	 6.6%	 11.8%	 ⇘	 10.4%	Health	Care	and	Social	Assistance	 12.8%	 ⇗	 14%	 13.1%	 ⇗	 14.1%	 13.7%	 ⇗	 14.5%	Arts,	Entertainment,	and	Recreation	 2.9%	 ⇘	 1.8%	 3.1%	 ⇘	 2.3%	 3.5%	 ⇘	 2.3%	Accommodation	and	Food	Services	 15.6%	 =	 15.6%	 15.2%	 ⇗	 17.4%	 14.5%	 ⇗	 17.1%	Other	services	(excluding	Public	Administration)	 3.9%	 ⇘	 3.2%	 4%	 ⇘	 2.4%	 3.5%	 ⇘	 2.8%	Public	Administration	 5.2%	 ⇘	 3.5%	 4.3%	 ⇘	 3.8%	 4.4%	 ⇘	 4%		 A	first	reading	of	the	indicators	and	sub-indicators	was	made	by	the	author	so	as	to	make	an	initial	evaluation	of	the	neighborhood.	It	seemed	relevant	to	compare	the	L9	to	HC,	and	to	see	how	the	changes	between	2000	and	2010	affected	the	neighborhood.	
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Also,	comparing	the	neighborhood	to	the	rest	of	the	city	helped	in	better	understanding	the	discrepancies,	and	shed	light	on	the	late	rebuilding	of	the	LNW.	Therefore,	the	author	took	the	initiative	to	make	a	preliminary	assessment	of	the	data	and	highlighted	in	red	the	numbers	that	reflected	negatively,	in	blue	the	numbers	that	reflected	positively,	and	in	 white	 the	 numbers	 that	 showed	 no	 change.	With	 a	 total	 of	 125	 sub-indicators,	 HC	shows	a	higher	ratio	of	red	over	blue	with	61	red,	58	blue	and	6	white	sub-indicators;	and	the	same	with	L9,	with	61	red,	59	blue	and	5	white	sub-indicators.	This	first	reading	is	summarized	in	table	6.2	and	it	comes	to	affirm	the	late	rebuilding	of	PD8.		Table	6.2:	Premilinary	assessment	of	Planning	District	8	compared	to	Orleans	Parish		 HC	 %	 L9	 %	 Orleans	Parish	 %	Red	 61	 48.8%	 61	 48.8%	 52	 41.6%	Blue	 58	 46.4%	 59	 47.2%	 64	 51.2%	White	 6	 4.8%	 5	 4%	 9	 7.2%	Total	 125	 100%	 125	 100%	 125	 100%		After	 compiling	 the	 indicators	 with	 the	marks,	 the	 color	 codes,	 and	making	 an	initial	assessment,	 it	deemed	necessary	to	go	in	depth	as	to	what	each	indicator	stands	for.	 	 A	 first	 glance	 makes	 it	 clear	 that	 there	 are	 negative	 elements	 affecting	 the	 slow	rebuilding	 process,	 especially	when	 compared	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 city.	 Yet,	 this	 is	 not	 a	sufficient	or	representative	figure,	but	it	gives	an	indication	as	to	where	to	look	next.	It	is	imperative	to	have	a	closer	 look	at	the	 indicators	and	sub-indicators	and	to	 investigate	these	trends.	This	analysis	will	focus	on	each	category	alone.		People	and	Household	Characteristics	Due	to	Hurricane	Katrina,	 the	city	 lost	a	 large	number	of	 its	residents.	Table	6.1	shows	 that	 the	city’s	 total	 population	dropped	30%	between	2000	and	2010,	and	HC	and	L9	lost	respectively	51%	and	80%	of	their	population.	This	had	a	direct	 impact	on	the	‘total	household’	and	‘family	household’:	HC	numbers	went	from	1,315	to	642	and	L9	from	3,467	to	683	family	households.	This	indicator	shows	a	drastic	loss	in	the	number	of	residents	in	the	PD8.	A	neighborhood	with	a	major	loss	in	its	population	can	affect	its	resilience.		
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In	terms	of	gender,	the	ratios	have	not	changed	much,	PD8	has	had	more	female	than	male	residents:	between	50%	and	55%	females	and	45%	and	50%	males	 (before	and	 after	 Katrina);	 both	 sub-neighborhoods	 witnessed	 a	 slight	 increase	 in	 their	 male	population	and	a	slight	decrease	in	their	female	population.	Overall	this	change	did	not	affect	 the	 general	 ratio	 of	 men	 and	 women,	 which	 means	 that	 even	 with	 Hurricane	Katrina,	the	proportions	between	the	genders	are	still	the	same	and	that	is	positive	to	the	LNW.		 As	for	age,	there	was	a	decline	amongst	the	young,	those	under	18	years	old	(yr),	a	slight	increase	in	the	category	between	18	and	34,	a	decline	in	the	category	between	35	and	49,	an	increase	in	the	category	between	50	and	74,	and	a	decline	in	those	older	than	75.	This	is	explained	by	the	fact	that	young	families	with	children	under	18	yr	have	not	returned	to	 the	area,	as	well	as	 their	parents	who	probably	are	between	35	and	49	yr.	Those	between	18	and	34	yr	are	both	living	with	relatives	and	decided	to	return	on	their	own,	or	are	single	and	can	live	on	their	own.	The	final	category,	the	older	generation,	has	increased	(between	50	and	64	yr)	from	13%	to	21%.	This	is	explained	by	the	very	strong	attachment	this	generation	has	with	this	neighborhood.	They	were	the	first	to	come	back	and	are	the	highest	in	numbers	because	their	children	are	older	and	no	longer	attended	schools.	This	generation	is	the	backbone	of	the	neighborhood	and	its	presence	is	a	sign	of	strength.	This	is	highly	noted	by	the	residents	themselves.			The	 indicator	racial	 and	 ethnic	 diversity	 shows	higher	percentages	of	African	Americans	in	the	PD8	with	89.3%	in	HC	and	95.5%	in	L9.	Being	a	pre-dominantly	African	American	 neighborhood	 pre-Katrina,	 these	 numbers	 explain	 the	 high	 percentages.	Whites	decreased	slightly	in	HC	and	increased	a	little	in	L9.	Asians	and	American	Indians	are	still	less	than	1%,	but	the	Hispanics	have	increased	slightly	in	number	between	2000	and	2010:	from	1.4%	to	2.1%	in	HC,	from	3.1%	to	5.2%	in	L9,	and	from	12.5%	to	16.3%	in	 Orleans	 Parish.	 This	 last	 trend	 is	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 Hispanics	 are	 still	considered	cheaper	labor,	and	with	all	the	devastation	caused	by	Hurricanes	Katrina	and	Rita,	the	city	witnessed	a	large	migration	of	Hispanics	seeking	jobs.	This	shows	that	the	area	 is	 starting	 to	 be	 more	 diverse,	 but	 the	 change	 remains	 insignificant.	 Also,	 the	
	 144	
numbers	 show	high	percentages	of	African	Americans	 in	both	 sub-neighborhoods,	 and	this	trend	can	explain	why	these	residents	are	highly	attached	to	their	neighborhood.	As	it	will	be	explained	in	section	6.3,	people	 in	the	LNW	have	a	very	strong	attachment	to	their	social	networks	as	many	of	them	are	related.		The	 type	 of	 household	 indicator	 shows	 a	 general	 decrease	 especially	 that	 the	total	household	number	went	 from:	1,982	 to	1,040—a	47%	drop—in	HC,	and	4,820	 to	1,061—a	 78%	 drop—in	 L9.	 Mainly,	 single-parents	 households	 are	 fewer	 in	 number,	especially	 the	 ‘married-couple	 family,	 with	 children	 under	 18’	 category:	 they	 dropped	from	16.5%	to	9.7%	in	HC	and	14.8%	to	9.4%	in	L9.	The	loss	among	the	households	with	children	 is	 explained	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 schools	 for	 these	 young	 families	 to	 return.	 Both	communities	 lost	 a	very	 large	portion	of	 their	households,	which	 is	due	 to	 the	 level	of	inundation	 that	 took	place	 in	2005,	when	many	of	 the	homes	were	swept	away	by	 the	high	waters.				The	 indicator	children	 in	household	 illustrates	well	 the	degree	to	which	both	areas	 changed.	 The	 PD8	 lost	many	 of	 its	 younger	 generation	 between	 2000	 and	 2010	(below	 18	 yr):	 HC	went	 from	1,782	 to	 721—dropping	 60%—,	 L9	went	 from	4,293	 to	682—dropping	 84%—,	 and	 Orleans	 Parish	 went	 from	 128,785	 to	 72,917—dropping	44%.	These	numbers	emphasize	again	the	lack	of	amenities	in	both	areas,	especially	the	absence	of	schools,	as	these	are	major	contributors	for	young	families	to	return.	The	PD8	has	one	school	left;	the	Martin	Luther	King	School,	and	it	cannot	absorb	all	the	children	of	the	neighborhood;	especially	when	it	takes	on	children	from	other	neighborhoods	as	well.		 The	last	indicator	in	this	category,	elderly	in	household,	is	a	little	intricate,	since	it	 shows	 a	 much	 smaller	 elderly	 population	 in	 absolute	 numbers,	 but	 yet	 higher	percentages.	HC	went	from	535	to	251,	losing	53%	of	its	elderly;	and	L9	went	from	1,963	to	406,	losing	80%	of	its	elderly.	Yet,	the	percentages	of	those	living	in	family	households	increased	between	2000	and	2010.	This	is	explained	by	the	fact	that	this	portion	of	the	community	is	the	one	mostly	attached	to	the	neighborhood.	Also,	they	do	not	have	young	children	 to	 send	 to	 school	 anymore,	 which	means	 they	 face	 less	 restrictions	 with	 the	
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prospect	of	returning.	They	are	the	backbone	of	the	community.	They	are	the	ones	who	help	the	rebuilding	process	and	encourage	the	rest	of	the	residents	to	return.		Housing	and	Housing	Costs		After	Hurricane	Katrina,	PD8	was	closed	for	months	and	residents	could	not	come	back	right	away.	This	factor	contributed	to	having	lower	occupancy	rates	in	both	areas.	The	indicator	occupancy	status	shows	that	the	total	housing	units	decreased	drastically	between	2000	and	2010:	2,340	to	1,767—dropping	24.5%	in	HC,	and	5,601	to	2,039—dropping	 64%	 in	 L9.	 From	 these	 housing	 units	 only	 58.9%	 and	 52%	 in	 HC	 and	 L9,	respectively,	were	occupied	post-Katrina.	Before	the	hurricane,	the	occupancy	rate	was	around	85%	in	both	areas.	This	implies	that	there	are	much	higher	vacant	lots,	which	for	a	city	like	New	Orleans—with	its	yearlong	tropical	weather—might	pose	problem,	as	one	of	the	main	issues	is	overgrown	lawns	and	plants.		As	 for	renters	 and	 owners,	 PD8	was	known	 for	 its	high	homeownership	 rates	pre-Katrina.	 Although	 the	 number	 of	 occupied	 units	 is	 lower,	 but	 the	 percentage	 of	ownership	 is	 higher	 post-Katrina.	 By	 comparing	 the	 neighborhood,	 before	 or	 after	 the	hurricane,	to	the	rest	of	the	city,	PD8	has	always	had	higher	homeownership	rates.	This	can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 back	 in	 the	 early	 days,	 the	 city	 gave	 permission	 to	people	settling	 in	 this	neighborhood	 to	purchase	 their	homes.	Also,	being	an	area	with	strong	 family	 ties,	 people	 tend	 to	 stay	 around	 family	 and	 pass	 on	 their	 home	 from	generation	 to	generation	(which	will	be	problematic	after	Katrina,	as	will	be	explained	further	in	this	chapter).		The	 indicator	mortgage	 status	 indicates	 that	 HC	 has	 a	 higher	 percentage	 of	homes	owned	 free	 and	 clean	 in	2010	 than	 in	2000,	 the	 same	goes	 to	L9.	But	with	 the	fewer	 housing	 units,	 the	 numbers	 do	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 more	 people	 are	mortgage-free.	Rather,	 it	 indicates	that	the	culture	is	geared	toward	owning	your	home	and	paying	off	 the	mortgage	 in	 full.	This	reinforces	again	the	strong	and	 long-term	ties	that	existed	and	continue	to	exist	in	the	neighborhood.		For	housing	 affordability	 by	 owner/renter	 status,	 this	 information	 does	 not	exist	 for	 the	 2000	 census,	 but	 the	 Data	 Center	 has	 numbers	 between	 2008	 and	 2012	
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(post-Katrina).	The	percentage	of	people	paying	30%	or	more	of	their	income	on	housing	is	high	for	both	areas,	HC	and	L9.	But	the	percentage	of	renters	is	much	higher	than	the	owners,	which	reflects	that	people	struggle	to	pay	for	their	homes.		Income	and	poverty		For	the	indicator	household,	and	after	taking	into	account	the	drastic	drop	in	the	number	 of	 households	 (a	 47.5%	 drop	 in	 HC	 and	 a	 78%	 drop	 in	 L9),	 wage	 or	 salary	income	post-Katrina	is	much	lower	in	L9	compared	to	both	HC	and	Orleans	Parish.	Self-employment	income	has	increased	in	all	three,	whereas	social	security	income	has	gone	up	in	L9	but	not	in	HC.	Either	before	or	after	Hurricane	Katrina,	the	percentage	of	people	receiving	social	security	income	or	public	assistance	is	high	if	compared	to	the	number	of	households	(around	24%	in	HC	and	50%	in	L9).	The	large	number	of	elderly	in	the	area,	along	with	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 all	 held	 jobs	during	 their	working	 years,	 can	 explain	 this	trend.	 Also,	 people	 seem	 to	 rely	 on	 multiple	 sources	 of	 income	 in	 both	 sub-neighborhoods.		The	average	 household	 income	has	dropped	post-Katrina:	 it	was	$44,375	and	became	 $36,463	 in	 HC,	 and	 it	 was	 $36,463	 and	 became	 $33,557	 in	 the	 L9	 (in	 2012	dollars).		As	 for	 income	 distribution,	 HC	 and	 L9	 are	 in	 the	 lower	 income	 ranges.	 If	 the	federal	minimum	wage	is	taken	into	account,	$7.24/hr17	with	a	full-time	job,	then	annual	income	ends	up	being	around	$15,000.		According	to	table	6.1,	19.9%	of	HC	and	31.4%	of	L9	 households	 have	 an	 income	 lower	 than	 $15,000.	 In	 the	 HC	 area,	 14.4%	 of	 the	households	have	an	income	between	$15,000	and	$19,999,	and	the	L9	has	9.5%.		Dr.	 Amy	 Glasmeier,	 professor	 in	 Urban	 Planning	 at	 Massachusetts	 Institute	 of	Technology	(MIT),	developed	a	 tool	called	 the	 ‘Living	Wage	Calculator’18	that	uses	data	from	the	U.S.	Census	bureau	to	estimate	minimum	wages	and	expenses.	This	tool	gives	an	 estimation	 of	 hourly	 wages,	 monthly	 expenses,	 and	 typical	 hourly	 wages	 for	 all																																																									
17	United	States	Department	of	Labor:	http://www.dol.gov/whd/minimumwage.htm		18	MIT	Living	Wage	Calculator	http://livingwage.mit.edu/		
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American	states.	Table	6.3	shows	the	typical	expenses	in	Louisiana,	and	the	values	vary	by	family	size,	composition,	and	location.	The	table	shows	that	a	family	made	of	1	adult	and	1	child	needs	$32,028	after	taxes	annually,	and	a	family	made	of	2	adults	and	1	child	needs	$31,152	before	taxes	annually.	These	numbers	are	around	the	average	household	income	for	HC	and	L9	areas,	and	the	PD8	is	a	family	oriented	neighborhood	with	more	than	one-child	per	family.		As	 for	population	 in	 poverty,	 table	 6.1	 shows	 that	 up	 to	 34.8%	 and	 31.3%	of	people	in	HC	and	L9	live	in	poverty.	Considering	the	total	number	of	residents	who	have	returned,	these	percentages	are	relatively	high.		Thus,	residents	of	the	LNW	do	not	have	high	 salaries,	 and	 the	 numbers	 show	 that	 they	 live	 in	 poverty.	 This	 trend	 emphasizes	more	 the	 reasons	behind	 their	 attachment	 to	 their	 social	 networks	 and	neighborhood.	Being	 poor	 is	 a	means	 for	 them	 to	 help	 each	 other;	 therefore,	 reinforce	 their	 already	existing	bonds.			Table	6.3:	Typical	expenses	-	The	values	vary	by	family	size,	composition,	and	the	current	location	(taken	from	MIT-Poverty	in	America,	Living	wage	calculator	http://livingwage.mit.edy/states/22	)	
Monthly	
Expenses	
1	Adult	 1	Adult,	
1	Child	
1	Adult,	
2	Children	
1	Adult,	
3	Children	
2	Adults	 2	Adults,	
1	Child	
2	Adults,	
2	Children	
2	Adults,	
3	
Children	Food	 $242	 $357	 $536	 $749	 $444	 $553	 $713	 $904	Child	Care	 $0	 $362	 $567	 $771	 $0	 $0	 $0	 $0	Medical	 $146	 $413	 $429	 $411	 $289	 $410	 $387	 $397	Housing	 $589	 $761	 $761	 $976	 $646	 $761	 $761	 $976	Transportation	 $318	 $618	 $712	 $764	 $618	 $712	 $764	 $777	Other	 $73	 $158	 $199	 $254	 $125	 $160	 $181	 $207	Required	monthly	income	after	taxes	 $1,368	 $2,669	 $3,204	 $3,925	 $2,122	 $2,596	 $2,806	 $3,261	Required	annual	income	after	taxes	 $16,416	 $32,028	 $38,448	 $47,100	 $25,464	 $31,152	 $33,672	 $39,132	Annual	taxes	 $2,840	 $5,542	 $6,652	 $8,149	 $4,406	 $5,390	 $5,826	 $6,771	
Required	
annual	income	
before	taxes		
$19,256	 $37,570	 $45,100	 $55,249	 $29,870	 $36,542	 $39,498	 $45,903	
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Transportation		According	 to	New	Orleans	Regional	Transit	Authority	 (NORTA)19,	 there	are	 two	bus	lines	that	go	to	PD8:	number	84	–	Galvez	and	88	–	St	Claude/Jackson	Barracks.	Both	lines	start	around	the	French	Quarter	area.	The	84	comes	in	through	Claiborne	Avenue	and	 passes	 every	 40	minutes.	 The	 88	 comes	 in	 through	 St	 Claude	 Avenue	 and	 passes	every	 20	 minutes	 (refer	 to	 Appendix	 F	 for	 bus	 maps	 and	 schedules).	 NORTA	 faced	several	challenges	in	restoring	most	of	its	services	post-Katrina,	and	it	took	a	long	time	to	have	mass	transportation	running	up	again20.		For	the	indicator	vehicles	available,	table	6.1	shows	that	a	majority	of	residents	had	one	car	in	the	household	in	HC	and	L9,	45%	and	41.7%	respectively.	Up	to	42.8%	in	HC	and	31.6%	in	L9	have	two	cars,	and	12.2%	in	HC	and	26.6%	did	not	have	any	cars.	The	 high	 car	 ownership	 in	 these	 areas	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 events	 following	Hurricane	Katrina.	Most	residents	who	did	not	evacuate	could	not	do	so	because	they	did	not	own	a	vehicle.	Those	are	the	residents	who	either	stayed	at	their	home,	or	evacuated	to	the	superdome	or	the	convention	center.		As	for	the	type	of	 transportation	used,	residents	of	both	areas	relied	mainly	on	car,	 truck,	 or	 van	 to	 go	 to	work,	 93.2%	 in	HC	 and	 89.6%	 in	 L9.	 Less	 than	 5%	 rely	 on	public	 transportation	 and	 around	 2%	 work	 from	 home.	 Public	 transportation	 is	therefore	not	used	by	 the	 residents.	Possible	 reasons	 for	 it	 are	 its	 lack	of	 reliability	or	efficiency	(see	next	paragraph).	Having	one	or	two	cars	means	having	the	possibility	to	evacuate	 if	 necessary.	 According	 to	 the	 residents,	 the	 possession	 of	 a	 car	 is	 a	 positive	thing	as	it	indicates	that	those	who	own	a	car	or	two	can	evacuate	with	their	loved	ones	without	having	to	rely	on	the	city	or	on	public	transportation.		For	travel	time	to	work,	residents	from	both	areas	do	not	exceed	30	minutes	to	get	to	their	workplace	(around	60%	of	the	residents	spend	less	than	30	minutes).	Less	than	10%	of	 the	 residents	 spend	more	 than	60	minutes	 to	 reach	 their	 job	destination.	This	 is	explained	by	the	fact	that	people	do	not	use	public	transportation	to	go	to	their																																																									
19	New	Orleans	Regional	Transit	Authority	(NORTA)	http://www.norta.com/		20	NORTA	History	http://www.norta.com/About-the-RTA/RTA-History.aspx		
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workplace,	because	taking	the	bus	or	a	combination	of	bus	and	streetcar	to	go	anywhere	in	the	city	takes	at	least	one	hour	(the	NORTA	has	a	‘Plan	Your	Trip’	option	which	gives	the	route	options	and	the	shortest	route	to	the	French	Quarter	is	30	minutes	long).	Educational	Attainment				The	level	of	schooling	varies	in	the	PD8.	Around	40%	in	both	areas	have	a	high	school	diploma	or	GED.	28.4%	 from	HC	enrolled	 in	college	without	 receiving	a	degree,	and	18.4%	in	L9.	Around	10%	from	HC	and	25%	from	L9	went	to	school	between	9th	and	12th	grade,	but	did	not	receive	a	diploma.	Very	few	residents	have	a	university	degree	or	higher.	This	trend	shows	that	the	level	of	schooling	is	not	high	in	the	neighborhood.		Language	The	 indicator	English	 as	 a	 second	 language	 shows	that	100%	of	 the	residents	exclusively	speak	English	in	both	sub-neighborhoods.	This	can	be	explained	by	the	lack	of	diversity	 in	 the	area	 since	 the	mid-1900s.	Yet,	Chapter	4	 showed	 that	 this	 area	was	home	 to	 immigrants,	 and	 that	 it	 was	 the	 part	 of	 town	 that	 spoke	 more	 French	 than	English.	This	indicator	therefore	shows	that	the	neighborhood	lost	its	ancestral	cultural	identity.		Employment		As	for	the	indicator	workers	living	in	the	neighborhood	by	wage	level,	HC	has	1,269	working	 residents	 (34%	 loss),	 among	whom	28.8%	are	paid	 less	 than	$1,250	or	less	per	month,	47%	are	paid	between	$1,251	and	$3,333,	and	24.2%	are	paid	$3,333	or	more	per	month.	The	L9	has	only	1,192	working	residents	 (74.5%	 loss),	among	whom	27.9%	are	paid	less	than	$1,250	or	less	per	month,	50.6%	are	paid	between	$1,251	and	$3,333,	and	21.5%	are	paid	$3,333	or	more	per	month.	The	 indicator	workers	 living	 in	 the	neighborhood	by	 industry	 sector	 shows	that	 people	 from	 both	 areas	 work	 mainly	 in	 construction	 (around	 5%),	 retail	 trade	(around	 15%),	 transportation	 and	 warehousing	 (around	 5%),	 administration	 and	support,	 waste	 management	 and	 remediation	 (around	 7%),	 health	 care	 and	 social	assistance	(around	14%),	and	accommodation	and	food	services	(around	16%).	This	can	
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be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 New	 Orleans	 relies	 primarily	 on	 tourism,	 an	 economic	sector	where	retail	and	food	services	are	major	sources	of	revenue.	As	for	the	health	care	and	social	assistance,	the	growing	number	of	hospitals	in	the	city	explains	this	trend.		
What	are	these	indicators	implying?	These	indicators	and	sub-indicators	show	that	the	population	dropped	drastically	after	Hurricane	Katrina.	Not	only	did	the	city	witness	a	smaller	population,	but	the	LNW	lost	51%	and	80%	of	 its	 residents	 in	 the	HC	and	L9,	 respectively.	That	 indicator	alone	explains	why	the	neighborhood	is	not	rebuilt.	The	rebuilding	process	is	not	going	to	take	place	 if	 the	residents	have	not	returned.	 In	the	rest	of	 the	city,	 the	population	dropped	30%.	Therefore,	why	is	the	rate	of	return	lower	in	the	LNW	than	it	 is	 in	the	rest	of	the	city,	especially	when	one	considers	that	this	area	has	a	strong	cultural	identity?	What	is	preventing	 people	 from	 coming	 back?	 In	 2012,	 the	 author	 noted	 that	 the	 LNW	 was	drastically	 falling	 behind	when	 compared	 to	 the	 other	 neighborhoods	 in	 the	 city.	 The	data	 shows	 two	 contradicting	 trends:	 one	 of	 a	 strong	 attachment	 and	 high	homeownership	rate,	and	another	of	a	slow	rebuilding	with	a	drastic	loss	in	residents.	It	was	 imperative	 to	conduct	 interviews	with	 local	stakeholders	and	questionnaires	were	designed	to	identify	the	following:		- The	cultural	landscape	(before	and	after	the	storm)	- The	strength	of	place	attachment	and	informal	social	networks	(before	and	after	the	storm)	- The	role	of	memory	and	place	attachment	in	creating	resilient	communities	
o Coming	back	after	the	storm	
o The	rebuilding	process	
o Hurricane	Betsy	
o Life	after	Katrina	
o Life	now	The	interviews	helped	understand	the	existing	bonds	between	the	residents,	and	between	 the	 residents	 and	 the	 neighborhood.	 Also,	 they	 provide	 hints	 for	 the	neighborhood’s	 slow	 comeback,	 from	 the	 residents’	 perspective.	 By	 talking	 and	
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interviewing	 the	 residents,	 it	was	 clear	 to	 the	author	 that	 there	was	more	 to	 the	LNW	than	the	numbers.		
6.2.2.	A	Second	Perspective:	the	Slow	Rebuilding	Process	This	section	is	based	mainly	on	the	researcher’s	notes	and	observations,	and	the	interviews	conducted	with	the	residents.	During	the	three	months	spent	in	New	Orleans,	and	more	specifically	 in	 the	LNW,	 the	author	noticed	the	residents’	 late	return	to	 their	neighborhood	stems	from	a	series	of	complex	factors.	Some	of	these	run	deep	in	the	past,	before	the	storm,	while	others	are	the	result	of	the	storm.	In	the	paragraphs	below,	the	author	will	 go	 over	 the	 factors	 that	 contributed	 to	 the	devastation	 of	 2005,	 those	 that	took	place	 after	 the	 storm,	 and	 those	 stemming	 from	 the	 author’s	 notes,	 observations,	and	 informal	 talks	 that	 took	 place	 with	 residents	 who	 did	 not	 want	 to	 sit	 in	 for	 an	interview	during	the	summer	of	2012.		As	portrayed	in	Chapter	5,	section	5.2,	many	pre-Katrina	historical	developments	contributed	 to	 increasing	 the	 neighborhood’s	 vulnerabilities	 at	 all	 levels.	 The	 most	important	 are:	 the	 draining	 of	 the	 wetlands	 to	 develop	 the	 land,	 the	 building	 of	 the	Industrial	 Canal,	 Hurricane	Betsy,	 and	 the	 building	 of	 the	MR-GO.	 The	 decisions	made	over	 the	 course	 of	 history	 increased	 the	 vulnerabilities	 of	 the	 LNW	 before	 2005.	 But	several	additional	elements	came	to	exacerbate	the	recovery	process	after	the	passing	of	the	storm.		
Hurricane	Katrina	Many	of	the	residents	did	not	have	the	means	to	evacuate	and	were	accustomed	to	 ride	 out	 the	 storms.	 They	 found	 themselves	 drowning	 in	 their	 own	 homes	 before	Hurricane	Katrina	hit.	The	levees	were	overtopped	and	breached	before	the	storm	made	landfall.	The	breach	caused	a	big	wave	of	water	that	washed	out	everything	in	its	path.	This	 explains	 why	 cars	 were	 on	 top	 of	 other	 cars	 and	 roofs	 were	 often	 found	 blocks	away.		
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“Because	 in	 Katrina	 the	 water	 went	 in	 at	 250miles/hr,	 and	 if	 you	 see	
what	 I	 saw,	 it	 was	 houses	 on	 top	 of	 houses,	 cars	 on	 top	 of	 cars,	 18	
wheels.”	(L9W_R&RV1,	2012)	This	was	still	part	of	the	post-hurricane	landscape	one	year	after	when	the	author	visited	 New	Orleans	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 and	 as	 described	 by	 Green	 et	 al.	 (2007).	 Some	residents	 testify	 to	 the	 mediocre	 maintenance	 of	 the	 levees,	 which	 were	 poorly	 kept	before	2005.	They	also	mentioned	 the	presence	of	 a	barge	 in	 the	 Industrial	Canal	 that	contributed	to	the	breach,	
“…	we	 later	 learned	 that	 part	 of	 the	 reason	why	 the	 L9W	 flooded	was	
because	there	was	a	barge	that	was	parked	in	the	industrial	canal	and	
we	are	still	trying	to	understand	why,	because	in	most	cases	when	there	
is	a	pending	storm,	all	ships	are	put	out	to	sea.	So	why	would	you	put	a	
barge	into	coastal	waters?”	(L9W_R&NPO6,	2012)	
The	Feeling	of	Being	Neglected	Most	 residents	who	 returned	 after	 the	 storm	 feel	 neglected	 by	 the	 city	 and	 by	other	neighborhoods.	This	 feeling	dates	back	way	before	 the	Hurricane	 and	 continued	afterwards.	It	 is	partly	due	to	the	fact	that	the	Industrial	Canal	physically	separates	the	neighborhood	from	the	city,		
“…the	canal	divided	us	from	rest	of	world	and	the	9th	Ward	is	a	Siamese	
twin	to	St.	Bernard	parish,	connected	by	the	hip,	and	they	created	untrue	
stories	about	us”	(L9W_R1,	2012).		To	 some	 residents,	 Hurricane	 Katrina	 brought	 some	 attention	 to	 the	 LNW,	 and	although	this	improved	slightly	the	situation,	it	was	not	enough,		
“We	was	neglected,	and	still	neglected,	not	as	bad	as	it	was	but	still.	We	
have	to	always	be	at	the	end	of	the	line,	we	were	never	able	to	be	at	the	
front	or	middle.”(L9W_R1,	2012)		Some	 residents	 think	 that	 the	 city	 is	 using	 the	 LNW	 to	 attract	 money.	 They	mention	 how,	 from	 their	 standpoint,	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 city	 can	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	permanent	image	of	a	neighborhood	that	has	not	been	rebuilt,	
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“…neglect,	 even	 before	 Katrina,	 this	 is	 a	 neighborhood	 that	was	 not	 a	
priority	 for	 the	city	and	 the	 interesting	 thing	 is	 that	after	Katrina,	 this	
has	become	like	a	tourist	destination,	however	 it’s	a	tourist	destination	
because	 of	 the	 tragedy,	 so	 it	 doesn’t	 benefit	 the	 city	 to	 make	 the	
neighborhood	better,	if	the	tragedy	that	is	bringing	the	dollar,	so	that’s	
problematic.	 I	 want	 to	 know	 where	 the	 money	 that	 came	 into	 NOLA	
went.	I	think	that	the	L9W,	became	the	poster	child	of	hurricane	Katrina,	
and	people	and	individuals	and	organizations	and	corporations	poured	
money	in	and	gave	money,	and	gave	money	and	this	neighborhood	is	not	
seeing	it.”	(L9W_R&NPO4,	2012)	Accessibility	and	Amenities	After	the	passing	of	the	hurricanes,	 the	city	was	closed	off	 for	a	 few	days	with	a	mandatory	curfew,	but	the	LNW	was	closed	for	months.	Only	gradually	did	the	residents	have	 the	opportunity	 to	check	on	 their	homes,	provided	 they	had	 the	proper	means	of	identification.	Some	residents	were	only	allowed	to	visit	their	properties	in	November	of	2005,	 almost	 6	weeks	 after	 the	 storm,	 and	 the	 northern	 areas	were	 not	 accessible	 for	residents	 for	 three	 months	 (Green	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 This	 process	 was	 a	 roadblock	 for	residents	who	wished	to	return	and	start	the	rebuilding	process.		
“When	we	got	back	here,	 the	 first	 day	we	go	back,	November,	 because	
they	only	allowed	us	to	come	in	to	look,	and	we	would	come	in	get	on	the	
bus,	police	car	front	and	police	car	in	the	back,	drive	around	a	desolated	
route”	(L9W_R&RV1,	2012)	Most	of	the	LNW	lacked	municipal	services	like	gas,	electricity,	and	potable	water	for	 almost	 a	 year,	 and	 it	 took	 longer	 for	 some	 areas	 to	 have	 access	 to	 these	 services	(Green	et	al.,	2007).	That	alone	greatly	contributed	to	the	late	return	of	the	residents,	and	a	 late	 return	meant	 a	 late	 starting	 date	 for	 rebuilding	 their	 home.	 In	 addition	 to	 that,	amenities	 have	not	 been	 restored	 as	well,	most	 importantly	 the	 schools.	 There	 is	 only	one	school	for	the	entire	Upper	and	Lower	Ninth	Ward,	and	it	does	not	have	the	capacity	to	accept	all	the	children	of	the	neighborhood,		
“…	we	watch	other	 areas	with	high	 school	 rebuild	 and	 the	 only	 school	
down	here	the	Martin	Luther	King	(MLK),	but	we	are	trying	to	figure	out	
why	it’s	taking	them	almost	7	years	to	build	a	high	school	in	the	LNW.”	
(L9W_R&NPO6,	2012)	
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Obstacles	faced	by	The	Road	Home	Program	Put	 in	 place	 after	 Hurricane	 Katrina,	 the	 Road	 Home	 Program	 (RHP),	 caused	additional	obstacles	to	the	residents	who	wanted	to	rebuild	their	homes	because	of	the	title	clearing	problem.	Many	of	the	properties	were	handed	down	from	generation	to	the	next,	because	Louisiana	follows	the	Napoleon	Code.		Many	of	the	residents	needed	legal	counsel	 to	 help	 them	 find	 a	 solution,	 but	 they	 could	 not	 cover	 the	 steep	 costs	 of	 legal	advice.	Many	residents	were	schemed	into	fake	deals	and	fake	promises:	
“But	the	problem	that	we	found,	especially	in	the	L9W	because	it	was	a	
mindset	where	if	your	great	great	great	grandmother	died,	she	handed	it	
down	to	her	child,	and	then	that	child	would	die	and	handed	down	and	
there	was	no	legal	transfer	or	titles	and	so,	there	was	no	clear	title	to	the	
property	 and	 it	 goes	 back	 generations.	 And	 we	 got	 back	 we	 had	
unscrupulous	 people	 talking	 about	 helping	 us	 to	 clear	 the	 titles,	 but	 it	
will	 cost	 $20,000	 and	 nobody	 had	 this	 kind	 of	 money.	 Louisiana	 is	
different	 from	a	 lot	 of	 states	 in	America,	 but	 the	Road	Home	Program	
said	that	if	you	don’t	have	a	clear	title	then	you	don’t	get	the	money	you	
needed	 in	 order	 to	 rebuild.	 So	 some	 people	 are	 just	 clearing	 up	 after	
7yrs,	and	some	people	are	throwing	their	hands	up	because	the	family	is	
so	scattered	after	all	these	generations.”(L9W_R&RV1,	2012)	
“…	 now	 we	 started	 to	 fight	 with	 the	 state	 government	 and	 the	 Road	
Home	 Program.	 The	 RHP	 maxed	 out	 at	 a	 $150,000,	 and	 that	 is	 not	
enough	to	replace,	and	rebuild	a	lot	of	the	structures	in	the	L9W.	There	
was	 no	 guarantee	 that	 you	 would	 get	 the	 whole	 amount.”	
(L9W_R&NPO6,	2012)	
The	Non-Profit	Organizations	The	 non-profit	 organizations	 (NPOs)	 active	 in	 the	 neighborhood	 had	 a	 mixed	impact	 on	 the	 rebuilding	process.	 Some	of	 these	NPOs	 took	 advantage	of	 the	 situation	people	were	 in	and	made	profit	out	of	a	very	unfortunate	situation.	According	to	some	residents	 and	 NP)s	 representatives,	 these	 other	 organizations	 promise	 people	 to	 help	them	 rebuild	 their	 homes,	 they	 get	 the	 funding	 to	 do	 so,	 and	 they	 do	 not	 keep	 their	promises.	Whereas,	other	NPOs	delivered,	they	helped	rebuilt	many	homes,	and	continue	to	 do	 so.	 These	 organizations	 are:	Make	 It	 Right	 Foundation,	 Lowernine.org,	 Common	Ground	 Relief,	 Lower	 9th	 Ward	 Village,	 Neighborhood	 Empowerment	 Network	
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Association	 (NENA),	 Lower	 9th	 Ward	 Center	 for	 Sustainable	 Engagement	 and	Development	 (CSED),	 and	 the	 Homeownership	 Association.	 All	 these	 are	 501(c)(3)	organizations	making	them	reliable	and	trusted	entities,	because	according	the	Internal	Revenue	 Service	 (IRS)	 they	 are	mandated	 to	 be	 charitable	 organizations	 and	 are	 tax-exempt:	“The	organization	must	not	be	organized	or	operated	for	the	benefit	of	private	interests,	and	no	part	of	a	section	501(c)(3)	organization's	net	earnings	may	inure	to	the	benefit	 of	 any	 private	 shareholder	 or	 individual.”	 (IRS,	 2015)	 A	 resident	 who	 is	 also	running	a	NPO	says,		
“A	lot	of	people	say	that	there	are	so	many	organizations,	why	can’t	you	
all	work	together	and	get	things	done.	There	is	a	lot	of	in-fighting	in	the	
L9W,	this	group	doesn’t	trust	that	group,	and	this	one	won’t	work	with	
that	one.	It’s	difficult.	But	I	think	that	these	groups	are	doing	what	they	
can.”(L9W_R&NPO4,	2012)	Another	resident	said,		
“And	so,	we	are	going	to	come	together,	and	that’s	my	agenda	because	I	
have	seen	it,	we	have	too	many	organizations	and	not	doing	all	they	can	
do	if	they	worked	together.”	(L9W_R&RV1,	2012)	
Lack	of	Trust	Residents	are	under	the	impression	that	the	government	does	not	want	them	to	return	and	is	purposefully	keeping	funds	away	from	residents,		
“When	we	saw	destruction,	they	saw	opportunity.	And	that	I	think	is	part	
of	why	we	haven’t	rebuilt.	Because	you	can	come	up	with	means	to	get	
people	to	fund	if	you	allocated	it,	but	we	got	all	the	funds	for	every	house	
in	 the	 LNW	 that	 was	 destroyed,	 but	 they	 haven’t	 issued	 these	
funds.”(L9W_R&RV1,	2012)	Also,	 the	 LNW	 received	 a	 lot	 of	 negative	 attention	 after	 the	 storm,	 and	 in	 the	BNOB	proposed	plan,	 the	area	had	a	green	dot	on	 it	and	was	considered	not	viable	 for	rebuilding.	The	media	often	 implied	 in	 their	 coverage	 that	with	devastation	as	 the	one	seen	in	the	LNW,	it	should	not	be	rebuilt.	The	administration	at	the	time	was	corrupt,	and	Mayor	Nagin,	who	is	currently	imprisoned	on	fraud	and	corruption	charges	(Robertson,	
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2014),	did	not	 facilitate	 the	rebuilding	process	 in	 the	some	areas	of	 the	city,	especially	the	LNW.	As	one	resident	puts	it,		
“We	 are	 on	 the	 right	 path	 to	 recover,	 but	 we’ve	 had	 so	 many	 things	
placed	in	our	path	that	I	don’t	think	the	politicians	get	 it	 just	yet.	They	
come	down	here,	with	their	grandiose	speeches	and	things	and	after	they	
leave	we	are	still	left	with	what	we	have.	So	we’ve	got	to	the	point	now	
where	we	look	long	and	hard	at	the	people	that	we	elect	because	we	see	
now	that	those	persons	that	we	have	elected	to	office	are	not	doing	what	
we	want	them	do	and	not	what	needs	to	be	done.”	(L9W_R&NPO6,	2012)	
“…	the	people	who	were	pushed	out	didn’t	have:	1)	the	resources	to	begin	
with	to	sustain	that	kind	of	loss,	and	2)	were	not	supported	properly	to	
be	 able	 to	 come	 back	 and	 that’s	 based	 strongly	 in	 racism.”	
(L9W_R&NPO4,	2012)	
6.2.3.	Why	is	the	LNW	not	rebuilt	7	years	after?	This	first	section	answers	to	the	questions	on	the	slow	rebuilding	process	in	the	LNW.	 The	 numbers	 show	 the	 unfortunate	 reality	 that	more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 residents	have	not	returned,	and	more	so	 in	 the	L9	 than	 in	HC.	After	 the	author	 interviewed	the	residents	and	spent	 time	 in	 the	area,	other	 facts	explaining	 the	 late	 rebuilding	process	surfaced.	Between	 the	 time	 it	was	 safe	 to	 return	and	 the	moment	 the	 interviews	were	conducted,	seven	years	later,	the	residents	of	the	LNW	kept	facing	obstacles	preventing	them	from	either	returning	or	rebuilding.		Other	 than	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 residents	 lost	 their	 lives	 during	 the	 storm,	 the	neighborhood	suffered	from	a	significant	loss	in	its	population	size.	This	essential	factor	provides	 a	major	 explanation	 about	 the	 late	 rebuilding	 of	 the	 LNW.	But	why	 have	 the	residents	not	returned	yet	seven	years	after?	First,	those	who	have	young	children	have	to	 think	 about	which	 schools	 they	 can	 send	 their	 children	 to,	which	 explains	why	 the	percentage	of	older	people	is	high	among	those	who	have	returned.	Second,	the	clearing	of	home	titles—identifying	who	owns	the	property	was	an	obstacle	to	many	as	many	of	the	homes	were	passed	on	from	generation	to	the	next—so	they	can	have	access	to	the	RHP	grant	was	not	an	easy	process,	and	continues	to	be	another	obstacle	among	many	others.	 	Third,	being	 located	across	 the	 Industrial	Canal,	 the	 residents	have	always	 felt	
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neglected	 by	 their	 local	 officials	 and	 government,	 and	 the	 LNW	 having	 been	 always	labeled	 as	 black,	 poor,	 and	 unsafe	 area	made	 it	 difficult	 for	 the	 neighborhood	 and	 its	inhabitants	 to	 recover	and	 trust	outsiders.	 	Finally,	 the	NPOs	are	also	 facing	 their	own	share	of	problems,	especially	getting	funding	to	rebuild	and	gaining	people’s	trust.	This	last	 point	 is	 being	made	 difficult	 since	 some	 NPOs	 have	 taken	 advantage	 of	 this	 very	unfortunate	situation.		The	slow	rebuilding	process	is	not	only	the	outcome	of	the	devastation	caused	by	Hurricanes	 Katrina	 and	 Rita	 alone,	 but	 also	 from	 the	 many	 historical	 events	 and	decisions	 that	 were	 made	 in	 the	 past.	 These	 contributed	 greatly	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	neighborhood	 that	 is	 socially	 and	physically	 very	 vulnerable.	 This	 combination	of	 past	and	present	factors	explain	why	the	LNW	suffered	from	such	an	enormous	devastation	and	why	it	has	not	been	rebuilt	yet	seven	years	after.		A	neighborhood	with	such	strong	cultural	values	is	commonly	assumed	to	be	one	that	would	rebuild	quicker	than	other	areas	in	the	advent	of	a	disaster.	This	first	section	brought	to	light	the	obstacles	faced	by	the	residents	who	wished	to	return	and	rebuild.	As	 to	whether	or	not	 the	 late	rebuilding	process	affects	negatively	 the	resilience	of	 the	area,	the	following	can	be	extracted:	at	the	physical	level,	the	LNW	does	not	show	signs	of	resilience;	but	at	 the	 level	of	 the	community,	 the	residents	are	taking	 initiatives	that	lead	to	a	more	resilient	state.	This	needs	further	exploration	and	it	will	be	the	subject	of	the	 following	 section.	 The	 author	will	 subsequently	 investigate	 1)	whether	 the	 strong	attachment,	the	social	networks,	and	memory	contributed	to	the	return	of	the	residents,	2)	 how	 they	 perceive	 themselves,	 and	 3)	 how	 they	 are	 perceived	 from	 outside	 the	neighborhood.		
6.3.	Perceptions	in	and	of	the	LNW	
6.3.1.	Identifying	the	cultural	landscape	in	the	LNW	
“as	i	mature	
i	wonder	
how	made	it	
we	being	
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the	men	in	my	family	
the	various	
african-american	males	
who	colorfully	crossed	
past	bold	confusions	
intentionally	engendered	
by	the	infamous	hidden	alabaster	hands	
of	america’s	human	marketplaces	
…	
if	only	i	can	embody	that	black	eloquent	
strolling	through	the	spaces	i	move	
returning	home	at	dusk	
from	the	workplaces/the	social	
slaughterhouses	with	nary	a	drop	of	blood	
messing	up	my	mean	cleanness,	no	malice	
on	my	mind,	and	just	a	grinning	wide	with	some	kind	of	
alligator	tossed	
casually	cross	my	shoulder”	
	[Kalamu	ya	Salaam]	(D’Ann	et	al.,	2009,	pp.	80-81)	As	mentioned	in	section	4.2.4,	the	cultural	landscape	in	the	LNW	is	unique	and	is	the	 result	 of	 strong	 family	 bonds	 that	 took	 form	 over	 generations.	 Many	 factors	contributed	 to	 this:	 being	 excluded	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 city,	 being	 a	 low-income	 yet	working	 class	 community,	 being	 majority	 African	 American,	 being	 religious	 and	attending	 church	 regularly,	 and	 being	 a	 network	 of	 close-knit	 families.	 With	 a	 large	portion	of	the	community	not	returning,	what	happened	to	the	cultural	 landscape	after	Hurricane	Katrina?	This	section	is	mainly	based	on	the	interviews	conducted	with	the	residents	and	their	testimonies.	The	focus	here	is	to	identify	the	LNW’s	cultural	landscape	through	the	residents’	eyes.	By	understanding	the	value	of	this	neighborhood	to	its	residents,	one	can	better	 fathom	 the	 persistency	 of	 the	 people	 to	 returning	 home	 and	 rebuilding	 their	devastated	 community.	 As	mentioned	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 the	main	 elements	 of	 the	 cultural	landscape	are	place	attachment,	social	networks,	memory,	 identity,	and	cultural	values.	The	interviews	focused	mainly	on	locating	these	elements	through	the	discussions.		In	addition	and	for	validation	purposes,	some	extracts	from	narratives	taken	from	the	book	“Overcoming	Katrina”	written	by	D’Ann	R.	Penner	and	Keith	C.	Ferdinand	will	
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be	used	as	well	to	reinforce	the	interviews.	These	narratives	tell	stories	about	the	LNW	from	the	1950s	and	1960s	up	until	Hurricane	Katrina	and	its	after-effects.	
Place	attachment	One	factor	that	contributed	to	the	strong	attachment	residents	have	to	the	LNW	was	 its	 high	 proportion	 of	 African	 American	 homeowners.	 Everyone	 wanted	 the	American	Dream—access	to	estate	property—for	themselves	and	for	their	families.	And	some	residents	emphasized	on	this	fact,	
“I	 think	 people	 have	 a	 strong	 loyalty	 to	 the	 neighborhood	 and	 it’s	
because	 they	 built	 the	 neighborhood.	 This	was	 a	 place	 at	 one	 time,	 or	
one	 of	 the	 few	 places	 in	 NOLA,	 where	 black	 people	 could	 own	 their	
property	 and	 live	 in	 a	 community	 safely.	 Because	 the	 properties	 are	
cheap	 enough	 and	 they	 didn’t	 have	 to	 worry	 so	 much.	 I	 have	 heard	
stories	about	family,	literally,	building	their	homes	from	the	ground	up.	
And	this	neighborhood	had	the	highest,	and	I	don’t	know	if	 it	still	does,	
but	 it	 had	 the	 highest	 homeownership	 rate	 in	 the	 entire	 city.”	
(L9W_R&NPO4,	2012)	
“…	American	dreams,	freedom,	Americans	believing	in	American	dreams.	
We	want	to	do	what	other	family	members	did:	work,	get	educated,	and	
get	a	house…	you	do	what	others	do.”	(L9W_R1,	2012)	This	is	also	emphasized	in	the	narratives	written	by	D’Ann	et	al.	(2009),	“The	land	and	house	were	for	the	family.	Just	about	everybody	in	the	Ninth	Ward	owned	his	own	property.	[…]	My	daddy	owned	three	adjacent	lots:	in	the	middle	was	our	houses;	on	one	side	 of	 our	 house	 there	 as	 a	 lot	where	my	 father	 used	 to	 grow	 the	 corn,	 string	 beans,	potatoes,	cabbage,	lettuce,	tomatoes,	and	belle	peppers”	(D’Ann	et	al.,	2009,	p.	11).	This	book	tells	how	the	LNW’s	population	changed	after	WWII.	Many	people	came	from	the	center	 of	 New	 Orleans	 because	 they	 wanted	 to	 live	 in	 better	 houses.	 Most	 of	 the	newcomers	were	first	time	homeowners	and	took	pride	in	that.		In	the	LNW,	the	church	plays	a	major	role	in	reinforcing	residents’	attachment	to	the	neighborhood,	as	 it	 constitutes	 their	main	opportunity	 to	congregate.	 If	 the	church	does	not	return,	an	incentive	for	many	people	to	return	vanishes.		
	 160	
“It’s	loosing	the	social	anchors	of	your	church	and	your	family	and	your	
people	 that	 led	 the	area	 to	be	what	 it	 is	 right	now,	which	 is	 this	void.”	
(L9W_R&P7,	2012)	
“…	the	African	American	black	church	 is	always	been	prominent	 in	 the	
history	of	our	nation.	Even	when	we	were	slaves,	they	allowed	us	to	have	
service.	 And	 that’s	when	people	 gathered	 […]	 even	 now,	 I	 feel	 that	 the	
church	has	to	be	a	part.	When	the	storm	hit,	my	wife	and	I	knew	that	we	
were	coming	back	and	had	nothing	to	come	back	to	[…]	we	were	going	
back	because	 if	 there	was	one	person	who	didn’t	know	God,	we	had	 to	
come	back	and	 share	 that	good	news	with	 them,	but	not	only	 that	but	
also	to	help	rebuild	our	community.”	(L9W_R&RV1,	2012)		Also,	the	community	is	kept	closer	because	many	members	of	the	same	family	live	around	each	other.	They	all	gather	and	help	each	other	in	cooking,	keeping	an	eye	on	the	children,	 or	 in	 helping	 a	 neighbor	 build	 his	 house	 (D’Ann	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 People	 always	gather	around	food,	music,	and	Mardi	Gras	Indians.			
“My	sister	in	law	is	next	door.	And	I	have	a	daughter	that	lives	around	7	
blocks	away.”	(L9W_R&RV1,	2012)	
“This	 was	 a	 place	 where	 people	 put	 down	 their	 roots,	 and	 raise	 their	
families	 for	 generations.	 So	 it’s	 this	 strong	 kind	 of	 attachment	 to	 this	
place,	which	 one	 of	 the	 horrible	 things	 about	 the	 levee	 failures	 during	
hurricane	Katrina	is	that	it	really	ripped	a	hole	in	that.”	(L9W_R&NPO4,	
2012)	
“…	 the	 thing	 that	New	Orleans	 is	known	 for	come	out	of	 the	culture	of	
the	 people	 who	 live	 in	 this	 neighborhood,	 lower	 to	 middle	 income	
African-American	people,	jazz,	the	food	is	very	strongly	rooted	in	African	
and	 African-American	 food	 traditions,	 the	 Mardi	 Gras	 Indians.”	
(L9W_R&NPO4,	2012)	
“People	here	used	to	sit	on	the	steps	at	2:30,	it’s	the	time	kids	get	out	of	
school	and	they	watch	the	kids	go	home.	They	watched	everything	that’s	
going	on.	It’s	kind	of	changing	now	because	the	kids	don’t	go	to	school	in	
this	community.”	(L9W_R2,	2012)	
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Social	networks	“Now	 when	 I	 was	 coming	 up	 we	 knew	 everybody.	 Just	 like	 family.	 […]	 There	wasn’t	any	sense	in	doing	something	wrong	because	somebody	was	going	to	tell	on	you.”	(D’Ann	et	al.,	2009,	p.	11)	One	of	the	elements	rendering	the	LNW	a	unique	place	is	the	strength	of	its	social	networks.	The	bonds	that	were	created	when	people	started	settling	in	the	neighborhood	only	grew	stronger	and	closer	over	the	generations.	Two	primordial	elements	are	at	the	root	of	these	networks:	family	and	church.		
“I	 think	we’ve	 lost	 a	 little	 bit	 of	 our	 culture	 since	 Katrina,	 but	 its	 still	
family	that	gathers	us.	It’s	still	family	oriented.	With	us,	my	sister	in	law	
was	 living	 around	 the	 corner,	my	 father	 in	 law	was	 living	 around	 the	
corner,	 our	 children	were	 no	more	 than	 15-20	minutes	 away,	 cousins,	
and	 family.	 But	 the	 storm	 has	 scattered	 that,	 but	 we	 are	 still	 back	
together,	 next	week	we	are	 going	 to	 have	 our	 3rd	 family	 reunion	 since	
Katrina.	 […]	 well	 the	 church	 is	 still	 a	 big	 part	 of	 the	 community.	
Community	activities.	Gatherings	at	churches,	whether	religious	or	 just	
community	gathering,	and	family	gatherings.	It’s	always	centered	on	the	
family	 in	 reaching	out	 […]	 If	 you	don’t	have	 food	 in	NOLA	then	 it’s	not	
going	on.	Food	is	a	catalyst.	We	even	try	to	educate	about	healthy	eating.	
But	always	centered	around	a	meal.”	(L9W_R&RV1,	2012)	
“But	what	is	unique	is	the	families	down	here.	Parents	and	children,	my	
mom	and	dad	 lived	here.	My	sister	 is	next	door,	and	you	got	 that	a	 lot.	
From	the	bridge	all	the	way	to	Florida	avenue	you	have	people	from	the	
same	 family	 all	 living	 there,	 first	 and	 second	 generations.”	 (L9W_R2,	
2012)	
“It	was	my	 grandparents	who	 lived	 there,	 so	we	would	 go	 there	 every	
week	at	 least	 to	hang	out	with	 them	and	go	 to	 church,	 the	St	Maurice	
Catholic	Church.”	(L9W_R&P7,	2012)	
“Any	given	day	you	pull	out	the	grill	or	if	you	smell	smoke,	you	know	that	
everyone	is	gathering.	People	gather	around	food	and	everybody	knows	
everybody.”	(L9W_R1,	2012)	After	Hurricanes	Katrina	and	Rita,	the	residents	of	the	LNW	felt	neglected	by	the	rest	of	the	city	and	its	officials.	Over	time,	the	area	saw	the	establishment	of	several	NPOs	who,	 as	 part	 of	 their	 mission,	 organized	 meetings	 during	 which	 residents	 have	 an	
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opportunity	 to	 discuss	 the	 issues	 they	 face	 and	make	 important	 announcements.	 The	NPO	meetings	became	a	 sanctuary	 for	 the	 residents	who	were	attending	 them.	During	these	meetings,	residents	have	the	freedom	to	talk	about	any	of	their	problem,	comforted	that	they	all	share	the	same	experience.	These	community	meetings	or	church	gatherings	have	become	a	new	form	of	social	networks	that	give	residents	a	safe	place	to	vent	and	have	fellowship.	
“There	 is	a	small	group	of	people	here	 that,	before	 they	never	spoke	to	
one	 another	 because	 they	 really	 didn’t	 need	 to.	 And	 now	 they	 are,	
everybody	is	getting	together	and	everybody	is	talking	to	each	other,	and	
everybody	knows	who	everybody	else	is.”	(L9W_R&NPO5,	2012)	
“…	we	 still	 have	 the	 town	hall	meetings	every	now	and	 then,	when	 the	
council	person	wants	to	pass	on	information.	And	yesterday	we	had	the	
4th	 of	 July	 celebration,	 we	 always	 have	 parties	 for	 labor	 day	 and	
Christmas	[…]	the	meetings	give	people	a	place	to	vent,	and	it	gives	them	
an	outlet	and	 say	exactly	what’s	going	on.	They	 feel	 conformable	here,	
that	 they	 can	 say	 what	 they	 want	 without	 any	 reprises.	 And	 we	 have	
always	maintained	it,	you	have	to	be	respectful	in	what	you	say	and	we	
are	not	going	to	disrespect	each	other.	I	will	defend	your	right	to	say	the	
things	 you	 can’t	 say.	 It’s	 helpful	 and	 it’s	 part	 of	 the	 healing	 process.”	
(L9W_R&NPO6,	2012)	
Memory		The	 residents’	 memory	 is	 deeply	 marked	 by	 what	 they	 had	 before	 the	 storm.	When	asked	about	the	landmarks	that	they	used	to	associate	with	before	the	storm,	their	answers	were	always	centered	on	churches,	schools,	or	gatherings.		
“People	 were	 the	 landmark,	 there	 were	 no	 big	 businesses	 in	 the	
community,	it	was	mainly	residential.”	(L9W_R1,	2012)	
“We	used	to	have	stuff,	you	used	to	walk	to	corner	stores	everywhere.	We	
grew	 up	 going	 to	 corner	 stores	 to	 go	 shopping.	 There	 was	 a	 little	
department	 store	 on	 Caffin	 and	 St.	 Claude.	 There	 were	 little	 smaller	
places	that	you	can	get	around,	but	now	there	is	one	little	gas	station.”	
(L9W_R&P7,	2012)	
“You	 had	 the	 Holy	 Cross	 School,	 then	 you	 had	 the	 St.	 Maurice	 Church	
down	 on	 St	 Maurice	 Avenue,	 you	 had	 the	 New	 Israel	 Baptist	 Church	
down	 on	 St.	 Claude	 Avenue,	 then	 you	 have	 first	 Thessalonian	 Church	
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down	on	Caffin	Avenue,	and	you	had	a	lot	of	businesses	up	and	down	the	
St.	Claude	corridor.”	(L9W_R&NPO6,	2012)	
“…	 a	 lot	 of	 stories	 that	 people	 tell	 about	 how	 the	 LNW	 used	 to	 be	 in	
addition	 to	 talking	 about	 how	 there	 were	 gardens	 everywhere	 and	
people	just	grew	their	own	food.	There	were	fruit	trees	everywhere.	They	
talk	 about	 how	 close	 the	 neighborhood	 was,	 it	 was	 a	 close-knit	
community.	 [...]	 church	 is	 a	 landmark,	 and	was	and	 continue	 to	be	 the	
primary	 gathering	 place	 of	 people.	 There	 is	 a	 lot	 of	 churches	 in	 the	
neighborhood	before	and	after	Katrina.”	(L9W_R&NPO4,	2012)	Also,	people	remember	that	the	LNW	was	a	self-sustaining	community	that	took	care	of	its	own,	one	where	people	could	walk	home,	feel	safe,	and	do	not	lock	their	doors.	There	 were	 no	 random	 crimes,	 and	 the	 only	 fights	 that	 took	 place	 were	 bar	 fights	between	intoxicated	people	(D’Ann	et	al.,	2009).	
“The	best	time	that’s	in	the	late	60s	early	70s.	That’s	when	neighbors	got	
along.	You	could	smell	everybody	cooking.”(L9W_R2,	2012)	When	residents	were	asked	about	Hurricane	Betsy,	and	how	they	dealt	with	the	flood	40	years	ago,	they	answered,	
“I	was	in	Middle	school,	they	always	put	out	the	hurricane	warnings	and	
notices	and	traditionally	people	would	put	together	the	evacuation	food	
[…]	my	brother	and	other	who	could	swim	rescued	people	and	brought	
them	to	higher	ground;	and	when	daylight	broke,	water	was	up	 to	 the	
rooftop	and	we	had	chicken	and	ducks	swimming	around	the	house.	[…]	I	
was	rescued	in	1965	but	in	2005	I	was	left	on	my	own.”	(L9W_R1,	2012)	
“a	lot	of	people	in	the	Holy	Cross	area,	for	Betsy,	they	had	never	flooded	
because	they	were	high	up,	so	my	mom	told	me	that	for	Betsy,	they	stood	
in	the	house	for	about	a	week	with	no	power	and	their	neighbors	would	
come	together	and	cook	and	they	would	do	big	barbeques	every	night	to	
eat.	 But	 they	 never	 flooded,	 they	would	 look	 down	 the	 street	 and	 they	
can	see	water.”	(L9W_R&P7,	2012)	Many	residents	yearn	to	 the	1970s	when	the	neighborhood	was	safe	and	 family	oriented.	Some	blame	Hurricane	Betsy	for	turning	the	LNW	into	a	dangerous	the	drug-ridden	area	that	it	has	become	in	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000.	“I	feel	that	a	lot	of	the	discord,	the	crime,	and	the	drugs	in	the	Ninth	Ward	were	because	of	the	damage	that	was	
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done	to	the	housing	and	the	stress	to	the	families.	[…]	The	Ninth	Ward	went	from	a	fairly	stable	environment	to	a	very	unstable	environment	after	Betsy,	and	it	never	recaptured	the	sense	of	purpose	that	it	had	before.”(D’Ann	et	al.,	2009,	p.	93)	
Identity	Residents	of	 the	LNW	identify	greatly	with	 the	 local	 culture,	whether	 it	was	 the	barbeques,	the	church	gatherings,	the	music,	or	the	Mardi	Gras	Indians.		
“Every	week	there	is	an	Indian	something,	there	are	Indians	everywhere.	
So	 they	 had	 these	 more	 familiar	 street	 parties	 and	 block	 parties.	 A	
couple	of	different	smaller	churches	that	they	would	congregate	to,	you	
had	 two	 predominant	 churches	 in	 the	 area,	 the	 St	 Maurice	 Catholic	
Church	 and	 St	 David	 Catholic	 Church.	 The	 St	 David	 was	 the	 African	
American	Catholics,	and	the	St	Maurice	was	the	white	Catholics.	The	St	
David	 survived	and	 is	 still	 there	 today.	So	 I	 think	churches	and	schools	
they	kept	them	where	they	are,	but	some	of	the	schools	even	went	away.”	
(L9W_R&P7,	2012)	As	one	of	the	residents	in	the	book	“Overcoming	Katrina”	puts	it,	“We	used	to	say,	People	 “from	 the	Nine	don’t	mind	dying.”	We	were	proud	of	 it.	 […]	 Some	of	 our	 areas	were	 swamp	 lands	 or	 the	 rough	 edges	 of	 the	 city,	where	 you	 had	 tall	 grasses,	marsh,	trees,	bushes,	and	shrubs,	so	they	had	to	be	claimed	as	a	place	to	make	a	home.	So	the	neighborhood	was	built	by	people	who	were	fairly	ambitious	in	terms	of	trying	to	make	a	homestead	for	themselves.”	(D’Ann	et	al.,	2009,	p.	91)	Physically	 they	 also	 identify	 with	 the	 Industrial	 Canal,	 whence	 the	 sardonic	expression	‘the	people	on	the	other	side	of	the	Canal’	they	use	to	describe	themselves.		
Cultural	values	The	 cultural	 factors	 that	 bring	 the	 residents	 of	 the	 LNW	 together	 are:	 family,	homeownership,	 church,	 school,	 food,	 and	 music.	 All	 of	 these	 are	 deeply	 engraved	 in	their	identity.		
“People	always	 interacted	with	each	other,	 it	was	very	 family	oriented,	
you	were	always	in	somebody’s	yard,	barbequing	food,	rehashing	history,	
complacent	with	 life.	 Everyone	 knew	 everyone,	 like	 a	 little	 village.	We	
was	 okay.	 […]	 Growing	 up	 as	 a	 kid,	 most	 of	 the	 neighbors	 are	 family.	
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People	shared	their	lives	with	each	other.	I	am	a	big	brother,	and	people	
come	to	me	for	advice.	My	wife	and	I	raised	two	sons	and	it	was	in	this	
yard.	They	call	me	Mister	R.	People	don’t	know	how	we	live	down	here.”	
(L9W_R1,	2012)	
“And	people	built	most	of	their	families’	houses.	The	children	help	and	it	
gives	you	more	ownership	and	you	take	a	little	more	pride	in	what	you	
got.	 You	 were	 always	 walking	 distance	 from	 your	 brother,	 from	 your	
sister,	from	a	relative.”(L9W_R2,	2012)	Even	 hurricanes	 are	 part	 of	 the	 local	 culture.	 They	 provided	 unwelcome	opportunities	for	people	to	gather	and	cook	together,	as	one	resident	explained,	
“we	were	told	that	the	water	could	never	get	as	high	as	it	did,	we	knew	
that	our	levees	were	going	down	and	they	were	sinking,	but	from	1970s	
through	Katrina,	2005,	there	was	nothing.	[…]	you	will	always	be	at	your	
grandparents’	home	and	hang	out	through	the	night	with	your	cousins,	
and	 that’s	what	 everybody	 did	 and	 nothing	 ever	 happened.	 You	 didn’t	
have	 any	 power	 for	 a	 day	 or	 two,	 and	 then	 you	 go	 help	 your	 parents	
sweep	 and	 pick	 up	 the	 leaves,	 twigs,	 and	 branches.	 But	we	 hadn’t	 had	
one	in	so	long	that	there	was	a	sense	of	complacency.	People	didn’t	know	
that	 the	 water	 can	 rise	 25ft	 and	 then	 bust	 through	 all	 these	 levees.”	
(L9W_R&P7,	2012)	When	 they	 are	 asked	 about	 the	 levees	 and	 their	 safety,	 they	 answer	 back	with	certainty	that	this	is	not	something	they	spend	their	time	thinking	about.	More	important	matters	were	finding	employment,	buying	a	home	and	founding	a	family.		
“It’s	 very	 New	 Orleans	 to	 not	 think	 about	 tomorrow.	 You	 think	 about	
today.	You	can’t	live	your	life	scared.”	(L9W_R&P7,	2012)	
“I	didn’t	think	about	the	levees,	there	were	just	there.	You	thought	about	
them	if	you	went	fishing	or	crossed	the	river.	The	levees	was	part	of	your	
life	and	community.”	(L9W_R1,	2012)	After	 interviewing	 the	 residents	 and	 trying	 to	 identify	 the	 cultural	 landscape	of	the	LNW,	it	turned	out	that	it	consists	primarily	of	the	people	and	the	bonds	they	have	built	 amongst	 each	 other	 over	 the	 generations.	 Whether	 they	 gathered	 around	 food,	church,	or	music,	what	mattered	at	the	end	was	the	fact	that	they	all	got	together	around	the	activities	that	mattered	to	them.	Their	landmarks	were	their	homes,	their	churches,	
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and	 their	 schools,	 to	 which	 frequent	 community	 meetings	 could	 be	 added.	 What	separated	the	residents	from	their	neighboring	areas	brought	them	closer	to	each	other,	and	the	resulting	networks	make	the	community	unique	and	irreplaceable.	This	gives	the	residents	the	motivation	and	the	will	to	return	even	after	such	a	devastating	loss.		As	the	interviewing	phase	of	the	research	was	ongoing,	the	author	began	to	notice	the	discrepancy	between	two	different	perceptions:	one	from	the	residents,	and	another	from	the	professionals.	These	two	perceptions	will	be	tackled	in	the	following	section.	
6.3.2.	Residents’	perception	of	the	LNW	It	 became	 clear	 after	 a	 few	 interviews	 with	 residents	 that	 they	 perceived	themselves	to	be	different	from	the	rest	of	the	city.	As	mentioned	in	chapter	4,	the	LNW	was	always	labeled	negatively	and	considered	one	of	the	poorest	neighborhoods	in	New	Orleans.	Being	physically	separated	by	the	Canal	and	surrounded	by	water	contributed	to	the	exclusion	of	the	neighborhood	from	the	inside	out.	“In	1923	the	construction	of	the	Industrial	 Canal	 further	 isolated	 the	 areas	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 city,	 dividing	 the	Ninth	Ward	 into	 the	 upper	 and	 lower	 sections.	 Thus,	 the	 Lower	Ninth	Ward	 referred	 not	 so	much	to	the	altitude	of	the	land	but	more	to	its	proximity	to	the	mouth	of	the	river	below	the	 Industrial	 Canal”	 (Wilkinson,	 2010,	 p.	 6).	 When	 the	 residents	 experienced	 the	segregation	of	their	area	from	the	city,	they	turned	onto	themselves	and	created	a	self-sustaining	 LNW	 with	 home	 gardens,	 corner	 stores,	 and	 small	 retail	 stores	 along	 St.	Claude	Avenue	(Wilkinson,	2010).	This	feeling	of	seclusion	reinforced	the	existing	bonds	and	many	members	of	the	same	family	lived	in	the	same	area.	When	Hurricane	Katrina	hit,	 the	 whole	 family	 was	 affected	 and	 people	 of	 the	 LNW	 had	 no	 one	 to	 help	 them	through	 their	 difficult	 time:	 “Everybody	 in	 New	 Orleans	 was	 going	 through	 the	 same	thing	so	who	were	you	going	to	go	to	for	help?	The	government	seemingly	had	no	clue.	I	didn’t	receive	any	assistance	until	the	end	of	November.	If	you	were	not	on	welfare,	like	we	weren’t,	it	seems	like	assistance	was	not	readily	available.”	(Wilkinson,	2010,	p.	14)	
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Feeling	Excluded	Residents	of	the	LNW	were	subject	to	being	labeled	poor	and	not	accepted	by	the	rest	of	the	city.	While	it	contributed	to	make	the	LNW	culturally	unique,	being	excluded	by	the	rest	of	the	city	nonetheless	led	the	residents	to	develop	a	negative	perception	of	themselves	when	compared	to	the	rest	of	the	city.	They	identify	with	being	on	the	other	side	of	the	Canal,	and	they	felt	unwanted	by	the	city,	before	and	after	Hurricane	Katrina	hit	 New	 Orleans.	 Many	 disliked	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 they	 were	 treated	 when	 they	wanted	to	return	to	the	neighborhood	after	 the	disaster,	with	mandatory	escort	by	the	National	Guard.	They	also	resented	being	labeled	“refugees”	by	the	media	when	they	did	not	leave	their	country.	
“the	 other	 thing	 that	 really	 hurt	more	 than	 anything	 else,	 is	 the	 news	
commentators	talked	about	refugees.	I	had	to	explain	to	my	14-year-old	
daughter,	 she	asked:	 “we	are	 refugees?”	 I	 told	her:	 a	 refugee	 is	 from	a	
foreign	country,	you	are	native	born,	you	can’t	be	a	refugee;	are	you	a	
displaced	American?	Yes	you	are,	refugee	no!”	(L9W_R&NPO6,	2012)	
“they	tell	us,	you	need	to	show	your	ID.	We	need	to	make	sure	that	you	
belong	here.	[…]	they	told	us	that	we	had	to	be	out	of	there	before	it	gets	
dark	as	 if	you	don’t	get	out	there	by	the	time	it	gets	dark	then	you	are	
not	allowed	to	leave	are	trapped	there	overnight.”	(L9W_R&NPO6,	2012)	
Obstacles	Faced	by	the	Residents	After	the	re-opening	of	the	LNW	and	authorization	given	to	let	people	come	back,	residents	were	struggling	with	insurance	companies	and	the	Road	Home	Program.	They	felt	that	they	were	discriminated	against	because	they	were	poor	and	black.		
“After	fighting	with	the	insurance	company,	now	we	started	to	fight	with	
the	state	government	and	the	Road	Home	Program.	The	RHP	maxed	out	
at	a	$150,000,	and	that	is	not	enough	to	replace,	and	rebuild	a	lot	of	the	
structure	 in	 the	 LNW.	 There	was	 no	 guarantee	 that	 you	 could	 get	 the	
whole	amount.	They	based	that	on	the	value	of	the	house	at	the	time	of	
the	 storm,	and	 they	used	a	 lot	of	 other	 formulas	 to	water	 it	down	and	
they	said	that	they	are	trying	to	make	sure	that	everybody	takes	a	piece	
of	it.[…]	and	after	the	fight	with	the	state	government,	you	have	to	fight	
with	city	hall.”	(L9W_R&NPO6,	2012)	
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“The	Road	Home	was	invented	as	a	way	to	bring	people	back	home	but	
in	reality	it	was	into	 ‘a’	home,	 ‘a’	house.	You	had	a	choice	to	make,	you	
got	more	money	if	you	decide	to	come	back	and	rebuild	your	home,	or	if	
you	decide	to	leave	all	together	and	move	somewhere	else,	you	could	do	
that	and	you	only	got	40%	to	60%	of	the	value	of	your	home.	So	lots	of	
people	 ended	 doing	 that,	 they	 sold	 their	 properties	 and	 they	 moved	
somewhere	else.”	(L9W_R&P7,	2012)	Also,	 the	 lack	of	schools	and	amenities	(grocery	stores,	pharmacy,	health	clinics,	etc.)	was	a	big	obstacle	for	people	not	returning.		
“We	only	have	one	school.	Before	the	hurricane	we	had	seven.	We	don’t	
know	 why	 we	 have	 one	 school	 only.	 They	 said	 there	 was	 one	 point	
something	 billion	 dollars	 to	 rebuild	 and	 they	 tore	 three	 schools	 down	
and	that	cost	almost	half	a	billion	dollars.”	(L9W_R2,	2012)	
The	Perception	from	the	Outside		Residents	were	asked	about	what	they	assumed	the	rest	of	the	city	thought	about	them.	 Some	 people	 said	 the	 government	 neglected	 them	 because	 they	were	 poor	 and	black	and	they	did	not	want	them	to	return.	Others	feel	that	the	city	does	not	want	them	as	 well,	 and	 that	 even	 the	 Road	 Home	 Program	 was	 designed	 to	 keep	 them	 from	returning.		
“The	people	on	the	other	side	of	the	canal,	they	look	at	us	like:	‘you	live	
down	there?	Are	you	out	of	your	mind?	Why	would	anyone	in	their	right	
mind	would	want	to	live	below	the	industrial	canal?’	they	view	us	as	the	
backwoods	aboriginals.	But	that’s	the	way	it	is.”	(L9W_R&NPO6,	2012)	
“	[The	LNW]	is	not	getting	any	attention.	We	need	to	get	out	and	get	our	
own	 money.	 You	 know	 nothing	 started	 here,	 there	 are	 plans	 for	
everything,	but	the	construction	has	been	going	on	here	now,	this	is	what	
President	Obama’s	quick	 shovel	 ready	projects.	They	have	been	 talking	
about	 this	 since	 2009,	 we	 knew	 about	 this	 3	 years	 ago,	 and	 now	 it’s	
starting.”	(L9W_R&NPO5,	2012)	
“there	 is	 always	 a	 negative	 connotation	 for	 being	 in	 the	 LNW,	 even	
before	there	were	black	people,	the	whole	people	were	considered	trash.	
No	matter	who	you	are	what	color	you	are.	My	dad	was	telling	that	they	
used	to	ride	bikes	into	St.	Bernard	and	the	police	would	chase	them	back	
to	 the	 Ninth	 Ward	 and	 tell	 them	 ‘get	 back	 in	 the	 ninth	 ward	
trash’”(L9W_R&P7,	2012)	
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“A	 lot	 of	 people	 never	 come	 down	here.	 And	 a	 lot	 of	 people	 think	 that	
Brad	 Pitt	 gave	 us	 these	 houses.	 They	 don’t	 realize	 that	 this	 is	 people’s	
land	 and	 people	 paid	 for	 it.	 They	were	 shocked	when	 they	 found	 out.”	
(L9W_R2,	2012)	
“The	 LNW	 is	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 disaster.	 Everything	 was	 focused	 on	 the	
LNW,	help	 those	poor	people,	we	weren’t	poor,	we	owned	the	 land.	We	
didn’t	 have	 a	 million	 dollar	 condo,	 but	 we	 owned	 the	 land.”	
(L9W_R&RV1,	2012)	
“in	neighborhoods	 like	 the	LNW	where	 there	 is	a	 lack	of	 resources	 […]	
the	mentality	of	 lack	 is	 really	 strong,	and	 they	 feed	of	 each	other,	 so	 if	
you	live	in	an	environment	you	are	very	protective	of	what	you	have	so	
you	 don’t	 want	 to	 share,	 you	 don’t	 want	 to	 risk	 somebody	 else	 taking	
what	you	have	because	you	 feel	 like	you	have	so	 little	already.	 […]	and	
that	leads	back	to	the	racism,	it	created	this	situation.”	(L9W_R&NPO4,	
2012)	The	 interview	extracts	presented	 in	 this	section	show	that	even	with	 the	strong	attachment	 the	 residents	 have	 in	 regards	 to	 their	 culture,	 their	 homes,	 and	 their	neighborhood,	 they	still	perceive	themselves	through	the	 lens	that	the	city	created	and	continues	to	see	them	through	it.	Over	the	years,	the	Canal	has	physically	segregated	the	neighborhood,	which	 in	 turn	 pushed	 away	 the	 residents.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 latter	kept	 to	 themselves	 and	 turned	 towards	 each	 other.	 While	 being	 fully	 aware	 of	 the	impression	 the	 outside	world	 had	 of	 them,	 they	 developed	 a	 sense	 of	 rejection	where	they	 only	 accepted	 each	 other	 and	 formed	 strong	 bonds	 between	 themselves.	 The	current	slow	rebuilding	process	is	a	direct	result	of	the	city	and	the	LNW	not	having	done	anything	 about	 restoring	 relationships	 between	 the	 city	 and	 the	 neighborhood	 –	 not	before	 the	 Hurricane,	 nor	 after.	 The	 city	 endured	 major	 corruption,	 especially	 post-Katrina,	 which	 led	 to	 loss	 of	 faith	 into	 the	 government.	 And	 people	 did	 not	 see	 any	change	 until	 the	 arrival	 of	 Mayor	 Landrieu	 and	 the	 new	 Obama	 administration.	 As	 a	result,	years	have	passed	and	residents	feel	they	need	to	figure	things	out	on	their	own,	yet	again.		
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6.3.3.	Professionals’	perception	of	the	LNW	As	 the	 author	 was	 interviewing	 the	 professionals	 to	 understand	 why	 the	 LNW	was	 not	 rebuilt	 seven	 years	 after	 the	 storm,	 and	 who	 is	 involved	 in	 the	 rebuilding	process,	 a	 different	 point	 of	 view	 about	 the	 neighborhood	 rose.	 Professionals	interviewed	 were	 planning	 professionals,	 planning	 professors,	 city	 officials,	 and	 non-profits	organization	representatives	(involved	or	not	in	the	LNW).		
The	Road	Home	Program	as	an	Obstacle	The	 main	 element	 that	 both	 sides	 agree	 on	 is	 the	 Road	 Home	 Program	 (RHP)	being	 an	 inefficient	 program	 for	 a	 neighborhood	 like	 the	 LNW,	 especially	 when	 the	homes	were	 passed	 on	 from	 generation	 to	 generation	 and	 the	 titles	were	 not	 cleared	properly.	According	to	an	old	rule	from	the	Napoleon	Code,	if	the	owner	of	a	property	did	not	 set	 a	 will	 in	 place	 before	 dying,	 then	 the	 latter	 is	 equally	 divided	 between	 the	children.	 Properties	 in	 the	 LNW	 were	 bought	 generations	 ago	 and	 handed	 down	 to	children	 and	 grandchildren.	 After	 Hurricane	 Katrina,	 this	 caused	 many	 delays	 in	 the	rebuilding	process	as	it	was	challenging	for	families	and	the	government	to	track	down	all	the	family	members	in	order	to	clear	home	titles.		
“…	in	the	LNW,	people	were	still	trying	to	prove	that	they	actually	lived	
in	the	property	and	had	some	rights	to	it,	and	they	were	waiting	for	the	
Road	Home	Program	which	was	extremely	slow	and	extremely	contorted	
and	 took	 years	 and	 years	 before	 any	 money	 really	 began	 to	 flow.”	
(NL9W_P5,	2012)	
“…	you	can’t	apply	 for	grants	knowing	that	you	don’t	have	a	clear	title	
on	the	property.	And	then	a	lot	of	the	paperwork	got	washed	away,	and	
got	 flooded	especially	 in	 the	LNW.	And	we	did	some	property	research,	
and	 at	 this	 point	 they	 had	 moved	 all	 the	 City	 Hall	 records	 to	 the	
convention	center	it	was	this	gigantic	circus.”	(NL9W_P6,	2012)	
“…	 the	 biggest	 barrier	 for	 [non-profit	 organizations]	 and	 for	 the	
homeowners	 also,	 is	 the	 state	 government.	 The	 billion	 and	 billions	 of	
dollars	that	were	allocated	to	get	people	home,	wasn’t	administered	well	
in	my	opinion.	[…]	So	as	a	result,	the	poorer	the	neighborhood	you	lived	
in,	 the	 less	 the	 resources	 you	had	at	 your	 disposal,	 the	 less	money	 you	
got.”	(NL9W_NPO3,	2012)	
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Acknowledging	the	Misconceptions	The	LNW	has	always	been	labeled	negatively.	Before	the	1960s,	 it	was	a	racially	mixed	poor	neighborhood.	 	Desegregation	 caused	 the	exodus	of	many	white	 residents,	who	were	replaced	by	African	Americans.	It	thus	became	a	poor	and	black	neighborhood.	Many	 of	 the	 interviewed	 professionals	 acknowledge	 the	 presence	 of	 misconceptions	about	the	LNW.	
“Part	of	what’s	held	the	LNW	back	is	that	it's	always	been	sort	of	isolated	
from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 city	 and	 looked	 down	 upon	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 city	 …	
there	 is	 this	 looking	 down	 on	 the	 LNW,	 and	 a	 lot	 of	 misinformation	
about	 thinking	 that	 it’s	 a	 lower	 elevation,	 its	 not.	 Lower	means	 down	
river.”	(NL9W_NPO3,	2012)	
“The	misconception	 is	 the	 lower	 component	 and	 the	 African	 American	
who	were	poor	and	desolate	and	subsidies,	 I	am	not	saying	that	wasn’t	
the	 case	 but	 it	was	 very	 vibrant	 historic	 community	with	 a	 lot	 of	 rich	
heritage.”	(NL9W_CO2,	2012)	
“One	 issue	with	 the	LNW	it	was	always	 the	 last	piece,	 it’s	 cutoff	by	 the	
Industrial	Canal	by	three	bridges	and	then	the	train	line.	So	to	get	 into	
downtown	New	Orleans,	you	have	to	cross	the	industrial	canal	on	one	of	
three	bridges,	 two	of	 the	 three	are	drawbridges,	 so	when	that’s	up	you	
are	 stuck.	 […]	 Many	 people	 choose	 not	 to	 go	 to	 the	 LNW	 for	 many	
reasons	 and	 I	 think	 the	 challenge	 with	 the	 LNW	 is	 what	 are	 the	
possibilities	for	the	LNW	to	be	a	sustainable	community	while	not	trying	
to	think	of	it	as	being	every	single	piece	of	property	has	to	be	occupied?”	
(NL9W_P10&P11,	2012)	
“…	a	neighborhood	that	historically	was	physically	and	socially	removed	
from	the	rest	of	 the	city	 that	 identified	 itself	as	country,	and	there	was	
very	 tightknit	 internally	 but	 not	 necessarily	 politically	 represented	 or	
connected	outside	of	itself.”	(NL9W_RS1,	2012)	
Drawing	Attention		In	the	wake	of	Hurricane	Katrina,	 the	area	received	a	 lot	of	media	attention	and	attracted	major	organizations	involved	in	the	rebuilding	process.	Some	of	this	attention	helped	the	area,	but	also	contributed	to	some	extent	in	its	late	rebuilding.	The	LNW	was	used	as	a	poster	child	for	the	whole	city,	and	many	tourists	come	to	see	the	devastation	of	the	LNW.	This	touristic	activity	requires	the	involvement	of	local	residents	as	tourist	
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guides,	and	thus	generates	revenue.	It	also	draws	a	lot	of	funding,	though	a	lot	of	it	is	not	necessarily	directed	towards	the	LNW.		
“I	think	the	LNW	got	a	lot	of	attention,	a	lot	of	positive	attention	because	
of	 all	 the	 negative	 that	 happened	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Katrina.”	
(NL9W_P10&P11,	2012)	
“Due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 LNW	 is	 in	 the	 region,	 we	 are	 paying	 more	
attention	to	the	LWN	due	to	Katrina	and	Rita,	and	right	after	the	storm	
we	brought	a	number	of	dignitaries	 in	the	areas,	 […]	the	LNW	was	the	
media’s	 target,	 so	 a	 number	 of	 people	 paid	 more	 attention	 to	 it.”	
(NL9W_CO2,	2012)		
“The	 LNW	 became	 to	 symbolize	 the	 destruction	 of	 New	 Orleans.”	
(NL9W_CO1,	2012)	
“…	the	LNW	became	the	symbol	of	the	city’s	tragedy,	because	it	really	is	
a	city-wide	tragedy	at	different	levels.”	(NL9W_P8,	2012)	
“The	LNW	had	been	the	spot	light	nationally.	All	had	gotten	lots	and	lots	
of	 attention	 from	 academics	 and	 urban	 planner	 and	 idealistic	 and	
opportunistic	types	of	all	stripes	and	sorts	and	through	all	that	attention	
and	time,	has	seen	very	little	payoff.”	(NL9W_RS1,	2012)	
Big	Storm	and	Bad	Economy	Many	of	the	planners,	city	officials,	and	non-profits	organizations	involved	in	the	LNW	 say	 that	 a	 lot	 of	money	 and	work	 have	 been	 invested	 in	 the	 area.	 However,	 the	economy	was	severely	hit	in	2008,	which	affected	the	amount	of	money	that	was	flowing	towards	the	city.	With	all	the	damage	caused	to	the	LNW,	many	residents	decided	not	to	return	 and	 that	 has	 caused	many	 challenges	 to	 the	 city	 and	 the	organizations	 that	 are	helping	the	LNW.		
“…	the	amount	of	funding	that	goes	to	the	LNW	compared	to	before	the	
canal,	 the	 per	 capita	 spending	 is	 unreal,	 the	 amount	 of	 debt-dollars	
going	 in,	 a	million	 dollars	 per	 person	 in	 funding,	 capital	 expenditures,	
road	 improvements,	 sewage	 improvement,	 levee	 work.”	 (NL9W_P6,	
2012)	
“The	only	thing	that	was	different	about	the	LNW,	the	force	of	the	water	
was	 so	 strong	 that	 it	 destroyed	 the	 houses	 completely,	 and	 that’s	
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different	from	slowly	rising	water	[…]	limited	resources	go	farther	when	
you	 are	 starting	 with	 a	 shell	 and	 not	 having	 to	 rebuild.	 That’s	 the	
distinguishing	 factor	 between	 the	 LNW	 and	 the	 other	 15	 very	 poor	
neighborhoods	that	flooded.”	(NL9W_P9,	2012)	
“…	in	community	development	and	redevelopment,	the	LNW	has	been	on	
the	 radar	 since	 well	 before	 Hurricane	 Katrina.	 Katrina	 exacerbated	 a	
situation	 that	 existed	 for	 years	 before,	 but	 there	 has	 been	 significant	
involvement	 and	 investment	 in	 the	 LNW	 by	 community	 development	
organizations	for	years.”	(NL9W_P10&P11,	2012)	
“Due	to	the	slow	progress	in	the	LNW,	the	senator	decided	in	2010,	and	
she	was	asked	by	the	residents	to	look	at	the	fact	that	they	didn’t	have	a	
high	 school,	 the	 senator	made	 a	 commitment	 to	 them	 that	 she	 would	
deliver	a	high	school.”	(NL9W_CO2,	2012)	
“The	 city	 has	 a	 place	 based	 strategy	 and	 one	 of	 their	 target	
neighborhood	is	the	LNW	and	they	are	putting	all	this	funding	towards	
the	school,	the	community	center,	the	fire	station,	roads.	So	we	are	trying	
to	 help	 them	 focus	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 what’s	 good	 in	 having	 all	 this	
infrastructure	 if	 you	 don’t	 have	 people	 living	 there?”	 (NL9W_NPO3,	
2012)	
“We	 started	 saying	 that	 there	 for	 to	 be	 a	 way	 to	 create	 an	 online	
community	 data	 information	 system	 that	 can	 be	 shared	with	multiple	
organizations	 and	 that’s	 when	 I	 started	 developing	 a	 very	 specific	
platform	 for	 this	WHODATANOLA	project.	 […]	 there	was	great	need	 to	
collect	 data	 that	 would	 help	 folks	 figure	 out	 how	 to	 help	 the	 LNW	 to	
come	back.”	(NL9W_P8,	2012)	
Disparities	Among	the	Neighborhood		Professionals	also	acknowledge	the	fact	that	there	are	some	disparities	within	the	neighborhood.	 Holy	 Cross	 being	 a	more	 historical	 area,	 it	 got	more	 funding	 and	more	positive	attention	than	the	northern	area.	Also,	the	Make	it	Right	Foundation	is	helping	people	close	to	the	levee	breach	to	return	and	rebuild	their	homes	following	green	and	sustainable	 standards.	 This	 foundation	 aims	 at	 re-installing	 a	 sense	 of	 community	 by	rebuilding	a	cluster	of	150	homes	in	the	same	area.	The	non-profit	organizations	that	are	involved	in	the	LNW	are:	lowernine.org,	NENA,	CSED,	The	Homeowner	Association,	LNW	Village,	and	Common	Ground.	They	all	work	for	the	residents	and	the	neighborhood,	but	their	work	 is	clustered	 in	specific	areas	and	they	have	 limited	resources.	Also,	some	of	
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them	do	not	cooperate	with	each	other,	and	that	causes	many	problems	to	the	city	and	hinders	the	rebuilding	process.		
“The	further	you	get	north	of	that,	so	north	of	the	MLK	charter	school,	at	
about	 Galvez,	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 people	 elected	 not	 to	 come	 back.”	
(NL9W_P10&P11,	2012)	
“One	of	 the	barriers	 in	 the	LNW,	 it	not	a	historic	district;	nobody	went	
back	to	determine	which	from	the	labeled	homes	actually	didn’t	need	to	
be	demolished.”	(NL9W_NPO3,	2012)		
“The	 residents	 who	 are	 there	 and	 the	 people	 who	 are	 considered	 the	
leaders	 of	 some	 of	 the	 organizations	 are	 doing	 the	 best	 that	 they	 can.	
But	they	are	not	cooperating	with	each	other	and	in	many	times	they	are	
not	cooperating	with	the	city.”	(NL9W_P8,	2012)	
“Every	 time	 I	 tried	 in	 the	LNW,	 there	were	a	 lot	of	 split	groups.	 It	was	
very	difficult.	[…]	there	is	a	lot	of	special	interest	people,	they	might	call	
themselves	 non-profits,	 some	 non-profits	 are	 wonderful	 and	 some	 are	
self-serving.”	(NL9W_P1,	2012)	
New	Administration		Finally,	 most	 of	 the	 professionals	 agree	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 change	 in	 the	 municipal	administration	was	a	positive	element,	but	it	came	a	little	late	in	the	process.	The	Nagin	administration	 made	 many	 promises	 that	 were	 never	 kept	 and	 corruption	 was	 a	significant	problem.	When	Mayor	Landrieu	was	elected,	he	promised	many	changes	but	it	 takes	 time	 to	 rebuild	 a	 torn	 city	 and	 reduce	 its	 corruption.	 This	 adds	 to	 people’s	motivation	and	hopefulness.	
“I	like	Mayor	Landrieu,	he	is	cleaning	house	in	every	which	way,	but	you	
try	to	clean	a	house	and	build	a	house	at	the	same	time	and	it’s	almost	
impossible.	 But	 I	 think	 that	 things	 are	 moving	 in	 the	 right	 direction.”	
(NL9W_P8,	2012)	
“I	think	our	mayor	[Landrieu]	is	effective,	so	I	think	there	has	been	a	lot	
of	 positive	 but	 you	 have	 to	 be	 very	 careful	 that	 sort	 of	 forward	
momentum	doesn’t	trample	on	the	people	who	make	the	city	what	it	is.”	
(NL9W_NPO3,	2012)	
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“I	think	with	the	new	mayor	[Landrieu]	things	are	happening.	You	have	
the	Sanchez	Center,	you	have	the	fire	station	is	coming	up,	you	have	the	
expansion	 of	 the	 MLK,	 you	 are	 going	 to	 have	 a	 new	 school,	 the	
infrastructure.	People	are	beginning	to	see	activity	in	the	LNW,	and	that	
makes	people	 feel	 hopeful.	Back	 in,	 and	 I	 not	 being	 critical	 of	 the	past	
administration,	but	they	said	that	a	 lot	of	things	were	going	to	happen	
but	it	really	didn’t.”	(NL9W_CO2,	2012)		From	the	professionals’	perspective,	 the	city	 is	 involved	 in	helping	 the	LNW	 in	coming	back.	But	there	are	many	barriers	to	face:	an	immense	devastation,	a	smaller	population,	and	 years	 of	 segregation	 (racial	 and	 physical).	 Professionals	 are	 well	 aware	 of	 the	misconceptions	 that	 the	 residents	and	 the	LNW	have	been	carrying,	 and	changing	 that	will	take	a	lot	of	time.		
6.3.4.	How	the	two	perspectives	lead	to	the	late	rebuilding	process?		The	 residents	 of	 the	 LNW	have	 always	 been	 excluded	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 city.	This	has	been	a	trend	that	dates	from	the	conception	of	the	neighborhood	and	more	so	when	 the	 Industrial	 Canal	 was	 built.	 As	 segregation	 came	 to	 an	 end,	 a	 major	transformation	 occurred	 in	 the	 LNW:	 it	 became	 majority	 African	 American	 coming	mainly	 from	 lower	 income	 families.	 Feeling	 secluded	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 city,	 the	residents	 turned	 towards	 each	 other	 and	 took	 care	 of	 their	 own.	 Over	 the	 years,	 the	combination	of	all	these	events	reinforced	the	segregation	of	the	LNW	and	its	reputation	was	 that	 of	 a	 drug	 and	 crime-ridden	 area,	majority	 black,	 and	 poor.	 It	 was	more	 and	more	neglected,	especially	with	the	high	levels	of	corruption	in	the	city.	The	LNW	is	an	area	with	limited	resources	and	with	under-insured	residents.	When	Hurricane	Katrina	hit,	a	monstrous	wave	washed	away	more	than	half	of	the	neighborhood.		Many	residents	could	 not	 evacuate	 and	 died.	 For	 those	 who	 survived,	 the	 level	 of	 stress	 that	accompanied	the	rebuilding	process	was	too	large	to	bear	and	either	died	or	decided	to	move	to	another	neighborhood	or	city.		From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 professionals—NPO	 representatives,	 city	 officials,	and	 planners—,	 other	 elements	 contributed	 to	 the	 LNW’s	 slow	 rebuilding.	 The	 storm	affected	 the	 whole	 city,	 and	 not	 only	 the	 LNW.	 The	 economic	 crash	 in	 2008	 reduced	greatly	the	amount	of	money	allocated	for	rebuilding.	With	the	funds	being	limited,	more	
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competition	appeared	between	the	NPOs	involved	in	the	neighborhood.	Also,	 too	many	residents	have	decided	not	 to	return,	and	 this	made	 it	difficult	 to	attract	 investors	and	businesses.	 Granted,	 a	 lot	 of	 attention	 has	 been	 given	 to	 the	 area.	 A	 lot	 of	money	was	donated	 for	 the	 LNW,	 but	 it	 is	 unclear	 how	 the	 money	 was	 managed.	 Yet	 the	 city	 is	investing	in	improving	streets	and	building	bus	shelters,	and	there	is	limited	amount	of	improvements	 that	 can	 be	 done	 since	 the	 administration	 has	 changed.	 The	 corruption	percolating	 from	 the	 Nagin	 administration	was	 a	major	 component	 that	 needed	 to	 be	addressed	 and	 fixed	 by	 the	 Landrieu	 administration,	 and	 change	 is	 happening	 only	incrementally.	In	conclusion,	there	is	a	gap	between	what	the	residents	and	professionals	think.	This	is	best	illustrated	in	the	figure	below	(Fig.	6.1.).			
	
	
	
	 		 Figure	6.1:	The	gap	between	the	residents	and	the	professionals	(source:	author)	Both	residents	and	professionals	agree	on	the	misconceptions	that	accompany	the	neighborhood	 and	 the	 barriers	 faced	 by	 the	 residents.	 The	main	 difference	 is	 that	 the	residents	are	under	the	 impression	that	 the	government	does	not	want	 them	to	return	and	 is	 continuing	 to	 neglect	 them,	 whereas	 the	 government	 and	 the	 planners	 claim	otherwise.	As	of	now,	the	LNW	has	only	a	quarter	of	its	residents	back,	thus	a	quarter	of	its	residences	rebuilt.	The	progress	 is	very	slow	when	compared	to	the	rest	of	 the	city,	especially	when	half	of	the	neighborhood	was	washed	away	during	the	disaster.	Also,	the	scarcity	in	available	resources	is	affecting	the	whole	city	and	not	only	the	LNW,	but	the	latter	is	the	neighborhood	that	shows	it	the	most.	The	most	unjust	element	is	the	use	of	
Residents’	Perception:	- Poor	neighborhood	- African	American	- On	the	other	side	of	the	Canal	
Professionals’	Perception:	- New	administration	is	more	proactive	- Many	residents	did	not	come	back	
?	
?	
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the	 tragedy—and	 of	 the	 LNW	 as	 a	 poster-child—to	 attract	 funds.	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	some	 miscommunication	 between	 the	 residents	 or	 their	 representatives	 and	 the	professionals.		Will	all	this	prevent	the	area	from	fully	recovering?	And	what	does	it	imply	for	the	future	of	the	LNW?	If	the	population	is	composed	of	mainly	older	people,	and	with	only	one	 school	 in	 the	 area,	 will	 it	 lead	 to	 a	 shrinking	 area	 until	 everyone	 leaves	 the	neighborhood	indefinitely?	
6.4.	Resilience	and	the	LNW,	the	residents	and	the	implications	This	section	aims	at	understanding	the	resilience	of	the	residents	and	that	of	their	neighborhood.	As	mentioned	 in	Chapter	3,	 it	 is	 imperative	 to	differentiate	between	the	various	 levels	 of	 resilience.	 More	 specifically,	 in	 section	 3.2,	 the	 literature	 shows	 that	resilience	 can	 be	 evaluated	 with	 tangible	 indicators,	 to	 which	 the	 author	 added	intangible	indicators	that	give	a	more	complete	evaluation	of	resilience.	Thus,	the	author	will	 first	 tackle	the	resilience	of	 the	residents,	and	then	the	neighborhood.	This	section	focuses	on	both	 types	of	data:	 the	 tangible	 indicators	 (Data	Center	numbers	 combined	with	the	compiled	indicators	in	section	3.2)	and	the	intangible	indicators	(the	interviews	with	the	participants).	
6.4.1.	How	does	the	data	reflect	on	the	resilience	of	the	LNW?		From	 the	 collected	 numbers	 in	 section	 6.2,	 the	 LNW	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 smaller	version	of	what	 it	used	 to	be	before	Hurricane	Katrina,	with	approximately	25%	of	 its	residents	 back.	 The	 percentages	 and	 ratios	 correspond	 to	 a	 similar	 pre-Katrina	 state;	with	 the	 population	 number	 being	 much	 lower	 as	 a	 difference	 (refer	 to	 table	 6.1	 for	numbers).	When	 it	 comes	 to	 housing,	 there	 are	more	 vacant	 lots	 but	with	 the	 smaller	population	size,	the	trend	is	easily	explainable.	Yet,	when	it	comes	to	the	total	occupied	housing	 units,	 the	 percentages	 before	 and	 after	 the	 hurricane	 are	 similar.	 The	 same	applies	 to	 income	 and	 poverty:	 the	 residents’	 average	 income	 varies	 approximately	between	$33,000	and	$36,000	per	year.	The	element	that	shows	significant	change	is	the	vehicles	available	per	household,	and	this	trend	implies	either	that	more	residents	have	
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acquired	cars,	or	that	only	those	possessing	cars	have	returned	to	the	LNW,	or	both.	As	for	 education,	 the	 percentages	 are	 very	 similar	 pre-	 and	 post-Katrina,	 and	 this	 trend	results	from	the	combination	of	the	presence	of	fewer	schools	and	the	lower	number	of	residents.		These	numbers	 show	a	 smaller	 sample	of	what	 the	LNW	was	before	 the	 storm,	though	this	does	not	necessarily	imply	a	smaller	footprint.	The	neighborhood	is	still	the	same	 in	 size,	 which	 is	 clear	 in	 the	 property	 surveys	 that	 were	 conducted	 by	WhoDataNOLA.	The	LNW	shows	a	clustered	and	random	rebuilding	configuration.	Figure	6.2	 shows	 the	 condition	 of	 the	 properties	 with	 blue	 for	 properties	 in	 good	 condition,	yellow/brown	for	properties	in	fair	conditions,	red	for	properties	in	bad	condition,	and	green	for	vacant	lots.	The	map	shows	three	distinctive	areas:	1)	the	northern	section	of	the	LNW	is	majority	vacant	lots	and	properties	in	bad	condition,	except	for	the	area	by	the	 levee	breach	 to	 the	east	where	 the	Make	 it	Right	homes	are	 located;	2)	 the	middle	section	is	half	rebuilt	with	vacant	lots	located	in	a	random	pattern	across	the	area;	and	3)	the	 southern	 section,	 the	 HC	 area,	 where	 the	 majority	 properties	 is	 in	 good	 and	 fair	condition,	with	a	 few	vacant	 lots.	The	HC	area	being	above	sea	 level,	 the	massive	wave	did	not	wash	it	away.	Hence,	its	residents	did	not	lose	their	homes	and	were	able	to	gut	and	clean	in	order	to	rebuild.	The	wave	washed	away	the	middle	and	northern	sections,	both	located	close	to	the	levee	breach.	These	are	the	two	sections	that	were	completely	devastated	by	Hurricane	Katrina.	
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	Figure	6.1:	WhoDataNOLA	map	of	vacant	and	rebuilt	properties.	The	northern	area	has	a	lot	of	empty	lots	and	the	southern	area	is	partially	rebuilt	and	recovered	faster	than	the	rest.	(source:	WhoDataNOLA.org)			
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It	 is	beyond	the	scope	of	 this	research	to	measure	resilience	quantitatively	with	the	use	of	indicators.	Yet,	it	was	imperative	to	attempt	a	comparison	of	tables	3.2	and	6.1.	The	 first	 table	 is	 a	 compilation	 extracted	 from	 the	 literature	 and	 reflects	 a	 cumulative	perspective	on	the	majority	of	the	indicators	that	are	taken	into	account	when	resilience	is	at	stake.	Table	6.1	is	compiled	from	the	Data	Center,	and	consists	in	a	reflection	of	the	indicators	that	represent	the	city	of	New	Orleans	and	its	neighborhoods.	Therefore,	the	table	 below	 (Table	 6.4)	 presents	 each	 of	 the	 indicators	 taken	 from	 the	 literature	 and	explains	 how	 they	 affected	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 LNW	 positively	 or	 negatively.	 This	analysis	 results	 from	 the	 informal	 talks	 and	 interviews	 conducted	 with	 the	 different	stakeholders.		Table	6.4:	The	tangible	indicators	taken	from	the	literature	and	put	in	the	context	of	the	LNW	to	show	if	the	indicators	affect	positively	or	negatively	the	resilience	of	the	neighborhood.	The	Analysis	results	from	the	interviews	with	the	different	stakeholders.	Refer	to	Table	3.2	for	the	sources	for	each	indicator	(compiled	by	the	author)	
Indicator	 Impact	on	
resilience	 Explanation	specific	to	the	LNW	
Governance/Institutional	Political	Power	 Negative		 Nagin	 administration	 did	 not	 invest	 in	 the	 area,	 whereas	Landrieu	administration	is	involved.	Recovery	 Negative	 The	 city	 and	 the	LNW	were	not	 prepared	 for	devastation	 as	large	as	Hurricane	Katrina.	Coping	 Negative	 More	 than	 half	 the	 residents	 have	 not	 returned,	 and	 those	who	have	are	still	struggling.	Preparedness	 Negative	 Residents	were	not	prepared	for	an	extended	evacuation	and	most	did	not	have	the	means	to	leave.		Adaptive	potential	 Negative	 The	 neighborhood	 and	 the	 residents	 are	 still	 struggling	 to	return	seven	years	after.			Uncertainty	 Negative	 The	lack	of	funds,	amenities,	and	support	create	an	uncertain	environment.		Cooperation		 Negative	 The	different	groups	and	NPOs	do	not	cooperate	together,	nor	does	the	government.		Trust	 Negative	 There	is	mistrust	toward	the	government	and	the	levees.	
Medical	Capacity	 Negative	 There	are	no	medical	facilities	in	the	LNW.		
Participatory	Development	 Positive	 Residents	 who	 rebuilt	 showed	 a	 lot	 of	 initiative	 and	participation	in	the	rebuilding	process	and	plans.	
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Indicator	 Impact	on	
resilience	 Explanation	specific	to	the	LNW	Local	organization		 Negative	 Random	rebuilding	and	NPOs	not	cooperating.		
Prevention		 Positive	 People	 are	 taking	 preventive	 measures:	 evacuate	 when	needed,	insure	property,	and	build	higher.		Auto-organization		 Negative	 Few	residents	took	initiatives	but	the	majority	did	not.		
Social	Diversity	 Negative	 The	 LNW	 is	 one	 of	 the	 least	 diverse	 areas	 with	 multiple	families	living	in	the	same	area.		Social	Structure	 Positive	 The	strong	bonds	contributed	to	the	return	of	the	residents.	
Livelihood	 Positive	 People	work	hard	and	lived	with	what	they	have.	
Gender	 Positive	 Equal	 ratios	 between	 female	 and	 male	 residents	 (refer	 to	table	6.1)	Age	 Negative	 Majority	older	and	few	young	residents	(refer	to	table	6.1).	
Physical	and	psychological	health		 Negative	 Residents	do	not	have	access	to	medical	facilities	in	proximity	of	the	LNW.	Place	Attachment	 Positive	 High	homeownership	rate	and	people	born	and	raised	in	the	LNW.		Cultural	values/	Traditions	 Positively	 Residents	 identify	 greatly	 with	 their	 churches,	 schools,	barbeques,	and	gatherings.	Adaptation/	Adaptability	 Positively	 Some	 residents	 are	 changing	 their	 habits	 and	 are	 better	prepared	for	the	future.	Education	 Negatively	 One	 school	 in	 the	 area	 and	 majority	 with	 a	 high	 school	diploma	(refer	to	table	6.1).	Knowledge	 Positively	 Residents	are	more	aware	of	their	vulnerability	and	are	more	informed.		Social	networks	 Positively	 Very	strong	bonds	exist	between	the	residents	and	the	church	plays	a	major	role.		
Economic	Income	 Negative	 The	LNW	is	a	low-income	area	(refer	to	table	6.1).	
Wealth	 Negative	 The	LNW	is	a	low-income	area	(refer	to	table	6.1).	
Technology/	Innovation		 Negative	 The	residents	of	the	LNW	do	not	rely	on	technology	except	for	some	new	houses	that	are	green	constructions.	
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Indicator	 Impact	on	
resilience	 Explanation	specific	to	the	LNW	Insurance	 Negative	 Most	residents	were	under-insured	pre-Katrina.		
Economic	stability	 Negative	 The	LNW	is	a	low-income	area	and	many	residents	lost	their	employment	after	the	storm.		Household	asset	 Negative	 Even	 with	 the	 high	 ownership	 rate,	 many	 homes	 were	undervalued	(refer	to	table	6.1).	Employment	 Positive	 The	 residents	 are	 hard	 working	 people	 and	 value	 this	mentality	(refer	to	table	6.1).	Land	tenure	 Positive	 Homeownership	 rates	 are	 among	 the	 highest	 in	 the	 LNW	(refer	to	table	6.1).	Susceptibility	 Negative	 The	LNW	remains	very	exposed	to	flooding.		
Poverty	 Negative	 The	LNW	is	a	low-income	area	(refer	to	table	6.1).	
Physical	Exposure	 Negative	 The	LNW	remains	very	exposed	to	flooding.	
Recurrence	 Negative	 Hurricanes	are	a	recurring	threat	multiple	times	every	year.		
Infrastructure	 Negative	 Roads	and	sidewalks	are	in	bad	condition.		
Resistance	 Positive	 The	Army	Corps	of	Engineers	improved	the	levee	system.	
Security	 Positive	 Police	presence	and	involvement	is	greater	in	the	LNW.		From	 the	 conducted	 interviews,	 with	 the	 residents	 and	 the	 professionals,	 it	 is	clear	 that	 the	 LNW	 faced	many	 obstacles	 since	 the	Hurricane	 took	 place	 in	 2005.	 The	series	of	events	that	followed	the	storm	hindered	the	recovery	process,	and	they	can	be	summed	up	as	follows:	- The	damage	caused	by	the	massive	wave	was	too	large	- The	death	toll	in	the	LNW	was	the	highest		- The	closing	of	the	neighborhood	with	restrictive	access	for	months		- The	lack	of	amenities,	infrastructure,	and	services		- The	title	clearing	creating	problems	with	the	Road	Home	Program	
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- The	using	of	the	LNW	as	a	poster	child	for	donations	- The	many	NPOs	working	in	the	LNW	but	not	cooperating	together	- The	economic	crisis	that	affected	the	whole	city	- The	lack	of	commitment	from	the	Nagin	administration		Table	 6.4	 shows	 that	 the	 LNW	 is	 not	 a	 resilient	 neighborhood,	 even	 without	putting	 numbers	 next	 to	 the	 indicators.	 Seven	 years	 after	 the	 storm,	 the	 LNW	 shows	early	signs	of	recovery,	despite	all	the	work	that	has	been	done.	Thus,	the	prospect	of	a	full	recovery	is	to	be	questioned.	How	does	this	unfold	in	the	short	term	and	in	the	long	term?	And	what	does	this	imply	when	the	numbers	and	the	indicator	show	two	different	realities?	The	first	shows	that	the	neighborhood	is	not	as	resilient	as	the	rest	of	the	city,	and	 the	 interviews	 show	 commitment	 and	 perseverance	 from	 the	 residents	 to	 rebuild	the	LNW.	These	questions	remain	yet	to	be	answered,	and	it	implies	that	more	research	needs	to	be	conducted	on	the	LNW.		
6.4.2.	How	does	the	Data	Reflect	on	the	Resilience	of	the	Residents?	As	shown	in	the	section	6.3,	the	residents	who	have	returned	to	the	LNW	identify	greatly	 with	 their	 neighborhood	 and	 are	 extremely	 attached	 to	 their	 community.	 But	how	does	this	reflect	on	their	level	of	resilience?		The	 residents	 who	 were	 interviewed	 are	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 people	 who	 are	determined	to	return	and	rebuild	their	homes,	their	community,	and	their	neighborhood.	It	was	challenging	to	gain	 their	 trust	and	to	have	them	agree	to	sit	 in	 for	an	 interview,	and	because	of	all	the	resistance,	the	researcher	did	not	have	the	opportunity	to	collect	quantitative	data	about	the	residents.	The	researcher	also	wanted	to	interview	residents	who	did	not	return	in	order	to	evaluate	their	level	of	attachment	to	the	area,	but	this	was	not	possible	due	to	lack	of	funding.		As	 for	 the	 residents	who	 have	 returned,	 the	 interviews	 showed	 a	 high	 level	 of	commitment	and	perseverance.	Even	facing	the	misconceptions	that	come	with	living	in	the	 LNW	 and	 the	multiple	 roadblocks	 they	 faced,	 they	 have	 not	 given	 up	 on	 the	 area.	They	are	doing	everything	in	their	power	to	bring	back	the	neighborhood	to	what	they	
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once	had.	In	terms	of	cultural	identity	and	attachment,	the	residents	have	showed	a	very	strong	sense	of	belonging	 to	 the	LNW,	as	 they	have	been	settled	 there	 for	generations.	Family	bonds	are	very	tight,	with	multiple	members	of	the	same	family	living	in	the	area.	Section	6.3.1	 focused	on	the	unique	cultural	 landscape	that	exists	 in	 the	LNW	and	how	residents	identify	with	the	local	culture	and	traditions.	The	objective	of	this	section	is	to	show	how	place	attachment,	 social	networks,	 and	memory	contribute	positively	 to	 the	resilience	of	the	residents.	Table	 6.4	 shows	 that	 by	 simply	 looking	 at	 the	 indicators,	 the	 LNW	 shows	 early	signs	of	recovery	and	this	points	to	an	uncertain	future.	Yet,	when	the	author	went	to	the	neighborhood	to	interview	the	residents,	it	was	clear	that	those	who	have	returned	are	very	 dedicated	 to	 rebuilding	 and	 they	 show	 an	 important	 attachment	 to	 their	neighborhood.	But	is	that	sufficient	to	say	that	they	are	resilient?	Why	 would	 residents	 who	 lost	 everything—their	 homes,	 their	 personal	belongings,	their	memories,	and	their	community—would	want	to	return	to	a	devastated	area?	This	question	is	simply	answered	by	the	following:	people	want	to	go	back	home.	From	 the	 inception	 of	 the	 LNW,	 residents	 who	 came	 to	 settle	 in	 it	 and	 stayed	 for	generations	have	made	it	a	home	to	them,	and	in	return,	they	became	have	settled	deep	roots	in	the	area.	This	neighborhood	matches	the	description	of	a	cultural	 landscape.	It	started	 as	 a	 swampy	 area	 that	 turned	 into	 farmlands	 for	 its	 first	 occupants.	With	 the	improved	 technology	 and	 the	 levees,	 these	 lands	 were	 divided	 into	 smaller	 lots	 and	developed	into	residential	areas	for	new	immigrants	and	free	people	of	color.	And	finally,	with	 the	 Industrial	 Canal,	 the	 LNW	 became	 a	 secluded	 neighborhood	 with	 majority	African	American	residents,	which	was	accentuated	further	when	segregation	came	to	an	end.	 It	 became	a	place	with	 a	 tightly	 knit	 community.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 a	 place	 that	was	transformed	 by	 people	 and	 they	 changed	 it	 to	 fit	 their	 own	 needs,	 and	 over	 time,	 the	LNW	acquired	its	own	unique	identity.	The	residents	of	the	LNW	are	trying	to	rebuild	a	neighborhood	with	similar	attributes	so	they	can	feel	home	again.	These	attributes	are:	
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- The	social	networks	 that	 they	once	knew	–	 the	 family	gatherings	and	networks,	the	churches	they	used	to	attend,	the	schools	that	their	children	used	to	go	to,	the	local	businesses	that	they	had,	and	the	social	events	that	brought	them	together.	- The	 strong	 attachment	 to	 their	 community	 –	 the	 LNW	 is	 a	 place	where	 people	looked	after	each	other,	worked	hard,	and	built	their	own	homes.		- The	unique	identity	–	residents	gathered	over	food	and	music,	took	part	in	Mardi	Gras	parades,	and	they	built	a	community	based	on	respect.		- The	good	memories	 they	have	of	 their	neighborhood	–	residents	reminisce	on	a	place	 that	 was	 safe	 with	 strong	 family	 values,	 and	 they	 have	 very	 distinctive	ability	 to	not	 think	about	the	 levees	or	 the	 floods;	but	Hurricane	Katrina	will	be	forever	engraved	in	their	memory.		- The	collective	cultural	values	 that	 they	all	 share	–	working	hard	 to	buying	 their	own	home,	attending	church	with	family,	and	gather	over	food	and	music.			Other	 intangible	 elements	 have	 been	 acquired	 through	 the	 hard	 experience	 of	rebuilding:	- Auto-organization:	residents	have	 learned	that	they	need	to	be	self-organized	to	bring	 back	 their	 neighborhood.	 Their	 personal	 commitment	 and	 involvement	does	not	compare	to	the	government	or	NPOs’	involvement.		- Social	learning	and	knowledge:	they	are	more	aware	of	their	vulnerabilities	and	of	the	 danger	 they	 face	 if	 another	 hurricane	 hits	 their	 city.	 They	 are	 more	resourceful	 and	 for	 those	 who	 never	 learned	 how	 to	 swim,	 they	 are	 either	learning	or	teaching	their	children.		- Empowerment:	residents	know	that	they	need	to	empower	themselves	in	order	to	get	 attention	 and	 to	 rebuild.	 By	 taking	 on	 initiatives,	 they	 understand	 they	 are	valued	and	by	being	on	the	other	side	of	the	Industrial	Canal	they	do	not	have	to	be	ignored.		- Diversity:	they	understand	that	change	and	having	a	more	diverse	neighborhood,	racially	 and	 economically,	 is	 a	 positive	 improvement.	 Opening	 the	 area	 to	 new	residents	will	attract	more	funds	and	more	amenities.		
	 186	
These	intangible	indicators	show	that	the	residents	show	signs	of	recovery,	some	have	rebuilt	and	are	helping	others	rebuild,	some	are	involved	in	NPOs,	and	others	are	involved	 in	 the	 opening	 of	 businesses,	 schools,	 and	 other	 amenities.	With	 their	 strong	attachment,	 social	 networks,	 knowledge,	 and	 auto-organization,	 residents	 have	proven	to	show	signs	of	resilience.	Their	implication	and	drive	in	the	rebuilding	of	their	homes	and	 community	 imply	 that	 the	 residents	 are	 working	 hard	 to	 bring	 back	 their	community,	 and	 maybe	 a	 few	 of	 them	 are	 individually	 resilient.	 But	 the	 fact	 that	residents	take	initiative	and	are	trying	to	improve	their	neighborhood	is	not	enough	to	make	 them	collectively	resilient.	 In	addition,	 the	numbers	show	that	 the	neighborhood	lacks	in	resilience;	thus,	what	does	that	imply	about	their	overall	resilience?		
6.5.	Hope	in	the	LNW	and	Improvements	since	Data	Collection	
6.5.1.	Hope	This	 section	 focuses	 on	 the	 hopes	 expressed	 by	 the	 residents	 and	 the	professionals	 since	 the	 data	 was	 collected,	 and	 on	 the	 steps	 that	 were	 taken	 to	 fulfill	them.	 When	 the	 interviews	 were	 conducted,	 the	 residents	 said	 that	 they	 felt	 hopeful	about	 the	 future	 of	 their	 neighborhood	 and	 their	 community.	 The	 majority	 showed	optimism,	more	awareness,	and	more	faith	for	an	improved	LNW.		
“As	 people	 rebuild,	 they	 are	 more	 clever,	 and	 they	 think	 ‘if	 this	 will	
happen	 again,	 how	 will	 I	 do	 this?’	 People	 are	 thinking	 about	 it.	 And	
hopefully	 it	 will	 be	 in	 everybody’s	 mind	 in	 this	 city.”	 (L9W_R&NPO5,	
2012)	
“Now	people	are	a	little	more	aware,	during	the	hurricane	season	people	
start	 preparing	 themselves	 early	 on,	 they	 start	 doing	 their	 checklists,	
and	watch	 the	news,	 collecting	batteries	and	getting	 radios	during	 the	
season.	 In	 case	 they	 need	 to	 evacuate,	 they	 put	money	 aside.	 […]	 I	 am	
very	optimistic.	I	think	this	area	has	a	great	deal	of	potential.	I	think	this	
area	 really	 has	 not	 hit	 a	 gross	 pert	 yet,	 I	 think	 we	 just	 need	 this	 one	
business	to	start.”	(L9W_R&NPO6,	2012)	
“There	 is	more	awareness	on	 the	ground.	Because	we	have	community	
groups	 that	 go	 out	 and	 share,	 the	 church	 shares	 information	 about	
evacuation,	and	we	have	an	evacuation	plan.”	(L9W_R&RV1,	2012)	
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6.5.2.	Empowerment		Some	residents,	especially	those	involved	in	NPOs	and	some	of	the	professionals,	feel	 that	 the	 residents	 of	 the	 LNW	 have	 become	 more	 empowered	 and	 are	 taking	initiatives	to	improve	and	continue	the	rebuilding	of	their	neighborhood.		
	
“Katrina	taught	the	people	of	this	area	a	valuable	lesson:	you	can’t	rely	
on	the	 federal	government	or	the	state	government	and	all	you	have	 is	
each	other.”	(L9W_R&NPO6,	2012)	
“The	hope	we	have	we	can	share	that.	As	long	as	we	have	hope,	and	I	was	
reading	that	in	bible	study:	 ‘The	hope	that	is	seen	is	not	hope	because	I	
got	it’,	but	the	hope	in	this	area	will	come	back	better	and	stronger,	but	
it’s	not	here,	and	how	do	you	get	it	here?	You	gotta	work	towards	it,	you	
gotta	 advocate,	 you	 gotta	 push	 for	 it,	 you	 gotta	 share	 with	 people.”	
(L9W_R&RV1,	2012)	
“And	 then	 you	 have	 everything	 else	 going	 on.	 You	 have	 neighborhood	
groups	who	 feel	 empowered,	 they	are	much	better	 organized,	 they	are	
much	more	organized	that	they	were	before.”	(NL9W_CO1,	2012)	
6.5.3.	Guarded	Optimism	As	for	the	professionals,	they	all	are	optimistic	about	the	LNW,	though	some	look	at	the	long-term	future	of	the	area	with	cautious	optimism.	
“I	 think	 the	 city	 as	 a	whole	 has	made	 really	 remarkable	 recovery.	 […]	
And	to	get	back	to	the	LNW,	the	recovery	has	been	uneven,	you	can’t	talk	
about	recovery	of	the	city	as	a	whole	you	have	to	look	at	it	neighborhood	
by	neighborhood,	not	only	the	LNW.”	(NL9W_NPO3,	2012)	
“I	 think	 there	 was	 paranoia	 when	 Gustav	 hit	 in	 2008,	 because	 people	
thought	it	was	Katrina	again.	But	I	think	that	everything	tested,	Gustav	
tested	the	system	and	people	are	very	aware	and	resilient	but	they	are	a	
little	 bit	more	 comfortable	 that	 they	 could	 come	 back	 go	 to	work	 and	
live	their	lives	again.”	(NL9W_P10&P11,	2012)	
“People	 are	 making	 sure	 that	 they	 have	 insurance.	 And	 I	 think	 that	
people	are	not	as	materialistic	as	they	were	pre-Katrina.	[…]	I	think	we	
have	done	a	lot.	We	had	to	rebuild,	and	basically	it	was	the	people,	it	was	
faith-based	organizations,	it	was	non-profit	organizations,	it	was	people	
who	still	volunteer	their	time.”	(NL9W_CO2,	2012)	
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“I	have	some	good	feelings	about	New	Orleans,	I	am	not	so	sure	that	they	
would	 transfer	 over	 to	 what	 the	 future	 of	 the	 LNW	 is	 going	 to	 be.”	
(NL9W_P5,	2012)	
“I	don’t	believe	that	 there	was	a	commitment	to	put	 the	type	of	money	
that	was	needed	to	build	a	neighborhood	up	[…]	I	think	there	is	less	of	an	
incentive	because	you	don’t	have	the	population,	you	don’t	have	the	tax	
base,	 you	 don’t	 have	 the	 homeownership	 level,	 you	 don’t	 have	 the	
political	will.	So	I	really	don’t	believe	that	there	is	a	sincere	commitment	
by	our	government,	meaning	our	 federal	and	 the	 state;	 I	 think	 the	city	
has	 some	 commitment,	 very	 limited	 to	 really	 bring	 that	 neighborhood	
back.”	(NL9W_P8,	2012)	
6.5.4.	Improvements,	Positive	Change,	and	10-year	anniversary	
Improved	Levees	and	Evacuation	Since	 the	 data	 was	 collected	 in	 2012,	 some	 positive	 changes	 took	 place	 in	 the	LNW.	An	 important	element	to	highlight	 is	 the	 levee	systems	have	been	 improved,	and	they	 have	 been	 put	 to	 the	 test,	 once	 with	 Hurricane	 Gustav	 in	 2008,	 and	 again	 with	Hurricane	Isaac	in	2012.	Yet,	as	Schleifstein	(2014)	puts	it	in	his	column,	“despite	levee	upgrades,	don’t	let	your	guard	down”,	people	need	to	be	constantly	reminded	that	in	the	advent	 of	 an	 approaching	 hurricane,	 safety	measures	 have	 to	 be	 taken.	When	 the	 city	calls	 for	 a	 mandatory	 evacuation,	 residents	 must	 leave	 and	 those	 who	 decide	 to	 stay	must	 bear	 the	 consequences	 of	 being	 on	 their	 own	 (Schleifstein,	 2014).	 There	 are	permanent	 structures	 being	 built	 on:	 the	 17th	 street,	 Orleans	 Avenue,	 and	 the	 London	Avenue	 canals.	 These	 structures	 “will	 include	 new	 gates	 to	 block	 storm	 surges	 and	pumps	 to	 move	 rainwater	 from	 the	 canals	 into	 Lake	 Pontchartrain	 during	 storms.”	(Schleifstein,	2014)	Also,	the	city	of	New	Orleans	now	has	an	online	page	designated	to	assist	 residents	 in	 better	 preparing	 for	 a	 hurricane	 and	 for	 an	 evacuation:	http://www.nola.gov/ready/21.	For	Hurricane	Isaac,	the	city,	mandated	an	evacuation	of	the	city	and	a	contraflow	plan	was	accessible	to	the	residents	on	the	local	newspaper’s	website,	NOLA.com	|	The	Times-Picayune	(refer	to	Figure	6.3).		
																																																								
21	Are	you	ready?	Get	informed.	Get	prepared.	Get	ready.	City	of	New	Orleans,	http://www.nola.gov/ready/		
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											 				Figure	6.3:	2012	Greater	New	Orleans	area	contraflow	map	(source:	NOLA.com	|	The	Times-Picayune)	(Swenson,	2013)	
Unsuccessful	Projects	Since	 2012,	 a	 few	 amenities	 opened	 in	 the	 LNW,	 or	 are	 under	 construction	 to	open	in	the	near	future,	and	others	are	still	struggling	to	open.	The	Alfred	Lawless	high	school	 was	 promised	 to	 open	 again	 to	 the	 residents	 of	 the	 LNW	 in	 2011	 (Vanacore,	2011).	 Unfortunately,	 it	 never	 saw	 the	 light	 of	 day,	 and	 according	 to	 the	 architect	 in	charge	of	the	project,		
“this	 school	 project,	 and	 I	 have	 designed	 the	 school	 for	 that	 project:	
Alfred	Lawless.	 […]	 and	we	had	 to	 change	 it	 several	 times	 to	meet	 the	
Louisiana	Recovery	School	District	(RSD)	requirements.	The	RSD	doesn’t	
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want	to	build	this,	because	they	don’t	think	that	there	should	be	a	school	
that	is	not	demographically	appropriate.”	(NL9W_P2,	2012)		Another	 project	 that	 never	 became	 a	 reality	 is	 the	 skatepark	 by	 the	 Lower	 9th	Ward	Village.	Due	to	lack	of	funding	and	code	violations,	the	park	was	never	completed.	The	park	was	 envisioned	 to	 be	part	 of	 the	 recovery	 and	 the	 revitalization	 of	 the	 LNW	(Lipinski,	2014).		
Upcoming	Projects	As	for	the	new	upcoming	projects,	the	LNW	now	has	its	first	CVS	drugstore,	which	opened	during	 the	 summer	of	 the	2015.	The	drugstore	 replaces	 an	abandoned	 service	station	and	a	residential	property,	and	is	located	on	N.	Claiborne	Avenue	(Sayre,	2014).	Also,	the	LNW	will	have	a	new	fire	station	and	a	community	center.	The	fire	station	will	cost	$4.1	million	and	the	community	center	will	cost	$19	million.	Both	will	 replace	 the	old	structures	that	were	destroyed	by	the	hurricane.	In	addition,	$44.9	million	are	being	invested	on	street	 repairs	 in	 the	LNW,	and	 these	 funds	are	part	of	 the	FEMA	Recovery	Roads	Program	 (Orleans,	 2013).	 The	 LNW	has	 also	 seen	major	 streetscape	projects	 to	enhance	accessibility	and	safety	for	the	residents.	The	first	phase	of	the	project	has	been	completed	in	2013,	and	the	second	phase	is	currently	underway	(Orleans,	2013).	These	projects	are	all	promoted	and	pushed	forward	by	Mayor	Landrieu.	He	is	showing	a	lot	of	commitment	towards	the	recovery	and	renewal	of	the	LNW,	and	continues	his	efforts	to	build	 the	 Alfred	 Lawless	 School.	 Also,	 with	 the	 mayor’s	 	 “place-based	 development	strategy,	 the	 Lower	 Ninth	 Ward’s	 recovery	 is	 benefiting	 from	 initiatives	 like	 the	 $52	million	 “soft	 second”	 mortgage	 homebuyer	 assistance	 program	 and	 Lot	 Next	 Door	Program	 reforms.”	 (Orleans,	 2013)	 With	 this	 project,	 WhoDataNOLA.org	 and	 New	Orleans	 Redevelopment	 Authority	 (NORA)	 identified	 vacant	 lots	 in	 the	 LNW	 for	 a	program	to	help	residents,	who	are	interested	in	expanding	their	lots,	to	purchase	vacant	lots	for	$100	(refer	to	Appendix	G).		There	have	been	many	improvements	in	the	area,	especially	with	the	commitment	of	 the	 local	 government.	 They	 are	 not	 enough	 to	 incite	 all	 the	 residents	 to	 return,	 but	they	are	 the	 first	steps	 toward	achieving	a	recovery	of	 the	LNW.	 In	addition,	 in	August	
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2015,	the	tenth	anniversary	of	Hurricane	Katrina	took	place,	and	the	main	focus	was	put	on	 the	 improvements	 of	 the	 city,	 and	more	 specifically	 the	 LNW.	 A	memorial	 site	 has	been	created	where	 the	 levees	breached.	This	place	will	always	be	remembered	as	 the	turning	point	in	the	lives	of	the	residents	of	the	LNW.	(Kleinschrodt,	2015)	
6.6.	Elements	to	Retain		This	 chapter	 focused	 on	 the	 results	 of	 the	 conducted	 fieldwork.	 The	 problem	remains	that	governments	and	planners	focus	on	the	physical	aspect	of	rebuilding,	while	they	disregard	 the	elements	 that	brought	 the	 community	 together	 in	 the	 first	place.	 In	addition,	 the	 collected	 data	 answered	 to	 ‘how’	 and	 ‘why’	 place	 attachment	 and	 social	networks	 render	 a	 community	 more	 or	 less	 resilient	 after	 the	 occurrence	 of	 a	catastrophe.	 The	 results	 fall	 under	 four	 distinct	 categories:	 1)	 exposing	 the	 recovery	process	 in	 the	 LNW,	 2)	 highlighting	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 as	 well	 as	 the	 different	perceptions	of	the	LNW,	3)	determining	the	resilience	of	the	LNW,	and	4)	portraying	the	continued	efforts	done	in	the	LNW	as	well	as	the	fears	expressed	by	the	stakeholders.		Firstly,	the	numbers	depict	the	neighborhood	as	poor,	uncared	for,	and	lacking	in	resilience.	 Whereas	 the	 interviews	 show	 that	 the	 residents	 are	 nonetheless	 very	implicated	in	the	recovery	of	their	neighborhood.	Looking	at	the	area	through	numbers	only	 proved	 to	 be	 inconclusive,	 leading	 the	 author	 to	 use	 mixed	 methods,	 notably	 to	conduct	 interviews	 and	 make	 field	 observations	 to	 give	 a	 realistic	 perspective	 of	 the	conditions	of	the	LNW.		Secondly,	 different	 perspectives	 surfaced	 when:	 1)	 identifying	 the	 cultural	landscape,	2)	the	reason	people	are	attached	to	their	neighborhood,	and	3)	what	renders	it	a	unique	place.	There	was	a	discrepancy	between	the	perspectives	of	the	residents	and	the	 professionals	 in	 the	 way	 they	 view	 the	 area.	 While	 residents	 believe	 that	 the	government	does	not	want	them	to	stay	and	they	felt	neglected,	professionals	showed	a	lot	of	 involvement	 in	 the	area.	But	with	a	bad	economy,	 the	 large	number	of	 residents	who	have	not	returned,	the	level	of	devastation,	and	the	corruption,	it	was	challenging	to	rebuild	the	city	as	it	was	before.	Therefore,	even	if	the	residents	have	a	strong	will	and	
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are	 implicated	 in	the	recovery	of	 the	LNW;	this	 initiative	 is	not	enough	to	render	them	resilient.		Thirdly,	when	it	comes	to	evaluating	the	resilience	of	the	LNW	and	its	residents,	it	turns	out	that	the	residents	show	signs	of	resilience	whereas	the	neighborhood	does	not.	The	 types	 of	 data	 collected	 show	 two	 different	 realities.	 For	 the	 residents	 who	 have	returned,	it	is	their	attachment	to	their	homes	and	their	social	networks	that	contribute	to	 their	 resilience,	 and	 that	 was	 clearly	 seen	 in	 the	 interviews	 and	 the	 intangible	indicators.	 As	 for	 the	 neighborhood,	 the	 indicators	 show	 that	 the	 neighborhood	 is	 far	behind	 in	 the	 rebuilding	 process,	 especially	 with	 the	 large	 number	 of	 non-returning	residents.	The	interviews	with	the	residents	and	the	professionals	show	a	certain	level	of	commitment	but	the	outcomes	are	slow	due	to	the	numerous	obstacles.		Finally,	 the	 collected	 data	 points	 at	 a	 neighborhood	 and	 its	 residents	 as	 not	resilient—even	 if	 the	 latter	 show	a	high	 level	of	 commitment	 toward	 the	 rebuilding	of	the	 area—the	 LNW	 as	 well	 as	 the	 whole	 city	 show	 signs	 of	 recovery,	 and	 most	importantly—hope.	 What	 will	 be	 a	 valuable	 element	 to	 study	 in	 future	 research	 is	whether	 or	 not	 this	 hope	 helped	 increase	 their	 resilience	 or	 not.	 Residents	 are	empowered	and	more	organized	than	they	were	prior	to	Hurricane	Katrina.	This	alone	can	add	to	the	continued	efforts	of	the	people	involved.	Yet	it	is	probable	as	well	to	see	people	 loose	 faith	and	give	up.	Another	study	10	years	down	the	 line	can	give	another	perspective	of	the	LNW	and	its	future.		In	conclusion,	 it	 is	 through	the	process	of	 identifying	the	cultural	 landscape	and	positioning	it	next	to	the	concept	of	resilience	that	it	became	possible	to	start	looking	at	the	resilience	of	the	neighborhood.	And	when	it	comes	to	evaluating	the	resilience	of	the	LNW,	 it	 turned	out	to	be	problematic.	From	the	collected	data,	 the	results	 indicate	that	neither	the	residents	nor	the	neighborhood	are	resilient.	This	being	said,	it	is	important	to	 point	 out	 that	 the	 residents	 are	 determined	 and	 the	 area	 shows	 signs	 of	 progress.	Regardless,	 a	 few	questions	 remain	 unanswered:	 how	 can	 the	 resilience	 of	 an	 area	 be	evaluated	if	the	residents	and	the	neighborhood	show	different	levels	of	resilience?	How	does	 this	 resilience	 evolve	 over	 time?	 These	 preoccupations	 lead	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 in	
	 193	
disaster	 research,	 the	measuring	 and	 evaluation	of	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience	 should	be	questioned.	It	also	shows	that	more	research	needs	to	be	done	to	properly	evaluate	the	resilience	of	a	geographic	area	as	well	as	its	residents.			 	
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Chapter	7: Discussion	and	Implications	of	the	Study	
7.1.	Overview	This	 chapter	 is	 divided	 into	 four	 sections.	 	 First	 the	 research	 problem	 and	question	are	presented	again	to	remind	the	reader	of	the	main	issues	addressed	in	this	dissertation.	Many	 elements	 are	 tackled	 throughout	 the	 chapters,	 and	 it	 is	 essential	 to	highlight	the	problem	again.		Second,	the	results	are	analyzed	in	the	light	of	the	problem	and	the	main	question.		It	is	pertinent	to	show	the	importance	of	setting	in	place	a	specific	research	strategy,	of	using	 an	 approach	 that	 help	 design	 the	 study,	 and	 of	 applying	 a	 methodology	 that	contributes	to	simplifying	a	complex	and	controversial	case	study.		Third,	the	author	presents	the	general	contributions	and	limitations	of	the	study.	Each	research	possesses	these	two	qualities,	without	which	research	cannot	advance.			Finally,	the	concept	of	resilience	is	revisited,	but	after	the	data	has	been	analyzed.	The	 author	 shows	 that	 resilience	 is	 a	 complex	 concept	 and	 measuring	 it	 should	 be	something	 that	 is	 not	 taken	 lightly.	 Undertaking	 such	 a	 task	must	 be	 done	 through	 a	holistic	 perspective.	 Taking	 into	 account	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 when	 evaluating	community	 resilience	 is	a	 crucial	 element	 in	disaster	 research	and	 this	 study	shows	 it.	Looking	at	the	cultural	elements	belonging	to	a	community	can	show	a	different	reality	than	 the	numbers	alone.	Therefore,	 it	 is	very	 important	 to	 look	at	 the	concept	 through	multiples	 lenses.	 	 Ultimately,	 because	 resilience	 is	 impacted	 by	 cultural	 elements,	 it	becomes	a	social	construction.		
7.2.	Revisiting	the	Research	Problem		The	majority	of	disasters	are	accompanied	by	substantial	loss.	This	loss	affects	the	different	levels	of	society:	the	economic,	the	physical,	the	social,	the	environmental,	the	political,	and	most	importantly	human	lives.	With	the	growing	number	of	people	living	in	clustered	 cities,	 the	 consequences	 of	 these	 disasters	 are	 increasingly	 becoming	debilitating.	 Early	 on	 in	 this	 document,	 the	 researcher	 states	 that	 the	 main	 problems	
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confronted	in	disaster	research	are:	1)	in	connecting	resilience	to	the	cultural	landscape,	2)	in	using	culture	as	essential	in	resilience	building,	and	3)	in	using	qualitative	data	in	the	evaluation	of	 a	 community’s	 resilience.	This	dissertation’s	 challenge	 is	 to	 tackle	 all	three	problems	 in	order	 to	answer	 the	main	research	question.	The	 latter	 interrogates	the	importance	of	taking	into	account	place	attachment	and	social	networks	in	creating	resilient	urban	communities.		Connecting	 culture	 to	 resilience	 is	 not	 established	 in	 the	 literature.	 And	 as	presented	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 both	 concepts	 of	 vulnerability	 and	 resilience	 have	 been	 used	extensively	in	disaster	research	and	management.	This	dissertation	does	not	undermine	the	 importance	 of	 these	 two	 concepts,	 but	 it	 adds	 another	 layer	 —the	 cultural	landscape—	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account.	 At	 a	 first	 glance,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	cultural	 landscape	 and	 resilience	 seems	 improbable,	 until	 they	 are	 both	 scrutinized	through	 their	 respective	 indicators.	 In	 doing	 that,	 the	 author	 designed	 interviews	 to	understand	 if	 elements	 of	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 can	 contribute	 to	 the	 resilience	 of	 a	devastated	 community,	 such	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 LNW	 post	 Hurricane	 Katrina.	 To	establish	 these	 relations	 and	 to	 move	 forward	 in	 the	 study,	 the	 author	 used	 a	 mixed	methods	research	design.	The	strategy	was	set	 in	place	so	as	to	follow	exploratory	and	explanatory	approaches	while	using	qualitative	and	quantitative	data.	This	is	important	to	 highlight	 as	most	 disaster	 related	 studies	 rely	mainly	 on	 quantitative	methods	 and	data.	By	using	this	approach,	the	research	was	able	to	reach	more	insightful	results.		
7.3.	Interpretation	of	the	Results	
7.3.1.	Bridging	between	the	Cultural	Landscape	and	Resilience	As	 shown	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 by	 looking	 at	 resilience’s	 indicators	 and	 identifying	 the	social	ones,	it	became	clear	that	the	same	indicators	that	affect	social	resilience	are	part	of	 the	 cultural	 landscape.	 From	 that	 point	 onward,	 the	 relationship	 between	 both	concepts	 is	 established,	 but	 how	 does	 it	 impact	 disaster	 research?	 This	 question	 is	answered	not	only	at	the	theoretical	level,	but	also	at	the	case	study	level.	This	research	managed	 to	 establish	 this	 by	 utilizing	 the	 literature	 in	 identifying	 indicators	 and	 by	
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designing	 the	 interview	 questions	 so	 as	 they	 demonstrate	 the	 importance	 of	 place	attachment,	topophilia,	and	social	networks	in	post-disaster	management	and	recovery.	The	historical	evolution	of	the	city	shows	how	the	exclusion	of	the	neighborhood	became	the	primary	reason	behind	its	strong	and	unique	cultural	identity.	In	the	results	chapter	of	this	document	(Chapter	6),	and	more	specifically	in	section	6.3.1,	the	elements	of	the	cultural	 landscape	 contribute	 to	 residents’	 attachment	 to	 the	 neighborhood.	 They	 also	identify	 with	 the	 LNW	 and	 the	 social	 networks	 that	 have	 been	 established	 over	 the	generations.	With	all	the	devastation	that	happened,	and	with	all	the	vulnerabilities	they	keep	on	facing,	the	residents	who	have	returned	do	no	accept	to	leave	the	area.	Through	the	observations	of	 the	 researcher,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 residents	have	a	 strong	sense	of	belonging	to	the	neighborhood	and	its	social	networks.	Seven	years	after	the	Hurricane,	the	 residents	 strongly	believe	 that	 the	LNW	 is	 coming	back	and	 their	hopefulness	was	highlighted	in	their	interviews.	Using	the	LNW	as	a	case	study	shows	how	important	and	relevant	all	these	elements	are	in	bringing	back	and	in	rebuilding	a	community.	And	even	if	the	different	types	of	data	lead	to	proving	that	the	neighborhood	and	its	residents	are	not	resilient,	but	it	demonstrates	the	significance	in	using	them	for	future	assessments.	After	all,	without	strong	communities,	cities	will	no	longer	thrive.			
7.3.2.	Using	Culture	in	Post-Disaster	Rebuilding	It	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 culture	 is	 not	 an	 element	 that	 is	 taken	 into	account	when	post-disaster	rebuilding	is	undertaken,	and	it	was	imperative	to	evaluate	whether	or	not	it	is	of	relevance	to	consider	it	so	as	to	foster	resilient	communities.	Also,	mixing	 types	of	 data	not	 only	 allowed	 to	 take	 the	 results	 further,	 but	 also	 it	 helped	 in	answering	 the	 research	 question.	 	 In	 the	 example	 of	 the	 LNW,	 it	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	complex	 case	 study	 as	 the	 historical	 evolution	 unraveled	 to	 be	 part	 of	 understanding	both	 the	 problem	 and	 the	 solution.	 By	 understanding	 the	 evolution	 of	 both	 the	neighborhood	as	well	as	the	city,	it	turns	out	that	the	cultural	mesh	that	defines	the	LNW	is	the	backbone	of	the	community’s	identity	and	the	reason	for	its	vulnerability.	By	being	excluded—physically,	economically,	racially,	and	socially—from	the	rest	of	 the	city,	 the	LNW’s	community	grew	stronger	and	closer.	But	also,	this	exclusion	contributed	greatly	
	 197	
to	 driving	 the	 neighborhood	 off	 the	 radar	 and	 to	 become	 a	 crime-ridden	 area.	 This	exclusion	played	an	important	role	in	abusing	and	in	ignoring	it.	It	was	abused	by	local	authority	 and	 it	 was	 ignored	 by	 local	 officials,	 as	 it	 is	 shown	 in	 section	 6.3.	 Over	 the	years,	the	neighborhood	was	transformed	from	a	mixed-income	and	racially	mixed	area,	to	a	low	income	and	majority	African	American	area.	This	process	shred	away	the	core	values	of	the	LNW	and	the	residents	had	to	fend	for	themselves.	In	the	interviews,	many	residents	were	looking	back	at	the	past	and	reminiscing	about	the	time	when	the	LNW	was	a	safe	and	family-oriented	neighborhood.		Through	the	researcher’s	observations,	it	is	clear	that	the	LNW	is	being	rebuilt	in	a	random	type	of	patchwork.	With	the	different	NPOs	involved	in	the	neighborhood,	the	work	is	scattered	and	unorganized.	The	disparities	between	the	two	sub-neighborhoods	are	evident	and	they	contribute	to	the	slow	rebuilding	process.	Yet	these	NPOs	have	one	thing	in	common,	and	that	is	to	take	into	consideration	people’s	needs.	The	Make	It	Right	Foundation	 proposed	 rebuilding	 homes	 with	 the	 same	 characteristics	 as	 the	 typical	shotgun	homes	but	with	a	more	sustainable	configuration.	Also,	this	organization	has	a	clear	mandate	to	rebuild	150	homes	in	the	same	cluster	of	blocks.	These	are	located	on	the	 western	 side	 of	 the	 neighborhood,	 north	 of	 Claiborne	 Avenue	 where	 the	 levees	breached.	The	questions	remain,	how	are	residents	going	 to	maintain	solar	panels	and	the	 complex	 equipment	 that	 accompanies	 such	 type	 of	 buildings?	 And	 how	 are	 these	clusters	of	green	homes	going	to	impact	the	architectural	heritage	and	future	of	the	area?	Another	element	that	came	out	of	the	interviews	and	of	the	researcher’s	observation,	the	NPOs	played	and	continue	 to	play	a	significant	 role	 in	 the	healing	process.	 In	addition,	the	 uneven	 rebuilding	 of	 the	 LNW	 will	 definitely	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 its	 future’s	architectural	 identity.	 Some	 people	 have	 rebuilt	 in	 the	 exact	 same	 way	 and	 others	followed	 a	more	 sustainable	 and	 green	 design	with	 elevated	 structures.	How	will	 that	impact	the	future	identity	of	the	LNW?	Should	the	architectural	and	historical	aspects	of	the	neighborhood	be	ignored	in	order	to	bring	back	the	community?	The	author	believes	that	these	elements	are	part	of	the	cultural	identity	of	the	neighborhood.	Thus,	will	this	identity	change	over	the	course	of	history?		
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The	 approach	 used	 in	 this	 dissertation	 demonstrates	 the	 importance	 of	 taking	into	account	cultural	values	and	identity	when	rebuilding	post-catastrophe.	It	is	through	the	meetings	conducted	by	NPOs	that	many	residents	were	able	to	not	only	rebuild	their	homes,	 but	 also	 to	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 move	 on	 with	 their	 lives.	 Before	 Hurricane	Katrina,	 it	was	 the	 churches	 and	 the	 backyard	 barbeques	 that	 gathered	 people.	 Seven	years	 after,	 another	 form	 of	 social	 gathering	 was	 added,	 and	 that	 is	 the	 result	 of	gatherings	in	and	after	meetings	organized	by	NPOs.	This	research	does	not	undermine	the	 importance	 of	 setting	 urban	 policies,	 stabilizing	 the	 economy,	 and	 rebuilding	infrastructures.	 It	 only	 underlines	 the	 importance	 of	 adding	 cultural	 identity	 and	 the	elements	of	the	cultural	landscape	to	the	list	of	priorities.	As	it	appears	in	the	LNW,	it	is	imperative	for	people	to	gain	back	their	cultural	anchorage	in	order	to	recover	from	the	devastation	 they	 have	 witnessed,	 which	 they	 are	 trying	 long	 and	 hard	 to	 put	 behind	them.		
7.3.3.	A	Methodology	that	Explains	a	Controversial	Situation		As	 the	 data	 and	 the	 historical	 study	 of	 the	 LNW	 show,	 the	 situation	 in	 the	neighborhood	is	quite	controversial.	 It	 is	a	complex	situation	due	to	all	 the	 interwoven	layers	that	contribute	to	its	unique	value,	yet	these	layers	are	at	the	heart	of	the	problem.	On	one	hand,	 the	LNW	categorizes	 itself	with	having	strong	 family	values	and	a	strong	cultural	 identity.	 And	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 the	 neighborhood	 that	 has	 the	 most	difficulty	in	rebuilding	and	in	having	the	majority	of	its	residents	return	after	Hurricane	Katrina.	 By	 using	 primary	 and	 secondary	 sources,	 multiple	 conclusions	 surfaced.	Statistics	show	one	aspect	of	the	situation,	and	it	is	the	tangible	and	pragmatic	side	of	the	results.	 The	 numbers	 show	 that	 many	 residents	 have	 not	 returned	 and	 that	 many	amenities	are	absent.	And	the	interviews	and	observations	highlight	the	many	difficulties	and	obstacles	that	the	residents	faced	and	continue	to	face.	Therefore,	even	the	collected	data	reflects	the	controversial	aspect	of	the	situation.	And	that	not	only	justifies	the	use	of	 mixed	 methods,	 but	 also	 proves	 that	 this	 approach	 is	 instrumental	 in	 disaster	research.	Using	such	a	methodology	in	circumstances	as	complex	as	in	post	catastrophe	planning	gives	an	extended	vision	of	 the	economic,	political,	 environmental,	 and	 social	
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statuses,	which	can	give	decision	makers	many	opportunities	in	making	better	decisions	in	order	to	avoid	major	loss	should	any	future	calamities	take	place.		In	 addition,	 through	 the	 triangulation	 of	 the	 data,	 this	 dissertation	 reached	 an	unexpected	 conclusion.	 The	 NPO	 meetings	 that	 were	 supposed	 to	 be	 helping	 people	rebuild	 their	 homes,	 solve	 neighborhood	 related	 issues,	 and	 act	 like	 the	 connection	between	residents	and	city	officials,	ended	up	doing	more	that	these	tasks.	These	NPOs	became	the	place	where	people	came	to	vent	and	they	felt	safe	to	address	any	issue	they	needed	to	talk	about.	The	meetings	and	the	time	spent	after	the	meetings	became	a	safe	haven	 for	 the	 residents,	 thus	 they	 became	 part	 of	 the	 healing	 process.	 People	 were	surrounded	by	others	who	had	gone	through	the	same	ordeal	and	have	lost	as	much	as	they	did.	These	meetings	also	contributed	at	bringing	neighbors	that	did	not	know	each	other	closer.	And	if	someone	suspects	any	criminal	activity	on	their	neighbor’s	property	while	they	are	absent,	then	they	feel	mandated	to	call	the	police	and	report	it.	NPOs	and	the	meetings	 that	 take	place	started	with	a	specific	mission,	and	ended	up	offering	 the	residents	much	more.	These	organizations	have	created	a	new	form	of	social	interaction	between	 the	 residents,	 thus	 a	 new	 form	 of	 social	 network	 that	 did	 not	 exist	 prior	 to	Hurricane	Katrina.		As	stated	 in	Chapters	1	and	2,	 the	 literature	shows	that	 the	majority	of	disaster	research	uses	quantitative	methods	to	evaluate	the	resilience	of	a	geographic	area.	And	qualitative	methods	do	exist	 in	post-disaster	studies	but	 there	 is	 something	essentially	lacking.	 This	 absence	 is	 noted	 by	 the	 undermining	 of	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 when	communities	are	rebuilt.	In	this	research,	the	author	proposes	the	addition	of	qualitative	methods	 to	 approach	 the	 issue.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 underline	 the	 importance	 of	 using	quantitative	 methods	 along	 side	 qualitative	 methods.	 This	 dissertation	 does	 not	undermine	the	relevance	of	either	method	alone;	it	reinforces	the	usage	of	both	in	order	to	propose	more	cumulative	and	sustainable	long-term	solutions.	As	a	result,	the	author	is	aware	that	mixed	methods	research	may	not	be	new	to	disaster	research,	but	it	is	the	approach	 proposed	 in	 this	 research	 that	 demarcates	 it	 from	 other	 post	 catastrophe	projects.	 It	 is	 the	 use	 of	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 as	 a	mean	 to	 understand	what	 existed	
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before	 the	calamity	 in	order	 to	understand	people’s	needs	and	aspirations	 for	a	better	and	faster	recovery	process.		
7.4.	General	Contributions	and	Limits	of	the	Research		
7.4.1.	General	Contributions	of	the	Research		This	 dissertation	 aims	 to	 contribute	 to	 post-disaster	 research	 at	 the	 level	 of	connecting	the	different	concepts	of	vulnerability,	resilience,	and	cultural	landscape;	and	at	 the	 level	 of	 the	methodology	where	 different	 types	 of	 data	 are	 used	 to	 answer	 the	research	question.	This	research	was	able	to	do	both	as	shown	in	the	previous	sections.	Through	 the	 literature,	 a	 bridge	 was	 built	 between	 the	 concepts	 and	 the	 results	reinforced	the	pertinence	of	building	such	connections.		While	 uncovering	 the	 links	 between	 vulnerability,	 resilience,	 and	 cultural	landscape,	 two	 types	 of	 indicators	 revealed	 to	 be	 important.	 The	 literature	 focuses	 on	tangible	 indicators	 in	evaluating	vulnerability	and	resilience.	And	when	the	author	was	looking	for	connections	between	the	concepts,	it	became	clear	that	intangible	indicators	were	 not	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 disaster	 research,	 as	 they	 are	 difficult	 to	 quantify.	Therefore,	 this	 dissertation	 proposed	 looking	 at	 resilience—and	 more	 specifically	community	resilience—through	intangible	indicators.	In	the	process,	the	study	revealed	that	place	attachment,	social	networks,	memory,	cultural	identity,	roots,	and	many	more;	affected	 community	 resilience.	 Yet	 these	 newly	 identified	 indicators	 are	 part	 of	 the	cultural	landscape.	This	research	contributes	at	building	bridges	between	different	fields	of	 research	 in	 order	 to	 enrich	 the	 existing	 literature	 in	 disaster.	 This	 strategy	 aims	 at	complementing	other	post-disaster	studies	in	taking	into	account	intangible	indicators	in	future	post-disaster	studies.		In	 addition,	 the	 approach	 used	 in	 this	 research	 permitted	 the	 testing	 of	 the	proposed	 model	 on	 the	 specific	 case	 of	 the	 LNW	 after	 Hurricane	 Katrina.	 The	 model	proposed	in	Chapter	3	focuses	on	the	concept	of	resilience	and	how	it	is	evaluated.	The	model	 uses	 not	 only	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 methods,	 but	 also	 focuses	 on	 the	cultural	 landscape	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 better	 assess	 the	 needs	 of	 a	 devastated	 community.	 By	
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mixing	 the	data,	 and	scrutinizing	 the	concepts	of	 resilience	and	cultural	 landscape,	 the	approach	 took	 the	 research	 in	 a	 unique	 direction	 where	 the	 results	 unraveled	 in	 the	process	 and	 new	 information	 emerged.	 The	 latter	 is	 explained	 in	 detail	 in	 section	 6.5	where	all	the	stakeholders	expressed	hope.		
7.4.2.	Limits	of	the	Research		With	 the	 many	 contributions	 this	 dissertation	 offers,	 yet	 it	 still	 holds	 a	 few	limitations.	 Some	of	which	would	have	been	 relevant	 to	 tackle	 and	others	 allowed	 the	research	to	take	the	form	that	it	did.	The	limits	of	this	research	are	mainly	concentrated	around	the	fact	that	time	and	money	were	limited.	Consequently,	it	was	not	possible	to	conduct	the	same	study	on	other	neighborhoods	in	New	Orleans	in	order	to	evaluate	the	different	levels	of	resilience	between	the	different	neighborhoods.	Doing	a	comparative	study	 of	 the	 different	 areas	 would	 have	 allowed	 the	 researcher	 to	 apply	 the	 same	approach	to	other	parts	of	the	city	and	evaluate	how	the	indicators	fluctuate.	But	by	only	concentrating	 on	 the	 LNW,	 the	 author	 was	 able	 to	 spend	 most	 of	 her	 time	 in	 the	neighborhood	and	better	understand	the	intricacies	of	the	LNW.	Another	limitation	was	not	having	access	to	residents	who	have	not	returned.	The	researcher	could	not	collect	data	about	 the	 latter	so	as	 to	evaluate	 their	 level	of	attachment	 to	 the	LNW.	Especially	that	many	moved	to	other	cities	or	even	states.	Interviewing	these	residents	could	have	added	 another	 perspective	 about	 the	 neighborhood	 and	 how	 they	 saw	 it	 before	 the	storm.	Yet	focusing	only	on	the	residents	who	have	returned	allowed	the	researcher	to	see	their	level	of	commitment	and	engagement.	Even	if	the	numbers	show	that	residents	and	the	neighborhood	are	not	resilient	in	2012,	but	the	interviews	show	that	they	both	portray	 signs	 of	 resilience.	 The	 residents	 are	 highly	 implicated	 and	 involved	 in	 the	process	 of	 rebuilding	 the	 LNW.	 Also,	 the	 city	 is	 more	 involved	 in	 the	 area	 since	 the	administration	changed.	In	addition,	this	keeps	the	door	open	to	see	how	much	progress	they	 will	 eventually	 accomplish	 in	 the	 future;	 for	 example,	 in	 2022	 or	 in	 2032.	 This	research	proves	that	resilience	evolves	over	time	and	at	the	different	scales	of	the	city.	And	since	the	residents	show	signs	of	resilience,	conducting	the	study	ten	or	fifteen	years	later	 can	 lead	 to	 different	 results.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 data	 shows	 different	 realities	 only	
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questions	the	relevance	of	trying	to	measure	resilience.	Furthermore,	another	limitation	to	point	out	about	 the	 interviews	 is	 the	difficulty	 to	gain	people’s	 trust.	As	 it	was	very	challenging	 to	 do	 so,	 the	 author	managed	 to	 get	 open-ended	 interviews	 but	 could	 not	collect	any	quantitative	data	pertaining	to	the	interviewed	residents.	After	the	data	was	collected	and	analyzed,	 it	did	not	seem	pertinent	to	have	this	 information,	but	 it	would	have	added	another	layer	of	data	and	the	author	believes	it	to	be	of	value.	Finally,	the	last	limitation	is	evaluating	the	impact	of	the	resilience	of	the	LNW	on	the	city.	The	study	did	not	 determine	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 LNW’s	 resilience	 on	 the	 whole	 city,	 what	 are	 the	implications	of	one	neighborhood	on	the	rest	of	 the	city?	These	questions	 indicate	that	this	 research	 is	only	 the	beginning	of	 a	bigger	 research	 initiative	 that	needs	 to	 look	at	resilience	through	the	cultural	landscape	and	with	a	team	of	specialized	professionals.		
7.5.	Revisiting	the	Concept	of	Resilience	
7.5.1.	Time,	Scale,	and	Levels	of	Resilience	Using	the	LNW	as	a	case	study	for	this	research	proved	to	act	as	a	filter	to	not	only	look	 at	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 residents	 and	 the	 neighborhood,	 but	 also	 to	 look	 at	 the	concept	of	resilience.	In	Chapter	3,	section	3.3,	the	author	highlighted	the	importance	of	differentiating	 between	 time	 and	 space,	 the	 different	 levels	 of	 resilience,	 and	 at	 the	different	 geographical	 scales.	 The	 use	 of	 the	 LNW	 proved	 that	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	individual	 was	 different	 from	 the	 household’s,	 and	 from	 that	 of	 the	 neighborhood.	 As	portrayed	 in	 figure	 3.1,	 and	 in	 Table	 5.3,	 at	 the	 individual	 level,	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	residents	of	the	LNW	is	different	from	one	person	to	the	other.	Those	who	have	returned	showed	 a	 strong	 attachment	 to	 their	 neighborhood	 and	 to	 their	 social	 networks.	 And	these	are	the	elements	that	contributed	to	increasing	their	resilience.	Also,	among	those	who	have	returned,	some	are	more	resilient	 than	others,	some	of	 them	are	 involved	 in	NPOs	and	committed	to	improving	the	whole	neighborhood	and	rebuilding	their	homes	higher	 (on	 stilts)	 and	 they	 have	 insurance.	 Others	 just	 want	 to	 get	 their	 lives	 back.	Overall,	 the	 residents	 of	 the	 LNW	 show	 signs	 of	 resilience	 but	 are	 not	 fully	 there.	Furthermore,	 they	prove	themselves	 to	 lack	 in	resilience	without	 their	social	networks	because	without	 the	 elements	of	 the	 cultural	 landscape,	 the	 area	does	not	prove	 to	be	
	 203	
resilient.	 This	 is	 especially	 pertinent	 in	 the	 LNW	 because	 the	 residents	 who	 have	returned	and	rebuilt	their	homes,	proved	that	they	based	their	decisions	on	the	strength	of	 their	 attachment	 to	 their	 homes	 and	neighborhood	 as	well	 as	 their	 social	 networks	(family	and	church).		At	the	household	level,	different	members	of	the	same	family	show	different	signs	of	 resilience.	 Some	 members	 of	 the	 same	 family	 decided	 to	 rebuild,	 whereas	 others	decided	not	to,	which	causes	 family	bonds	to	rupture.	Also,	some	family	members	died	during	the	storm,	which	broke	down	the	family	network.	Others	could	not	return	due	to	the	 lack	 of	 schools,	 thus	 forcing	 them	 to	 stay	 in	 different	 cities	 in	 order	 to	 pursue	 the	education	 of	 their	 children.	 These	 rifts	 between	 family	 members	 are	 affecting	 the	number	of	residents	who	have	returned,	and	are	preventing	others	from	returning.		At	the	neighborhood	level,	some	areas	in	the	LNW	have	proven	to	recover	faster	than	 others	 like	 the	 Holy	 Cross	 area,	 which	 benefitted	 from	 being	 located	 at	 a	 higher	level	than	the	rest	of	the	neighborhood.	The	rest	of	the	LNW	was	more	severely	damaged	than	the	southern	section,	rendering	it	longer	and	costlier	to	rebuild	and	revitalize.	But	from	 the	 numbers,	 the	 observations,	 and	 the	 interviews,	 the	 LNW	 shows	 signs	 of	recovery	seven	years	after	Hurricane	Katrina,	but	is	not	resilient,	as	it	has	not	adopted	a	functional	equilibrium	and	lacks	in	basic	amenities.		At	 the	 city	 level,	 each	 neighborhood	 in	 the	 city	 recovered	 at	 a	 different	 speed.	From	 the	 author’s	 personal	 observations,	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 most	 of	 the	 city	 had	undergone	more	progress	than	the	LNW.	As	the	interviewed	professionals	pointed	out,	it	was	necessary	to	reach	the	city’s	population	number	that	existed	before	the	storm,	and	most	of	them	looked	at	the	future	of	the	city	with	hopefulness	and	positivity.	They	also	claimed	that	many	lessons	were	learned,	and	that	the	city	was	attracting	new	and	young	professionals,	which	is	a	positive	change	because	New	Orleans	has	for	long	been	known	for	its	‘brain	drain’	that	forced	the	young	people	of	the	city	to	leave	in	search	for	a	better	future	elsewhere.		At	the	state	and	country	levels,	New	Orleans	received	a	lot	attention	from	the	rest	of	 the	nation	because	 it	exposed	many	 issues	 that	were	 ignored	 for	decades.	Being	 the	
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most	costly	disaster	in	the	history	of	the	United	States,	Hurricane	Katrina	caused	major	devastation	 and	 thousands	 of	 lives	were	 lost	 in	 the	 process,	 but	 it	 opened	 the	 eyes	 of	elected	officials	that	they	had	to	make	the	necessary	changes	to	avoid	such	a	disaster	in	the	future.	There	is	much	work	to	be	done	yet,	especially	at	the	state	and	at	the	federal	levels,	but	since	Hurricane	Katrina,	the	levees	have	proven	to	withstand	and	the	disaster	preparedness	mentality	is	changing.		But	how	does	the	resilience	of	one	neighborhood	affect	the	resilience	of	the	city?	With	 the	 LNW	being	used	 as	 a	 poster-child	 and	 an	 image	 for	 the	 tragedy	 that	 the	 city	went	through,	the	area	and	its	residents	found	themselves	on	the	city’s	radar.	After	being	neglected	 and	 set	 aside	 for	 decades,	 the	 LNW	 has	 finally	 found	 some	 attention	 and	recognition.	 It	will	not	be	enough	to	erase	 the	misconceptions	 that	have	been	 installed	into	 the	city’s	memory,	but	 it	can	be	 the	beginning	of	a	positive	change.	Unfortunately,	this	recognition	was	at	the	cost	of	people	losing	their	lives	and	everything	they	had.		Also,	 this	 proves	 that	 time	 is	 an	 essential	 element	 because	 resilience	 evolves	continuously.	 The	degrees	 of	 resilience	 of	 the	 area	 and	 its	 residents	 vary	 according	 to	each	 specific	 stage:	 the	 moment	 the	 hurricane	 takes	 place,	 the	 moment	 people	 can	return,	 the	 moment	 they	 start	 rebuilding,	 etc.	 Resilience	 proves	 to	 have	 different	temporalities.	These	depend	on	the	chronological	evolution	of	 the	different	events	 that	take	place:	 it	 starts	with	 the	beginning	of	 the	disaster,	how	 it	 is	managed,	up	until	 the	geographic	area	finds	a	functional	equilibrium.	The	level	or	the	degree	of	resilience	of	a	community	 or	 of	 a	 city	 changes	 with	 the	 different	 disaster	 temporalities.	 Before	 the	Hurricane	 hit	 the	 city	 of	 New	 Orleans,	 the	 neighborhood	 of	 the	 LNW	 had	 already	 its	resilience	tested.	When	the	levees	breached	in	the	early	morning	hours,	it	was	before	the	eye	of	the	storm	made	a	landfall	in	the	city,	half	of	the	area	was	underwater	and	homes	were	 lifted	off	 their	 foundations	and	many	 lives	perished.	 It	 is	at	 that	 specific	moment	that	the	temporalities	of	the	Hurricane	can	be	highlighted,	they	go	as	follows:	
• At	this	specific	temporality,	resilience	was	null	because	it	was	the	moment	of	shock	happened.		
• The	following	temporality	is	undergoing	the	storm	and	its	winds.		
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• Once	the	storm	passed,	the	temporality	that	follows	is	rescuing	people	and	managing	the	big	blow	and	the	hole	in	the	levees.		
• Then,	 it	 was	 the	 proper	 maintenance	 of	 the	 levees	 and	 cleaning	 up	 the	area.	
• During	 this	 time,	 the	area	was	closed	off	 to	 its	own	residents	and	 it	 took	months	for	people	to	have	access	to	their	homes.	
• Then	came	the	rebuilding	plans,	the	Road	Home	Program,	and	the	NPOs.		
• Some	people	decided	to	rebuild	as	their	homes	were,	some	decided	to	opt	for	more	sustainable	structures,	and	others	could	not	manage	to	clear	their	titles	to	rebuild.		
• For	 years,	 it	 was	 obstacle	 after	 obstacle	 for	 the	 residents,	 and	 up	 until	2012	some	residents	managed	to	move	back	in	and	other	not.		
• The	 following	 temporality	was	 bringing	 some	 amenities	 to	 the	 area	 and	improving	roads	and	access	to	the	area.	But	 what	 comes	 next	 is	 still	 unpredictable,	 as	 the	 future	 of	 the	 LNW	 remains	unknown.	With	each	of	the	temporalities	stated	above,	the	resilience	of	the	residents	and	their	 neighborhood	 changes.	 Therefore,	 how	 can	 resilience	 be	 measured	 if	 it	 changes	constantly?	Is	it	an	effective	way	to	determine	the	resilience	of	a	city,	its	neighborhood,	and	 its	 residents	 every	 five	 years,	 ten	 years,	 or	 more?	 Can	 researchers	 take	 specific	timespans	and	measure	resilience?	The	residents	of	the	LNW	are	in	constant	fight	with	time,	 especially	 as	 resources	 become	 scarcer	 with	 the	 years	 passing.	 However,	 it	 is	through	 their	 commitment	 and	 their	 organization	 that	 things	 are	 changing.	 Since	 the	data	was	collected	in	2012,	and	up	until	2015,	many	positive	changes	took	place	in	the	LNW,	and	 this	can	only	be	 the	sign	of	 their	perseverance	and	 their	will	 to	not	give	up.	This	evolution	affects	their	resilience	directly,	and	it	only	adds	to	the	complexity	of	the	concept.		Many	elements	have	proven	to	affect	the	resilience	of	the	area	of	study.	When	the	tangible	 indicators	were	 taken	 into	 consideration	 alone,	 the	neighborhood	had	proven	itself	not	to	be	resilient.	The	numbers	are	a	reflection	of	a	specific	time,	the	year	2010.	
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The	Data	Center	indicators	are	based	on	the	U.S.	Census	Bureau,	and	they	were	collected	in	2000	and	2010,	while	Hurricane	Katrina	took	place	in	2005.	Hence,	the	numbers	are	a	good	 indication	 of	 the	 drastic	 change	 that	 took	 place	 in	 New	 Orleans,	 and	 more	specifically	 in	the	LNW.	Since	this	data	 is	only	collected	every	ten	years,	 then	 it	will	be	pertinent	to	compare	the	2010	numbers	to	the	2020	numbers	and	evaluate	the	evolution	of	the	neighborhood	and	how	it	affects	its	resilience.		As	for	the	intangible	indicators,	they	show	the	level	of	attachment	of	the	residents	to	their	neighborhood,	their	culture,	and	the	social	networks.	Through	the	interviews,	it	was	possible	to	have	a	different	perspective	from	the	one	portrayed	by	the	quantitative	data.	 The	 residents,	 who	 have	 returned,	 have	 proven	 to	 be	 perseverant	 and	 hard-working	people	in	bringing	back	their	neighborhood	and	community.	They	have	not	lost	hope	in	the	future	of	the	LNW.	The	residents	and	their	neighborhood	have	been	receiving	a	 lot	 of	 attention	 from	media	 and	 from	 the	 city,	 some	 yielding	 positive	 results,	 some	negative.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 LNW	was	 put	 back	 on	 the	 map	 at	 the	 city	 level	 and	 at	 the	country	level.	Will	Hurricane	Katrina	open	a	new	chapter	in	the	history	of	the	LNW	and	of	the	city	of	New	Orleans?	Will	it	be	less	neglected,	if	so,	how	will	that	change	the	LNW?		It	was	imperative	to	look	at	resilience	from	a	cumulative	perspective	because	the	numbers	show	a	different	reality	than	the	interviews.	The	case	of	the	LNW	as	well	as	the	research	 approach	 have	 permitted	 to	 scrutinize	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience,	 and	 this	reinforces	 the	 arguments	 proposed	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 in	which	 it	 states	 that	 resilience	 is	 a	complex	concept.	The	case	study	proved	that	resilience	can	change	depending	on:	1)	the	geographic	scale	at	which	the	studied	area	is	located	(individual,	neighborhood,	city,	or	country),	2)	the	time	between	the	moment	the	disaster	took	place	to	when	the	study	is	undertaken,	and	3)	the	different	levels	of	resilience.		Disaster	 researchers	 should	 take	 into	 account	 all	 the	 elements	 that	 affect	resilience,	 and	 the	 concept	must	 be	 looked	 at	 holistically	 in	 order	 to	 better	 assess	 the	resilience	 of	 a	 community,	 a	 neighborhood,	 or	 a	 city.	 Not	 looking	 at	 the	 concept	holistically	will	open	the	door	to	many	misinterpretations,	especially	since	this	concept	is	increasingly	 popular	 among	 scholars.	 Many	 authors,	 as	 stated	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 provide	
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different	definitions	to	this	highly	controversial	concept.	Instead,	researchers	should	not	look	 at	 resilience	 with	 a	 reductionist	 lens,	 for	 the	 concept	 did	 not	 start	 in	 disaster	research;	it	is	a	much	older	concept	that	was	initially	used	in	mechanics	and	psychology.	Therefore,	 researchers	 must	 give	 it	 justice	 and	 acknowledge	 its	 complexity	 before	looking	at	it	from	a	narrow-minded	perspective.		
7.5.2.	Resilience:	a	Social	Construction	As	mentioned	 in	Chapter	2,	 the	 literature	 states	 that	disasters	and	vulnerability	are	a	social	construction.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	with	the	growing	number	of	people	settling	 down	 in	 cities,	 the	 latter	 have	 become	 hubs	 of	 highly	 clustered	 urban	 fabrics.	When	disasters	hit	urban	areas,	they	directly	affect	the	people	inhabiting	the	space.	The	vulnerabilities	of	 the	affected	areas	percolate	 from	decisions	made	by	humans,	 turning	disasters	into	social	constructions.	With	 Hurricane	 Katrina	 and	 more	 specifically	 in	 the	 LNW,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	devastation	 caused	by	 the	 storm	 transpires	 directly	 from	 the	 decisions	made	 over	 the	years:	 developing	 a	 low	 lying	 area,	 building	 levees	 to	 expand	 the	 area,	 building	 the	Industrial	Canal	and	the	MR-GO,	and	suffering	from	economic,	social,	racial,	and	physical	segregation.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 LNW	 turned	 inward	 and	 that	 created	 very	 strong	 bonds	between	 the	 residents.	Over	 the	 years,	 the	 residents	 grew	more	 and	more	 attached	 to	their	 homes,	 their	 social	 networks,	 and	 their	 neighborhood.	 With	 a	 hurricane	 as	devastating	as	Hurricane	Katrina,	the	decisions	made	over	the	decades	ended	up	creating	a	 very	 vulnerable	 area.	 The	 vulnerabilities	 of	 the	 LNW	are	 socially	 constructed	 by	 the	decision-makers	 as	 well	 as	 by	 the	 residents.	 The	 decision-makers	 contributed	 to	 the	exclusion	of	 the	neighborhood,	 and	 the	 residents	 reinforced	 this	 exclusion	by	 shutting	down	from	the	rest	of	the	city.		With	a	unique	cultural	landscape,	the	LNW	stands	out	as	a	neighborhood.	Being	as	neglected	as	it	was	before	the	storm,	the	LNW	suffered	from	many	misconceptions.	The	elements	 that	 constitute	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 are	 place	 attachment,	 memory,	 social	networks,	 roots,	 and	 identity.	 What	 stands	 out	 the	 most	 is	 the	 topophilia	 that	 the	residents	 have	 developed	 over	 the	 generations.	When	 compared	 to	 older	 civilizations,	
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this	emotional	attachment	was	established	rather	fast	and	in	a	short	span	of	time;	it	only	took	a	few	generations.	And	this	can	be	due	to	many	factors:	being	excluded	from	the	rest	of	 the	 city,	 being	majority	African	American,	 and	 sharing	 similar	 Christian	 values.	 The	people	who	occupied	the	space	socially	constructed	the	cultural	landscape.		The	process	of	starting	off	with	natural	disasters	to	then	talk	about	the	concepts	of	 vulnerability,	 resilience,	 and	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 led	 this	 research	 toward	 social	constructionism.	The	 intangible	 elements,	 presented	 in	 this	 dissertation,	 play	 a	 role	 in	encouraging	people	to	return	after	the	occurrence	of	a	disaster,	which	is	proven	through	the	case	of	the	LNW.	These	intangible	elements	reinforce	the	resilience	of	a	community,	and	 thus	 become	 important	 elements	 to	 consider	 in	 post-disaster	 situations.	 This	research	started	by	relating	resilience	to	the	cultural	landscape	with	the	use	of	indicators	adopted	from	the	literature.	Then,	the	main	element	that	stood	out	was	the	fact	that	the	indicators	are	intangible,	which	sets	forth	the	type	of	methodology	used	in	this	research.	The	 used	 approach,	 and	 more	 specifically	 the	 conducted	 interviews,	 reinforced	 the	relation	 between	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 and	 community	 resilience.	 And	 when	 the	cultural	landscape	is	the	result	of	a	social	construction,	then	resilience	is	proven	to	be	a	social	 construction.	 This	 is	 demonstrated	 below	 in	 Figure	 7.1,	 which	 summarizes	 the	whole	process	of	this	research	project	and	shows	how	the	case	study	plays	the	role	of	a	filter	in	terms	of	reaching	results	at	the	theoretical	level	and	at	the	case	study	level.				 		
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	 Figure	7.1:	Graph	showing	the	whole	research	process	and	how	resilience	is	a	social	
construction	(source:	author)		
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7.6.	Elements	to	Retain	The	objective	of	this	chapter	is	to	show	how	the	research	problem	is	tackled	and	how	 the	 results	 are	 interpreted.	The	 latter	were	 looked	at	 from	 the	perspective	of	 the	research	question	and	they	show	how	the	different	data	contributed,	in	multiple	ways,	to	reaching	 the	 different	 conclusions	 stated	 in	 the	 earlier	 sections.	What	 is	 important	 to	highlight	 is	how	 the	mixing	and	 the	 interpretation	of	 the	data	end	up	clarifying	a	very	complex	situation.	Especially	when	put	alongside	these	multiple	layers:	historical,	social,	cultural,	political,	economic,	and	environmental.		Also,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 limits	 and	 the	 contributions	 of	 any	research	 as	 they	 draw	 the	 lines	 for	 future	 research.	 It	 is	 pertinent	 to	 underline	 that	 a	research	 project	 undertaken	 by	 one	 researcher	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 a	 project	 lead	 by	 a	group	of	researchers.	One	person	confronts	many	limitations	that	a	group	can	overcome,	which	is	one	of	the	main	recommendations	set	forth	by	this	research.	Furthermore,	it	is	the	limits	faced	by	the	author	that	ended	up	drawing	the	path	for	her,	and	that	process	led	 to	 reaching	more	 intricate	 results.	 This	 research	 reached	 results	 pertaining	 to	 the	case	study	as	well	as	the	theory	where	the	concept	of	resilience	is	re-evaluated	to	finally	conclude	that	it	is	a	social	construction.		
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Chapter	8:	Conclusion		When	disasters	 strike,	 and	after	 the	 chaos	has	 settled	down,	 the	 first	 thing	 that	comes	 to	 people’s	mind	 is	 returning	 ‘home’.	When	 people	 face	mandatory	 evacuation,	they	only	take	what	is	necessary,	thinking	that	they	will	return	to	find	everything	in	its	place.	But	when	the	disaster	causes	unimaginable	devastation,	people	end	up	losing	their	homes,	 their	memories,	 their	 social	 networks,	 and	 their	 community.	Most	 importantly,	many	lose	their	lives	in	the	disaster.			A	 community	 (Gemeinschaft)	 is	 the	 result	 of	 “real	 and	 organic	 life”	 (Tonnies,	1957).	 Communities	 are	 part	 of	 a	 cultural	 landscape	 that	 has	 taken	 form	 over	 the	generations.	It	is	the	immaterial	result	of	an	interactive	relationship	between	people	and	their	environment	 (refer	 to	 section	2.3.).	This	 relationship	 is	 the	outcome	of	 the	 social	networks	combined	with	place	attachment	that	people	have	established	for	generations	with	their	homes,	community,	and	neighborhood.	In	this	research,	the	main	concepts	of	interest	are	resilience,	vulnerability,	and	the	cultural	landscape.	First,	vulnerability	is	perceived	as	a	state	that	is	part	of	resilience,	and	is	measurable.	 Second,	 resilience	 is	 a	 continuously	 evolving	 concept	 that	 changes	with	time	and	at	the	different	scales	of	geography,	which	brings	out	its	complexity.	And	third,	the	cultural	landscape	helps	in	better	understanding	this	complexity	by	using	intangible	elements	to	evaluate	resilience.		This	 dissertation	 sets	 in	 place	 a	 new	 resilience	 model	 to	 study	 post-disaster	situations,	where	 it	 is	 evaluated	quantitatively	and	qualitatively.	But	 the	main	element	that	 makes	 it	 stand	 out	 is	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 to	 evaluate	community	resilience.	This	is	done	with	a	set	of	intangible	indicators	that	are	common	to	both	concepts.	This	process	led	to	not	only	establishing	a	relationship	between	the	two	at	the	theoretical	level,	but	it	also	led	to	using	a	mixed	methods	design	that	took	the	results	in	a	new	direction.	Also,	it	is	imperative	to	understand	resilience	before	dividing	it	into	sub-components.	Researchers	ought	to	look	at	it	holistically	and	assemble	the	pieces	of	the	puzzle	in	order	to	have	a	cumulative	and	comprehensive	perspective	about	it.		
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The	focus	is	geared	on	the	community	of	the	LNW	after	Hurricane	Katrina	while	using	a	mixed	methods	research	design	as	a	methodology.	This	allowed	for	a	collection	of	a	 wide	 array	 of	 data	 (quantitative	 and	 qualitative)	 in	 order	 to	 answer	 the	 research	question	 and	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience.	 If	 community	 resilience	 is	 better	understood	through	the	 lens	of	 the	cultural	 landscape,	 then	more	research	needs	to	be	conducted	on	 the	 subject.	 The	work	done	 in	 the	 course	of	 this	dissertation	 is	 only	 the	beginning	of	 a	 bigger	 study	 that	needs	 to	be	 conducted	by	 a	multidisciplinary	 team	of	researchers	and	professionals.		
The	Investigative	Process	This	research	 is	 the	result	of	an	 investigation	that	started	back	 in	2006.	Visiting	New	Orleans	one	year	after	Hurricane	Katrina,	and	more	specifically	the	LNW,	brought	forward	many	social	 injustice	 related	 issues.	 In	 the	general	 scheme	of	 things,	 the	LNW	was	devastated	beyond	people’s	 imagination.	The	series	of	events	that	percolated	from	the	disaster	and	the	rescue	efforts	kept	people	in	shock	for	years	to	come.	When	people	think	 about	 Hurricane	 Katrina,	 the	 first	 images	 that	 come	 to	mind	 are	 snapshots	 of	 a	flooded	 city,	 people	 trapped	 on	 their	 own	 roofs,	 and	 the	 superdome	 crammed	 with	people	in	distress.		One	year	later,	in	2006,	many	residents	of	the	LNW	were	still	trying	to	go	back	to	their	 old	 neighborhood	 and	 rebuild	 their	 homes.	 Yet	 it	 was	 hard	 to	 understand	 why	people	wanted	to	return	to	an	area	that	is	continuously	exposed	to	many	elements	that	contribute	to	its	vulnerability.	The	elements	that	exposed	people	to	risk	are	the	uneven	topography,	 the	 levees	 that	 breached,	 and	 the	 exclusion	 of	 the	 neighborhood	 at	 the	social,	physical,	and	economic	levels.	After	the	hurricane,	the	residents	wanted	to	return	‘home’	to	the	LNW	and	rebuild	the	neighborhood	they	once	knew	and	had.		The	main	 turning	points	 for	 the	neighborhood	were	 in	1961	and	 in	1965.	First,	when	 segregation	 came	 to	 an	 end,	 and	 due	 to	 white-flight,	 the	 neighborhood	 lost	 the	majority	of	its	white	residents,	and	it	became	a	majority	African	American	neighborhood.	Shortly	after,	Hurricane	Betsy	hit	the	city	and	pushed	the	last	of	the	white	residents	out	of	 the	 LNW.	 Over	 the	 years,	 the	 residents	 formed	 strong	 social	 networks	 and	 became	
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part	of	 their	 individual	and	neighborhood	 identity.	But	corruption	was	on	 the	rise	and	the	 LNW	 was	 perceived	 as	 a	 poor	 and	 crime-ridden	 area	 by	 the	 outside	 world.	 As	 a	result,	 residents	 kept	 on	 taking	 care	 of	 each	 other	while	 the	 city	 lost	more	 and	more	interest	in	the	LNW.	When	Hurricane	Katrina	hit	in	2005,	the	storm	destroyed	more	than	the	homes	of	this	neighborhood,	it	destroyed	the	neighborhood’s	identity,	social	networks,	landmarks,	cultural	 landscape,	 and	 everything	 that	 it	 stands	 for.	 The	 loss	 experienced	 by	 the	residents	 and	 the	 neighborhood	 was	 so	 great	 that	 the	 recovery	 process	 and	 the	rebuilding	process	were	very	challenging	(as	shown	in	the	interview	extracts	in	Chapter	6).	The	obstacles	faced	by	the	residents	accumulated	one	after	the	next,	and	seven	years	later,	 the	 neighborhood	 was	 only	 partially	 rebuilt.	 Because	 of	 many	 non-profits	organizations,	 the	 corruption,	 and	 the	 lack	of	 a	 consistent	plan,	 the	 rebuilding	process	was	done	randomly	and	haphazardly.		Before	 the	storm,	 the	LNW	had	an	architectural	 identity	with	 the	majority	of	 its	structures	built	like	shotgun	homes.	Now,	with	the	residents	who	built	higher	and	those	who	 did	 not;	 those	 who	 opted	 for	 green	 homes	 and	 others	 who	 did	 not,	 the	 LNW	resembles	a	big	puzzle	with	pieces	that	do	not	fit	anymore.		Since	2012,	the	LNW	has	evolved,	and	the	changes	that	took	place	since	then	are	part	of	the	recovery	process.	These	changes	contribute	to	building	back	the	community	and	 the	 neighborhood.	 The	 feeling	 of	 hope,	 and	 the	 feeling	 of	 accomplishment	 that	transpires	from	the	interviews	conducted	with	the	residents	of	the	LNW	(refer	to	section	6.5.),	help	in	moving	things	along	and	“bouncing	forward”.	New	Orleanians	do	not	wish	to	live	in	the	shadows	of	Hurricane	Katrina	anymore.	It	will	remain	part	of	their	history	and	it	will	not	be	forgotten,	but	they	need	to	move	on.	A	lot	of	people	are	focusing	on	the	positive	 elements	 that	 have	 taken	 place	 during	 the	 recent	 years.	 To	 see	 their	neighborhood	 and	 city	 go	 through	 a	 positive	 transformation	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	healing	 process,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 necessarily	 defines	 either	 the	 residents	 or	 the	neighborhood	 as	 being	 resilient.	 New	 Orleans	 cannot	 stagnate	 in	 the	 residues	 of	Hurricane	 Katrina,	 and	 its	 residents	 are	 focusing	 on	 the	 lessons	 learned.	 Putting	 the	
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experience	 they	 have	 endured	 behind	 them	 was	 greatly	 emphasized	 in	 2008	 when	Hurricane	Gustave	hit	 the	city	and	the	 levees	did	not	breach.	This	event	contributed	 in	increasing	people’s	 trust	 in	 the	 levees	and	the	 local	and	 federal	governments.	With	the	events	that	took	place	since	the	data	was	collected,	there	is	some	positive	progress	in	the	area,	enough	to	say	that	they	area	shows	signs	of	resilience.		This	 research	 answered	 the	 following	 research	 question:	 If	 a	 relationship	 is	established	between	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience,	 then	what	 is	the	 role	 of	 place	 attachment	 and	 social	 networks	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 resilient	 urban	communities	in	the	Lower	Ninth	Ward	after	Hurricane	Katrina?	And	by	trying	to	answer	this	question,	the	concept	of	resilience	is	scrutinized	from	different	angles.	This	research	established	a	relationship	between	the	cultural	landscape	and	the	concept	of	resilience	at	the	 theoretical	 level	and	at	 the	case	study	 level	while	using	a	mixed	methods	 research	design.	Place	attachment	and	social	networks	play	a	key	role	in	inciting	people	to	return	to	their	homes	and	neighborhoods,	because	devastated	areas	did	not	rebuild	themselves	without	 the	people	who	 resided	 in	 them.	 If	 community	 resilience	 is	 better	understood	through	the	lens	of	the	cultural	landscape,	then	more	research	needs	to	be	conducted	on	the	subject.	The	work	done	in	the	course	of	this	dissertation	is	the	beginning	of	a	bigger	study	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 piloted	 by	 a	 multidisciplinary	 team	 of	 researchers	 and	professionals.	
The	Concepts	of	the	Cultural	Landscape	and	Resilience	Scrutinizing	 resilience	 highlighted	 its	 complexity	 (with	 time	 and	 the	 scales	 of	geography).	By	looking	at	the	concept	through	the	cultural	landscape,	it	highlighted	the	gap	in	knowledge	when	it	comes	to	relating	the	two.	Culture	was	never	considered	when	evaluating	 or	 measuring	 resilience	 in	 disaster	 research	 because	 it	 is	 challenging	 to	quantify,	which	 is	acknowledged	by	researchers	 in	the	 field	 like	Cutter	et	al.	 (2008).	 In	addition,	 this	 research	 underlines	 that	 culture	 is	 not	 taken	 into	 consideration	 and	 is	undermined	 by	 planners	 and	 decision	 makers.	 Therefore,	 this	 dissertation	 looks	 at	resilience	 from	 a	 new	 perspective,	 one	 that	 prioritizes	 place	 attachment	 and	 social	networks	in	the	rebuilding	of	a	devastated	community.		
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This	 research	 recognizes	 that	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 and	 its	 components	 can	affect	community	resilience.	The	elements	that	constitute	the	landscape	are	an	important	contributor	 to	 the	 resilience	 of	 a	 devastated	 community.	 As	 presented	 in	 this	dissertation,	 the	 numbers	 show	 that	 the	 community	 of	 the	 LNW	 ended	 up	 being	 not	resilient,	but	the	interviews	show	a	different	reality;	one	that	demonstrates	that	because	of	 the	 strong	 attachment	 and	 social	 networks,	 the	 residents	 have	 been	 able	 to	 rebuild	parts	 of	 their	 neighborhood.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 take	 these	 elements	 into	account	 in	 future	 research	 projects	 so	 as	 to	 determine	 how	 they	 contribute	 to	 the	resilience	 of	 a	 devastated	 urban	 community.	 Therefore,	 the	 cultural	 elements	 should	become	part	of	the	rebuilding	process	after	the	occurrence	of	a	disaster.	The	intentions	behind	this	research	are	to	bring	the	cultural	elements	and	the	concept	of	resilience	to	light	 and	 to	 show	 their	 importance	 so	planners,	 city	 officials,	 and	 governments	do	not	undermine	them.	
General	scope		This	investigation	started	with	a	general	review	of	the	literature	with	a	focus	on	the	 concepts	of	 resilience,	 vulnerability,	 and	 the	 cultural	 landscape.	Then	 relationships	started	appearing	between	resilience	and	vulnerability,	and	between	resilience	and	the	cultural	 landscape.	 As	 the	 literature	 proposes	 measurable	 indicators	 to	 quantify	resilience,	 this	 research	 proposes	 a	model	 that	 digs	 deeper	 and	 proposes	 an	 in-depth	perspective	 about	 resilience.	 By	 combining	 the	 historical	 evolution	 of	 the	 city	 and	 the	LNW	with	the	mixed	methods	research	design	proposed	in	Chapter	4;	it	was	possible	for	the	researcher	to	find	the	reasons	behind	the	late	rebuilding	process,	and	to	unveil	 the	discrepancies	 and	 gaps	 between	 the	 residents	 and	 the	 professionals.	 The	 research	identifies	the	local	cultural	 landscape	and	the	reasons	why	people	are	attached	to	their	neighborhood.	 Also,	 by	 collecting	 multiple	 types	 of	 data,	 the	 researcher	 understands	better	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 community	 and	 the	 neighborhood.	 And	 this	 is	 possible	because	of	the	choice	of	the	methodology	that	allows	reaching	results	at	the	case	study	level	and	at	the	theoretical	level.	This	permitted	revisiting	the	concept	of	resilience	and	a	
	 216	
relationship	 is	 established	 between	 resilience	 and	 the	 cultural	 landscape,	 and	 that	confirms	that	resilience	is	a	social	construction.		This	research	provided	a	better	understanding	of	the	concept	of	resilience	and	to	determine	that	it	is	constantly	evolving,	which	makes	it	very	challenging	to	measure	over	time.	Consequently,	the	indicators	collected	in	this	study	(refer	to	Chapter	3	for	the	list	of	indicators)	are	of	great	importance	in	evaluating	the	concept,	but	it	is	the	interviews	that	helped	understand	the	resilience	of	the	community	of	the	LNW.	Also,	the	concept	shows	that	it	varies	and	changes	according	to	time	and	to	the	geographic	scales	(the	individual,	the	household,	the	neighborhood,	the	city,	the	state,	and	the	country	level).	The	LNW	is	only	one	neighborhood	in	the	city	of	New	Orleans,	and	its	resilience	must	be	integrated	in	the	resilience	of	the	city.		
Research	and	Practical	Recommendations	This	 research	was	 able	 to	 establish	 two	 important	 facts:	 first,	 the	presence	of	 a	relationship	 between	 resilience	 and	 the	 cultural	 landscape.	 Second,	 the	 cultural	landscape	is	one	of	the	many	elements	that	contribute	to	the	rebuilding	of	a	community	that	underwent	a	disaster,	especially	in	the	case	of	the	LNW	post	Hurricane	Katrina.	This	study	 contributes	 to	 the	 disaster	 literature	 by	 taking	 into	 account:	 	 1)	 tangible	 and	intangible	 indicators	in	evaluating	community	resilience,	and	2)	to	use	these	indicators	in	 the	 rebuilding	 process	 and	 in	 bringing	 back	 communities	 together.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	crucial	that	planners,	governments,	and	decision	makers	take	cultural	values	and	identify	them	in	order	to	use	them	as	a	tool	to	help	in	the	long	term	rebuilding	process.		This	will	help	communities	rebuild	themselves	in	a	more	just	and	sustainable	way.	This	dissertation	intervenes	at	the	theoretical	 level	as	well	as	the	practical	 level.	At	 the	 theoretical	 level,	 it	 questions	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience	 and	 whether	 is	 it	 used	properly	 in	how	a	community’s	resilience	 is	evaluated.	The	theoretical	contributions	of	this	 research	 are	 many	 and	 touch	 multiple	 disciplines.	 It	 bridges	 between	 disaster	literature	 and	 landscape	 architecture	 especially	 with	 the	 importance	 of	 taking	 into	account	 the	 cultural	 landscape	while	 examining	 the	 resilience	 of	 a	 community.	 Also,	 it	bridges	 between	 Urban	 Planning,	 Landscape	 Architecture,	 and	 Sociology,	 which	
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accentuates	the	much-needed	multi-disciplinary	aspect	of	research	in	post-catastrophes	studies.	 This	 research	 shows	 the	 importance	 of	 using	 a	 case	 study	 to	 not	 only	 bring	forward	results	on	the	physical	level,	but	also	at	the	theoretical	level	and	this	stresses	the	importance	of	 bringing	 closer	 theory	 and	practice.	The	 case	 study	played	 the	 role	of	 a	window	 through	 which	 the	 concept	 was	 looked	 at	 from	 multiple	 perspectives.	 What	makes	 this	 research	 unique	 is	 looking	 at	 resilience	 from	 the	 cultural	 landscape	perspective.	The	elements	constituting	the	landscape	contribute	greatly	to	the	resilience	of	a	community,	as	their	topophilia,	their	social	networks,	and	their	cultural	identity	play	an	 important	 role	 is	 motivating	 people	 to	 returning.	 The	 will	 to	 return	 and	 rebuild	helped	 set	 in	 motion	 the	 difficult,	 tiresome,	 and	 long	 healing	 process.	 This	 also	underlines	 that	 resilience	 is	 a	 social	 construction.	When	 it	 comes	 to	 a	 community	 that	inhabits	an	environment,	then	the	landscape	and	the	elements	constituting	it	are	socially	constructed.	 Resilience	 has	 confirmed	 to	 be	 more	 complex	 than	 what	 the	 literature	states.	 When	 time,	 space,	 and	 scale	 of	 a	 geographic	 area	 are	 at	 stake,	 then	 resilience	becomes	more	than	the	indicators	that	help	evaluating	it.		At	the	practical	level,	it	comes	and	inserts	itself	among	the	different	stakeholders	that	are	involved	in	the	recovery	process.	This	research	sets	the	course	for	a	new	set	of	rebuilding	 tools	 while	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 cultural	 landscape.	 These	 tools	 are	designed	 to	assist	 governments,	professionals,	 and	communities	 in	better	planning	 the	recovery	 process	 when	 a	 city	 has	 been	 utterly	 devastated	 by	 a	 calamity.	 Auto-organization	 is	 a	 key	 element	 in	 setting	 those	 tools	 in	 place.	 At	 the	 government	 level,	post-disaster	 recovery	 policies	 need	 to	 be	 set	 in	 place	 in	 order	 to	 manage	 chaotic	situations.	 These	 policies	 need	 to	 conform	 to	 proper	 disaster	 prevention	 and	management.	 The	 best	 way	 to	 design	 such	 policies	 is	 by	 learning	 from	 previous	experiences.	And	this	particularly	pertinent	in	the	case	of	New	Orleans	and	the	LNW	as	hurricanes	are	recurring	events.	At	the	professional	level,	the	main	element	is	to	reach	a	level	 where	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience	 is	 operationalized	 with	 the	 incorporation	 of	 a	resilient	 plan.	 The	 foundation	 100	 Resilient	 Cities	 22 	proposes	 a	 ‘city	 resilience																																																									
22	100	Resilient	Cities:	http://www.100resilientcities.org/#/-_Yz40MTI1MydpPTEocz5j/		
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framework’	where	it	defines	the	different	components	of	the	framework.	It	proposes	four	dimensions,	 12	 drivers,	 and	 7	 qualities23	under	 which	 cities	 around	 the	 world	 can	identify	their	areas	of	weakness,	and	accordingly	contribute	and	improve	the	resilience	of	their	cities.	Among	the	qualities	that	they	propose,	the	elements	of	culture	and	social	networks	are	implied	indirectly	but	they	do	not	surface.	By	using	the	100	Resilient	Cities	model	and	incorporating	the	cultural	landscape,	as	proposed	in	this	study,	then	each	city	can	 develop	 its	 own	 resilient	 plan.	 Therefore,	 experts	 and	 planners	 need	 to	 work	 on	setting	up	rebuilding	plans	so	as	to	tackle	elements	 layer	by	layer.	These	layers	will	be	undertaken	by	more	specialized	domains	like	engineers,	architects,	and	others;	as	well	as	community	 leaders.	 New	 zoning,	 building	 codes,	 and	 evacuation	 routes	 need	 to	 be	updated.	 Engineers	 take	 responsibility	 of	 structural	 stability	 and	 improvement.	Architects	 work	 on	 taking	 into	 account	 history,	 memory,	 and	 topophilia	 to	 develop	designs	 that	 are	 not	 only	 sustainable	 but	 also	 respect	 the	 historical	 value	 of	 the	properties	while	preserving	the	memory	of	place.	Community	members	play	the	role	of	representing	people’s	wishes;	they	also	help	in	by	improving	neighborhoods	in	order	to	preserve	the	cultural	landscape	and	all	the	elements	that	are	part	of	it.	In	addition,	social	scientists	 need	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 process	 so	 as	 to	 assess	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 recovery	process	 from	 a	 socio-cultural	 standpoint.	 This	 will	 help	 identify	 whether	 new	 trends	have	emerged	or	if	people	hold	on	to	old	habits	and	traditions.	At	the	community	level,	locals	 should	 be	 empowered	 and	 auto-organized	 when	 a	 disaster	 strikes.	 The	 more	empowered	and	 informed	a	population	 is,	 the	stronger	 it	 is	when	facing	a	catastrophic	event.		The	 tools	 proposed	 in	 this	 research	 should	 be	 used	 as	 the	 result	 of	 a	 common	effort	between	the	different	stakeholders	especially	in	cities	or	countries	with	recurrent	natural	disasters	like:	New	Orleans,	California,	Haiti,	Japan,	and	many	more.	Working	and	planning	 a	priori	 of	 a	 calamity,	 prevents	major	 catastrophic	 results	 and	 devastation	 a	
posteriori.	Since	humans	do	not	possess	the	power	to	stop	calamities	from	taking	place,																																																									
23 	For	 more	 information,	 consult	 the	 following	 website:	 http://www.100resilientcities.org/resilience#/-_Yz40MTI1MydpPTEocz5j/		
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and	cities	will	continue	to	grow;	then	the	best	way	to	look	at	them	is	to	minimize	their	consequences.	 For	 example,	 the	damage	 caused	by	Hurricane	Katrina	 could	have	been	avoided	 if	 proper	 planning	 of	 levees,	 transportation,	 secondary	 refuge,	 and	 proper	evacuation	were	made	before	an	event	as	such	could	have	taken	place.	Another	element	to	consider	is	trial	and	error	as	disasters	are	never	similar	and	they	rarely	strike	in	the	same	way.	As	humans	are	concerned,	 it	 is	only	through	learned	lessons	that	better	and	more	sustainable	practices	can	be	reached,	especially	in	the	case	of	recurring	disasters.		This	 research	 recommends	 that	 collaboration	 must	 take	 place	 at	 the	 different	levels	 of	 stakeholders	 and	 in	 a	 multi-disciplinary	 fashion.	 With	 cities	 being	 webs	 of	complex	layers,	it	takes	a	very	versatile	team	to	help	propose	a	series	of	solutions.	How	this	 research	 is	 generalizable	 is	 through	 its	 approach	 and	 not	 its	 application.	 The	approach	 of	 working	 with	 the	 different	 stakeholders,	 consulting	 a	 multi-disciplinary	group	of	experts,	and	using	local	knowledge	must	be	the	base	for	developing	a	coherent	recovery	 plan.	 The	 plan	 must	 take	 into	 account	 not	 only	 the	 rebuilding	 of	 the	infrastructure	 and	 the	 economy,	 but	 also	 the	 cultural	 landscape	 and	 how	 it	 can	 be	restored	 even	 if	 it	 has	 changed.	 As	 for	 the	 applicability	 of	 such	 a	 study,	 the	 type	 of	disaster	and	its	location	will	determine	the	‘how	to’.	According	to	these	two	factors,	what	needs	 to	be	highlighted	 is	 the	 local	 context	must	be	 considered	as	 the	 constant	 factor,	and	 the	different	 experts	 can	 tackle	 the	 layers	 that	 constitute	 the	 city	 as	 the	 variables	that	change	from	an	urban	context	to	the	next.		
Towards	a	new	direction	This	 type	 of	 research	 targets	 a	 large	 audience;	 it	 is	 aimed	 toward	 researchers	(from	 multiple	 disciplines),	 urban	 planners,	 government	 official,	 and	 anyone	 who	 is	interested	 in	 post-disaster	 community	 resilience.	 When	 the	 researcher	 was	 facing	obstacles	getting	interviews	with	the	residents,	it	was	because	the	residents	wanted	fast	and	 real	 solutions	 to	 their	 rebuilding	 problems.	 Unfortunately,	 many	 researchers	 and	people	of	 interest	who	passed	by	 the	LNW	made	many	 fake	promises,	and	researchers	should	be	very	clear	about	their	intentions	and	how	their	work	can	help	the	devastated	community.	 In	 this	 research,	 the	 author	 made	 sure	 not	 to	 give	 any	 false	 hope	 to	 the	
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people	 who	 generously	 gave	 their	 time	 and	 agreed	 to	 sit-in	 for	 an	 interview.	 It	 was	crucial	 from	 the	 beginning	 that	 this	 research	 project	 uncovers	 the	 underlying	 issues	behind	the	late	rebuilding	process,	and	the	importance	of	giving	the	cultural	landscape	a	place	 in	 post-disaster	 rebuilding.	Most	 importantly,	 it	was	made	 clear	 to	 the	 residents	that	 the	 results	 of	 this	 dissertation	will	 contribute	 to	 the	 long-term	 aspect	 of	 disaster	research.	Understanding	 resilience	 presented	 an	 opportunity	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	cultural	 landscape	 and	 to	 apply	 it	 to	 future	 research	projects.	 This	 research	opens	 the	door	to	a	wide	variety	of	future	projects	that	involve	cities,	communities,	and	disasters.	In	addition,	it	lays	the	ground	to	re-consider	the	concept	of	resilience	and	try	to	look	at	it	from	a	holistic	perspective.	 Furthermore,	 considering	 the	different	 levels	of	 geography	and	how	resilience	can	change	according	to	the	different	scales	will	only	generate	more	research	 that	 can	 focus	 on	 how	 time	 and	 the	 different	 scales	 affect	 resilience	 while	integrating	it	at	a	multi-disciplinary	level.	From	a	practical	perspective,	this	study	can	be	used	by	professionals	as	well	as	by	academics	to	set	in	place	community	rebuilding	tools	based	on	the	elements	of	culture.	Connecting	the	cultural	landscape	to	resilience	is	what	makes	 this	 dissertation	 unique	 from	 a	 theoretical	 and	 practical	 perspective.	 This	research	can	be	replicated	onto	other	disaster	research	projects,	like	the	plan	proposed	by	100	Resilient	Cities,	while	 taking	 into	account	multiple	 factors:	 the	 type	of	disaster,	the	local	context	or	geographic	area,	the	affected	community,	and	its	cultural	landscape.	By	 taking	 into	 account	 culture	 in	 any	 resilient	 plan,	 this	 research	 contributes	 to	 post-disaster	rebuilding	at	the	theoretical	level	as	well	as	at	the	practical	level,	and	it	leads	to	more	 sustainable	 solutions	 in	 order	 to	 built	 a	 better	 and	 strong	 future.	 As	 for	 the	approach—using	mixed	methods	research	design	and	taking	culture	into	account	when	evaluating	resilience—remains	the	constant	element	throughout	any	study	that	follows	the	tracks	of	this	research.			
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Appendix	 A:	 Satellite	 images	 of	 the	 LNW	 provided	 by	 the	 Regional	 Planning	
Commission		 	
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Appendix	B:	Certificate	of	Completion	with	the	National	Institute	of	Health	(NIH)		 	
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	(a)	Nada	Toueir	(Ph.D.	Candidate)		
	(b)	Prof.	Isabelle	Thomas	(Associate	Professor	at	University	of	Montreal)	
	
 
   
 
Certificate of Completion 
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Extramural Research certifies that 
Nada Toueir successfully completed the NIH Web-based training course “Protecting 
Human Research Participants”. 
Date of completion: 03/21/2012  
Certification Number: 892301  
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	University	of	Montreal’s	Ethics	Board	Approval	
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Appendix	C:	Sample	of	Consent	Form		 	
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	Example	of	Consent	Form		 	CONSENT	FORM	
	
Research	 Title:	 The	 Relationship	 between	 Place	 Attachment,	 Memory,	 and	Resilience.	The	Case	of	the	Lower	Ninth	Ward	in	Post-Katrina	New	Orleans.	
	
	
Researcher:	 Nada	 Toueir,	 PhD	 Candidate,	 Urban	 Planning	 Institute,	 Faculty	 of	Environmental	Design,	University	of	Montreal. 	
Research	Director:	Isabelle	Thomas-Maret,	Associate	Professor,	Urban	Planning	Institute,	Faculty	of	Environmental	Design,	University	of	Montreal 	
Co-Researcher:	 Michelle	 Thompson,	 Assistant	 Professor,	 Planning	 and	 Urban	Studies,	University	of	New	Orleans	
	
A)	 INFORMATION	FOR	THE	PARTICIPANTS	
1. Research	 Goals:	 To	 understand	 the	 role	 place	 attachment	 and	 informal	 social	networks	 in	 the	 creation	of	 stronger	 and	more	 resilient	urban	 communities	 in	 the	case	of	the	Lower	Ninth	Ward	after	Hurricane	Katrina.	
	
2. Participation:	 Interviews	will	 take	 place	with	 residents	 of	 the	 Lower	Ninth	Ward,	and	any	person	 (non-profit	organizations,	 community	 leaders,	 and	urban	planners)	involved	 in	 the	 Lower	 Ninth	 Ward	 in	 the	 City	 of	 New	 Orleans.	 If	 you	 decide	 to	volunteer,	you	will	be	asked	to	participate	in	one	or	two	interviews	at	a	place	you	find	convenient.	You	will	be	asked	several	questions,	some	of	them	about	your	experience	before/during/after	Hurricane	Katrina,	 others	will	 be	 about	 the	 rebuilding	 process	and	how	you	identify	with	your	neighborhood	if	you	are	from	the	Lower	Ninth	Ward.	The	interviews	will	be	recorded	only	with	your	permission.	You	will	not	be	asked	to	state	your	name	on	the	recording.	The	interview	will	take	approximately	1	hour.			
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(If	 applicable)	With	 your	 consent,	 your	 child	will	 be	 asked	 to	participate	 in	the	 same	 interview	 and	 to	 answer	 similar	 questions	 about	 their	 experience	regarding	Hurricane	Katrina.		 	
3.	 Confidentiality:	 Your	 and	 /or	 your	 child’s	 answers	 to	 interview	questions	will	 be	kept	 confidential.	 Once	 transcribed,	 all	 recorded	 interviews	 will	 be	 deleted.	 Each	participant	 will	 be	 assigned	 a	 random	 numerical	 code	 and	 only	 the	 supervising	researcher	 or	 anyone	mandated	 to	 this	 task	 will	 have	 the	 list	 of	 participants	 and	their	 attributed	numbers.	 Furthermore,	 the	 key	 code	 linking	 your	name	with	 your	number	and	all	the	collected	data	will	be	kept	under	lock.	No	information	of	any	sort	about	you	or	your	child	will	be	published	and	at	no	time	will	your	actual	identity	be	revealed.	 The	 transcript,	 without	 your	 name,	 will	 be	 kept	 until	 the	 research	 is	complete.	Personal	data	will	be	kept	for	7	years	after	this	project,	and	then	deleted.		 	
4. Research	 Results:	 The	 data	 you	 provide	 will	 be	 used	 for	 this	 thesis	 and	 in	 any	articles	 for	 publication,	 and	 may	 be	 used	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 future	 articles	 or	presentations.	 Your	 name	 or	 any	 information	 that	 would	 identify	 you	 in	 any	publications	or	presentations	will	not	be	used	or	shared	at	any	point	of	this	research.			
5. Advantages	and	disadvantages:	If	you	are	a	resident	of	the	Lower	Ninth	Ward,	this	is	 a	 moment	 for	 you	 to	 tell	 your	 story	 about	 your	 experience	 during	 Hurricane	Katrina	 and	your	 sense	of	 belonging	 to	 your	neighborhood.	 Some	of	 the	questions	may	however	bring	back	upsetting	memories	 and	 emotions;	 therefore,	 feel	 free	 to	share	them	with	the	interviewer	at	any	time.	If	you	are	not	a	resident	of	the	Lower	Ninth	Ward,	this	interview	will	help	in	the	understanding	of	the	rebuilding	process.	Counsel	will	be	available	if	needed.	
		
6.				Right	to	Withdraw:	Your	and/or	your	child’s	participation	are	on	a	voluntary	basis,	and	you	may	withdraw	 from	 the	 study	at	 any	 time	without	prejudice	or	having	 to	explain	your	decision.	You	may	do	so	by	 informing	 the	supervising	researcher	 that	you	no	 longer	wish	to	participate	(no	questions	will	be	asked).	A	phone	number	 is	supplied	 on	 this	 form.	 You	may	 also	 omit	 any	 question	 during	 the	 interview,	 but	continue	to	participate	in	the	rest	of	the	study.	Any	data	collected	before	withdrawal	will	be	deleted.			
	 	
B)	 CONSENT	
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Consent	for	adults	
Adults:	By	signing	this	consent	 form,	 I	am	indicating	that	 I	 fully	understand	the	above	information	and	I	agree,	after	reflection	and	due	delay,	to	participate	in	this	study.	I	declare	having	gotten	answers	to	my	questions,	and	fully	understand	the	nature	of	this	research	 and	 whatever	 pertaining	 risks,	 advantages	 and	 inconveniences.	 Also,	 I	 am	aware	that	I	can	withdraw	at	any	moment	by	verbally	informing	the	interviewer.		
Signature:	 	 Date:	
	
		Adult	Name:	 	 		
Consent	for	minors	(if	applicable)	
Parent/Guardian	 (if	 applicable):	By	signing	this	consent	 form,	I	am	indicating	that	I	 fully	understand	the	above	information	and	I	agree	that	my	child,	after	reflection	and	 due	 delay,	 may	 participate	 in	 this	 study.	 I	 declare	 having	 gotten	 answers	 to	 my	questions,	 and	 fully	 understand	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 research	 and	 whatever	 pertaining	risks,	 advantages	 and	 inconveniences.	Also,	 I	 am	aware	 that	my	 child	 can	withdraw	at	any	moment,	with	or	without	any	valid	reason,	by	verbally	informing	the	interviewer.		
Minor’s	consent:	The	following	research	project	has	been	clearly	explained	to	me	and	I	accept	to	participate.	I	am	also	aware	that	I	can	withdraw	at	any	given	time,	with	or	without	a	valid	reason.			Signature:	 	 Signature:	 		Adult	Name:	 	
	Minor	Name:	 	Date:	 	 Date:		 	By	signing	this	form,	I	declare	I	have	explained	the	goal,	nature,	benefits,	risks	and	disadvantages	 of	 the	 study	 and	 I	 have	 answered	 the	 questions	 to	 the	 best	 of	 my	knowledge	and	belief.		Researcher’s	signature:	 	 Date:	 	Name:	 	
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If	 you	 have	 any	 questions	 about	 this	 study	 or	 to	withdraw	 your	 child	 from	 the	 study,	please	contact	Nada	Toueir,	PhD	Candidate	at	Université	de	Montréal,	phone	(504)275-8228,	email:	nada.toueir@umontreal.ca	Any	 complaints	 about	your	participation	 in	 this	 research	 can	be	directed	 to	 the	ombudsman	 at	 the	 Université	 de	 Montréal,	 phone	 (514)	 343-2100	 or	 email	ombudsman@umontreal.ca	(the	ombudsman	accepts	collect	calls).		If	 you	 have	 any	 questions	 about	 your	 rights	 as	 a	 subject/participant	 in	 this	research,	or	if	you	feel	you	have	been	placed	at	risk,	please	contact	Dr.	Ann	O’Hanlon	at	the	University	of	New	Orleans	(504)	280-6501.	
	
A	 copy	 of	 the	 consent	 form	 should	 be	 signed	 and	 handed	 over	 to	 the	
participant		 	
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Appendix	D:	Samples	of	Interview	Questionnaires		 	
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Sample	of	a	Quantitative	Interview	Questionnaire	for	residents	
A) LIFE	AND	HOUSING	BEFORE	KATRINA	
	
Background	information:		1.	Prior	to	Katrina,	how	long	had	you	lived	in	New	Orleans?	Please	check	appropriate	
box.	
□	fewer	than	5	years	□	6	-10	yrs.	□	11	-	20	yrs.	□	more	than	20	yrs.	
`	2.	How	long	have	you	lived	in	this	neighborhood?	
□	fewer	than	5	years	□	6	-10	yrs.	□	11	-	20	yrs.	□	more	than	20	yrs.	
	3.	Is	your	family	originally	from	New	Orleans?		
□	Yes	□	No	
	4.	How	many	family	members	lived	in	New	Orleans	prior	to	Katrina?	
□	fewer	than	5	□	5-10	□	10-20	□	more	than	20	
	5.	Where	in	New	Orleans	were	you	living	when	Katrina	struck?		Street	Address:		Name	of	Neighborhood:	
	6.	Did	you	live	in	a:	
□	House	
□	Apartment	
□	Public	Housing	
□Assisted	Living/Retirement	Home	
□	Other:	
	7.	Did	you	own	or	rent?	□	Own	□	Rented	If	you	owned,	did	you	have	a	mortgage?	□	Yes	□	No	Did	you	have	insurance?	□	Yes	□	No	
If	yes,	please	check	one:	□	Flood	□	Homeowners	□	Both	
	8.	Did	you	get	any	help	from	any	organization	or	person?	□	Yes	□	No	If	yes,	which	organization:			9.	How	many	people	(including	yourself)	lived	in	your	household	prior	to	Katrina?	
	10.	Did	you	have	any	children	under	the	age	of	18	in	your	care?	□	Yes	□	No	
If	yes,	were	they	attending	school	in	New	Orleans?	□	Yes	□	No	
Name	of	school(s):	
	11.	What	was	your	living	situation	like	prior	to	Katrina?	
Employed_____	Student_____Retired_____	Disabled_____Unemployed_____Caregiver_____		
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12.	Describe	your	work	situation	now:	
□	I’m	unemployed.	
□	I’ve	returned	to	my	pre-Katrina	job.	
□	I	have	a	new	job	in	New	Orleans	(Orleans	Parish).	
□	I	have	a	new	job	outside	of	New	Orleans	(Orleans	Parish).	Where?	
□	Other___________________________________________________________________________	
	
B) LIFE	AND	HOUSING	AFTER	KATRINA	
	13.	After	Katrina,	were	you	able	to	evacuate	with	your	family?	
Yes__________	No________________	
If	no,	where	did	you	stay?	_________________________	
If	yes,	where	did	you	relocate?______________________	
Temporary	shelter___	Rental________	House_______________	Relative_____________	
	14.	Where	else	have	you	lived	since	you	left	New	Orleans?	
Please	list	in	order,	first	to	most	recent:	
City/State:	
City/State:	
	15.	Please	describe	your	current	housing.	Please	check	one:	
□	Returned	to	my	pre-Katrina	home	
□	Staying	with	friends	or	relatives	nearby	
□	Renting	an	apartment	or	home	within	the	region	while	I	repair	my	home	
□	Other____________________________________________________________________________	
	16.	How	satisfied	are	you	with	your	current	living	situation?	
□	Very	satisfied	□	Satisfied	□	Somewhat	satisfied	□	Not	satisfied	
	17.	How	many	people	(including	yourself)	live	in	your	current	household?	
	18.	What	condition	 is	your	house/apartment	 in	New	Orleans	 in	now?	Please	check	
the	best	answer:	
□Removed	debris	
□	Gutted	and	prepared	for	rehab	
□	In	the	process	of	rehabbing	
□	Rehabbed	and	re-occupied	
	19.	Do	you	envision	moving	back	into	the	house	or	apartment	you	lived	in	before	Katrina?	
□	Yes	□	No	□	Not	sure/Don’t	know	
	
Homeowners	If	you	have	not	begun	restoring	your	home,	what	are	your	future	plans?	
□Sell	as	is	
□	Rehab	and	sell	
□	Rehab	and	return	to	live	
	
Renters	
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If	you	wish	to	return,	have	you	spoken	to	your	landlord?	□	Yes	□	No	
Is	your	landlord	repairing	your	apartment?	□	Yes	□	No	□	Don’t	know	
Are	the	proposed	rents	affordable	to	you	□	Yes	□	No	
Is	your	landlord	selling	the	building?	□	Yes	□	No	□	Don’t	know	
If	you	can’t	return	to	your	old	apartment,	would	you	like	to	rent	another	unit	in	the	area	□	Yes	□	No	
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	Sample	of	a	Qualitative	Interview	Questionnaire	for	residents	
□	Old	Resident					□	New	Resident		Identify	the	cultural	landscape	(Before	Katrina)	
• What	initially	attracted	you	to	this	neighborhood?	
• How	did	you	relate	with	this	neighborhood?	
• Did	it	feel	like	home?	
• Did	you	move	around	in	the	city	or	have	you	been	in	the	same	house?	
• What,	in	your	opinion,	made	this	neighborhood	special?	
• In	your	own	words,	how	do	you	describe	your	neighborhood	before	the	storm?		
• What	did	you	like	the	most	about	your	neighborhood?	And	what	did	you	like	the	least	about	your	neighborhood?	
• Were	there	any	landmarks	that	you	associated	with?	Are	they	still	around?	
• How	did	you	feel	about	the	levees	before	the	storm?	Identify	the	cultural	landscape	(After	Katrina)	
• What	brought	you	back	to	this	neighborhood?	
• How	do	you	relate	with	this	neighborhood	now?	
• Does	it	feel	like	home?	
• Did	you	move	around	in	the	city	or	did	you	return	to	the	same	house?	
• What,	in	your	opinion,	makes	this	neighborhood	special?	
• In	your	own	words,	how	do	you	describe	your	neighborhood	after	the	storm?	And	now,	7	years	later?	
• What	do	you	like	the	most	about	your	neighborhood?	And	what	do	you	like	the	least	about	your	neighborhood?	
• Are	there	any	new	landmarks	that	you	associate	with?	
• Do	you	feel	safe	with	the	new	levees?	******	Understanding	 the	 strength	 of	 place	 attachment	 and	 informal	 social	 networks	(Before	Katrina)	
• What	was	your	relationship	with	your	neighbors?	
• How	often	did	you	see	them?	
• Can	you	give	me	an	example	of	a	time	when	neighbors	got	together?	Tell	me	about	that.	
• How	often	did	such	things	take	place?	
• Did	you	attend	church	services?	
• Was	your	church	close	by?		
• Did	you	take	part	of	any	church-related	activities?	How	about	cultural	activities?	Can	you	talk	a	little	about	this?	
• Were	there	shops	and	businesses	you	would	go	to	frequently?	
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• Were	there	places	you	would	go	to	socialize	or	just	hang	out?	Who	would	you	go	with?	Understanding	 the	 strength	 of	 place	 attachment	 and	 informal	 social	 networks	(After	Katrina)	
• What	is	your	current	relationship	with	your	neighbors?	
• How	often	do	you	see	them?	
• Can	you	give	me	an	example	of	a	time	when	neighbors	get	together?	Tell	me	about	that	
• How	often	do	such	things	take	place?	
• Do	you	attend	new	church	services?	
• If	yes,	is	your	church	close	by?		
• Do	you	still	take	part	of	any	church-related	activities?	Cultural	activities?	Can	you	talk	about	how	things	changed?	
• Are	there	new	shops	and	businesses	you	go	to	frequently?	
• Are	there	places	you	would	go	to	socialize	or	just	hang	out?	Who	do	you	go	with?	 ******	The	role	of	memory	and	place	attachment	in	creating	resilient	communities		a. Coming	back	after	the	storm	
• Did	you	think	about	not	coming	back?	Why	did	you?	
• When	did	you	return?		
• Were	there	any	complications	to	coming	back?	
• What	was	your	first	priority	when	you	returned?	Tell	me	about	that.	
• In	what	condition	was	your	home?	
• How	much	were	you	able	to	salvage?	
• What	had	been	the	biggest	challenge(s)	since	your	return?	And	did	you	overcome	it?	
• Are	you	part	of	any	community	organization?		b. The	rebuilding	process	
• Have	you	rebuilt	your	home?	If	not,	how	far	along	are	you?	
• Did	you	take	part	in	any	of	the	planning	committees?	
• Did	you	have	any	help	in	rebuilding	your	home?		
• Who	helped	you?	And	what	were	your	expectations?	
• How	did	you	manage	to	finance	rebuilding	your	home?	
• How	did	the	plans	proposed	by	the	city	affect	you?	
• What	is	the	single	most	important	thing	that	you	would	like	the	recovery	planning	process	to	achieve?	Anything	else	you	wish	to	share?		c. Hurricane	Betsy	
• Do	you	remember	Hurricane	Betsy?	If	yes,	what	do	you	remember?	
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• If	no,	did	people	tell	you	stories	about	it?	If	yes,	what	were	these	stories?		d. Life	after	Katrina	
• How	would	you	describe	your	life	since	you	returned	to	New	Orleans?	
• How	could	you	describe	your	neighborhood?	
• Since	Katrina,	where	are	the	places	that	people	get	together	to	socialize?	How	is	it	different	from	before	the	storm?	
• What	do	you	think	about	the	rebuilding	process	in	the	Lower	9th	Ward?		e. Life	now	
• You’ve	been	through	challenging	times,	what	keeps	you	going?	
• How	did	you	handle	the	stress?	
• Were	you	surrounded	by	supportive	people?	
Today’s	Date:	Month:					Day:					Year:			
Your	Name:	
Current	address:	City/State:	Zip:	
Phone(s):																																																				email:	
Gender:	□	Male	□	Female	Age:		 			 	
	 253	
Sample	of	a	Qualitative	Interview	Questionnaire	for	Minors	Identify	the	cultural	landscape		
• What,	in	your	opinion,	makes	this	neighborhood	special?	
• In	your	own	words,	how	do	you	describe	your	neighborhood?	Before	and	after	Katrina	
• What	did	you	like	the	most	about	your	neighborhood?	And	what	did	you	like	the	least	about	your	neighborhood?	
• What	are	the	fun	activities	that	you	do	around	here?	
• Do	you	attend	the	same	school	or	a	new	one?	How	do	you	feel	about	that?		Understanding	the	strength	of	place	attachment	and	informal	social	networks		
• Do	you	have	friends	in	the	neighborhood?	
• How	often	do	you	see	them?	
• When	you	see	your	friends,	what	do	you	do	with	them?	And	where	do	you	hang	out?	How	often?	
• Did	you	attend	church	services?	
• Was	your	church	close	by?			The	role	of	memory	and	place	attachment	in	creating	resilient	communities			a. Coming	back	after	the	storm	
• Do	you	remember	Hurricane	Katrina?	
• How	was	your	experience	of	coming	back	after	Katrina?	
• In	what	condition	was	your	home?	
• Did	you	help	your	family	or	your	neighbors?	How?		b. Hurricane	Betsy	
• What	do	you	know	about	Hurricane	Betsy?		
• Did	people	tell	stories	about	Betsy?	If	yes,	what	were	those	stories?	
Today’s	Date:	Month:					Day:					Year:			
Your	Name:	
Current	address:	City/State:	Zip:	
Phone(s):																																																				email:	
Gender:	□	Male	□	Female	Age:	
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Sample	of	a	Qualitative	Interview	Questionnaire	for	Community	Leaders	Role	of	the	community	leader	and	identifying	the	cultural	landscape		
• How	do	you	define	your	role	in	this	community?	
• What	is	your	contribution	to	the	residents	of	the	L9W?	
• Are	you	from	the	L9W?	How	long	have	you	been	here?	
• Do	you	have	family	here?	
• How	to	relate	with	this	neighborhood?		
• How	would	you	describe	your	neighborhood	before	and	after	Hurricane	Katrina?	Understanding	the	strength	of	place	attachment	and	informal	social	networks		
• What	have	you	done	to	help	people	return?	
• How	do	you	keep	in	touch	with	people	of	your	congregation	or	cultural	group?	
• How	would	you	define	your	relationship	with	the	members	of	your	congregation	or	cultural	group?	Are	you	a	symbol	of	leadership/mentorship	or	a	friend?	
• Do	people	come	to	you	for	advice?	
• Are	you	affiliated	with	any	community	organization?	If	yes,	which?	
• In	what	state	was	your	church/establishment	after	the	Hurricane?	
• How	would	you	describe	the	returning	after	the	Hurricane?	
• How	would	you	describe	your	community	before	and	after	the	Hurricane?	
• Do	you	organize	social	events?	How	often?	What	kind	of	events?	
• How	do	you	encourage	people	to	get	involved?	
• Does	the	community	give	back	to	your	congregation	or	cultural	group?	How	would	you	describe	that?	
• Would	you	consider	your	community	to	be	resilient	or	not?	Why?	The	role	of	memory	and	place	attachment	in	creating	resilient	communities			Coming	back	after	the	storm	
• Can	you	tell	me	briefly	what	you	remember	from	Hurricane	Katrina?	
• How	was	your	experience	of	coming	back	after	Katrina?	
• In	what	condition	were	your	home	and	your	church?	
• Did	you	help	your	family	or	your	neighbors?	How?	
• Did	you	get	any	help?	Can	you	talk	a	little	about	that?	
• How	did	you	manage	rebuilding	your	home	and	your	church	at	the	same	time?	
	 255	
• What	was	the	most	challenging	and	difficult	task	to	achieve	after	the	hurricane?		Hurricane	Betsy	
• What	do	you	know	about	Hurricane	Betsy?	Did	you	witness	it?	
• Did	people	tell	stories	about	Betsy?	If	yes,	what	were	those	stories?	
Today’s	Date:	Month:					Day:					Year:			
Your	Name:	
Current	address:	City/State:	Zip:	
Phone(s):																																																				email:	
Gender:	□	Male	□	Female	Age:	
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Sample	 of	 a	 Qualitative	 Interview	 Questionnaire	 for	 Non-Profit	 Organization	
members	Role	of	members	involved	in	the	non-profit	organization		
• How	long	have	you	been	working	with	this	organization?	
• How	long	has	this	organization	been	in	place?	
• How	would	you	describe	your	role	in	the	organization?	
• Can	you	talk	a	little	bit	about	the	kind	of	work	you	are	involved	in?	
• What	are	the	main	barriers	or	problems	that	you	face,	short	term	and	long	term?	
• How	many	active	members	are	in	your	organization?		Involvement	in	the	community	
• How	do	you	help	the	L9W’s	community?	
• How	would	you	describe	the	role	of	the	organization	in	the	community?	
• How	would	describe	the	L9W	now?	
• And	how	would	you	describe	the	progress	done	since	this	organization	began?	
• How	would	you	describe	the	barriers	that	the	community	faces?	
• How	do	you	envision	the	future	of	the	L9W?	
• How	many	homes	did	you	help	rebuild?	
	
	
Today’s	Date:	Month:					Day:					Year:			
Your	Name:	
Current	address:	City/State:	Zip:	
Phone(s):																																																				email:	
Gender:	□	Male	□	Female	Age:	
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Sample	 of	 a	 Qualitative	 Interview	Questionnaire	 for	 Urban	 Planners	 (Academics	
and	Professionals)		
• Can	you	talk	a	little	about	yourself,	what	do	you	do?	
• How	would	you	describe	the	city	before	the	hurricane?	And	after?	
• Can	you	talk	a	little	about	the	plans	that	have	been	proposed	over	the	years	after	Katrina?	
• Were	you	involved	in	these	plans?	
• What	do	you	think	about	the	UNOP	plan?	
• In	your	opinion,	is	it	the	most	suitable	plan	for	the	city	of	New	Orleans?	
• How	would	you	describe	the	impact	of	this	plan	on	the	L9W?	How	about	at	the	community	level?	
• Where	do	you	see	the	city	in	10	years?	20	years?	50	years?		
	
Today’s	Date:	Month:					Day:					Year:			
Your	Name:	
Current	address:	City/State:	Zip:	
Phone(s):																																																				email:	
Gender:	□	Male	□	Female	Age:	
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Appendix	E:	Images	of	the	LNW	Architecture		 	
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	 						(a)	Steamboat	houses	in	the	Holy	Cross	area	(taken	by	the	author,	2012)		
(b)	Shotgun	houses	in	the	Holy	Cross	area	(taken	by	the	author)				 	
	 260	
Appendix	 F:	 Maps	 of	 bus	 routes	 going	 to	 and	 from	 LNW	 (taken	 from	 the	 New	
Orleans	Route	and	Transit	Authority)		 	
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	(a)	Bus	Route	84	
	
	 262	
(b)	Bus	Route	88	 	
	 263	
Appendix	G:	WhoDataNOLANOLA	Maps	of	the	LNW		
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Summer 2011 Property Condition Survey
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D
isc
la
im
e
r: Th
e
 d
a
ta
 h
e
re
in
, in
c
lud
in
g
 b
u
t n
o
t lim
ite
d
 to
 g
e
o
g
ra
p
hic
 d
a
ta
, ta
b
u
la
r d
a
ta
, a
n
a
lytic
a
l d
a
ta
, e
le
c
tro
n
ic
 d
a
ta
 struc
tu
re
 o
r file
s,
a
re
 p
ro
vid
e
d
 "a
s is" w
ith
o
ut w
a
rra
n
ty o
f a
n
y kin
d
, e
ith
e
r e
xp
re
sse
d
 o
r im
p
lie
d
, o
r sta
tu
to
ry, in
c
lu
d
ing
, b
u
t n
o
t lim
ite
d
 to
, the
 im
p
lie
d
w
a
rra
n
tie
s o
r m
e
rc
h
a
n
ta
b
ility a
nd
 fitn
e
ss fo
r a
 p
a
rtic
ula
r p
u
rp
o
se
. Th
e
 e
n
tire
 risk a
s to
 the
 q
u
a
lity a
nd
 p
e
rfo
rm
a
n
c
e
 o
f th
e
 d
a
ta
 is
a
ssu
m
e
d
 b
y th
e
 use
r. N
o
 g
u
a
ra
n
te
e
 o
f a
c
c
ura
c
y is g
ra
n
te
d
, n
o
r is a
n
y re
sp
o
n
sib
ility fo
r re
lia
n
c
e
 the
re
o
n a
ssum
e
d
. In
 no
 e
ve
nt sh
a
ll
a
n
y c
ite
d
 e
ntity b
e
 lia
b
le
 fo
r d
ire
c
t, in
d
ire
c
t, in
c
id
e
n
tia
l, c
o
n
se
q
u
e
n
tia
l o
r sp
e
c
ia
l d
a
m
a
g
e
s o
f a
ny kin
d
, in
c
lu
d
in
g
, b
u
t no
t
lim
ite
d
 to
, lo
ss o
f a
n
tic
ip
a
te
d
 p
ro
fits o
r b
e
ne
fits a
risin
g
 o
u
t o
f use
 o
f o
r re
lia
n
c
e
 o
n th
e
 d
a
ta
. Th
e
 c
ite
d
 e
n
titie
s w
ill no
t a
c
c
e
p
t lia
b
ility fo
r
a
n
y d
a
m
a
g
e
s o
r m
isre
p
re
se
n
ta
tio
n
 c
a
u
se
d
 b
y in
a
c
c
ura
c
ie
s in
 th
e
 d
a
ta
 o
r a
s a
 re
sult o
f c
h
a
n
g
e
s to
 th
e
 d
a
ta
 c
a
u
se
d
 b
y syste
m
tra
n
sfe
rs o
r o
th
e
r tra
n
sfo
rm
a
tio
n
s o
r c
o
n
ve
rsio
n
s, no
r is th
e
re
 re
sp
o
n
sib
ility a
ssum
e
d
 to
 m
a
in
ta
in th
e
 d
a
ta
 in
 a
n
y m
a
n
ne
r o
r fo
rm
.
Th
e
se
 d
a
ta
 h
a
ve
 b
e
e
n
 d
e
ve
lo
p
e
d
 fro
m
 th
e
 b
e
st a
va
ila
b
le
 so
u
rc
e
s. A
lth
o
u
g
h
 e
ffo
rts h
a
ve
 b
e
e
n
 m
a
d
e
 to
 e
n
su
re
 th
a
t th
e
 d
a
ta
a
re
 a
c
c
u
ra
te
 a
n
d
 re
lia
b
le
, e
rro
rs a
n
d
 va
ria
b
le
 c
o
nd
itio
n
s o
rig
in
a
tin
g
 fro
m
 p
h
ysic
a
l so
u
rc
e
s u
se
d
 to
 d
e
ve
lo
p
 th
e
 d
a
ta
 m
a
y b
e
 re
fle
c
te
d
 in
the
 d
a
ta
 sup
p
lie
d
. U
se
rs m
u
st b
e
 a
w
a
re
 o
f th
e
se
 c
o
n
d
itio
n
s a
n
d
 b
e
a
r re
sp
o
n
sib
ility fo
r the
 a
p
p
ro
p
ria
te
 u
se
 o
f th
e
 info
rm
a
tio
n
 w
ith
re
sp
e
c
t to
 p
o
ssib
le
 e
rro
rs, sc
a
le
, re
so
lu
tio
n
, re
c
tific
a
tio
n, p
o
sitio
n
a
l a
c
c
ura
c
y, d
e
ve
lo
p
m
e
nt m
e
tho
d
o
lo
g
y, tim
e
 p
e
rio
d
, e
nviro
n
m
e
n
ta
l
a
n
d
 c
lim
a
tic
 c
o
n
d
itio
n
s a
n
d
 o
th
e
r c
irc
u
m
sta
n
c
e
s sp
e
c
ific
 to
 th
e
se
 d
a
ta
. Th
e
 u
se
r is re
sp
o
n
sib
le
 fo
r u
n
d
e
rsta
n
d
ing
 th
e
 a
c
c
u
ra
c
y
lim
ita
tio
n
s o
f th
e
 d
a
ta
 p
ro
vid
e
d
 he
rin. Th
e
 b
u
rd
e
n
 fo
r d
e
te
rm
ining
 fitn
e
ss fo
r use
 lie
s e
n
tire
ly w
ith
 the
 u
se
r. Th
e
 u
se
r sh
o
u
ld
 re
fe
r to
the
 a
c
c
o
m
p
a
n
yin
g
 m
e
ta
d
a
ta
 n
o
te
d
 fo
r a
 d
e
sc
rip
tio
n
 o
f the
 d
a
ta
 a
n
d
 d
a
ta
 d
e
ve
lo
p
m
e
n
t p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s. A
lth
o
ug
h
 th
e
se
 d
a
ta
 ha
ve
 b
e
e
n
p
ro
c
e
sse
d
 su
c
c
e
ssfu
lly o
n
 c
o
m
p
u
te
rs w
ithin th
e
 e
n
titie
s, no
 g
u
a
ra
n
te
e
, e
xp
re
sse
d
 o
r im
p
lie
d
, is m
a
d
e
 b
y th
e
 c
ite
d
 e
ntitie
s
re
g
a
rd
ing
 th
e
 u
se
 o
f the
se
 d
a
ta
 o
n
 a
n
y o
th
e
r syste
m
, n
o
r d
o
e
s th
e
 a
c
t o
f d
istrib
utio
n
 c
o
n
stitu
te
 o
r im
p
ly a
ny suc
h
 w
a
rra
n
ty. D
istrib
u
tio
n
o
f the
se
 d
a
ta
 is inte
n
d
e
d
 fo
r in
fo
rm
a
tio
n
 p
u
rp
o
se
s a
n
d
 sh
o
u
ld
 n
o
t b
e
 c
o
nsid
e
re
d
 a
u
tho
rita
tive
 fo
r na
vig
a
tio
na
l, e
n
g
in
e
e
rin
g
, le
g
a
l a
n
d
o
th
e
r site
-sp
e
c
ific
 u
se
s.
M
e
ta
d
a
ta
:
C
ity o
f N
e
w
 O
rle
a
ns: <d
a
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o
v> 2014 G
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a
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N
O
LA
_Stre
e
t_C
e
nte
rline
s.shp
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;
W
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T. (2014, A
ug
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G
N
O
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s o
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http
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m
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o
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lo
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a
c
h/
Pro
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ct O
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The
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e
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d
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a
p
 a
re p
a
rt o
f the
 N
e
w
 O
rlea
ns Re
d
e
ve
lo
p
m
ent A
utho
rity's (N
O
RA
) invento
ry. Ba
sed
 up
o
n the
 inform
a
tio
n c
o
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c
te
d
 from
 http
s://trib
w
g
no
.file
s.w
o
rd
p
ress.co
m
/2014/08/a
va
ila
b
le-lo
w
e
r-
ninth-w
a
rd
-p
ro
p
e
rtie
s.p
d
f N
O
RA
’s p
ro
p
e
rtie
s to
ta
l 600; ho
w
e
ver, o
nly 550 a
re
 p
o
ste
d
 in this d
a
ta
 se
t. This m
a
p
 sho
w
c
a
se
s 92%
 o
f the
 a
va
ila
b
le
 p
ro
p
erties. A
 p
ro
p
o
se
d
 c
o
nstitutio
na
l c
ha
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nsid
e
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tio
n
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 a
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w
 the
 c
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e
w
 O
rle
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ns to
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e
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 b
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o
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d
 o
n the
 b
a
llot a
s "Pro
p
o
se
d
 A
m
e
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m
e
nt N
o
. 13".
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